[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. December 1908.

CONFIDENTIAL.

(9433.)

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS

OF

ASIATIC TURKEY.

[In continuation of Confidential Paper No. 9432.]

April to June 1908.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
1	India Office ..	..	Mar. 30, 1908	Abu Musa. Transmits telegram from Government of India as to amount of oxide to be removed, and draft reply, for observations	1
2	„ „ ..	..	30,	Abu Musa Concession. Claim of Nejd for profits. Transmits telegram (22nd March) from Viceroy. Comments	2
3	„ „ ..	..	31,	Red Oxide Concession on Abu Musa. Refers to No. 15, Confidential Paper No. 9432. Transmits correspondence from India expressing views on German case. Comments on various points in detail ..	3
4	„ „ ..	..	31,	Englishman at Kazim. Transmits correspondence of Government of India with Bushire and Bagdad	49
5	„ „ ..	..	Apr. 1,	Muscat Arbitration Award. Refers to No. 175, Confidential Paper No. 9305. Transmits correspondence explaining settlement. Suggests simultaneous French and English acceptance	51
6	„ „ ..	..	1,	Abu Musa. Transmits telegrams to and from the Viceroy of 28th and 31st March	58
7	Mr. G. Barclay ..	81 Tel.	2,	Disorders at Van. Captain Dickson reports chief instigators are officials. Grand Vizier has instructed Vali to warn them. Situation less critical	59
8	India Office ..	..	2,	Building operations of Nakib of Bagdad. Transmits report from Major Ramsay respecting	59
9	„ „ ..	..	2,	Situation in Nejd. Transmits report from Major Knox. Intervention of Sheikh Mubarek in feud between Bin Saud and Bin Rashid	61
10	Mr. G. Barclay ..	82 Tel.	3,	Attack on P.S. "Blosse." Report received from Bagdad..	62
11	To Mr. G. Barclay ..	64 Tel.	3,	Attack on Messrs. Lynch's steamer. Refers to No. 10. Instructs as to representations to Porte and demand for compensation ..	62
12	Mr. G. Barclay ..	84 Tel.	4,	Maghil outrage. Refers to No. 11. Is constantly pressing for payment of 5,000*l.* to Mrs. Glanville	62
13	„ „ ..	86 Tel.	4,	Attack on Messrs. Lynch's steamer. Reports assurances of Grand Vizier. Further details from Bussorah	62
14	„ „ ..	57 Commercial	Mar. 31,	Agricultural development in Diarbekir district. Transmits despatch from Mr. Heard respecting possibilities of, with comments	63
15	„ „ ..	163	Apr. 1,	Armenian revolutionary organization at Van. Transmits despatch from Captain Dickson. Practically all male Armenian population are enrolled	66
16	Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company	..	6,	Attack on steam-ship "Blosse Lynch." Reports details received from agent at Bussorah. Asks for services of the "Comet"	69

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
17	To Mr. G. Barclay ..	68 Tel.	Apr. 7, 1908	Attack on Messrs. Lynch's steamer "Blosse." Refers to No. 13. Steamer service suspended. Asks views and those of Major Ramsay as to sending "Comet" ..	70
18	Mr. G. Barclay ..	107	5,	Situation at Van. Refers to No. 98, Confidential Paper No. 9432. Reports measures taken by Vali. Considers temporizing policy best, and has refrained from pressing for immediate punishment of officials ..	70
19	India Office ..	..	8,	Ill-treatment of Bahreini by Deputy Governor of Lingah. Transmits repetitions from India of telegrams from Major Cox. Asks views and comments on recommendations	71
20	Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company	..	8,	Attack on "Blosse Lynch" steamer. Asks support of His Majesty's Government to claim for damages against Turkish Government. Harm done to British trade by attacks. Anticipates recurrence ..	72
21	Mr. G. Barclay ..	91 Tel.	9,	Patrol of Tigris. Reports consultation with Major Ramsay. Transmits telegram from Bagdad. Origin of outbreak	73
22	To Mr. Marling ..	76 Tel.	9,	Protection of Bahreinese. What action does he recommend to uphold right of British Government to protect Bahreinese? ..	74
23	Mr. G. Barclay ..	108	6,	Attack on Messrs. Lynch's steamer. Refers to No. 13. Gives details as to casualties, action of Vali and Grand Vizier, and cause of	74
24	Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company	..	9,	Attack on steam-ship "Blosse Lynch." Considers protection afforded by Turkish military authorities inadequate. Points out dangers to British steam-ships. Asks advice of His Majesty's Government ..	74
25	To Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company	..	10,	Attack on steamer "Blosse Lynch." Informs of Nos. 20 and 24. His Majesty's Government unable to authorize employment of "Comet"	75
26	India Office ..	..	10,	Situation at Abu Musa. Transmits telegrams to and from Viceroy of 6th and 9th April respecting arrangements for removal of oxide	76
27	Mr. Marling ..	95 Tel.	11,	Protection of Bahreinis. Refers to No. 22. Suggests enforcement of view of His Majesty's Government by occupation of an island in the Persian Gulf	76
28	„ „ ..	96 Tel.	11,	Protection of Bahreinis in Persia. Refers to No. 27. Interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom he urged to send amended note	77
29	Mr. G. Barclay ..	60 Commercial	7,	Improvements in Turkish Customs. Transmits February Reports from Consuls respecting	77
30	„ „ ..	176	8,	Attitude of Bedouins towards Europeans and Hedjaz Railway. Transmits despatch from Jeddah respecting	83

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
31	Sir A. Nicolson ..	187	Apr. 8, 1908	Military preparations by Russia and Turkey. Refers to No. 73, Confidential Paper No. 9432. Transmits copy of official communiqué published in press announcing declaration on part of Ottoman Government that no concentration of troops has occurred on Russian frontier ..	84
32	India Office		11,	Sheikh of Koweit's properties at Fao. Transmits correspondence respecting dispute with Turks	84
33	To India Office		15,	Protection of Bahreinese. Refers to No. 19. Persian Government have sent instructions to Lingah to make reparation to the injured man. Claim to ownership of Bahrein on part of Persia made in note, but withdrawn on advice of Mr. Marling. Asks for opinion whether this is sufficient	88
34	Mr. G. Barclay ..	189	15,	Heraklea coalfield. Porte will not allow French group to form a Company to work mines, and has made counter-offer which has been rejected	88
35	Sir A. Nicolson ..	74 Tel.	22,	Military preparations by Turkey. Reports conversation with M. Isvolsky on subject of Turkish mobilization at Erzeroum ..	89
36	To M. Cambon		22,	French flag on dhows of subjects of Muscat and Zanzibar. Refers to No. 32, Confidential Paper No. 9432. Transmits Inclosures 3 to 11 in No. 5. Hopes French Government will approve Proclamation ..	89
37	To India Office ..	Confidential	23,	Abu Musa Red Oxide Concession. Refers to No. 3. Suggests that Government of India should formulate proposals for limited monthly supply of red oxide being furnished to Messrs. Wönckhaus ..	90
38	Admiralty	..	23,	Visit of His Majesty's ship "Royal Arthur" to Farsan Islands. Impracticable owing to weather	90
39	Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company	..	23,	Attack on P.S. "Blosse Lynch." Presses once more for damages	90
40	Nil.				
41	Mr. G. Barclay ..	200	20,	Attack on P.S. "Blosse Lynch." Punitive measures have resulted so far in death of six Arabs. Refers to No. 10	91
42	„ „ ..	202	21,	Outrages on Armenians in the Mutessariflik of Moush. Transmits three despatches from Erzeroum. Reports representations to Porte respecting crimes of Kassim Bey	92
43	Sir A. Nicolson ..	203 Confidential	22,	Military preparations by Turkey. Reports interview with M. Isvolsky. Latter's complaints of Turkish mobilization ..	95
44	India Office		25,	Abu Musa. Transmits telegram dated 24th April from Viceroy	96
45	Mr. D. Fraser		11,	Attack on Mr. Fraser near Urfa. Transmits statement, and asks assistance in applying to Porte for compensation	96
46	Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company	..	27,	Attack on P.S. "Blosse Lynch." Transmits report from Bussorah agent respecting. Urges punishment of those responsible for	100

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
47	India Office		Apr. 29, 1908	Abu Musa. Transmits telegram from Viceroy and draft reply (see No. 37)	101
48	To India Office		30,	Abu Musa. Refers to No. 47. Concurs in terms of draft reply	102
49	India Office		30,	Ill-treatment of a Bahreini at Lingah. Concurs in No. 33	102
50	„ „		30,	Italian Consul for Muscat. Transmits telegram from Viceroy, dated 30th April, covering telegram from Major Cox, dated 20th April, and concurring in his suggestion to postpone question till conclusion of Arms Conference	102
51	Mr. Marling ..	113 Tel.	May 1,	Protection of Bahreinis and subjects of Trucial Chiefs. Desirability of two questions being settled simultaneously. Further arrests by Governor of Lingah	103
52	Mr. G. Barclay ..	101 Tel.	2,	Mobilization by Turkish troops. Refers to No. 35. Reports reply received from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum denying rumours of Turkish mobilization ..	103
53	Mr. Marling ..	115 Tel.	2,	Treatment of Bahreinis and subjects of Trucial Chiefs in Persia. Refers to No. 51. Attitude of local authorities at Bushire in regard to	103
54	„ „ ..	116 Tel.	2,	Protection of Bahreinis. Refers to No. 53. General question remains unaltered. Has not been given amended note, and urges that, if Persian Government remains obstinate, coercive measures be taken ..	104
55	To Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company	..	2,	Attack on P.S. "Blosse Lynch." Refers to Nos. 20 and 39. Claim should be more clearly defined for presentation to Porte ..	104
56	Mr. G. Barclay ..	214	Apr. 28,	Attack on "Blosse Lynch" on Tigris. Comments on weakness of Company's claims and steps taken by Turkish authorities to restore security	104
57	„ „ ..	219	28,	Mobilization by Turkish troops. Transmits despatch from Military Attaché showing absence of Turkish military activity on Russian frontier	105
58	„ „ ..	223	28,	Situation at Van. Telegram from Captain Dickson states situation is still unsatisfactory. Will speak to Grand Vizier ..	105
59	„ „ ..	230	30,	Turkish military preparations. Refers to No. 57. Transmits two despatches from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum explaining military activity in Vilayet of Van	106
60	Memorandum communicated by Rifaat Bey	..	May 5,	Visit of English officials to country between Koweit and Nejd and distribution of arms by them. Protests against ..	107
61	India Office		6,	Abu Musa. Transmits telegram from Major Cox, dated 29th April, reporting details as to loading of oxide on German steamer "Louise"	108
62	To Mr. G. Barclay ..	169	7,	Outrages on Armenians in Mutessariflik of Moush. Refers to No. 42. Approves action. To continue to press for appointment of better officials	109

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
63	To India Office ..	..	May 7, 1908	Protection of (1) Bahreinis and (2) subjects of Trucial Chiefs. Refers to No. 49. Transmits Nos. 51, 53, and 54. Moment inopportune for raising question (1) in general way. Suggests it will suffice if Persian answer does not dispute. Suggests resting satisfied with the assurance given to Major Cox as regards (2)	109
63*	Mr. G. Barclay ..	232	2,	Situation at Diarbekir. Refers to No. 180, Confidential Paper No. 9305. Transmits despatch from Mr. Heard (No. 13) reporting result of Commission of Inquiry. Ibrahim Pasha exonerated; Notables condemned, but pardoned..	109A
64	„ „ ..	233	3	Disorders in Van and recent events there. Transmits despatches Nos. 9 and 10 from Captain Dickson with comments. Situation still unsatisfactory	110
65	Mr. Marling ..	101	Apr. 24,	Protection of Bahreinis. Refers to No. 97, Confidential Paper No. 9432. Transmits note to Minister for Foreign Affairs and answer, reaffirming that Bahrein belongs to Persia. Comments, and reports visit from Nizam-es-Sultaneh. Suggests formal threat of force	123
66	Mr. G. Barclay ..	234	May 4,	Revolutionary movement in and near Van. Transmits telegrams from Governor-General (communicated by Grand Vizier) showing how far Turkish authorities think it has spread. Representations with a view to preventing irregular troops entering Van	125
67	„ „ ..	238	5,	Increase in garrison at Fao. Transmits despatch from Mr. Crow reporting ..	128
67*	„ „ ..	242	6,	Turkish troops in Asia Minor. Refers to No. 59. Transmits despatch from Erzeroum reporting dispatch of more troops to Van, &c.	128*
68	„ „ ..	243	6,	Attack on P.S. "Blosse Lynch" and disturbances on the Tigris. Transmits two despatches from Bussorah respecting. Has approved Mr. Crow's action and mentioned Messrs. Thornycroft's tender to the Porte	128
69	India Office		13,	Protection of Bahreinis and subjects of Trucial Chiefs. Concurs, but suggests intimation of attitude in future should not be made until after receipt of amended note	133
70	„ „		14,	Proposed appointment of Italian Consular Agent at Muscat. Transmits telegraphic correspondence with Government of India, who give grounds for deprecating, and advise that Italian Government be urged to substitute native news agent	133
71	To Mr. Marling ..	100 Tel.	16,	Protection of (1) Bahreinis and (2) subjects of Trucial Chiefs. Refers to Nos. 51, 53, and 54. Instructs as arranged in No. 69..	134
72	Mr. G. Barclay ..	109 Tel.	17,	Disorders at Van. Transmits telegram of 16th May from Van describing. Has instructed Captain Dickson to act in concert with French and Russian colleagues ..	134

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
73	Mr. G. Barclay ..	252	May 12, 1908	Economic situation in Vilayet of Van. Transmits despatch from Captain Dickson describing. Comments on Captain Dickson's suggestions for stopping fedai movement	135
74	„ „ ..	255	13,	Distress in Vilayet of Erzeroum. Transmits despatch from Consul Shipley, and reports success of representations to Porte urging relief	139
75	„ „ ..	257	13,	Persecution of Armenians of Moush by Kassim Bey. Refers to No. 42. Transmits despatch from Erzeroum inclosing reports from dragoman at Bitlis. Comments	141
76	India Office		15,	Property of Sheikh of Koweit at Fao. Transmits telegram from Viceroy supporting Major Cox' recommendation that Porte should be moved to agree to Sheikh's request for Committee to adjudicate, and comments	144
77	To Mr. D. Fraser ..	..	18,	Attack on Mr. Fraser near Urfa. Refers to No. 45. Explains why claim cannot be presented to Porte. Regrets Mr. Fraser's action	147
78	M. Cambon ..	..	18,	French flag on Muscat dhows. Refers to No 36. Approves text of Proclamation, which can be published	147
79	India Office ..	..	20,	Red Oxide Concession on Abu Musa. Transmits telegram, dated 15th May, from Government of India respecting temporary arrangements for supply of red oxide to Messrs. Wönckhaus Owing to heat no serious operations possible till September or October	148
80	Mr. G. Barclay ..	112 Tel.	20,	Disorders at Van. Transmits telegram from Captain Dickson reporting capture of revolutionary leaders	149
80A	Mr. O'Beirne ..	84 Tel.	22,	Russo-Persian frontier. Transmits official announcement of communication addressed to Governor-General of Tabreez threatening crossing of frontier by Russian troops	149*
80B	„ „ ..	85 Tel.	23,	Russo-Persian frontier. Refers to No. 80A. Request by Persian Chargé d'Affaires for delay of fifteen days was referred to Governor of Caucasus, who has given his consent	149*
81	Mr. G. Barclay ..	260	16,	Final dismissal of Mutessarif of Moush and proceedings against Kassim Bey. Refers to No. 75. Transmits reports from Bitlis on	149
82	„ „ ..	265	18,	Situation in Van and district. Refers to No. 64. Transmits despatch (No. 14 of 20th April) from Captain Dickson reporting on	151
83	„ „ ..	267	19,	Attack on P.S. "Blosse Lynch." Refers to No. 56. Transmits despatch from Bussorah suggesting mode of exacting reparation. Assurances of Grand Vizier. Danger of any further move in matter	153
84	„ ..	269	19,	Situation in Van. Refers to No. 72. Transmits further telegram from Van. Reports representations (jointly with French and Russian colleagues) respecting proposal for proclaiming general amnesty	154

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
85	Mr. G. Barclay ..	270	May 19, 1908	Claims of Heraclea Syndicate. Refers to No. 34. Iradé issued for acceptance of French demands. Conversation with French colleague	156
86	Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company	..	18,	Attack on "Blosse Lynch." Refers to No. 55. Transmits statement of claim on Turkish Government for damages ..	156
86*	Mr. G. Barclay ..	116 Tel.	25,	Disorders at Van. Transmits telegram from Captain Dickson of 19th May respecting conduct of search. Six revolutionaries have escaped after fight, and are a real danger	158
87	To India Office ..	..	25,	French flag on Muscat dhows. Refers to No. 5. Has sent correspondence to M. Cambon. French Government satisfied with solution. Transmits No. 78 ..	158
88	„ „ ..	..	25,	Export of red oxide from Abu Musa. Concurs in views of Lord Morley as expressed in No. 78	158
89	India Office ..	..	25,	Sheikh of Koweit's property at Fao. Refers to No. 76. Transmits further correspondence respecting action of local authorities	159
90	„ „ ..	..	25,	Protection of Bahrein subjects, &c. Transmits telegram of 22nd May to Viceroy, informing of No. 71	161
91	To India Office ..	..	26,	Protection of Sheikh of Koweit's property at Fao. Refers to No. 76. Inquires as to cause of change in Sheikh's attitude ..	161
92	Mr. G. Barclay ..	119 Tel.	27,	Disturbances in Samos. Reports information from Vice-Consul Marc and M. Constans. Gives statement by Porte in answer to inquiry by the three Embassies	161
93	„ „ ..	120 Tel.	28,	Samos. Grave account from Mr. Marc at Scio. Reports satisfactory answer of Grand Vizier to inquiry of three Embassies. Advisable to await Commissioner's report before sending war-ship ..	162
94	To the Marquis di San Giuliano	..	28,	Proposed appointment of Italian Consular Agent at Muscat. Submits that appointment of secret native Agent would serve purpose of controlling arms traffic better	162
95	Sir F. Elliot ..	8 Tel.	28,	Disorders at Samos. Reports account of M. Skouses, who hopes Protecting Powers will send war-ships	163
96	Mr. G. Barclay ..	122 Tel.	29,	Situation at Van. Captain Dickson reports well on conduct of troops. Discusses source and value of information received from Droshak	163
97	„ „ ..	123 Tel.	29,	Samos. Reports measures of French Ambassador for embarking French and British subjects if necessary. Refers to No. 95. Greek colleague urges dispatch of man-of-war. Inadvisable	163
97A	Mr. Marling ..	126 Tel.	29,	Oil Syndicate. His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire reports that Lieutenant Wilson has telegraphed that oil has been struck at 1,200 feet	163*
97B	„ „ ..	127 Tel.	29,	Persian Customs launches. Reports recent incidents in the Gulf. His Majesty's Consul-General urges making of formal protest to Persian Government	163*

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
98	Memorandum communicated by M. Métaxas ..	..	May 29, 1908	Disorders at Samos. Gives telegram from Greek Government to Greek Minister at Constantinople for communication to Representatives of Guaranteeing Powers. Asks for dispatch of "stationnaires" ..	164
99	To Mr. G. Barclay ..	89 Tel.	29,	Disturbances in Samos. To furnish full report and continue to co-operate with colleagues. Possibility that man-of-war may have to be sent	164
100	Mr. G. Barclay ..	278	25,	Troubles at Samos. Reports arrival of Imperial troops and alleged imprisonment of Prince-Governor	164
101	M. Métaxas ..	..	30,	Disorders at Samos. Apprehension of Greek Government, who desire withdrawal of Ottoman troops	165
101*	Sir F. Elliot ..	9 Tel.	30,	Samos. Gives substance of letter from members of Samian Council to British Vice-Consul, explaining origin of disorders and their attitude	165
102	„ „ ..	10 Tel.	30,	Disorder at Samos. Views of the King of Greece as to significance and origin of. Has informed French and Russian colleagues	166
103	Mr. G. Barclay ..	124 Tel.	30,	Samos. News very scanty. Choice of Raouf Pasha as Special Commissioner is excellent. Undesirable for European warship to be sent at present	166
104	„ „ ..	125 Tel.	31,	Disturbances in Samos. Refers to Nos. 101* and 102. Discusses responsibility for. Reports assurances of Porte and account from them of recent events	166
105	„ „ ..	288	25,	Maghil outrage. Result of trial	167
106	„ „ ..	286	26,	Grant-in-aid to peasants in Erzeroum. Transmits Mr. Shipley's No. 26, reporting ..	167
107	„ „ ..	127 Tel.	June 1,	Samos. Reports assurances of Grand Vizier to three Embassies of restoration of order. Full description to follow	168
108	Sir F. Elliot ..	11 Tel.	2,	Samos. Refers to No. 101. Prime Minister entirely disapproves of movement, but suspects Porte. Proposes to receive two members of Council if they call	168
109	Mr. G. Barclay ..	129 Tel.	2,	Samos. Gives report of French Consular Agent to Embassy of restoration of order, and recommending dispatch of French war-ship	169
110	Memorandum communicated by M. Métaxas ..	..	2,	Disturbances at Samos. Athenian rumours as to	169
111	To Sir E. Egerton ..	67	2,	Italian Consular Representative at Muscat. Italian Ambassador informed that His Majesty's Government hope Italian Government will not press their request for ..	170
112	Mr. G. Barclay ..	131 Tel.	3,	Disorders in Samos. Transmits telegram to Athens, informing of probable responsibility of Sofouli, who is probably one of the two Samians mentioned in No. 108 ..	170
113	„ „ ..	132 Tel.	3,	Outbreak in Samos. Persons implicated to be tried by civil Courts. Measures for restoration of order	170

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
114	To Sir F. Elliot ..	18 Tel.	June 3, 1908	Reception of members of Council of Samos by His Majesty's Minister. Refers to No. 108. Authorizes under certain conditions	170
115	To Mr. G. Barclay ..	92 Tel.	3,	Disturbances at Samos. Refers to No. 109. Concurs that man-of-war should not be sent	171
116	Sir F. Elliot ..	75	May 29,	Disorders in Samos. Conversation with M. Skouzès respecting. Views and apprehensions and versions of Greek Government respecting	171
117	M. Métaxas ..	..	June 3,	Disturbances at Samos. Informs of hoisting of Turkish flag on the Konak	172
118	India Office ..	..	3,	Red oxide at Abu Musa. Refers to No. 88. Transmits telegram to Viceroy respecting instructions to Major Cox. Concurs in proposed addition to answer to German Memorandum	172
119	Sir F. Elliot ..	13 Tel.	4,	Samos. Refers to No. 113. Suspects Porte. Protecting Powers should not abdicate their functions. Greek Consul's alleged complicity	173
120	Mr. G. Barclay ..	299	May 31,	Disorders in Samos. Refers to No. 103. Transmits despatch from Acting Consul-General at Smyrna	173
121	Mr. Pears	..	June 2,	Disturbances at Samos. Expatiates upon ..	174
122	India Office ..	..	3,	Dispute respecting Sheikh of Koweit's property at Fao. Refers to No. 91. Transmits draft telegram to Government of India, asking for more detailed information	175
123	„ „ ..	..	4,	Muscat Arbitration Award. Refers to No. 87. Transmits telegram to Viceroy of 2nd June. Political Agent to make arrangements with French Consul ..	175
124	Mr. G. Barclay ..	133 Tel.	5,	Samos. Refers to No. 119. No question of Mussulmans being enrolled in Samian gendarmerie. Inquiry inadvisable pending receipt of Consular reports	176
125	*Note-verbale* communicated by M. Métaxas	..	5,	Disturbances at Samos. Submits that period be fixed for withdrawal of Turkish troops	176
126	Sir F. Elliot ..	77	May 30,	Disorders at Samos. Transmits copy of letter from member of Council to British Vice-Consul at Samos, with comments of King of Greece	177
127	„ „ ..	78	30,	Disorders at Samos. Audience with King of Greece respecting	178
128	Memorandum communicated to M. Métaxas	..	June 6,	Disturbances in Samos. Acknowledges No. 101. His Majesty's Government do not believe dispatch of war-ship necessary at present	178
129	Mr. Marling ..	126	May 21,	Protection of Bahreinis in Persia. Refers to No. 65. Regrets that he may not adopt a more energetic attitude, so as to settle question once for all	179

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
130	Mr. G. Barclay ..	302 Very Conf.	June 2, 1908	Transmits telegram from Prince-Governor to Porte and extract from despatch by French Consul-General at Smyrna, also statement by the Porte. Believes allegations in Nos. 95 and 101* are unfounded	179
131	„ „ ..	306	3,	Situation at Bitlis. Transmits despatch respecting expulsion of Mutessarif and Mudir of Ghendj and Khuyt	183
132	„ „ ..	307	3,	Tribal differences at Hassa. Vali of Bussorah has invited Bin Saoud to settle ..	185
133	„ „ ..	308	3,	Further Bedouin raids on Jeddah–Mecca road. Transmits Mr. Monahan's No. 21, reporting	185
134	„ „ ..	311	5	Samos. Transmits despatch (No. 49) from Smyrna giving account by eyewitness of disorders in Vathy. Comments on discrepancies in different accounts. . ..	186
135	To India Office ..	..	10,	Sheikh of Koweit's property at Fao. Concurs in draft telegram to Viceroy (see No. 122)	187
136	India Office ..	..	11,	Muscat Arbitration Award. Refers to No. 123. Transmits telegram of 10th June to Viceroy postponing action	187
137	To Mr. G. Barclay ..	228	12,	Attack on P.S. "Blosse Lynch." Transmits No. 86. To consult Mr. Crow as to details of claim and then present it to Porte. Refers to No. 83. Would like report from Mr. Crow before informing Messrs. Lynch that their claim cannot be supported	188
138	Mr. G. Barclay ..	136 Tel.	13,	Attack on P.S. "Blosse Lynch." Lynch's agent has shown him No. 86, and states confidentially that disturbance has been source of profit rather than loss. He is telegraphing to London to have claim withdrawn	188
139	„ „ ..	139 Tel.	13,	Samos. Gives casualties in recent fighting. Withdrawal of troops to be begun at once. Local gendarmerie enrolled ..	188
140	„ „ ..	140 Tel.	14,	Attack on P.S. "Blosse Lynch." Refers to No. 138. Major Ramsay urges punishment of Gadban. Grand Vizier in favour of temporizing. Suggests Messrs. Lynch's views should be ascertained	189
141	Sir F. Elliot ..	80	4,	Disorders at Samos. Refers to No. 127. Interview with M. Theotoky. Conduct of Greek Consul	189
142	„ „ ..	84 Confidential	6,	Disorders at Samos. Interview with member of Samian Council as to causes ..	190
143	Mr. G. Barclay ..	321	9,	Outbreak in Samos. Transmits report by Vice-Consul Marc with comments. Further assurances from Grand Vizier respecting troops	192
144	The Marquis di San Giuliano	..	10,	Italian Consular Agent at Muscat. Refers to No. 94. Agrees to course suggested ..	194
145	Mr. G. Barclay ..	142 Tel.	15,	Samos. Grand Vizier states ships have left and troops are to be withdrawn at once. Inaccuracies in Sofouli's statements (see No. 155). French colleague confirms confidentially atrocities mentioned in No. 143	194

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
146	Mr. G. Barclay ..	324	June 11, 1908	Situation at Van. Reports improvement in. Proposed tour of Captain Dickson in western part of Van	195
147	To Mr. G. Barclay ..	96 Tel.	16,	Attack on P.S. "Blosse Lynch." Refers to No. 140. To ask Major Ramsay's views as to validity of Grand Vizier's reasons and possibility of punishing Gadban at once	195
148	Sir F. Elliot ..	15 Tel.	17,	Samos. Reports receipt of letter from M. Sofoulis, protesting against elections and convocation of Assembly	195
149	" " ..	17 Tel.	18,	Samos. Has only seen M. Sofoulis once and does not answer his letters	196
150	Mr. G. Barclay ..	147 Tel.	19,	Samos. Reports meeting of Assembly. Sultan has ordered reduction of force to two companies as before outbreak ..	196
151	To Mr. G. Barclay ..	213	19,	Dispatch of Turkish troops to Samos. Refers to No. 143. To point irregularity of without consent of Guaranteeing Powors..	196
152	Mr. G. Barclay ..	149 Tel.	21,	Glanville case. Has received £T. 500 compensation, which will be placed to credit in Extraordinaries account	196
153	Messrs. Malcolm to Messrs. Strick (communicated by Mr. Wilson Fox)	..	May 30,	Abu Musa red oxide. Reports interview with Major Cox, and inquires whether they are authorized to deal with the Sheikh	196
154	Sir F. Elliot ..	86	June 9,	Samos. Transmits Memorandum submitted to Representatives of Protecting Powers by Samian Councillors. Reports action in concert with French colleague	197
155	" " ..	88	11,	Alleged proscriptions, &c., at Samos. Transmits further letter from M. Sofoulis protesting against	206
156	" " ..	90	11,	Samos. Reports conversation with M. Skousès respecting complicity of Greek Consul. His suspicions of the Porte ..	207
157	" " ..	93	17,	Elections and convocation of Assembly in Samos. Refers to No. 155. Transmits letter from M. Sofoulis, traversing statements of Grand Vizier (see No. 145) and suggesting remedies	208
158	Mr. G. Barclay ..	328	12,	Kurdish oppression of Christians in Diarbekir Vilayet. Transmits two despatches from Mr. Heard respecting. Official representations to Acting Vali useless. Reports satisfactory action of Grand Vizier in response to representations	209
159	" " ..	331	12,	Revolutionaries at Van. Refers to No. 146. Transmits despatch from Captain Dickson, reporting measures for suppression of ..	213
160	" " ..	333	12,	Murder of the Superior of the Catholic Mission at Derna. Transmits copy of collective protest addressed to Porte on subject of difficulties in the way of acquisition of land by foreigners ..	218
161	India Office ..	..	23,	Substitution of Koweit for Bushire as coaling station. Transmits correspondence between Resident, Government of India, and naval authorities respecting ..	219

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
162	India Office ..	..	June 24, 1908	Silver currency in Muscat. Transmits correspondence between Muscat, Bushire, and Government of India	226
163	" " ..	..	24,	Abu Musa red oxide. Returns draft, suggesting some verbal alterations, and proposes adding a paragraph as regards working of mines in future	228
164	Mr. G. Barclay ..	346	22,	"Johara" piracy case. Reports reasons for delay. 1,025*l.* damages awarded. Settlement arranged so as not to raise question of our right to protect natives of Hadramut	229
165	" " ..	347	22,	Revolutionaries at Van. Refers to No. 146. Gives further report from Captain Dickson. Search has ceased. Situation normal again. Commission of Inquiry. Disturbed condition of Bitlis	229
166	" " ..	351	23,	Situation in Vilayet of Bitlis. Refers to No. 42. Transmits despatches from Diarbekir and Bitlis. Danger of release of Major Riza Bey	230
167	" " ..	352	23,	Insecurity of Jeddah–Mecca road. Refers to No. 133. Transmits despatch from Jeddah reporting. Due to hostility of Bedouins to Hedjaz Railway	233
168	To Mr. G. Barclay ..	258	30,	Samos. Refers to Nos. 155 and 157. Notes contradictions between statements of M. Sofoulis and the Porte. To ascertain the real facts	235

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. July 1908.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Asiatic Turkey.

[In continuation of Confidential Paper No. 9432.]

[11050] No. 1.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received April* 1.)

Sir, *India Office, March* 30, 1908.

WITH reference to your letter of the 22nd ultimo, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Morley to inclose, to be laid before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram from the Government of India as to the amount of oxide which Messrs. Wönckhaus are entitled to remove from Abu Musa Island.

I am also to inclose the draft of a telegram which, subject to Sir E. Grey's observations, Mr. Morley proposes to send to the Government of India in reply.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Government of India to Mr. Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 26, 1908.

ABU MUSA.

Your telegram dated the 18th instant. Following telegram, dated 22nd instant, received from Resident, Persian Gulf:—

"Abu Musa Island. See my telegram No. 247.

"Very prejudicial effect will be created, in view of reports German firm have circulated, if, during present visit of ship for removal of oxide on sea-shore (which is that claimed by Wönckhaus as about 2,000 tons ready for shipment), Hassan or German firm are permitted any access whatever to inland oxide. His Majesty's Government will, I hope, see their way to refuse to entertain claim to this inland oxide put forward by Wönckhaus, or at least to reply that it will be necessary to consider quite separately, after examination of concessionnaires' books, other claims that exist upon the oxide."

Following was text of Major Cox' telegram No. 247, which was dispatched before your telegram of the 18th instant was passed on to him:—

"Abu Musa.

"1. Reference is invited to my letter of the 8th March. I have now received letter from German Consul stating that, according to communication received from German Government, all oxide on island already excavated is covered by British

* Printed elsewhere.

Government's consent to the removal of oxide. Consul therefore requests that I will arrange that similar guarantee shall be given by Sheikh for the removal by subsequent steamers of this oxide also, and he suggests that when our Representatives proceed to Abu Musa Island to weigh the material just about to be removed, they should estimate the amount of this other oxide. In reply, I am informing him that only the oxide lying on the sea-shore 'ready for shipment,' and not any other, appear to me to be dealt with in the previous correspondence and my instructions, but that his communication is being referred to Government by me, and that on receiving their further instructions I will again communicate with him. By to-morrow's mail I will forward a copy of his letter. No legitimate claim to this other oxide appears, in the first place, to be possessed by Wönckhaus; and, secondly, to bring it to the shore would take some weeks, while, until it is cleared, it is impossible to estimate its weight satisfactorily.

"2. Information was yesterday volunteered by the Bushire Karguzar, with whom the Governor is at enmity, that Darya Begi had been indented on by the German Consulate for information tending to show that Persia was the owner of Abu Musa Island, and that, as one item of evidence, Darya Begi had cited the long connection with the mine of Nakhoda Ali, a Persian subject. Mention in German case of Nakhoda Ali may possibly be thus accounted for."

From his letter of the 8th instant, it appears that your telegram of the 22nd ultimo was interpreted by Major Cox as referring to oxide already mined and ready to be shipped. See letter of the 8th January from Foreign Office, paragraph 9. Major Cox was told quite recently by German Consul that latter had instructed Wönckhaus not to go near mine, and that he quite understood that only the oxide on the beach near the huts was in question. It is important to support Major Cox, in view of interest taken by Arabs in the case and of activity of Germans. I therefore recommend that only the oxide on the shore lying ready for shipment should be taken by ship now going, and that Major Cox should be instructed to submit separately proposals regarding the oxide lying near the mines inland. Clearing this and getting it to shore for shipment will take some time.

[11049] No. 2.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 1.)

Sir, *India Office, March 30, 1908.*

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Morley to inclose, to be laid before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram from the Government of India, dated the 22nd instant, as to a claim for profits in respect of the Abu Musa Concession, entered formally before His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Bunder Abbas by Nejef, the son and heir of Nakhuda Ali, of whom mention was made, as a partner in the Concession, in Inclosure No. 2 of the case submitted by the German Government.

Mr. Morley sees no objection to the proposal in itself. But it seems open to question whether, at the present stage of the discussion with the German Government, it is desirable to instruct the Consul to take up the case, and whether, if such instructions are sent, the German Government should not be informed.

If the case is taken up, there would seem to be no objection to the originals* of Inclosures Nos. 1 D and 1 E of the German case being called for, and to the summoning of Mr. Brown as a witness.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 2.

Government of India to Mr. Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March 22, 1908.*

ABU MUSA. My telegram of the 16th ultimo, repeating telegram No. 116 of the 12th ultimo from Resident, Persian Gulf.

Formal claim for profits of Concession was entered on the 16th ultimo before Consul at Bunder Abbas by Nejef, son and heir of Nakhuda Ali, partner mentioned in Inclosure No. 2 of German case. Major Cox inquires if case should now be taken up by Consul. Provided Consul is careful that correct legal procedure is observed, we see no objection. As Major Cox reports that Hassan and Brown are now working together at Lingah at construction of account books, it might be useful to secure Hassan's account books as exhibits in case. See second paragraph of telegram, dated the 18th ultimo, from Resident, which we repeated to you on the 21st ultimo. Resident now inquires whether production of originals of Inclosures Nos. 1 D and 1 E of German case should be demanded from Brown. To call latter as a witness in the case brought by Nejef Ali might be a means of doing this.

* See paragraphs 5 and 6 of Foreign Office letter No. 78 of January 8, 1908; also Viceroy's telegram of February 16 (middle) and Viceroy's telegram of February 21 (end).

[11051] No. 3.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 1.)

Sir, *India Office, March 31, 1908.*

WITH reference to your letter No. 78 of the 8th January, 1908, forwarding a statement from the German Embassy of the claims of Messrs. Wonckhaus in respect of the cancellation by the Sheikh of Shargah of the Concession for mining oxide of iron on Abu Musa Island, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Morley to inclose copy of a telegram from the Government of India, expressing their views on the representations of the German Government.

It is understood that the reply to the German case will be prepared by the Foreign Office. The papers referred to in the telegram, which have been received by this mail from the Government of India, are therefore forwarded without detailed examination. As regards the general questions of policy involved, Mr. Morley would draw attention to the following points:—

1. The references in the German case to the fact that the Sheikh was at one time a partner in the lease raise the point whether it might not be held that he was thereby precluded from denying that his uncle, Salim-bin-Sultan, who granted the lease, was the owner of the mines, and had a legal right to lease them to the original lessees, and that Messrs. Wonckhaus, into whose hands the Sheikh's share in the lease ultimately passed, are *qua* their rights as partners the assignees of the Sheikh's share.

It appears to be established that Salim-bin-Sultan, subsequently to his loss of the Sheikhship in 1883, was in no sense the owner of the mines; that, subsequently to the Agreement arrived at in 1889, he lived at Shargah as the Sheikh's adviser, and in granting the lease he was acting merely as proxy for the Sheikh. The right of the Sheikh to cancel the lease, in spite of the fact that he was at one time a partner in it, is based by the Government of India partly on the terms of the Agreement of the 20th August, 1898, constituting his partnership, but mainly on the arbitrary nature of the sovereign powers enjoyed by the Sheikh. It is to be observed that the original Concession concludes with the words: "I have perhaps made out certain Agreements previous to this. They do not hold good, and this Agreement is to be acted on."

2. The argument in the German case that Hassan Samaiyeh had acted within his rights as managing partner in contracting with Messrs. Wonckhaus for the delivery of the oxide, and that the terms of the contract were known both to Abdul Latif, the representative of the British Government, and his son Esa, a partner in the lease, is met by the facts stated regarding Abdul Latif's action in the matter, and the objection taken by Esa to Hassan Samaiyeh's proceedings. Strictly speaking, the question of the managing partner's powers in such a case would appear to be one to be decided according to local law.

3. As regards what is said in your letter of the 8th January, as to the difficulty, in view of the action taken by His Majesty's Government in the matter of the Hormuz oxide contract, of basing an argument with the German Government on the ground of objections to a monopoly, I am to point out that in Esa's letter to the Sheikh demanding the cancellation of the lease, and the Sheikh's letters to Hassan Samaiyeh of the 21st February, 1907; the 11th Safar, 1325; and the 25th Shaban, 1325, stress is laid on the objections to a monopoly as a justification of the cancellation. It appears to Mr. Morley that a distinction can be drawn between a monopoly containing provisions that safeguard the Sheikh's interests, and one in such general terms as those of the cancelled lease.

4. To turn to the question of the future working of the mines, it will be seen that the Government of India concur in the suggestion in Major Cox's telegram of the 10th March that "as soon as circumstances permit, we should introduce a trustworthy British subject or firm to the Sheikh, who would manage the mining and sales on his behalf on suitable terms to be negotiated through the Residency."

Mr. Morley would be glad to be favoured with Sir E. Grey's views on this proposal. All that seems actually necessary is that the new Concession to be granted by the Sheikh should be in a form to safeguard his interests and sovereign rights in the island which the cancelled Concession failed to do. The grant of a fresh Concession would be in accordance with the Sheikh's own views expressed in the concluding words of his letter of the 11th Safar, 1325, to Hassan Samiyeh, which said: "You are not allowed to take oxide of iron from Abu Musa Island on the condition which you have made unless the business is put on a footing of which we need not fear the consequences."

5. Mr. Morley would suggest, for Sir E. Grey's consideration, that the reply to the German case should include a statement that the object of cancelling the lease was not to interfere with the commercial interests of Messrs. Wonckhaus, but to maintain the sovereign rights of the Sheikh of Shargah; and that His Majesty's Government have no objection to a fresh Concession being negotiated through the Resident at Bushire, and to temporary arrangements, pending the grant of a fresh Concession, to enable Messrs. Wonckhaus to fulfil their contracts. The question of these temporary arrangements was dealt with in my letter of the 30th March, 1908.

6. The question whether compensation should not be offered as an act of grace to Messrs. Wonckhaus is one that can hardly be ignored, though no claims founded on action taken by the firm since the cancellation of the lease need presumably be entertained. Mr. Morley will be glad to be favoured with Sir E. Grey's views on the subject. He proposes to deal separately with [the question of the incidence of any charge that may be incurred on this account.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 3.

Government of India to Mr. Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March* 21, 1908.

ABU MUSA. Your telegram dated the 4th instant.

Paragraph 1.—Papers forwarded with German case contain nothing in support of first German point, viz., that Salim, the uncle of Sheikh Sagar, is owner of mines, and that Sagar had no right to annul lease which Salim gave to a Company in his capacity as owner. Island is shown by its history to be integral part of Sheikh of Shargah's dominions used for grazing of live-stock of ruling Sheikh and his family, and fact that Salim only resided in island on sufferance was referred in two letters addressed by Sheikh Sagar to Resident in 1884. Moreover, when necessary, Sheikh Sagar has continued to send his own live-stock annually to island for grazing. It is true that Salim, since he was ousted from Sheikhdom by Sagar, has enjoyed income of Abu Musa Island by personal and oral arrangements with Sheikh Sagar. Sheikh admits this, and says that, in order to stop Salim's complaints as to inadequate allowance given him by Sheikh, he has also allowed Salim to retain rent from mines paid under terms of contract now in question. But Salim, in a letter dated the 21st ultimo to Sheikh Sagar, has now categorically disclaimed all right of ownership in island, and has declared that he merely acted as proxy for Sagar in granting lease. Examination of Agreements between Sagar and Salim, dated respectively 1883, 1884, and 1889, supports genuineness of this declaration. Salim's right to revenue of Abu Musa Island is not mentioned in these Agreements, which show that fixed stipend granted to him by Sheikh Sagar was Salim's chief means of support. Fact that produce of mines had been leased by Salim, while acting as Regent of Shargah, was referred to by Sheikh Sagar in a letter to Resident dated the 11th October, 1902. German argument, therefore, based on rights of Salim, fails.

Paragraph 2.—We pass to the second German point, viz., that Sheikh's cancellation of lease was unjustifiable, even if power to grant it emanated from himself. Subject to such general control as we exercise, Sheikh is law to himself, and has

absolute right to do as he pleases. Sheikh's territorial rights over island have been admitted by the Germans. Nothing to limit Sagar's right as Sheikh to cancel lease under any circumstances he chose was contained in Agreement. Under this Agreement Sheikh took personally a commercial share in undertaking for so long as mines are workable and in lease.

Lease was cancelled by Sheikh for good reasons, viz.:—

1. Lease did not contemplate grant of monopoly to foreigner, particularly after Residency Agent at Shargah had given Sheikh a general warning in December 1904 to refer to Resident before dealing with Wonckhaus.

2. Monopoly had, therefore, been given by Hassan Samayieh without the consent of a partner, Esa-bin-Abdul Latif, who accordingly complained of being ignored to the Sheikh. Description of Hassan in heading of contract as "owner and holder of Concession" was particularly objected to by Esa. It is claimed by Germans that grant of contract had really been known and approved of by Esa. This is not borne out by documents forwarded by Germans, and the reverse is suggested by documents which Major Cox now forwards. The 1st June, 1906, was date of execution of deed of contract between German firm and Hassan Samayieh. Monopoly of purchase for four years and preference for new contract on expiry of old one was given by it to German firm. Hassan concealed existence of monopoly and preferential right of renewal when, on the 11th June, 1906, he reported Agreement to Esa's father, Abdul Latif, who is our Residency Agent at Shargah. It is significant that this letter is omitted from German case. In reply Hassan was requested by Abdul Latif, on the 14th June, not to make lease to German firm or sign deed of contract with them. On the 26th June Hassan received from Malcolm, with whom concessionnaires had engagements, request for a copy of Agreement and inquiry whether other European firms could enter into similar contracts. Both points were evaded by Hassan in his reply of the 13th July, and in a letter of the 11th October to Malcolm, Hassan refused to send copy of Agreement, and said that secrecy of transaction had been enjoined by German firm. Finally, at the end of October 1906, he was induced to give Residency Agent at Lingah a copy. It was not until the 16th December, 1906, that he sent a copy of it to Abdul Latif. Latter wrote on receipt of document, on the 23rd January, 1907, that nullification of contract was desired by his son, Esa, who did not agree to it. Esa wrote to Sheikh Sagar on the 20th February, requesting that contract should be cancelled. In a letter dated the 8th March, 1907, to Abdul Latif, Hassan asserted that details of Agreement had, at time of its execution, been communicated by him to Abdul Latif, and that latter had then expressed his approval in writing. No evidence either of letter or reply is forthcoming. Resident writes that, in going through Abdul Latif's correspondence, he has found some office copies missing, or too faint to be decyphered; he adds, however, that Abdul Latif gave his solemn word that we need be under no apprehension that anything more than appears in letters hitherto produced is contained in any letter of his of which an office copy is not available. He was quite frank, and Major Cox sees no reason to doubt his word. It is of especial importance to note, in connection with Esa's request for cancellation, that he knew nothing of objectionable description of Hassan as "owner and holder of Concession" contained in lease until he got its text.

Paragraph 3.—Evidence produced by Major Cox disproves third German claim, viz., that as Hassan was managing partner on behalf of others, action taken by him did not, in any case, require consent of Esa or other partners. On the 25th November, 1907, German Consulate dragoman went to Bunder Abbas, and attempted, unsuccessfully it would appear, to obtain the signature to a document, agreeing to sub-contract, of Nejef-bin-Ali, a claimant to a share in Concession.

Paragraph 4.—An actual share in original Concesssion has been secured by Wonckhaus with a view to strengthening his case. The arrangements for cancelling the lease had, however, already been made, when the purchase of this share was effected; and Sheikh's right to determine lease is in no way diminished thereby. It is clear that the purchase was merely an afterthought. As, by its terms, the German firm was admitted to a leasehold interest in the island without the Sheikh's consent, it affords an argument in justification of action taken by Sheikh, inasmuch as it contravened assurance given by Sheikh to Political Resident that, without the knowledge of the British Government, he would not do anything of the kind. An infringement of the 1892 Treaty might have resulted.

Paragraph 5.—German case does not appear to shake our own case, which seems to be strong.

Paragraph 6.—We concur in suggestion made in Resident's telegram of the 10th instant, repeated to you on the 12th instant, as regards future working of mines.

Paragraph 7.—With Foreign Secretary's letter of the 12th instant we sent you papers on which above statement is based. We are sending you by mail a referenced copy of this telegram.

Inclosure 2 in No. 3.

Papers received by mail of March 27, 1908, being those referred to in the last paragraph of the Viceroy's Telegram of March 21, 1908, as documents on which that Telegram was based.

[*Note.*—As stated in paragraph 2 of the draft to the Foreign Office, the papers have not been examined in detail by the India Office.]

March 28, 1908.

(1.)

Government of India to Major Cox.

(Telegraphic.) *Calcutta, January* 11, 1908.

ABU MUSA.

I repeat, for your information and guidance, the following telegram, dated the 10th January, from the Secretary of State:—

"Case regarding . . . . from island."

Please take action without delay and report to me what arrangements you have made for sending official to the island.

(2.)

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *Bushire, January* 12, 1908.

Abu Musa.

Please see your telegram of 11th January.

Warning previously given by me to the Sheikh regarding removal of accumulated oxide has again been repeated to him by me, and German Consul has promised to give me an early intimation as soon as it is desired to send a ship for that purpose.

As directed, dispatch of an official either by German ship or separately will then be arranged for by me.

(3.)

Government of India to Major Cox.

(Telegraphic.) *Calcutta, January* 15, 1908.

Following telegram received from Secretary of State, dated 11th January, 1908. Abu Musa:—

"Following telegram sent to His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, dated 9th January, 1908:—

"'It would be better . . . . of Treaty obligations.'"

(4.)

Government of India to Major Cox.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Calcutta, January* 15, 1908.

With reference to your telegram of the 13th ultimo regarding the Abu Musa incident, I request that you will forward to this Department copies of two official letters addressed by German Consul at Bushire to Sheikh of Shargah and his uncle.

(5.)

Government of India to Major Cox.

(Telegraphic.) *Calcutta, January* 17, 1908.

Please see my telegram of 15th January. Abu Musa.

We have received the following from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated 15th January:—

"Objection based . . . . Major Cox accordingly."

(6.)

Government of India to Major Cox.

(Telegraphic.) *Calcutta, January* 21, 1908.

Abu Musa.

Please see your telegram dated 12th January.

The following telegram which has been received from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated 20th January, is repeated for information and guidance:—

"If idea of removing oxide . . . . German ship."

(7.)

Government of India to Major Cox.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Calcutta, January* 28, 1908.

Abu Musa. Please telegraph your observations as early as possible, on receipt of papers sent you direct by India Office. Please report, in particular, whether any evidence exists that rights of ownership over the island belonged to Sheikh's uncle. Is it possible to establish that annual rent was paid, not to Sheikh's uncle, but to Ruling Sheikh himself?

Can precise wording of Inclosures 4 (*d*) and 4 (*e*) to German case be ascertained? His Majesty's Government desire that case should be dealt with as a commercial dispute, and that Concession to Wonckhaus should be cancelled, on the ground that all the partners did not consent, and that one of them protested spontaneously. All facts being on this contention, and the arguments, in the German case, thereon, will doubtless be thoroughly examined by you. Your opinion might also be given as to effect of transfer without Sheikh's consent to Wonckhaus, a foreigner, on the 10th October, and also in regard to Brown's claims to mines and concession for these, as security for advances made, put forward by him in his letters of the 31st October, 1907. Treaty of 1892, might, perhaps, be infringed by this, or such an infringement might result therefrom.

(8.)

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Bushire, January 20, 1908.*

In continuation of the correspondence ending with Foreign Department telegram, dated the 21st instant, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copies of the letters which have passed between my German colleague and myself, regarding Messrs. Wonckhaus' plans for the removal of the oxide accumulated at Abu Musa.

2. The sentence in Dr. Listemann's informal letter of the 13th January; "for as we both stated the other day all official steps in this matter are, until further notice, to be taken by our respective Legations," needs a little comment as it does not represent what was said quite correctly.

When my colleague visited me on the 10th January in order to ascertain the source of the report communicated to his Legation regarding the "Sicilia," he seemed disposed, on the conclusion of the conversation reported in my telegram of the same date, to embark upon a discussion of the details of the case. I therefore asked him before going further whether he now had authority to deal with me in the matter. He replied: No, the case was being dealt with by our Legations in Tehran, but he thought we might conveniently discuss it privately together. I answered that as long as the case was being handled by our Legations, any private discussion of the details on our part, unless we were both instructed in that sense, would be irresponsible and that I would therefore prefer to refrain from it for the present. In this view on second thoughts he concurred.

I next met him on the 24th instant just after receiving his official letter of the 23rd, and he then informed me that he had not thought it necessary to mention specifically in that letter that he had now received instructions to address himself to me, but took it for granted that I should understand that this was the case from the mere fact of his having addressed me an official letter on the subject.

(9.)

Major Cox to Herr Listemann.

My dear Dr. Listemann; *Bushire, January 12, 1908.*

Since our conversation of the day before yesterday I have addressed the Sheikh of Shargah again regarding the removal of the accumulated oxide from Abu Musa, and if when it is desired to send a ship there for the purpose, you will give me early intimation of the intention as agreed upon between us, I will do whatever else may be necessary to ensure that the ship's operations are not impeded in any way by the Sheikh's people.

In case it should be desired to send the "Sicilia" I hope you will lose no time in communicating with me.

Yours sincerely,
(Signed) P. Z. COX.

(10.)

Herr Listemann to Major Cox.

My dear Major Cox, *Bushire, January 13, 1908.*

I received your kind letter of yesterday, and I thank you very much for having taken the trouble of writing to the Sheikh of Shargah regarding the removal of the

accumulated oxide from Abu Musa and also for offering to take steps that, if the firm of Wonckhaus desired to send a ship there for the purpose, the ship's operations should not be impeded by the Sheikh's people. It is very kind of you, and I am thankful.

But, as I told you the other day, the firm has no such intention at the present, and it is out of question that the "Sicilia" should go to Abu Musa.

In case it should be decided later on to remove the oxide, I shall not fail to report your kind offer to the German Legation in Tehran, for as we both stated the other day, all official steps in this matter are, until further notice, to be taken by our respective Legations.

Thanking you very much all the same, I remain, &c.

(Signed) H. LISTEMANN.

(11.)

Herr Listemann to Major Cox.

M. le Consul-Général, *Bouchir, le 23 Janvier, 1908.*

En me référant à une conversation que j'ai eu avec vous, il y a quelque temps, au sujet de l'oxyde de fer de l'île d'Abou Mousa, et à une lettre privée que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser ensuite au même sujet, j'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que la maison de Robert Wonckhaus et Cie. s'est décidée, en principe, à enlever l'oxyde en question, pourvu qu'elle ait la garantie que les opérations de chargement, &c., ne soient pas empêchées ni troublées.

Comme vous avez, au courant de la conversation et dans la lettre susmentionnées, eu l'obligeance de m'offrir votre bienveillante entremise pour empêcher le Sheikh de Shargah de faire des difficultés dans cette occasion, j'ai l'honneur de vous prier de bien vouloir m'informer si vous êtes à même de prendre la garantie ci-dessus mentionnée, de laquelle dépend la décision définitive de la maison Wonckhaus.

Je ne manquerai pas, en cas que vous vouliez bien me munir d'une réponse affirmative à ce sujet, de vous informer sans délai par quel bateau il sera décidé d'expédier l'oxyde d'Abou Mousa et à quelle date le bateau s'y rendra à cet effet.

En vous remerciant d'avance d'une obligeante réponse à ce sujet, je profite, &c.

Le Consul Impérial d'Allemagne,
(Signé) H. LISTEMANN.

(12.)

Major Cox to Herr Listemann.

M. le Consul, *Bouchir, le 20 Janvier, 1908.*

J'ai l'honneur de vous accuser réception de votre lettre en date du 23 Janvier, par laquelle vous avez bien voulu m'avertir que la maison Robert Wonckhaus et Cie. désire enlever d'Abou Mousa l'oxyde de fer lequel se trouve déjà amoncelé au bord de cette île.

En réponse, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que je suis à même de garantir que les ouvriers employés par la dite maison pour les opérations du chargement de l'oxyde ne seront pas ni empêchés ni dérangés, pourvu qu'on se conforme en façon générale aux démarches indiquées ci-dessous, c'est-à-dire:—

1. Qu'en raison de la lenteur des voies de communication avec l'île en question vous vouliez bien m'avertir, aussitôt que possible, de la date approximative à laquelle le navire désigné à enlever l'oxyde arriverait à l'île, et que ce dernier ne s'y rende point avant que je vous annonce l'achèvement des dispositions nécessaires. A cet égard je me permets d'espérer qu'un avis de dix jours au minimum me serait accordé.

2. Que lorsque le navire (ou navires, s'il y en a davantage) quitte l'île après l'embarquement de la cargaison, ou les ouvriers employés soient ramenés par le dit vapeur, ou bien que des boutres servant à les reconduire au port d'où ils étaient sortis soient apprêtés afin qu'il ne reste sur l'île aucun élément provocateur d'émeute.

3. Que nos délégués respectifs y assistent afin de se faire une idée aussi exacte que praticable du poids de l'oxyde mis à bord, et si le tout n'est pas enlevé d'un seul chargement, du poids du restant, pour que cette question ne se fasse pas par la suite

l'origine d'un désaccord entre les partis en cause. Il se peut que vous jugerez bien de vous informer auprès de la maison Wonckhaus, et de me faire part des moyens lesquels se présentent à leur avis comme les plus simples pour faire ce posage.

Il va de soi que si tout l'amoncellement, autant qu'il soit, pouvait être enlevé par un seul vapeur, il en résulterait une diminution sensible de dérangement à tous, et si la quantité n'est pas excessive, je me permets d'exprimer l'espoir que vous ne trouverez pas d'inconvénient à donner des conseils à MM. Wonckhaus et Cie. dans le sens précité.

Dans la confiance que vous saurez vous mettre d'accord avec les dispositions susmentionnées, je prolite, &c.

Le Résident Britannique dans le Golfe Persique,
(Signé) P. Z. COX, *Major.*

(13.)

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Bushire, February* 12, 1908.

German Consul has agreed to proposals made in my letter of the 26th ultimo, and intimates that Messrs. Wonckhaus would like ship to be sent about middle of next month to Abu Musa. He explained, however, that greater portion of oxide has still, he understood, to be cleaned, so that it is not actually ready for shipment. Messrs. Wonckhaus desire to place a number of coolies on the island for three weeks before steamer arrives in order to carry out this operation, and I have been asked to give a guarantee against hindrance or molestation of these coolies. In reply I said that it is difficult, in view of fact that the firm would have no practical control over these coolies, to give formal guarantee for the state of things the preservation of which depends upon good conduct of firm's coolies no less than on that of retainers of Sheikh; but that I am ready to do my utmost to remove difficulties. Subject to the approval of the Government of India, which I anticipate, I have suggested, in order to simplify matters and to obviate necessity of such a guarantee, that, as arrangements would in all probability be made by Wonckhaus for Hassan Samayieh to supply coolie labour, I should inform Hassan, *qua* British subject, after securing concurrence of Sheikh, that he is at liberty to carry out for Messrs. Wonckhaus the cleaning and subsequent loading.

I trust that this will be approved by Government of India, and that, as time for arrangements is short, reply will be sent by telegraph. German Consul agrees provisionally. It appears to be unnecessary to locate one of our war vessels for the whole period, which would be involved by giving official guarantee, but I will send Agent to remain on island during the period.

(14.)

Government of India to Major Cox.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Calcutta, February* 16, 1908.

Abu Musa. Your telegram of the 12th instant.

Question of removal of oxide has been referred to Secretary of State, with request that he will send instructions to you direct. We see no objection to removal if precautions are taken to prevent fresh mining, and the coolies leave on departure of ship.

(15.)

Government of India to Major Cox.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Calcutta, February* 16, 1908.

Copy of third document of 1888 between Sheikhs Sagar and Salim should, if possible, be obtained and forwarded to me. Your telegram of the 12th instant has been repeated to Secretary of State.

(16.)

Government of India to Major Cox.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Calcutta, February* 16, 1908.

Your telegram of the 12th instant.

Matter has been referred to Secretary of State; it would, however, in our opinion, be preferable to follow procedure laid down in Foreign Office letter of the 8th ultimo.

(17.)

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *Bushire, February* 14, 1908.

Abu Musa. Please give for facility of reference numbers from 1 to 32 to the clauses of German firm's complaint, as set forth in Foreign Office Blue Book print of the 31st January.

Clause 1, regarding Sheikh Salim's precise rights on island. Further report will be sent after inquiry at Shargah. Salim has hitherto never attempted although present as Sheikh's adviser at all interviews held by myself and Consul, Bunder Abbas, with the Sheikh to assert over island or mines any independent rights of ownership.

Clause 2.—Third partner asserted in his complaint to Sheikh, dated the 20th February, 1907, that Hassan* [(had)] general power to act without† [(?)] other partners, and this is clearly corroborated by the second inclosure of the German case.

Clause 3.—See my telegram dated the 12th February. On the 10th October, Hassan, a British subject, sold a share of a Concession which no longer existed to Brown, another British subject. Theoretically, therefore, Brown should prosecute Hassan in British Court for obtaining money by false pretences, and Wonckhaus should proceed to enter a civil claim in British Court *versus* Brown for refund of price paid for a share of a concern which was non-existent.

Clause 4.—The Company also included a fourth party, apart from Wonckhaus, according to Inclosure 2 of German case.

Clause 7.—Inclosures 16 to 24 are new to me.

Clause 10.—See my telegram dated the 12th February regarding Brown's nationality. If he, a British subject, was attacked by British protected (?) person on island, why did he not make his complaint to the British Consular authorities? The identity of the alleged German employé is being investigated.

Clause 15.—The young "Esa" is a man of about 30 years of age with a family.

Clause 22.—It was at Brown's express bidding that the German contract was kept secret. A written statement to this effect by Hassan Samayieh in original is in my possession. Much less was it ever registered in a British Court or attested by British Agent, Lingah. Understanding injunctions the Trucial Chiefs are not to give Concessions without consulting British authorities. This is very necessary in order to prevent the exploitation of these unsophisticated Arabs by unscrupulous persons.

Clause 23.—The letter to which the German Inclosure 6 is a reply, and which they are careful to omit did not forward copy of document at all but merely gave a garbled purport thereof. As soon as the third partner, who knows no English, received a copy and got it translated into Arabic, he saw it was objectionable and repudiated it. The sentence "Annulment is preferable to its continuance" is a polite way of saying "It should be annulled." It is possible, as the contract was in English, that Hassan himself never accurately understood it or perhaps Brown gave him an incorrect Arabic translation of it.

Clauses 26 *and* 27.—33rd (of) German case seems (to) be based on fraudulent or invalid transaction between two British subjects.

Clause 32.—I will report after obtaining precise details.

Inclosure 1 to German case. The words "as long as they choose to possess" are not accurate rendering. It should be "as long as there is to them a purpose in the mines."

* [Did not have ?]

† Consent of ? Obscure. Might ask for repetition.

Inclosure 2. It is curious that this document should have been included. The probable motive was the impression that a certificate of his cognizance of and concurrence in German contract could be obtained from fourth partner, Ali, or his heir; but latter is believed to have rejected the German Consulate's overtures, and refused to give it. Point is being followed. It may not have.

Inclosure 3 is not on my record.

Inclosure 4 (*c*), Share in Oxide Company. It is possible that, as the arrangements for shipping accumulated oxide are progressing satisfactorily, the pressing urgency is removed, and I trust that, before making any reply to German case, it will be possible to await further report and submission of documents by me after local inquiries have been made.

The India Foreign Office Cypher Code should be used if it is desired to telegraph any instructions to me. I am now leaving for Lingah and Henjam.

(18.)

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Henjam, February* 18, 1908.

Your telegram of the 16th instant.

Hassan has retained for himself all proceeds received since the inception of German contract, including price of 800 tons shipped on board steam-ship "Teutonic." As share in the receipts is claimed by a fourth and possibly a fifth person, it might be well to arrange to hold in deposit any further cash balance due from Germans.

(19.)

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Henjam, February* 18, 1908.

See my last telegram relative to Abu Musa Island.

Intimation has reached me from Consul, Bunder Abbas, that shareholders mentioned in Inclosure 2 to German Case have submitted formal complaint to him, lodging a protest against German contract being executed without division of proceeds and without authority from shareholders of the Company. In these circumstances, I suggest that, in the interests of the shareholders of the Company, we should consider advisability of impounding Hassan's account book.

(20.)

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *Henjam, February* 18, 1908.

Please refer to correspondence regarding Abu Musa.

1. Information which I sent from Bushire regarding Brown's nationality needs correction. I find from inquiries made at Lingah that in 1901 he had British passport, and that when he has been in Lingah our Agent has occasionally afforded him assistance in connection with his private affairs.

2. Inclosure 4 D to German case is an indorsement recorded in Arabic on the original Inclosure 4 A, and follows Inclosures 4 B and 4 C. It is clear that Inclosure 4 E is a further indorsement on the same document. The Germans have the original paper, and the copy with concessionnaire does not include Indorsement 4 E. If 4 D was executed on the 10th October, then why, when Brown wrote his letter dated the 31st October to the Sheikh of Shargah, a copy of which was sent to Government of India under Bunder Abbas letter dated the 25th October? Did he not refer to it? It was probably arranged either before or during visit of Brown and son of concessionnaire Hassan to Bushire early in November 1907, as the outcome of which German Consul dispatched his assistant and also his letters of the 19th November mentioning transfer in question to Shargah.

(21.)

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Bushire, February* 9, 1908.

In continuation of my letter dated the 29th January, 1908, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the communication which I have now received from Dr. Listemann, Imperial German Consul at Bushire, in reply to my letter of the 26th January, 1908, regarding the removal of the oxide accumulated at Abu Musa.

2. I have not time before the mail leaves to consider it fully, but *primâ facie* the modifications suggested seem to me objectionable.

I shall communicate with Government by telegram, if necessary, before replying to Dr. Listemann.

(22.)

Herr Listemann to Major Cox.

M. le Consul-Général, *Bouchir, le* 8 *Février*, 1908.

En accusant réception de votre lettre en date du 26 Janvier concernant l'enlèvement de l'oxyde de fer de l'Ile d'Abou Mousa, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que la maison Wonckhaus et Cie, est prête à se conformer aux mesures que vous avez désignées comme nécessaires pour que les opérations de chargement, &c., puissent s'effectuer sans troubles.

Comme, dans une conversation que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir avec vous à ce sujet, il y a quelques jours, nous sommes convenus que les mesures à prendre, et que vous avez bien voulu me communiquer par votre lettre du 26 Janvier, soient modifiées en quelques points, je prends la liberté de résumer le contenu de ces mesures, telles que nous les avons fixées verbalement, et auxquelles la maison Wonckhaus est à même de se conformer,

1. La maison Wonckhaus a désigné, pour enlever l'oxyde en question, le vapeur "Louise," qui se rendra à Abou Mousa vers le milieu du mois de Mars. Je ne manquerai pas de vous faire connaître ultérieurement la date exacte de l'arrivée du bateau à Abou Mousa, dès que celle-ci pourra être fixée. Les travaux de nettoyage de l'oxyde, &c., à mentionner ci-dessous ne seront pas commencés avant que vous avez bien voulu m'informer que vos dispositions sont achevées.

2. Vu qu'une grande partie de l'oxyde amoncelé dans l'île doit encore être nettoyée avant le chargement, il est indispensable que des ouvriers en nombre suffisant soient envoyés à Abou Mousa, à peu près trois semaines avant le bateau susmentionné, pour procéder au nettoyage. J'ai donc l'honneur de vous prier de me faire savoir si vous voulez bien prendre aussi, comme pour les opérations de chargement, &c., la garantie que ces ouvriers ne soient pas dérangés ni troublés en aucune façon pendant leur travail.

Après le chargement, les dits ouvriers seront embarqués et quitteront l'île sur, ou en même temps que, le bateau en question.

3. Le pesage de l'oxyde qui resterait sur l'île après le départ du bateau étant, pour des raisons purement techniques, impossible à effectuer, des délégués de la maison Wonckhaus et Cie, d'une part, et de Hadji Hassan-bin-Ali Sammyieh, d'autre part, procéderont conjointement, après l'achèvement du chargement, à une estimation de la quantité d'oxyde restant amoncelé sur l'île et signeront, si vous le jugez nécessaire, en présence de nos délégués respectifs, un procès-verbal comme quoi ils sont tombés d'accord, d'après l'estimation susmentionnée, sur la quantité approximative d'oxyde restant amoncelé sur l'île.

La maison Wonckhaus fera tout son possible pour que tout l'oxyde soit enlevé par un seul bateau.

J'ose espérer, M. le Consul-Général, que vous voudrez bien, dans les conditions précitées, prendre la garantie que les opérations de nettoyage, chargement, &c., de l'oxyde ne soient point troublées, et que les ouvriers et employés qui y procéderont puissent accomplir leur tâche en toute sûreté personnelle.

Je prends, en même temps, la liberté de vous prier de bien vouloir prendre aussi vite que possible les mesures que vous jugerez nécessaires à cet effet, afin que les

travaux de nettoyage puissent commencer sans délai et que le vapeur "Louise" n'ait pas à subir un retard qui nécessairement causerait des frais considérables à la maison Wonckhaus et Cie.

En vous remerciant d'avance d'une obligeante réponse à ce sujet, je vous prie, &c.

Le Consul Impérial d'Allemagne,
(Signé) H. LISTEMANN.

(23.)

Government of India to Major Cox.

(Telegraphic.) *Calcutta, February* 21, 1908.

Abu Musa. Please see your telegram dated the 29th January.
Secretary of State telegraphs, dated the 17th February, 1908:—

"I approve action of Resident."

(24.)

Government of India to Major Cox.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Calcutta, February* 21, 1908.

Affairs in Abu Musa Island. [Your telegrams of the 18th instant.

Precise object to be gained by action proposed is not apparent. Would it not be better, now that shareholders have lodged formal protest, to leave Consular Courts at Bunder Abbas, in exercise of its regular functions, to take whatever action is practicable?

(25.)

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Bushire, March* 10, 1908.

Abu Musa. Your telegram dated the 21st February.

Pending the consideration of the papers by the Foreign Department, I thought it best to defer instructions to the Consul at Bunder Abbas. I should be glad to be informed whether he should now take up the suit of Nejef-bin-Nakhoda Ali. This procedure would, I presume, include the impounding of account books.

If any amendments are desired in the wording of the documents recently written by Sheikh Sagar, Sheikh Salim, Esa-bin-Abdul Latif, and Nejef-bin-Nakhoda Ali, they could probably be effected in fresh documentary form by the [? time] our case reaches London.

With regard to the deed of transfer to German firm, dated the 16th October, 1907, am I to call upon Brown, in his capacity as a British subject, to produce it (either the original or a copy) for the information of the Foreign Office?

Inclosure 3 in No. 3.

Major Cox to Government of India.

Sir, *Bushire, March* 1, 1908.

IN amplification of information furnished by telegram, I have the honour to submit material according to the attached list, for the consideration of Government in connection with the preparation of a rejoinder to the German arguments, on the subject of the Abu Musa dispute. Nearly all the documents are sent in duplicate.

2. As the German case acknowledges the sovereignty of Shargah over Abu Musa, I have not thought it necessary to furnish evidence especially upon that point.

3. The several compilations are in a great measure self-contained, and hardly need separate comment here, but I have a few other observations to make on miscellaneous points which I have found it impossible to complete for to-night's post. They will follow by telegraph or next post.

4. I venture to suggest that when the papers are communicated to His Majesty's Government, comparative Christian-Mahommedan almanacs be forwarded with them for the years to which the dates refer in order that the admixture of Christian and Mahommedan dates may not cause confusion. I have been unable to obtain them here in time for inclusion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) P. Z. COX, *Major*,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

LIST OF SUB-INCLOSURES.

I A.—(i.) A Memorandum on the connection of the Jowasim clan, the ruling Chief of Shargah, and Sheikh Salim-bin-Sultan respectively, with Abu Musa Island, as indicated by the archives of the Bushire Residency.

(ii.) Three Agreements between Sheikh Sagar and Sheikh Salim in 1883, 1884, and 1889.

I B.—(i.) Letter dated the 19th Moharrum, 1326, and Memorandum from Sheikh Sagar, giving his exposition of the position of his uncle and himself in regard to Abu Musa.

(ii.) Letter from Sheikh Salim-bin-Sultan, dated the 18th Moharrum, 1326, frankly repudiating any personal claims of ownership to mines or island.

(iii.) Miscellaneous papers showing that Sheikh Salim-bin-Sultan, after being ousted from the Sheikhship, had no jurisdiction anywhere, and that in granting lease he was doing so as officiating Chief of Shargah.

II A.—(i.) Correspondence showing that Hassan-bin-Ali Sammiyeh intentionally deceived and kept his partners in the dark throughout the proceedings in regard to the deed of Agreement with the German firm; also

(ii.) Statement regarding the working of the Oxide Company by Esa-bin-Abdul Latif.

II B.—(i.) Partnership of Nakhoda Ali and Mr. T. Malcolm; and

(ii.) Claims by heir of Nakhoda Ali and Esa-bin-Abdul Latif against Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Sammiyeh on account of his suppression of transactions and accounts and non-division of profits.

II C.—(i.) Copy of transfer indorsement dated the 16th October, 1907, between Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Sammiyeh and Mr. Brown.

(ii.) Sheikh Sagar's letter of protest against same.

III.—Evidence recorded regarding expulsion of German dhow from Abu Musa on the 23rd October, 1907, in course of which some shots were fired.

IV.—Nationality of Mr. Thomas Brown and Haji Ali Tashanker.

I A.—(i.) *Memorandum showing the connection of the Jowasim Clan, the Ruling Chief of Shargah, and Sheikh Salim-bin-Sultan, respectively, with Abu Musa Island, as indicated by the Archives of the Bushire Residency.*

More than a century and a-half ago the Chiefs of the Jowasim Clan of Arabs, at that time paramount in authority on what was known as the "pirate coast" of Oman; with head-quarters at Ras-el-Khaima and Shargah, crossed over to the Persian Coast with their war craft and captured the port of Lingah and other places on the coast. There they remained in occupation for upwards of a century, one of the ruling family from Ras-el-Khaima, acting as Chief of the branch of the tribe which remained on the Persian Coast; having its seat of Government at Lingah, but remaining subject to the overlordship of the ruling Chief of the head-quarters of the tribe, then at Ras-el-Khaima.

At that time as now practically all the islands in the Gulf were permanently or at certain seasons tenanted by Arabs tribes; and several of them, including Abu Musa, by the Jowasim. In the pearling season the tribal fishing-boats would have recourse to these islands for water or for refuge from stress of weather; in the spring, after rain, the various Sheikhs would send their horses and flocks for grazing, and in

the winter parties of their subjects habitually sojourned in the islands for fishing purposes. Time went on and the sections of the Jowasim on the Persian Coast after some generations became as it were permanent settlers there and quarrels began to arise between parties of them and their kinsmen from Oman sojourning on the islands, when their grazing interests clashed. In order to put an end to this recurrent friction the Chiefs of the Clan came to a friendly understanding under which particular islands were henceforth to be used exclusively by different portions of the tribe. Under this understanding Abu Musa fell to the Shargah branch, and the arrangement then made has never been disturbed.

While not ordinarily intervening in the internal politics of the Jowasim or other Arab tribes in Treaty relations with them, the British authorities have in practice recognized this position, and, in pursuance of their time honoured policy of maintaining the "maritime truce," the principles of which, as we have specifically notified to the tribes, are held to apply to the islands of the Gulf as well as its waters, we have interfered in the present instance in so far as that when alien tribesmen from Dubai and elsewhere have attempted to send their flocks for grazing, or otherwise to meddle with Abu Musa Sir Bu Nuair Islands, they have been directed either to desist or first obtain the acquiescence of the ruling Sheikh of Shargah in their proceedings.

It is true that on one or two occasions the Persian Government, apparently from ignorance or misconception of the history of these islands generally, have attempted to insinuate a claim to Abu Musa, but in 1888, when this claim was first asserted, in conjunction with a similar one in connection with Sirri, Colonel E. C. Ross, for eighteen years Resident in the Persian Gulf, writing to Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, on the 28th April, 1888, observed: "The claim now put forward to the Island of Abu Musa has no justification whatever and any attempt to assert Persian authority there in a practical form would lead to disturbance."

Again in April 1904 when an over-zealous Belgian Customs official proceeded to the island and incontinently hauled down the Shargah flag and hoisted the Persian emblem in its place, the Persian Government was called upon to repair the unwarranted affront, and a British man-of-war was sent to see that it had been done and that the Arab flag was replaced with due ceremony. Thus, as far as the Jowasim are concerned the position which existed from time immemorial has been maintained up to the present moment, and every year in the spring, when and after rain has fallen and vegetation made its appearance, the ruling Sheikh of Shargah and his immediate relations have been in the habit of sending their live-stock to graze on the island.

So much for the abstract history of Abu Musa as an appanage of Shargah. We may now turn to the aspects brought into relief by the present misunderstanding in connection with the grant of a Concession for mining oxide on the island.

In the year 1883, the ruling Chief of Shargah was Sheikh Salim-bin-Sultan. He had held the reins of tribal Government for about eighteen years, but his régime was a weak and unpopular one.

This Sheikh had taken a particular and enterprising interest in Abu Musa and had planted some date groves and built himself a rough residence there. In the spring of 1883 he was according to his habit spending a few weeks there with the tribal horses and flocks and had left his nephew, Sagar-bin-Khalid, a young man of about 25 years of age, in charge of his head-quarters at Shargah.

Among these Arab Chieftains the principle of "might is right" prevails, and Sagar-bin-Khalid, finding that the majority of the tribesmen of the principality were tired of his uncle's rule, and ready to support himself in a *coup d'état*, seized the government and proclaimed himself Sheikh on the 4th April, 1883, informing the Resident of his action.

The British authorities leave these questions of personnel to the will of the tribes concerned, and usually do no more than recognize the individual whom the support and choice of the tribe puts in a position to handle the reins of government; and in this case Sheikh Sagar received recognition in due course. As soon as he had made sure of his position he addressed the Resident (on the 17th May, 1883) saying that he now proposed to expel Sheikh Salim from Abu Musa. In reply he was reminded that the Residency had in former years specifically notified to the Trucial Chiefs that the principles of the maritime truce must be held to apply to the islands as well as the seas of the Persian Gulf, and that he should consequently endeavour to arrange a peaceable settlement with his uncle.

Simultaneously Sheikh Salim left Abu Musa for Lingah, and thence wrote to the Resident asking his good offices. He in turn was advised to remain in Lingah (it being more convenient for purposes of communication) until he could come to an understanding with Sheikh Sagar.

Being in the weaker position Salim soon came to terms and a settlement guaranteed by the Sheikhs of Ras-el-Khaima and Dubai was arrived at in July 1883, under which Sheikh Salim was to receive a pension of 600 dollars per annum for his maintenance.

A copy of the settlement is attached. Sheikh Salim, however, found it difficult to refrain from intriguing against his nephew, in the hope, no doubt, of getting back the Sheikhdom.

Thus, on the 21st January, 1884, Sheikh Sagar complained to the Resident of his uncle's conduct, and in the course of his letter he wrote:—

"At present you are aware that Salim resides on Bu Musa, which is an island dependent on Shargah, and I cannot spare it to others, and perhaps Salim may create some disturbance which may break the maritime peace. I beg, therefore, that you will kindly warn Salim and inform him that if he is desirous of living at Abu Musa he must do so peaceably, you being his guarantee that nothing wrong will be done by him of a nature to disturb the maritime peace. But should he not choose to obey it will be your choice either to remove him from the island or to leave us to settle the matter between us, and in that case we should not be called to account in the event of our attacking one another. I leave the matter to your disposition."

In reply the Sheikh was informed that if either party broke the maritime peace he would be promptly repressed.

About this time the Sheikhs of Ras-el-Khaima and Dubai also complained to the Resident against Sheikh Salim's violation of the Agreement, guaranteed as it had been by themselves.

On the 14th February following Sheikh Sagar again wrote to the Resident, politely urging that it was all very well for him to say that whoever broke the maritime peace, would be repressed, but reminding him that Abu Musa was his—Sheikh Sagar's property—a hereditary appanage of Shargah. He added:—

"If Salim wants to live there and guarantees that he will not commit anything which would interfere with my affairs, or disturb the maritime peace, so be it; but I cannot dispense with this island, which is of the greatest use to me. I beg, therefore, that you will plainly write to me on the subject, and likewise instruct your agent."

On this letter was recorded an office note to the following effect:—

"Sheikh Sagar seems to insist that if Salim continues to live on Bu Musa he should give a guarantee through the Resident that he will not do anything to disturb him, Sheikh Sagar, or the maritime peace."

On the 5th April Sheikh Sagar wrote the Resident another letter pressing for a reply to the above. He added that he had communicated his precise object in writing to the Residency Agent, who would explain it. This was that now that spring had arrived he wished to send his horses as usual for grazing, and was not sure whether Sheikh Salim would leave them and their caretakers in peace. If the Resident would not allow him to make his own arrangements for ensuring safety of life and property on the island he wanted an assurance from the Residency that his stud would not be molested by Sheikh Salim.

Sheikh Salim, however, who was now getting into financial straits, solved the difficulty himself. He made an appeal to the Residency alleging that Sheikh Sagar and the guarantors of the Agreement of 1883 had not stood by the terms of it; that they had taken away the State horses which as Sheikh of Shargah he had with him on the island when his nephew ousted him from the Sheikhdom, that he, Sheikh Salim, had had to sell all he possessed to maintain himself and now had nothing left, and that he had now come to beg his nephew to provide him with the wherewithal for a bare living. He declared that if he got this he would remain in peace and quietude. Finally he begged our Agent to intercede for him, and to induce Sheikh Sagar to act up to the Agreement.

By the advice of the Residency Agent, Sheikh Sagar, who had found the 600 dollars somewhat too much for his purse, consented to pay his uncle a reduced allowance of 400 dollars annually, half of which only was to be paid in cash and the

other half in grain and other articles. He also promised to assign to Sheikh Salim the revenue of the Island of Sir Abu Nuair, which contained some salt deposits and was expected to bring in about 200 dollars more. A document in the above sense was drawn up at a meeting at Ajman and there ratified. When reporting the conclusion of this Agreement the Residency Agent mentioned that Sheikh Salim was at present going on a visit to Ras-el-Khaima and that his family would spend the hot weather there and the winter on Abu Musa. Things went on smoothly after this for a time, but the two Sheikhs eventually got at loggerheads again and in April 1889 our Agent reported that Salim had endeavoured to raise an attack on Shargah. On getting wind of his uncle's intentions Sheikh Sagar, as usual, asked the advice of the British Agent and the latter soon succeeded in bringing about a friendly meeting between the two resulting in the framing of a third Agreement in supercession of the preceding ones. This was to the following effect; Sheikh Sagar bound himself to pay his now aged uncle the 400 dollar pension regularly and to permit him to return to the mainland of Oman and to live where he pleased within certain limits. He also offered to take Sheikh Salim into his service as Vizier or chief adviser and to consult him in all matters affecting the interests of the State. Sheikh Salim in turn undertook to serve his nephew in obedience and loyalty.

No mention was made of Sir Bu Nuair in this Agreement because it had hitherto disappointed previous expectations and had not brought in anything.

The above has held good and no further documentary agreement has since been necessary. On the conclusion of it Sheikh Salim came to live in Shargah as his nephew's adviser and for some years past the two have been the best of friends, so much so that when Sheikh Sagar leaves his head-quarters, which he not infrequently does, he always leaves his uncle to officiate in the Government of Shargah, as he did, for instance, on his departure for the Mecca pilgrimage in 1897–8.

It was on return from the said pilgrimage in 1898 that his uncle informed him of the grant of the Abu Musa Oxide Concession; when, in view of the fact that since the reduction of his pension from 600 to 400 dollars, Sheikh Salim had always been complaining of the paucity of his income, Sheikh Sagar as an act of generosity decided to let his uncle enjoy the 250 dollars annual rent fixed for the Concession and thereby cease to have cause for further discontent.

From first to last, however, Sheikh Sagar's acquiescence in his uncle's enjoyment of the produce and income of the island in question, has been purely a personal and verbal arrangement which Sheikh Sagar might, at any time, have terminated had he chosen to do so. No deed whatever, according to the statements of the two Sheikhs themselves, has ever been given by Sheikh Sagar to his uncle in regard to this island, although the Island of Sir Abu Nuair did find mention in the second Agreement as above mentioned, dropping out again in the third and last because it had never brought in any income.

Stronger proof of the status of the island could hardly be wanted than the declarations furnished by the two Sheikhs themselves.

(Signed) P. Z. COX.

February 28, 1908.

I A.—(ii.) *Three Agreements between Sheikh Sagar and Sheikh Salim of* 1883, 1884, *and* 1889.

Agreement of 1883 *between Sheikh Sagar and Sheikh Salim.*

Note.

In reply to the German case it seems unnecessary for us in the first instance to go behind the third Agreement of 1889, which is still in operation, the others having lapsed.

If, however, it is considered advisable for us to refer to this Agreement of 1883 in detail, it would seem prudent, in order to preclude misunderstanding, to give an explanation of the reference to Abu Musa Island in the text of Sheikh Salim's undertaking. Read by itself, the terms of this document would perhaps enable the German Government to argue corroboration for the assertion made in their case to the effect that Sheikh Salim was the owner of the island, and not Sheikh Sagar. In point of fact the explanation of the reference is natural and simple.

As stated in my Memorandum on the status of Abu Musa, it had been the custom from time immemorial for the Sheikhs of Shargah to send their State and private horses and live-stock over to graze on the island every spring, and at the time when Sheikh Sagar seized the government from his uncle it will be remembered that the latter was spending his yearly visit to the island, and had a number of the State horses with him.

After the *coup d'état* the disposal of these horses became one of the chief difficulties in the way of a friendly settlement; but eventually Salim had to give them up.

While, therefore, in the interests of peace, acquiescing in Sheikh Salim's taking up his residence on the island for the present, Sheikh Sagar naturally did not wish to forgo the convenient practice of sending his stud over to graze; on the other hand, for him to have sent them over without being able to take any adequate steps to insure their safety would have been to put in Salim's hands a simple and effective means of annoying his nephew by interfering with his horses. Sheikh Sagar therefore got Salim to give him a written assurance that while he resided in Abu Musa Sheikh Sagar could send over his horses as usual without apprehension.

Letter from Shargah Agent, dated 12 *Ramadan,* 1300 (*July* 19, 1883).

I received a letter from Salim-bin-Sultan asking me to meet him at Debay, but I could not go on account of the wind. I also received letters from Sakar-bin-Khalid and the Chief of Ras-el-Khaimah by the hand of their agent, Yusuf-al-Shareef, asking me to assist in effecting a fair arrangement between Salim and Sakar, so that Salim might not attack Shargah. I saw Sakar, and understood that he wanted an arrangement. He asked me to guarantee the conditions, but I refused. I and the agent, Yusuf-al-Shareef, consulted and approved of the Chiefs of Ras-el-Khaimah and Debay being guarantees, to which Sakar consented. I, Yusuf-al-Shareef, and Haji Mahomed Khalfan then went to Salim at Debay. He consented to what we proposed. The documents, of which I inclose copies, were given by Sakar and Salim to each other. Besides the conditions mentioned in them, Sakar will deliver up all arms, household utensils, slaves, male and female, and their families, belonging to Salim. When these arrive at Debay, Salim will send a man to Lingah to make over the horses there to Sakar according to list. I wished Sakar and Salim to meet, but they did not consent. On the 18th July Sakar took the document of agreement and left for Shargah. It is understood that Salim will not concern himself about the other sons of Sultan-bin-Sakar. I hear that Ahmad-bin-Sultan is going to Debay. Ibrahim-bin-Sultan is at Ajman. Salim's intention is to stay at Abu Musa during the spring, and at other seasons at Ras-el-Khaimah and Ajman.

Agreement of 1883.

I, Sakar-bin-Khalid, bind myself by this deed to pay to Salim-bin-Sultan every year 600 dollars in four monthly instalments of 200 dollars each, two-thirds in produce and one-third in money. I will also pay the debts contracted by him while Chief of Shargah. His property in Shargah and Debay, shops, houses, and date trees are his; he may appoint an agent to manage them and I will protect him. If Salim should live in a town other than Shargah or its dependencies and I should have a difference with the town, he will not interfere. All his people may visit Shargah in safety, while he respects this compact between us.

(Signed) SAKAR-BIN-KHALID.

11 *Ramadan*, 1300.

I, Hamaid-bin-Abdullah, am security for Sakar-bin-Khalid. If he infringes this agreement, I will side with Salim in everything.

(Signed) HAMAID-BIN-ABDULLAH.

Eight witnesses.

Note.—The above is the translation forwarded to Government with Colonel Ross's letter No. 165, dated the 8th August, 1883, but it is very free; I, therefore, attach a literal translation with the Arabic version.—P. Z. C.

Agreement of 1883.

I, Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid, have given and undertaken to pay to my "father,"* Sheikh Salim-bin-Sultan, a sum of 600 dollars per annum, by instalments, every four months 200 dollars; two-thirds in live-stock and one-third in money. I will also settle for him such debts as he incurred during the period of his rulership of Shargah, until he has got free of them. He has no further responsibility in that connection. The real property which he owns in Shargah such as houses, go-downs in the bazaar, and date-groves, they can remain for him, as also the date-grove at Dhaid. He is to appoint an agent for superintending his repairs and collecting the harvest, and I also will, myself, assist the agent in his supervision, if there should arise any difficulty.

Similarly, if my "father,"* Sheikh Salim, should desire to live in one of the townships other than Shargah or its suburbs, such as Khan or Haira, and if there should be any enmity between me and them, he will not concern himself with it, and provided that I have not molested him (Sheikh Salim), he will not hinder me from hostilities against the people of the town where he resides. The second condition will be that everybody belonging to him is at liberty to do his business at Shargah and shall be immune from harm either as to person or property; so long as Sheikh Salim abides by the conditions existing between him and me according to these presents. This is ratified by an oath in the name of God and of honest dealing, and no artifice or deception shall enter into these terms.

(Signed) SAGAR-BIN-KHALID.

11 *Ramazan*, 1300.

I, Hamaid-bin-Abdullah, am security for Sheikh Sakar-bin-Khalid. If he infringes this agreement, I will side with Salim in everything.

(Signed) HAMAID-BIN-ABDULLAH.

Undertaking given by Sheikh Salim to Sheikh Sagar in connection with Agreement of 1883.

I, Salim-bin-Sultan, forgive Sakar-bin-Khalid for what he had done, and will advise him truly and honestly while he wishes it, and while this compact holds good. If Sakar wishes to send his horses in the spring to the island he may appoint his own horse-keepers and send them.

(Signed) SALIM-BIN-SULTAN.

11 *Ramadhan*, 1300.

I, Hamaid-bin-Abdullah, am security for Sheikh Salim. If he infringes this compact, I will side with Sakar.

(Signed) HAMAID-BIN-ABDUELLAH.

I, Hashar-bin-Maktoom, am security for Salim. If he infringes these conditions, I will help Sakar.

(Signed) HASHAR-BIN-MAKTOOM.

Two witnesses.

Note.—The above is the translation sent to Government with Colonel Ross's letter No. 165 of the 8th August, 1883, but the following is the correct rendering of Arabic version (attached): "I, Salim-bin-Sultan, have become satisfied (or reconciled) with the son,† Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid, in regard to what has been done by him, and I have taken upon myself the oath of God and of honest dealing to the effect that I will not direct my energies in directions prejudicial to him nor join his enemies against him. Also should my son† Sagar wish to send his horses to the island and to depute his own caretakers he is free to do so as long as he abides by the conditions recorded in the written agreement."

---

* The word "father" here is simply used as a mark of respect for a much older man (really his uncle).—P. Z. C.

† The word "son" here is simply used in a patronizing or affectionate way, analogous to the use of "father" on preceding document.—P. Z. C.

Second Agreement of 1884.

Abdul Latif to Resident, Persian Gulf.

(After compliments.) *Shargah, June* 24, 1884.

On the 14th June Sheikh Salem-bin-Sultan sent me word that he wanted to see me at Ajman. I saw him there on the 16th June. He complained that the Sheikh of Shargah had broken the promise and agreement made by him, copy of which I sent to you in my report, dated the 19th July, 1883, and which bore my signature. He said this was done without any fault on his part; they took away the horses he had with him, and the persons who had guaranteed the arrangement also failed to stand by their promise because they were related to the Sheikh of Shargah. That he had sold all he owned to meet his expenses, and now possessed nothing; that he was there to ask the Chief of Shargah to furnish him with a bare living, and if he got this he would remain in peace and quietude; that he wanted me to intercede for him and make the Chief of Shargah stand by his agreement; if he did not do so then he would break his promise to me not to cause disturbance to Shargah and its dependencies; that he was determined to create disturbance by land; that he could not suffer longer; either he would gain his object or die in the attempt.

I replied to him that I could not force the Chief of Shargah, but I would give him my advice and use good offices for a compromise that it was not advisable for him to create disturbance and attack the place as then the Resident would hold him responsible for any losses which the British subjects might sustain.

I found that he was quite determined to attack Shargah, and that some of the Bedouins, as the Beni Katab, Naeem, and the Chief of Hamryah had promised him their assistance in the attack, which was to be on the 5th day of Ramandhan (30th June, 1884); while the generality of Shargah people do not like the rule of the Chief as he is a weak ruler; each head of a tribe considers himself an independent Sheikh.

So I returned to Shargah and informed the Sheikh about the matter, and the determination of Salem-bin-Sultan.

On this the Chief of Shargah consented to grant him a pension of 400 dollars annually, half to be in cash, and the rest in grain and other articles, and he promised to grant him also the revenue of the Island of Saer Bu Na'air, which sometimes amounts to about 200 dollars. He would also give him on account of past year 250 dollars. I then sent Haji Mahomed-bin-Khalfan Hyderabader on my behalf to accompany Ahmed-bin-Ali on behalf of the Chief to Ajman. They have made the necessary arrangements and returned.

Then on the 22nd June I took Sheikh Sake and the principal merchants with me, and proceeded to Ajman, where a cordial meeting took place between the Chief and his uncle Salem-bin-Sultan; and a document of agreement was written as above. For the sum of 400 dollars, to be paid annually, Hasan-bin-Abdullah, Ahmed-bin-Ali, and Ibrahim-bin-Bhalhan stood guarantee.

This will be paid in quarterly instalments, commencing from the month of Shawal (1301).

Of the 250 dollars on account of last year, within two days they have promised to pay 200 dollars, and the balance of 50 dollars will be paid after the "Eid." The matter was arranged as detailed above, and we all returned to Shargah. Salem-bin-Sultan intends going on a visit to Ras-el-Khymah, and his family will spend the hot weather there, and will return in cold weather to the Island of Bu Musa.

Third Agreement of 1889.

Sagar-bin-Khalid to Abdul Latif.

(After compliments.) 2 *Shauban*, 1306 (*April* 3, 1889).

With reference to the matters in reference to which you acted as intermediary between me and Salim-bin-Sultan with a view to his being reconciled to me, and the meeting which we had, I hereby take upon myself the oath of God and of sincerity, so that he who fears may feel secure. There shall be no deceit and no duplicity in the

fulfilment of the conditions which I gave to Sheikh Salim in regard to the display of honour and liberality towards him and in my exchanging views with him in matters affecting our interests, and in the payment to him of the amount of his fixed pension, namely 400 French dollars, and I will not give any one's opinion preference to his, and he can live where he pleases from among the following particular places: Shargar, or Khan, or Hijra. And I hope that God will prosper relations between us and will make the result auspicious both for him and me. This is what had to be written.

(Seal of Sagar-bin-Khalid.)

Note.—This document was preliminary to the Agreement; perhaps its presence is hardly necessary, the text of the Agreement itself being sufficient.—P. Z. C.

Agreement of 1889, *dated* 5 *Shaaban*, 1306 (*April* 6, 1889).

This is what we have assembled to arrange. We have come to an agreement in the name of God and in all sincerity, without trickery and deceit, we the Sheikhs Salim-bin-Sultan and Sagar-bin-Khalid through the mediation of Abdul Latif-bin-Abdurrahman, the Agent of Government. What I, Sheikh Sagar, have bound myself to do in regard to Sheikh Salim is that I will continue the payment of the pension fixed at 400 dollars per annum, and will show him honour and complete magnanimity, and will exchange views with him in regard to matters needing consultation and expression of opinion; and in these which are needful in our own interests, and I will not put my one's opinion before his, and he can live where he likes—from Khan to Hijra.

And what I, Sheikh Salam, have bound myself to do in regard to Sheikh Sagar is to fulfil the obligations of docility and obedience and the display of energy in advising him in matters affecting our interests inwardly and outwardly. And if we came to know of anything in the way of misunderstanding that might tend to cause soreness in our minds one against the other, then we will explain it to one another with a view to the removal of misunderstanding and the suppression of the efforts of the mischiefmakers and intriguers to make misunderstanding between us. And of our own wish and pleasure we have bound ourselves to the British Government to the effect that in the event of any violation on the part of either of us of what is outlined in this deed in the way of conditions, he will be worthy of being held responsible, and will accept what results to him in the way of punishment and revenge from the aforesaid Government as a recompense for his breach. This is what was arranged and settled peaceably. We hope that God will prosper the results of it between us in the direction of prosperity and happiness.

Executed and written 5th Shaaban, 1306.

(Signed) SAGAR-BIN-KHALID (by his own hand).
SALIM-BIN-SULTAN (ditto).
IBRAHIM-BIN-SULTAN.

In.—(i.) *Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid to Major Cox.*

(After compliments:) 10*th Moharram*, 1326.

As you are aware, on the 19th Moharram, 1325, we decided to annul the deed of contract for the oxide contract of Abu Musa, which was in the hands of Haji Hassan-bin-Ali-Sanayieh and his partners, and subsequently we expelled his workmen from the island. We now learn that Haji Hassan-bin-Ali-Sanayieh, on the 10th October, 1907, that is to say, after eight months after the annulment of the Concession, sold a share in the Oxide Company, which had formerly belonged to Yusuf-bin-Abdulla. How could this person possibly sell a share in a concern which a long time since had been done away with wholly and entirely? And seeing that the procedure of Haji Hassan is against all principles, and his motive is to create confusion, it is necessary for me to inform you that I am unable to accept or agree to this action, and, in view of the fact that the buyer and seller are dependents of the British Government, I request that you will take steps for the suppression of these objectionable proceedings.

And whereas you have inquired of me the nature of Sheikh Salim's connection Abu Musa, your Honour must be fully aware of the circumstances, namely, that

since the time of my assuming the Government of Shargah and its dependencies, I have left the income of the Island of Abu Musa for the subsistence of my uncle Sheikh Salim so long as he remains steadfast in his loyalty to and concord with myself; and his sojourn there has been with my acquiescence and at my will, and my honoured uncle Sheikh Salim in no wise denies this, and as you will see from his letter to me in which he details the true facts of the position in which we are placed toward each other in this connection. For your information, I send you Sheikh Salim's letter in original. Furthermore, I have recorded in a note the nature of the position in regard to Abu Musa in detail from beginning to end so that you may be aware of it. This is what had to be explained.

(Signature and seal of Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid.)

Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid's Explanation of the Position in regard to Abu Musa.

In reference to the Island of Abu Musa, it is well known to everybody that it is the property of the Sheikhs of the Jowasim of Oman, and on that point there is no doubt. As to the residence of my uncle in it, the facts of the matter are as explained below:—

From olden days, from the time of my ancestors Sheikh Sultan and others, it was their habit in the days of spring, after a fall of rain and the sprouting of vegetation, to send their live-stock to the Island of Abu Musa for grazing, and also a number of our subjects from Shargah and Khan habitually sojourned on the island during the winter for fishing purposes, and had houses and huts there. In the year 1300 Hijri Sheikh Salim, who was then ruling Chief of Shargah, after sending his live-stock there as usual, went over to the island, and by the fate ordained by God the populace called upon me to become their Ruler in place of Sheikh Salim, and I accepted their call and occupied the post of the Sheikhdom. It was then open to me to expel Sheikh Salim from Abu Musa Island, and I addressed the Resident in the Persian Gulf on the subject in letters which must be available on your records; the first was dated the 22nd Rabi-ul-Awal, 1301, and the second the 14th Rabi II, 1301, but the Resident pressed me to make a peaceable settlement so that there might be no cause for a breach of the maritime peace. Accordingly we agreed that I would set apart for Sheikh Salim a pension for his subsistence—every year 600 dollars. That settlement afterwards became void by my not being able to pay the amount fixed, and subsequently a second agreement was come to between us under which I was to pay him yearly 400 dollars and also the income derived from the Island of Sir Abu Nuair, which was expected to approach 200 dollars. This agreement also became void, and in the year 1300 we made a third agreement with Sheikh Salim by the mediation of the Government Agent, and in view of the fact that up to this agreement no income had been obtainable from Sir Abu Nuair for Sheikh Salim, mention of the island was omitted and his pension remained at the previous figure of 400 dollars, but I now agreed to the return of Sheikh Salim to Shargah, and I took him into my service. Then, later on in the year 1315, I went on the Mecca pilgrimage and appointed Sheikh Salim to act for me in the Shargah Government, and on my return Sheikh Salim informed me that he had been afforded an opportunity, and had seen it to our interest, to lease the mines of Abu Musa to three persons subject to the British Government. I did not repudiate it, and saw nothing objectionable in it, and so I acquiesced in it; and seeing that Sheikh Salim had ceased not to complain that the sum of 400 dollars was not sufficient for his subsistence, I voluntarily set aside the amount of this rent for him, that it might make up his subsistence, so that the total of what came in to him yearly might be 600 dollars as before, and over, and that no cause of soreness might be left to him on account of the paucity of his allowance. I have absolutely not given him any deed in connection with the island nor in regard to the mines therein; all I did was to relinquish the income to him, in the way of financial assistance from me to him, and it was done voluntarily and at my own discretion. And I have not ceased in the days of spring in years when there has been rain and herbage to send my live-stock to the island for grazing purposes, as has been our custom from of old; and my flag ceases not to fly there.

Such are the facts of the matter, and I have recorded them for your information.

(Signature and seal of Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid-bin-Sultan.)

I B.—(ii.) *Sheikh Salim-bin-Sultan to Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid.*

(After compliments.) 18*th Moharrum*, 1326 (*February* 21, 1908).

I WRITE to inform your honour that whereas I have come to know that Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Samayich and the friends who advise him assert that the oxide mines which are in the Island of Abu Musa are my personal property, and that the lease which was issued by me to Haji Hassan and his partners was given by me in my own right, and not by proxy, in your behalf. I fear that this statement may become a cause of ill-feeling between us; I have therefore thought it necessary to apprise your honour of it, and to acquaint you with what is in my mind, namely, that I absolutely made no such claim as that which interested parties allege; and I hereby admit that when I came before you in the presence of the British Agent on the 4th Shaaban, 1301, I had no pension or means of subsistence, and you were kind enough to place the Island of Abu Musa under my supervision, so that I might cultivate therein and reap from it the means of subsistence, and you did so conditionally that I showed loyalty and concord and obedience to you in all respects; and I am well aware that the island in question and the mines which are in it belong to your honour, and that you might at any time decide to take the island from my charge—it is at your disposition to do so, and I have no status or power to gainsay you; and when I leased the mines of Abu Musa I was officiating on your behalf, and the Concession was given by proxy for you; and I was well aware that on your return from the pilgrimage to Mecca, if you considered that my action in the matter of the Concession was good, you would confirm what I had agreed to, and if in your opinion it was objectionable, you could annul it either at the time or at any other time; and I altogether disapprove of the proceedings of Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Samayich in regard to this lease, and in respect of whatever action you took in this connection, that is, in cancelling the document, I was acting in accord with you, seeing that your action was taken in consultation with me and for the interests of us all, and in no respect have I any view contrary to yours; and it is in order to dispel doubt from your mind and as an evidence of my singleness of view with you that I have written this, so that you may have cognizance.

(Signature and seal of Salim-bin-Sultan.)

I B.—(iii.) *Miscellaneous Papers.*

Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid to Resident, Persian Gulf.

(After compliments.) *January* 21, 1884.

Previous to this I wrote to you a letter, but received no reply. I hope nothing untoward has prevented you from doing so. You are acquainted with the arrangements which were effected between me and Sheikh Salem, through the medium of Sheikh Hamid-bin-Abdullah and Hashar-bin-Maktoom. At present the above Sheikhs met at Shargali, and desired Salem to stand by the agreement and arrangement effected by them between me and him. But he did not wish to do so, consequently they have absolved themselves of all responsibility, and revoked their guarantee which they had tended on our behalf, and the arrangements effected between us have been dissolved.

At present you are aware that Salem resides at Abu Musa, which is an island dependent on Shargah, and we cannot spare it to others. Perhaps Salem may create some disturbance which may break the maritime peace. I beg therefore to request that you will kindly warn Salem, and inform him that if he is desirous of living at Abu Musa, he must do so with peace, giving you as a guarantee that nothing wrong will be done by him which will disturb the maritime peace. But should he not choose to do so, it will be your choice either to remove him from the island or leave us to settle the matter between us; and we should not be called to answer in the event of our attacking each other. I leave the matter to your disposal.

Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid to Resident, Persian Gulf.

(After compliments.) *February* 14, 1884.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 2nd February, 1884, per Mirza Abdul Kasim, and I understand its contents to the effect that anyone attempting to break the maritime peace, whether he be Salem or any other people, shall be duly repressed. There is no doubt about this. But according to what I have already said, I beg to tell you that Bu Musa is our island and a dependency of Shargah. If Salem wants to live in it and guarantees that he will not commit anything which would interfere with my affairs or disturb the maritime peace, it matters not, because I cannot dispense with the Island of Bu Musa, as it is of great use to me. I beg therefore you will plainly write to me on the subject, and inform your agent of the same.

Statement of the Chief of Shargah, Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid, dated January 14, 1888.

Our uncles the Kawasem were the Chiefs of Lingah, and they had placed Lingah and other possessions of the Kawasem in Oman on the same footing; and they made no distinction between these territories, so much so that formerly my uncle Sheikh Abdullah-bin-Sultan, Chief of Shargah, exercised authority over Lingah, as it is well known to the people in general.

When my grand uncle, Sheikh Saeed-bin-Kadtheeb died, his son Sheikh Khaleefeh was very young; and therefore my father Sheikh Khaled-bin-Sultan assumed the government of the place—at the same time he married the mother of Sheikh Khaleefah, and when the latter became of age he handed over the authority to him; and there was no difference between them either personally or as regards the properties, &c.

It is quite plain that the islands of Sirri, Bu Musa, Tumb, and Sir Bu Na'air, all are dependencies of the Kawasemees of Oman.

When hostility broke out between the Kawasem and the Beni Yas, the Chief of Aboothabee wanted to plunder the cattle which the Kawasemees used to send to Sirri for grazing, and at this the Kawasemees of Oman sent some armed men to protect the island. After the death of Sheikh Khaleefeh, Sheikh Ali became the ruler of Lingah, and the various dependencies continued as before without any alteration; and the properties of our forefathers were inherited by their heirs and descendants who, up to this day, secure the proceeds and profits of their properties. After the death of Sheikh Ali, Sheikh Yusuf became the ruler of Lingah, and retained all the former relations, so much so that whenever there was any dispute between any of the Kawasemee Chiefs and the other Chiefs of Oman, the matter used to be taken up by the Lingah Chief, who used to break off all communication with the hostile Oman Chief. When Sheikh Kadtheeb became the ruler of Lingah, there occurred no alteration in the former relations, in so far that we have been related by descent with the above-enumerated Chiefs. When the violence of the Persians was experienced through the aggression of the Malek-el-Tojjar, and they set up their flag at Sirri, and things became altered, we could not bear to remain quiet; and in so far as we have entered into agreement with the British Government to maintain the maritime peace and general security for all, we do not like to do anything except after reference of the matter to the British Government; and we have submitted the matter to the British Government, and we hope due remedy will be done, and that full endeavours will be made to remove those aggressions. We have good hopes in them.

T. T. P.
R. H.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball to Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid.

(After compliments.) *March* 10, 1902.

A report has reached me that you wish to grant a Concession to Haji Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh for excavating and exporting red oxide from the islands of Sir Abu Nuair. I have therefore the honour to inform you that it would be advisable for you to let me see the draft of the Concession before concluding the arrangement.

I shall also be glad if you will let me see a copy of the Concession granted to Haji Nakhoda Ali for working the red oxine mines on the Island of Abu Musa.

(Signed) C. A. KEMBALL, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Resident.

On the 30th June no reply having been received, a reminder went.

C. A. K.

Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid to Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball.

(After compliments.) *7th Rajab*, 1320 (*October* 11, 1902).

I have the honour to state that I have received your letters of the 10th March and 30th June, 1902, regarding the mines of salt and red oxide in the island of Sir Bu Nuair. No Agreement between us and Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh took place, and no document in writing was executed upon that subject. With regard to Abu Musa, my uncle Sheikh Salim-bin-Sultan cultivates in that island, and in the year in which I went on the Hajj, my aforesaid uncle was acting as my regent ("kaim maqam") in Shargah, and he saw fit to lease the mines of Abu Musa to Hassan-bin-Sammyich, a British subject, and Abdallah-bin-Hassan and Esa-bin-Abdul Latif, and the lease has remained up to now. I think your agent Abdul Latif must have informed you about it. This is what had to be written.

Note from Residency Records tending to demonstrate that Sheikh Salim, when he ceased to be Chief of Shargah, ceased to hold Jurisdiction anywhere.

In 1888 the Jowasim Sheikh of Lingah who, at the time, had come to be regarded as Deputy Governor on behalf of the Persian Government, asked Sheikh Salim, who was then living in exile at Abu Musa to extradite a negro of Sirri Island who had taken refuge at Abu Musa.

Sheikh Salim inquired from the Residency as to what answer he should send. Colonel Ross directed the Residency Agent to "advise Sheikh Salim to inform the Deputy-Governor of Lingah that he (Sheikh Salim) is not in a position to exercise authority in such a matter."

In his letter of the 11th February, 1888, to the Government of India reporting the incident, Colonel Ross wrote:—

"Sheikh Salim-bin-Sultan, to whom the Persian Department addressed . . . : has no right to exercise jurisdiction anywhere."

2. Again in August 1884, after being ousted from the Sheikhdom, he wrote to the Resident that the Headman of Fujairah had plundered some dependants of Shahgah on the Batinah and Gharaifa appanages of the Shargah principality on the Oman Coast, and asked the Resident to take action. It was noted on this reference:—

"Sheikh Salim is now no longer Chief of Shargah, and the Agreement which Hamid-bin-Abdallah made with him, was at a time when he was ruling Chief of Shargah, consequently the Agreement has no force and validity in it now. Batinah, Fujairah and Gharaifa are dependencies of the ruling Chief of Shargah and they do not concern Salim in any way."

Colonel Ross informed Sheikh Salim in reply to his reference: "Under present circumstances I see no advantage in discussing these matters with you."

(Signed) P. Z. COX.

February 29, 1908.

II A.—(i.) *Correspondence showing that Hassan Samayich intentionally deceived and kept his third Partner in the dark throughout the Proceedings in regard to the Deed of Agreement with the German Firm.*

Summary of Correspondence.

The correspondence shows that Hassan acted with duplicity all through.

The disposition of M. Wonckhaus to interest himself in Abu Musa Island and its oxide became evident at the end of 1904, when, in reporting his visit to the island, the Residency Agent, Lingah, recommended that a warning be administered at Shargah.

This was done, and Hassan Samayich likewise received a caution from Abdul Latif, the Residency Agent, and his son. (*Vide* Hassan Samayich's letter of the 30th January, 1905, in which he flouted the idea of his ever letting the German get a footing.)

Nothing of importance was heard of the matter until reports of some objectionable compact between Samayich and Wonckhaus reached the Resident in August 1906, and on investigation it appeared that there was evidently truth in the report in question, and that Hassan Samayich was endeavouring to throw dust in the eyes of Esa and his father and to keep the precise terms of the deed of contract secret from them.

Thus, on the 7th June he had written to Mr. Pigrame Malcolm, of Bushire (who claims to have a subsidiary share in the concern), and on the 11th June to Abdul Latif, telling them of his deal with Wonckhaus, but not mentioning the existence of any formal deed, and glozing over the fact that an absolute monopoly of purchase had been granted to the German firm. In the German Case the letter is conspicuous by its absence from the inclosures.

Abdul Latif, our Native Agent on the Trucial Coast, after the warnings which he had given to Hassan not suspecting Hassan's good faith, and attracted, no doubt, by the prospect of reaping profit from a concern from which during ten years past his son had derived no benefit, did not appreciate the real significance of Hassan's naive remark that "if more was extracted Wonckhaus would be a taker of it"; and in the absence of the text of the document was misled into expressing his satisfaction. He clearly did so, however, on the supposition that no lease or formal deed had been executed, for in intimating his provisional approval he repeated his former caution in this regard.

In reply, Hassan pooh-poohed his apprehensions, and assured him that there had been nothing more than a simple sale of oxide.

It was now that Hassan began a series of lies intended to facilitate concealment of the text of the contract with Wonckhaus as long as possible. Thus, when asked by Mr. Malcolm for a copy of the Agreement he replied that it was in German, and that he could get no one to copy it. This letter was forwarded to the Resident by Mr. Malcolm, of Bushire, who had mentioned the matter in conversation a few days before.

Recourse was then had to the Residency Agent, Shargah, but nothing resulted for some time. Meanwhile, Mr. Malcolm heard again from Hassan, who now excused himself from sending a copy on the grounds that the "German" had enjoined secrecy upon him.

The Residency Agent, Shargah, wrote two or three times for a copy, meanwhile the Resident being on tour at the end of October called at Shargah and ascertained that a copy was still not forthcoming, but having regard to the purport of the letter from Hassan to Abdul Latif dated the 11th June which was now shown to the Resident, Esa was advised to write and repudiate the contract.

On the 2nd November the Lingah Agent forwarded a copy obtained after a good deal of pressure. It was found to be in English, and not German as pretended by Hassan, and the terms of it were in parts open to objection.

A few days after giving this copy to our Lingah Agent, Hassan wrote to Abdul Latif and put him off with the obviously false statement that the deed had been in Bombay for a month and-a-half with his son.

Abdul Latif, however, continued to press for it, and at last on the 16th December Hassan sent a copy to him.

On getting it, or soon after, Abdul Latif wrote on behalf of his son and objected to the terms of it.

Meanwhile authority was received by the Resident from the Government of India to discuss the question with the Sheikh of Shargah, and in the result the latter addressed Hassan a communication intimating the nullification of the Concession, Esa-bin-Abdul Latif protesting against Hassan's conduct simultaneously.

In spite of the evidence to the contrary forthcoming in his previous letters, Hassan Samayich now began to pretend that he had sent Abdul Latif a copy of the deed when first asked, and that the latter had agreed after seeing it.

He also complained to the Residency in an undated letter received on the 12th March, 1907, making the same allegation, namely, that he had sent Abdul Latif the terms of the Agreement in English and Arabic in the first instance and that it had been agreed to by Esa and his father.

This appears to be absolutely untrue. See Hassan's letter of the 11th June to Abdul Latif and subsequent correspondence showing that he intentionally kept the terms secret. It is to be noted that the letter of Abdul Latif to Hassan, dated the 27th March, 1907, is the same as Inclosure 10 in the German Case, but there is some divergence in our translation.

The two letters dated the 30th March, 1907, but unsigned, though apparently from Hassan to Abdul Latif and the Sheikh of Shargah call for no special remark.

From the above papers it will be seen that whereas the Residency Agent at Lingah was vigilant and astute throughout in connection with the conduct of this Concession, the behaviour of our Shargah Agent was not altogether free from blame.

The truth was, I think, that he is not a man of business, and did not at first realize the serious possibilities of Hassan Samayich's relations with the German firm.

He as a rule takes a press copy of private letters issued by him, but on his going through his books with me it was found that one or two items wanted could not be traced; either copies were not taken or the press copy is so faint as to be unidentifiable. Since he realized the way in which he had been deceived by Hassan Samayich he has been quite frank with me and gives me his solemn word that he fears nothing that Hassan Samayich can produce, either in his own writing or his son's, and that we need not fear that any letter of his of which an office copy is not forthcoming contains anything more than appears in letters hitherto produced. I see no reason for thinking otherwise.

(Signed) P. Z. COX, *Major*,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

March 1, 1908.

Hassan Samayich to Major Cox.

(After compliments.) *Lingah, November* 26, 1904.

I beg to report that M. Robert Wonckhaus, Manager of the German firm, arrived here by the mail steamer from Bahrein on the 18th November, 1904, and that I have heard that he intends visiting Abu Musa Island at the beginning of December 1904, with a view to inspect the red oxide mines, &c.

If you approve, the Residency Agent at Shargah may be asked to request Sheikh Salem-bin-Sultan, who is in charge of the island on behalf of the Chief of Shargah, not to enter into any agreement or engagement with the said Robert Wonckhaus or his employés.

It being my duty I report this to you, but the decision rests with you.

Captain Trevor to Abdul Latif.

(After compliments.) *Bushire, December* 3, 1904.

It is reported to me that Herr Wonckhaus, the German merchant, intends to visit Abu Musa in a few days. I, therefore, write to inform you accordingly, and to ask you that should Herr Wonckhaus wish to make any arrangement with the Chief of Shargah or Sheikh Salim-bin-Sultan, you should tell them that before they complete any arrangement with him they should consult the Resident.

(Signed) A. P. TREVOR, *Captain*,
First Assistant Resident (in charge of current duties).

Abdul Latif to Major Cox.

(After compliments.) *Shargah, January* 16, 1905.

In reply to your letter, dated the 3rd December, 1904, I beg to inform you that as directed by you, I informed the Chief of Shargah and his uncle, Sheikh Salim-bin-Sultan, that they should not enter into any agreement or arrangement with Robert Wonckhaus, the German merchant, before consulting the Resident, and that they have assured me that they would not engage in the matter without the knowledge of the Resident.

News reached me that the said Robert Wonckhaus visited Abu Musa, inspected the red oxide mines, &c., and left the island. The arrivals from Bu Musa report that Robert Wonckhaus had promised to return to the island in a few days.

Note.

There should come in here a letter which would appear to have been addressed by Abdul Latif, Residency Agent, Shargah, to Hassan Samayich, on the 12th Zilkaadeh, 1322 (19th January, 1905), in which he repeated his previous warning to Hassan against entering into any contract with M. Wonckhaus.

The Residency Agent cannot find the office copy of this letter. It is referred to by Hassan in the next following letter.

(Initialled) P. Z. C.

Hassan Samayich to Abdul Latif.

(After compliments.) *Lingah, 24th Zilkadah*, 1322 (*January* 30, 1905).

I have read your letter of the 12th instant (19th January, 1905) with pleasure, and understood its contents.

During my interview with you we held a conversation about the visit to Abu Musa Island of Wonckhaus, the German, and you said you heard it was in connection with the lease of that island, and you warned me not to let him approach me. Please note that the fact is this as I informed you, that Wonckhaus visited the island merely to inspect the oxide, saying that if he approved (the oxide) he would perhaps communicate with me with regard to the price, and would probably buy some. This was his object. You should not think that I would fail to let you know if he communicated with me on the subject which you indicate. We could not allow this sort of interference from any one, especially on the part of these persons. You may rest assured.

On seeing the oxide he approved that from one of the mines and returned to Lingah, and says that he will perhaps buy 300 tons if he obtains reasonable rates of freight.

He left for Bushire sometime ago, and has opened a branch there for the transaction of business.

Note.

The deed of contract between Hassan Samayich and the German firm was executed on the 1st June, 1906.

Meanwhile nothing had been received on the subject from the Shargah Agent since his letter of the 16th January, 1905, and his report was not received for some months later.

Hassan now proceeds to tell Abdul Latif and Mr. Malcolm of the contract, but in both correspondences shows great disinclination to produce a copy of the Agreement, the fact being that he has therein given a monopoly of which he is anxious that they should not know. His letters are clearly calculated to mislead on this point.

(Initialled) P. Z. C.

Hassan Sumayieh to Mr. T. Malcolm.

(After compliments.) *Lingah, 14th Rabi II*, 1324 (*June 7*, 1906).

I beg to say that I have made an agreement with M. Wonckhaus that he should buy red oxide from the Island of Abu Musa.

I settled with him that he should ship 2,000 tons every year from the island, and I settled the price with him at 15*s.* per ton, and a commission is to be charged thereon. We have to deliver the oxide on board the steamers, and M. Wonckhaus should pay boat-hire at 10 annas per ton. (Other) expenses are to be borne by us.

If God pleases, it will prove to be prosperous. I have concluded an agreement with him for a period of four years. Should we be able to obtain more than 2,000 tons red oxide, he will take it. The work will begin from the 1st June, 1906. This is a fortune which God has destined to us.

If God pleases, this work will go on regularly. And it is arranged that when we receive a telegram from them advising that a steamer comes to ship red oxide, they should then pay us one-half of the price of what is to be shipped by the steamer; the remaining half should be paid when the steamer finishes shipping the consignment.

It has been arranged that we can ship afterwards the 6,000 bags (300 tons) which we have contracted to ship to India. I have taken from them an advance of 2,000 rupees. I hope this affair will pass on easily. I have written to my son Abdullah to finish his work at any rate, and to come to take up this business.

Hassan Sumayieh to Abdul Latif.

(After compliments.) *Lingah, 18th Rabi II*, 1324 (*June 11*, 1906).

I had previously sent you a letter viâ Dubai. I trust it has duly reached you.

As regards the agreement which we have made with Wonckhaus, the German, for the sale of red oxide, I have to tell you that we settled with him that 2,000 tons should be shipped every year, and that if we got out more than that he would be a taker of it. I have settled the price with him at 15*s.* per ton, and we have to bear all the expenses and deliver the oxide on board the steamers. Praise be to God, this is a godsend, and will make up for the past. The arrangement will continue for four years, and I have taken from him an advance of 2,000 rupees. He has made conditions with us for the shipment of 200 or 150 tons per diem.

The work begins from the 1st June, 1906, and I have written to my son Abdullah to settle his affairs (in India), at any rate, and to come and supervise the work. I have sent labourers to the island, and we shall have in any case to buy more donkeys for transportation.

I hope that, once begun, the work will go on regularly.

Abdul Latif to Hassan Sumayieh.

(After compliments.) *Shargah, 21st Rabi II*, 1324 (*June 14*, 1906).

I have received your former and later favours and was glad to hear of your welfare.

As to your remarks in the subject of the red oxide in regard to which God decreed that you sold it to the German Wonckhaus at 15*s.* per ton, and whereas it was arranged that you should excavate 2,000 tons per annum, all the charges to be defrayed by you, and he to receive the oxide nett. Very good; I hope it is auspicious. It will be good fortune after trouble. In any case, our brother Abdullah must reach there to supervise the work, because I think the operations cannot be regulated without him. Please, however, refrain from entering upon any arrangements whatever in the nature of leases or deeds of contract from which there will arise difficulties and quarrels which will lead to complaints and claims, because this will be difficult for our over-lords and they will not consent to it; and you are by God's grace wise and will not commit any negligence or hesitation likely to entangle you, because in these days everyone is making a trap with which to entangle people. I hope you will not be neglectful in this regard.

At any rate I am glad to hear this news, if we are safe from this world's tricks more than before.

Hassan Sumayieh to Abdul Latif.

(After compliments.) *Lingah, 12th Jumadi I*, 1324 (*July 5*, 1906).

Your esteemed letter, dated Rabi ul Thani, reached me in due course, and I understood what you said. In particular regarding the receipt by you of my letter and your comprehension of its purport with reference to our transaction with the German. Insh Allah it will turn out well. You told me to take care that he did not get any bond from me (which would enable him) to enter the island. Set your mind at rest, I, your brother, am knowledgable and well versed in matters of business, and am far from acting in such a way as you indicate. He has not the presumption to make overtures to me in that direction. For, just as I told you, he is only a purchaser of the oxide itself, nothing more. Whether it be he or someone else, whoever wants to buy the oxide from me, if the price suits me I shall sell it. Do not let any idea beyond this enter your head. You may rest assured.

(Letter goes on to speak of other matters.)

Hassan Sumayieh to Mr. T. Malcolm.

(After compliments.) *Lingah, July 13*, 1906.

I have received your esteemed letter dated the 26th June and perused it gladly and understood what you had stated.

You had acknowledged receipt of my letter the contents of which you had understood.

As regards the sale to the German, it is satisfactory, and I hope it will be fortunate. You had understood the details regarding the sale, shipment, and boat-hire, but you did not let me know about the commission; is it to be charged by us from them or by them from us? You had written that I should send you a copy of the agreement. Very well, but the agreement has been written in German,[1] and there is no one with us who can write such a hand. The purport of the agreement is accurately the same as I have written to you.

You had written to me whether we had contracted with the German for 2,000 tons per annum. Yes, we have contracted with him that the quantity should be 2,000 tons at least, and he can, according to the agreement take any more quantities which we may be able to obtain from the mines.

You had written whether we can obtain more than this quantity, and if so, whether we can contract with other Europeans, so that you may negotiate with them. I have understood this, but I cannot give the accurate quantity unless the mine is worked for two or three months when I will be able to form an idea.

I dispatched forty-five workmen to the island in the beginning of June, but little work is done, it being summer and the days being hot. If more than 2,000 tons are obtained, the German is bound to take it from us. We can therefore make no other contract.

I beg also to inform you that my son Abdulla has sold about 100 tons more or less at Calcutta. Only the freight is to be paid by us, every maund will be 1 r. 9 a. delivery at Calcutta. I have been trying to procure a vessel since a long time. I have now-a-days chartered "Alimghir," the vessel belonging to the sons of Khoja (to ship red oxide) at 10 rupees per ton. It is now several days that she has gone to the island to ship (the oxide).

Thank God my son Abdulla has freed himself from the dispute at Calcutta. He has compromised with them. He has come to Bombay, and I will receive his letter from Bombay by this mail, if God pleases. I hope he will not be detained there, and that he will settle his case with Jetha Bania and come to our parts soon.

Note by Major Cox.

Up to this point, I had received no report of this contract with Wonckhaus from the Residency Agent at Shargah. It was not until some little time after my return to head-quarters on the 27th July, 1906, after a visit to Simla, that Mr. Malcolm the

[1] Hassan can read and understand English.

British protected Armenian merchant of Bushire mentioned the matter in a somewhat exaggerated form in the course of a private visit to the Residency. (This was reported in my diary of the 12th August.) He promised to try and get authentic details, but not hearing from him for a few days I wrote to him privately on the subject as below.

Major Cox to Mr. T. Malcolm.

(Private.)
Dear Mr. Malcolm, *August* 23, 1906.

You mentioned to me last time we met that you had reason to believe that Hassan Samayich had sub-leased the red oxide Concession at Abu Musa which he holds from Shargah, to M. Wonckhaus. Has that been confirmed by further news from Haji Hassan? If you have a copy of the terms of the agreement with M. Wonckhaus and could let me see it, I should be interested to do so. Also, where is it that you have an interest in this matter? Your name is not on the original document of the Concession from Shargah is it? Perhaps you have a separate arrangement between yourself and Hassan Samayich?

I am sorry to trouble you in this hot weather. Hoping you are well, &c.

(Signed) P. Z. COX.

Mr. T. Malcolm to Major Cox.

(Private.)
Dear Major Cox, *August* 23, 1906.

In reply to your letter regarding Abu Musa, I beg to inclose in original two letters in Arabic, addressed to me by Haji Hassan bin Samayich dated the 11th Rabi-es-Sani, 1324 (7th June, 1906),* and the 13th July, 1906.* From these you will see the terms of the contract entered into between him and M. Wonckhaus.

I have not been able to obtain a copy of the contract because according to Samayich's statement it is in German and he is unable to copy it.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) T. J. MALCOLM.

Major Cox to Abdul Latif.

(After compliments.) *August* 27, 1906.

Please refer to the correspondence ending with your letters dated the 16th January and of the 18th January, 1905. In the first of these you had informed me that Sheikh Sagar and Sheikh Salim have given you an assurance that they would not enter into any negotiations without consulting the Resident, with any foreigner for the lease of the red oxide deposits on Abu Musa Island; and in the second letter you reported that you had impressed on the concessionaires, your son Esa and Hassan Samayich that they likewise should not enter into partnership with foreign merchants in connection with this Concession.

I have lately received information that Herr Wonckhaus has entered into some arrangement with the concessionaires for all the produce of the red oxide deposits of Abu Musa for a term of years.

Please let me know the facts of the case; and if my information is correct, I shall be glad if you will obtain from your son Esa either the loan of the original contract with M. Wonckhaus or a copy certified by yourself and forward it to me for inspection.

(Signed) P. Z. COX, *Major*,
Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

---

* *See ante.*

Mr. T. Malcolm to Major Cox.

(Private.)
Dear Major Cox, *October* 17, 1906.

Yesterday I received through a third party a letter from Samayich which I inclose in original. You will see he declines to let me have copy of the contract, alleging that he was originally forbidden by Wonckhaus to impart information. I, however, think that as a partner I have a right to see the contract or demand a copy.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) T. J. MALCOLM.

Hassan Samayich to Mr. T. Malcolm.

(Translation.) *Lingah, 23rd Shaban*, 1324 (*October* 14, 1906).

I have received your letter dated the 20th December, 1906, and was glad to hear of your well-being. I have understood what you stated. Regarding my son Abdulla, I beg to say that after settling the case at Calcutta he has arrived at Bombay, where he has some easy matters to settle with the Bania. He will settle his account and will leave for our parts in two or one and a-half months. You had remarked that you had asked some one in the post-office to take from me a copy of the document, which is in German. Let it not be hidden from you that the German, when the bargain was concluded with him, said to me that this transaction should be kept secret ("Yekoon Mastoor"), and so I did not wish that any outsider should come to know of it, and I fear that if news of the copying of the document reaches his ears he will be annoyed. In truth, it is not my intention that anyone should come to know about it except myself and you. What you wanted, namely, the details of the sale which had taken place, I have already communicated to you in a previous letter. Procedure will be according to that letter, neither more nor less, in pursuance of what is written in the document.

Abdul Latif to Hassan Samayich.

[Inclosure 7 of German Case.]

(After compliments.) *Shargah, 14th Shaban*, 1324 (*October* 5, 1906).

I inform you that my wish is that you send me a copy of the contract which has passed between you and the Germans regarding the export of oxide to Calcutta. Please send it soon, because the Resident has asked for it. I hope Abdulla will soon arrive at Lingah after having finished work as desired, and it will be a pleasure to us all to hear of his arrival. Please inform me of your good health always. I am at your service.

Note.

Here should follow a letter from Abdul Latif to Hassan Samayich, dated the 12th Ramazan, 1324 (the 31st October, 1906), repeating his previous request for a copy of the document itself.

The Residency Agent cannot trace the office copy of this.

Note.

At this time, the end of October, I was on tour in the Royal Indian Mail steamship "Lawrence," and not having, when I left head-quarters, received a copy of the contract either from Lingah or Shargah, I called at Shargah on the 7th November to see if Esa or his father Abdul Latif had yet obtained it. I then ascertained that they had not yet received a copy, but they showed me the letter from Hassan dated the 11th June, and on seeing it I advised Esa-bin-Abdul Latif to write and repudiate the contract. On my return to head-quarters on the 19th November I found that a copy had since been received from the Residency Agent at Lingah.

(Initialled) P. Z. C.

Hassan Samayich to Major Cox.

(After compliments.) *Lingah, 14th Ramadan* (*November* 2, 1906).

WITH reference to your letter dated the 6th October, 1906, I beg to state that in conformity with your orders I took the necessary steps in the matter and asked Hassan-bin-Ali Samayich to show me the original Agreement which he had entered into with the German, M. Wonekhaus, in connection with the red oxide mines in Abu Musa Island. He refused at first, saying "it had been arranged that no one should come to know of this transaction except those who are partners (to the first lease), and I reported it to the Residency Agent at Shargah because his son Esa was one of the partners. I will, however, show you a copy of the Agreement." Somehow or other, I persuaded him and he produced to me the original Agreement, which bore his own seal and signature and the signature of M. Wonekhaus, and which was written in English in the handwriting of M. Carsten, late Manager of the German firm.

After examining it, I requested him to let me have the loan of the original version, but he did not agree. I, however, got him to agree to give a copy of the contract, and in company with him took the document in question to the British Postmaster, who took a certified copy thereof and attested it. Hassan then took back the original document, and I beg to submit its copy herewith.

It appears from Hassan-bin-Ali Samayich remarks that there is with M. Wonekhaus a similar document under the signatures of Hassan and Wonekhaus himself. Hassan stated likewise that he has no right to give (any quantity of red oxide) to others as long as M. Wonekhaus wishes to have it. He further stated that he has purchased the Chief of Shargah's share and that he holds a writing (to that effect) from the Chief. I wanted to ask him for the document in which he has purchased the Chief of Shargah's share, but thinking that he would form a misapprehension, I did not do so pending receipt of your instructions. According to his own statement Hassan has hitherto received an advance of 6,000 rupees from the firm of Wonekhaus.

These are the true facts of the case, and I report them for your information.

In my opinion, and if you think it advisable, arrangements should be made for the abolition of the lease of Abu Musa Island altogether. It would be better if the island is not leased.

Note.

It should be noted that whereas Hassan Samayich had the original deed of contract a day or so before the 2nd November, on which day the Residency Agent at Lingah posted it to me (the letter stating that he sent it on directly he got it without missing a mail), yet on the 11th November he, Hassan (in the letter next following), wrote to Abdul Latif that he had forwarded the document a month ago to his son Abdulla in Bombay. As he was aware that I had by now got a copy, this lie was *primâ facie* unnecessary, but the explanation probably is that he knew that objection would come from Esa and wanted to delay it as long as possible, on the supposition that the longer the delay the more difficult it would be for his Agreement with M. Wonekhaus to be upset.

(Initialled) P. Z. C.

Hassan Samayich to Abdul Latif.

(After compliments.) *Lingah, 22nd Ramadan*, 1324 (*November* 11, 1906).

In the best time I received your letter of the 12th Ramazan, and I was glad to learn of your well being. I have understood what you had stated.

With regard to your desire to be furnished with a copy of the Agreement concluded between the German and myself for the shipment of red oxide to Calcutta, as the Resident has asked for the same; please note that no deed of agreement has been made between me and the German for the shipment of red oxide to Calcutta, but that deed of agreement was made for the sale of oxide from the island. He will ship the same to Europe, as I have informed you before. One month and a-half before this I forwarded it (*i.e.*, the Agreement) to my son Abdulla at Bombay. I shall write a letter by the next mail to my son Abdulla asking him to send down a copy of the Agreement. On its receipt I shall forward the same to you.

Let it not be hidden from you that before I sent the Agreement to my son Abdullah as the Resident had, I think, written to Bedr-bin-Mohamed Amin requesting for a copy of the document, I wrote the copy and delivered the same to him. I presume he has forwarded it to the Resident.

Perhaps they think that I have made a lease to the German and so forth. This Agreement, as I told you (relates to) the sale made by me of a certain quantity per annum for four years. There is nothing else. My object is to sell the stuff, whether to him or to others.

I will, Inshallah, receive it soon, and forward it to you without fail.

Abdul Latif to Hassan Samayich.

(After compliments.) *Shargah, 2nd Shawal*, 1324 (*November* 21, 1906).

I have written to you already in reference to the deed of agreement between you and the German in regard to the oxide, and I asked you to send me the said deed of agreement; but I see that you do not send it. Please understand, God preserve you, that I have been asked by the Resident to call for the deed of agreement from you, either the original or a copy, and I therefore beg that on receipt of this you will send the document by any dhow coming our way, so that I may be able to reply to the Resident. Insha Allah, you will not neglect to send it.

Abdul Latif to Major Cox.

(After compliments.) *Shargah, 26th Shawal*, 1324 (*December* 15, 1906).

I have received your letter dated the 6th October, 1906.

As directed by you, I asked Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Samayich for the original Agreement or a copy therefrom. Herewith you will find a letter* received by me from Haji Hassan regarding the Agreement concluded with the German for red oxide.

Hassan Samayich to Abdul Latif.

(After compliments.) *Lingah, 27th Shawwal*, 1324 (*December* 16, 1906).

I wrote to you previously. I hope the letter reached you, and that you are well. Now I forward, inclosed in this letter, a copy of the Agreement regarding the sale of oxide to Wonekhaus, a copy made according to the original. Please acknowledge receipt.

Our news is quiet. I have nothing deserving of mention except to say all well.

Inshallah, in these days we expect Abdullah to arrive Bombay in safety, and on his arrival I will apprise you.

Abdul Latif to Major Cox.

(After compliments.) *Shargah, 5th Zilkaadeh* (*December* 23, 1906).

With reference to my letter dated the 15th December, 1906, inclosing a letter from Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Samayich regarding the Agreement made with the German for the red oxide at Abu Musa Island. I beg to forward herewith copy of the said Agreement in English, together with his letter to me.†

---

* Dated 22nd Ramadan (November 11, 1906): see *ante*.
† Dated 27th Shawwal, 1324 (December 16, 1906): see *ante*

Abdul Latif to Hassan Samayieh.

[Inclosure 8 of German Case.]

(After compliments.) *8th Zilhijjah*, 1324 (*January* 23, 1907).

I have received your esteemed letter and understood what you stated. I have understood the copy of the Agreement concluded by you with the German for the sale of the Abu Musa red oxide. My son Esa does not agree to the execution of an Agreement to this effect, and you had neither consulted with, nor referred to him, nor did you send him a copy of the Agreement before the settlement with the German of the affair concerning the red oxide, so that views might be exchanged between you both, and that you might adopt a recognized, obvious, and evident course, because it is obligatory for the partners not to undertake a matter except after a general consensus of views, so that no difficulties may occur, and you have undertaken this affair without any consultation.

Therefore, my son Esa does not agree to the Agreement concluded between you and the German, because he fears difficulty will result from foreigners concerning themselves in the matter. The nullification of this Agreement is better than its acceptance.

You had previously received a letter (from me) saying that you should not involve yourself into difficulties with the German in regard to the red oxide, because he (Esa) fears an untoward result. I communicate to you what my son Esa says.

Abdul Latif to Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid.

(After compliments.) *8th Moharrum*, 1325 (*February* 20, 1907).

I have to communicate with your Honour with reference to the lease which I and two partners acquired from the Government of Shargah, relating to the extraction of red oxide from your island of Abu Musa. As your Honour is aware, the document of lease was drawn up in the names of three persons, namely, your humble servant Esa-bin-Abdul Latif, Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Samayieh, and Abdullah-bin-Hassan Samayieh.

I have come to know that on the 1st June, 1906 (8th Rabi-ul-Thani, 1324), the said Haji Hassan entered into a contract with a European merchant named Wonckhaus without consulting me, and that, according to the terms of the document, he bound himself and his partners in giving an absolute monopoly for the extraction of the red oxide for a period of four years. And the said Haji Hassan executed this Agreement and bound himself without consulting me previous to the drawing of the deed of contract. The details of the said deed have only now reached me, and I do not agree to the terms of this contract. Accordingly, I forward to your Honour a copy of the deed of contract for you to examine; kindly look into it. I beg from your Honour assistance in taking the necessary steps for the cancellation and annulment of this contract, for I am altogether unwilling to agree to this lease. Previous to this I have written to Haji Hassan Samayieh expressing my disagreement to this contract, but he has sent me no answer.

Finally, I am obliged to call your attention to the deed of contract, in the beginning of which begins as follows: "Contract between Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Samayieh, of Lingah, owner and holder of the Abu Musa Concession, and M. Robert Wonckhaus, of Lingah." Now Haji Hassan Samayieh has no deed of authority from me giving him any general power in regard to action which he might take respecting the lease, &c.; how then has Haji Hassan the right thus to mention himself only without consulting or referring to his partners, of whom I am one. I am in consequence obliged to make a complaint on the subject to your Honour, and it is for your Honour to issue orders.

Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid to Hassan Samayieh.

[Inclosure 12 of German Case.]

(Translation.)
(After compliments.) *9th Moharrum*, 1325 (*February* 21, 1907).

I have to inform you that Esa-bin-Abdul Latif has preferred a complaint to me in connection with the red oxide mines on Abu Musa, which for some years have been

leased in the names of yourself and Esa-bin-Abdul Latif and your son Abdullah, according to the deed executed on the 18th Zilkaideh, 1315 (21st April, 1898). He has sent me a copy of the deed of contract in operation between you and M. Wonckhaus, and complains that you executed this contract without consulting him, and that he does not agree to the conditions written in the contract now that he has come to know them. I, too, do not agree to this contract at all, and as for you, you had no right to give a contract in this fashion and bind yourself to give away possession of the whole output of red oxide to others for a long period and without consulting us or making the slightest reference to us. And, according to our view, harm will accrue to us from the continuance of this Concession in your hands in connection with Abu Musa; and your conduct in the present case is a violation of your duty towards us.

Accordingly it appears to us advisable to withdraw the document of Concession from you, and we now inform you accordingly by this letter, so that you may realize that the contract between us has terminated. You have no longer any right of enjoyment in regard to the mines of Abu Musa.*

(Seal of Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid.)

Letter from (presumably) Hassan Samayieh to Abdul Latif.

(After compliments.) *23rd Moharrum*, 1325 (*March* 8, 1907).

Your letter dated Zilhijjeh 1324 reached me in due course, and I was glad to receive it and understand its contents. You particularly wrote about the deed of contract which I executed with Wonckhaus the German for the sale of oxide from Abu Musa Island. You said that your son Esa did not agree to the execution of document of such a nature, and complained that I did not consult you, although it was necessary that no partner entered into transactions without the knowledge of the other partners; that I had so entered into transactions without consultation; and that, as Esa feared that complications would result owing to the entry of foreigners into the matter, the nullification of the contract was better than its acceptance. I understood it all.

Oh! my brother, at the time I executed the deed of Agreement I communicated to you the details of it, copied in Arabic alongside the English without addition or omission, and you came to know of it and approved it, and wrote to me in reply that it was all right. Similarly you asked me for a copy of the deed, and I sent it you, and you acknowledged its receipt and approved of it. It is now a matter of eight months. How can I cancel it? You, by the grace of God, are a wise man, and if you suggest complications. Remember, the German has no connection with the leasehold of the mines; he has no concern except to take from us the oxide itself, nothing further, for a stated period. There is no harm in this. The object is to effect sales and the stuff be sold whether to him or to any one else. You are aware that he took some from us last year, and we saw nothing objectionable in his deal with us; and, as you know, we have spent a considerable sum of money in expenses in this connection. If we do not sell the stuff how are we to get back our own? Please God, the matter will end satisfactorily.

Salaams to Esa and the brothers.

Hassan Samayieh to Major Cox.

[Inclosure 14 of German Case.]

(Translation.)
(After compliments.) [*Received March* 12, 1907.]

I beg to state that on the 18th Moharrum, 1325, I received a letter from Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid, Chief of Shargah, stating that Esa-bin-Abdul Latif has made a complaint that he does not agree to the contract concluded between me and M. Wonckaus, the German, and states that it had been effected without his knowledge. Sheikh Sagar also intimated that he wishes to cancel the contract of the lease of the Abu Musa Island which has been leased by us from Sheikh Salim-bin-Sultan. As I am one of the dependents of the British Government, and as I find that Sheikh

* The word used is "tasarruf" = use, possession, enjoyment, occupancy, or control.—P. Z. C.

Sagar's letter is meaningless, it became necessary for me to give you information before they could misrepresent the matter to you. I possess the original deed of lease of the mines from Sheikh Salim-bin-Sultan, which was drawn up in the year 1315, and which will hold good as long as I wish to retain the mines. It has been attested by your Agent, Abdul Latif; Sheikh Sagar has also entered into partnership with us in the mines contract with the knowledge and testimony of your Agent, Abdul Latif. I wrote in due course to your Agent, Abdul Latif, informing him of the terms of the Agreement in Arabic opposite to what was written in English in detail,* and I received a letter from your Agent dated the 21st Rabi II, 1324, in which he expressed his pleasure and gratification as regards the Agreement with the German. You will receive herewith a copy of the letter received by me on the subject; Esa had been aware of the matter and agreed thereto. I find from Sheikh Sagar's letter that he intends to upset our works and cause us loss; therefore I took a copy of his letter and forward it herewith. Before making any communication I thought it necessary to make a representation to you, who are our governor, because all our transactions were made with the knowledge of Esa and Abdul Latif and with their consent. There are with me contracts and Agreements in their own handwritings and with their attestations. If he, Esa, was not agreeable he should have prevented me from carrying out the Agreement when I received Abdul Latif's letter dated the 21st Rabi II. I did not carry on this affair with the German except with their consent. My Agreement with the German concerns the sale of the commodity only and nothing else, and the stuff is offered to the buyer whether he be the German or any one else.

Abdul Latif to Hassan Samayich.

[Inclosure 10 of German Case, which is a mistranslation.]

(After compliments.) 12*th Safar*, 1325 (*March* 27, 1907).

Your esteemed letter has reached me in due course, and I have noted its contents. When your communication reached me saying that you had sold to the German before mentioned oxide from Abu Musa, every year 2,000 tons of oxide at 15*s.* per ton, I sent you back an answer, dated the 21st Rabi II, 1324, which purported to convey acquiescence, but in the course of the same letter I cautioned you against entering into any agreement in the nature of a leasehold or into any relation likely to result in dispute, on the grounds that the overlords of our affairs would not agree to it. I asked you to give us immunity against the complications of the world (time). My letter in question is no doubt with you. Since writing it I have never received from you the copy of the deed of agreement existing between you and the German until the 5th Zilkaadeh, 1324, when it came in English after I had asked you for it time after time. I mentioned its arrival to you in my letter of the 6th Zilkaadeh, 1324. And when we got a translater and translated the English document, it became plain to us that you had launched yourself into the very thing against which we had cautioned you and had tied yourself up by giving a lease. Consequently, my son Esa does not agree to this document which does not leave you any power of control or modification in regard to the oxide mines of Abu Musa. And previous to this present communication I communicated to you in my letter dated 8th Zilhijjeh a translation of the deed for your information and said that you would perceive that the question was not one of mere sale as stated by you, but one of leasehold, against which I had warned you. Moreover, Sheikh Sagar does not agree to the lease of the oxide to outsiders from foreign Powers and claims that the agreement (with him) was that you should do the work yourselves and not farm it out. This is what had to be explained.

Hassan Samayich to Abdul Latif.

[Inclosure 11 of German Case.]

(After compliments.) *Lingah*, 15*th Safar*, 1325 (*March* 30, 1907).

Your esteemed letter dated this month has been received and your friend has understood its contents, especially your remarks in regard to my contract with the

* This is not true. If it was why was not date and copy of letter quoted as inclosure in the German Case.—P. Z. C.

German to the effect that it is not a question of the sale of the red oxide only as I had informed you previously. My brother, what is proved to me is this that it is really only (for) the sale of the red oxide, but for a specified period a certain quantity every year until the expiration of the period. It is not a lease of the island. Deeds of contracts and conditions for sales are always (made) on these lines. He agreed to take a certain quantity from me every year and I agreed to excavate the oxide from the mines and to deliver it to him as long as there exists red oxide in the same quality as before. Every person when he sells anything must necessarily take out a deed of sale and this is not a lease once for all. You know that I will not be entrapped either by the German or others but perhaps you are being forced to dispute about this; for the rest the German has bought some red oxide and nothing else, from the leaseholders of the mines at Abu Musa Island; Hassan bin Ali and Co. Even were we to convey the oxide for him to Lingah,* the expenses thereof being paid by us, he would have no objection, neither would he have anything to say about the Island or the possession of it. Notwithstanding this, when I received letters from you on this subject (saying) that surely the contract could be nullified, I communicated with him regarding the nullification of the same. He replied, "If you suggest any interference in the island, I (the German) will write a document for you (to the effect) that I have no concern in the lease of the island. I have simply bought oxide from the leaseholders of the mines on the Island of Abu Musa for a specified period in the same way as others buy from you. I have been in dealings with all the merchants of the Persian and Arab Coasts and there has not been the least confusion in our intercourse with the people; and if you are not satisfied with the writing and wish nothing but the nullification of this contract all right, but please pay me 15*s.* per ton according to the contract and also the money I paid for expenses. If you pay me the money, I will no longer require the Agreement and will relinquish it. Otherwise it is not possible for me to abandon my rights. We are not sitting here to play games in business matters. We act in accordance with rules."

Now, if you think it advisable write him a letter and give him explanations regarding the nullification of the contract. Perhaps he will agree, otherwise, as far as I can judge, I have not the power to depart from what has passed in the way of conditions of sale except after the expiry of the period according to the deed of agreement. And you are the wisest of the learned. It is proved to you that I did not do (this) until I was satisfied that you would approve of this transaction. You had better drop discussion about this, because the road is closed (to any discussion). If the German says he will write to you a letter according to your desire, saying that he has no concern in the island or in the mines on the island, and that he has only purchased from the lease-holders of the island, Hassan-bin-Ali and Co., the red oxide which is being excavated from the mines on the island, he has left no grounds for further argument, and you are aware that such a wholesale transaction cannot be obtained at all times, and that we have spent considerable sums over this since we leased this mine up to the present. Which of the partners paid me a single cent, and who would have paid up my claim if I had not sold (the stuff)? You are aware that the sale is a matter of luck, and whenever such is achieved the burden falls from the necks of all the partners; but if it is not achieved, then all the partners are necessarily answerable for the expenses when the accounts are made up.

When my son Abdullah arrives from Bombay I will settle the accounts of the island, and you will understand everything in its proper state.

Give salaams to your sons, Esa, and brothers.

(Unsigned.)

Hassan Samayich to Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid.

[Inclosure 13 of German Case.]

(After compliments.) 15*th Safar*, 1325 (*March* 30, 1907).

Your esteemed letter dated the current month has been received, and what you had stated was understood by your friend, especially (your remark) that although in one paragraph of a letter Abdul Latif did consent to the German's contract there was, nevertheless, in the same letter a warning regarding any lease, &c., which may

* Hassan Samayich told me it would not pay him to bear cost of transport to Lingah.—P. Z. C.

lead to any obligation. Yes; I did not act contrary to that warning, and the German has no concern in the lease or anything else in the island. Only the oxide has been sold to him. Therefore on the day that my brother, Abdul Latif, received an answer to the letter of warning it was proved to him that I had not acted in a contrary way. It is only the sale of the red oxide and nothing else; and I am not bound by the German except for the sale of oxide. But, as regards what you have stated that I had written that I was the owner of the island. How can I take possession of the island? I have but leased from Sheikh Salem-bin-Sultan the mines which are on the island of Abu Musa, and I am paying Sheikh Salem a certain rental every year, as per the agreement. As to what you had stated that I had written that I was in charge and possession (of the mines), and the sales were (left) in my control, true; it is obvious to the partners that since the lease (was executed) it was I who undertook possession, sale, expenditure, and the needs, according to rule. And from the time of (the execution of) the lease up to now, it was I who undertook everything and all expenses, and worked up to now, and none of the partners opposed me in this affair, and they have no right to do so. Who was it that paid me a single cent on account of the expenses I incurred over this oxide so that he may raise objections against me? (They can do so only) when they find any irregularity (on my part).

As you say, I am a dependant of the British Government, and shall not behave except according to rules; and it was not desirable for you to make this objection without any fault (on my part) or any reason. You are aware that the German has no concern; he has only bought the red oxide from me for a specified period; and it is not hidden that we have spent a large sum over these mines, and if we procure no sale, wherefrom can we obtain (money) equal to what we have taken from the German and others?

(Unsigned.)

True copy:
(Signed and sealed) ABDUL LATIF.
KHAN BAHADUR.

Abdul Latif to Major Cox.

Shargah, April 15, 1907.

(After compliments.)

With reference to my letter dated the 23rd March, 1907, I have the honour to state that I and Sheikh Sagar have received two unsigned letters which appear from their contents to be from Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Sanayieh, Lingah.

The original of the one for me and the copy of the one for Sheikh Sagar are inclosed for your information. The two letters are to the effect that he has sold to Wonekhaus, the German, a quantity of red oxide, which is in Abu Musa Island, for a specified period, and that his sale is not by way of a lease, and he wishes to continue what he had done with the aforesaid Wonekhaus. The decision now rests with you, and action will be taken upon what you may deem prudent.

---

11 B.—(ii.) *Statement regarding the Working of the Oxide Company, by Esa-bin-Abdul Latif, dated 7th Moharram, 1326.*

The nature of the circumstances connected with the affairs of the Company of which I was a partner was as follows:—

In the beginning the Company was composed of three persons, namely, Haji Hassan-bin-Sanaiyeh, and his son, Abdullah-bin-Hassan, and myself. On our requisition of the lease we gave a share to Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh. Subsequently, on the return of Sheikh Sagar from the Mecca pilgrimage, he too asked us to give him a share in the concern, and we gave him one on the 1st Rabi II, 1316. Then the Company consisted of five shares, all equal. Six months later, in the month of Ramazan, my cousin, Yusuf-bin-Abdullah, asked Sheikh Sagar to sell his share to him, and as Sheikh Sagar had received no proceeds from the oxide he sold his share to Yusuf. Yusuf's partnership continued for about two years. After that Yusuf not receiving any profits from this share during the past two years, sold his share to Haji Hassan Sanayieh, so it resulted that there were now two shares in Haji Hassan's name, one in that of his son Abdullah, one in Nakhoda Ali's name, and one in my own; and the rights of us were similar in proportion of our shares. From time to

time I paid to Sheikh Salem my share of the yearly rent, and similarly I contributed a portion of the expenses incurred.

I in nowise gave any power of attorney to Haji Hassan which would warrant his acting just as he pleased without consulting me in operations connected with the Concession. On the contrary, it was incumbent upon him to act in regard to every transaction in communication with me according as was agreed in the deed which was drawn up between us and Haji Ali Ahmed Saleh; and from the time of the commencement of the lease up to the date of his contract with M. Wonekhaus, the German, Haji Hassan from time to time had shipped oxide to Calcutta and Bombay and elsewhere, without informing us, as he was under obligation to do, according to the Agreement. If, however, we heard of any shipment, we used to inquire from him, and then he would inform us. And the details of his shipments, according to what we have heard from him or from others, is recorded in our books and amounts, approximately, to 8,000 tons. On every occasion on which we asked him for an adjustment of the accounts he has put us off with promises of adjustment. It was my father who was in the habit of corresponding with him on my behalf. On the 18th Rabi II, 1324, Haji Hassan intimated to my father his transaction with M. Wonekhaus, the German, but he neither forwarded any document in original nor a copy thereof, nor did he ever mention at all the execution of any written contract in this regard. He simply mentioned to my father that he was selling to M. Wonekhaus 2,000 tons yearly, and that if more was available Wonekhaus would take it. Several times my father specifically wrote to Haji Hassan cautioning him against the giving of any bond or written agreement to outsiders. In reply he (Hassan) invariably gave assurance that he would not enter into any engagement except the sale of oxide to whosoever would purchase it; and when we learnt that he had executed a deed of contract in connection with this transaction, we made objections to him in regard to it, and demanded from him a copy of the deed of contract, and repeated the demand several times, before he sent it to us. It was written in English, and when we perused a translation of it into Arabic we saw that it was objectionable. At once I refused to acquiesce in it, and intimated to him my non-acceptance of this document, and also complained to Sheikh Sagar in regard thereto.

(Signed) ESA-BIN-ABDUL LATIF.

II B.—(i.) *Note by Major Cox regarding Inclosure 2 of German Case, i.e., the Partnership of Nakhoda Ali in the Concession, and his Rights under the same.*

I am unable to understand why the German Government have included in their case the mention of Nakhoda Ali and the deed giving him a share in the concern. If it not a part of the original Agreement, although concluded very soon afterwards; and if the document had not found mention in the German Case, it would appear to have been difficult for us to have introduced it. Their doing so seems to place in our hands an important instrument in favour of our own case.

The circumstances attending the connection of Nakhoda Ali with the concern are briefly as follows:

The said Nakhoda was formerly cargo landing contractor at Bushire and well known to the Residency as such, but becoming involved in local Persian politics he found himself in difficulties and had to flee the town, taking refuge for some time at Bussorah. When things had quieted down he proceeded to Bunder Abbas, and obtained the landing contract there. Finally he migrated to Lingah, where he died some two years ago, being succeeded by his son Nujaf, who has now lodged a claim with His Majesty's Consul, Bunder Abbas.

When the lease of the 10th April, 1898, was granted by Sheikh Salim-bin-Sultan, the plain fact of its grant appears to have been duly reported by the Residency Agent, Shargah (on the 31st May, 1898), but no report was made by him of the supplementary deed admitting Nakhoda Ali to partnership, and the first mention of the latter was contained in a letter dated the 28th May, 1898, from our Lingah Agent, who, in reporting Lingah news regarding the lease, quoted Nakhoda Ali as the chief concessionnaire and Hassan Sanayieh only as his co-sharer. As the Lingah news was divergent from the Shargah report and appeared to be mistaken in regard to Nakhoda Ali no action was considered necessary. Nothing more was heard of the Concession

for four years, during which period Nakhoda Ali continued to superintend the mining of the oxide on behalf of the partners, as prescribed in his Agreement. In 1902 another report was received from our Lingah Agent, who, after referring to the Abu Musa Concession, went on to say that he had reason to believe that Nakhoda Ali was now attempting to obtain from the Sheikh of Shargah a similiar lease of the mines on Sir Bu Nuair Island, and that as he, Nakhoda Ali, was an indifferent character and of late suspected of intriguing with Russian Agents, he advised that the Trucial Sheikhs should be warned to discontinue communication with him. On receipt of this information the Chief of Shargah was addressed by my predecessor, Colonel Kemball, who asked for a "copy of the Concession said to have been granted to Nakhoda Ali for working the red oxide mines on the island of Abu Musa," and also advised the Sheikh to let him (the Resident) see a draft of any Concession which he might be intending to grant to Nakhoda Ali in connection with Sir Bu Nuair Island. The Sheikh replied on the 11th October, 1902, that he had entered into no lease with anyone in regard to Sir Bu Nuair, and that as regards Abu Musa the Concession for mining had been granted to Hassan Samayieh, &c., and not to Nakhoda Ali. It is possible Sheikh Sagar may not have been aware of the secondary deed introducing Nakhoda Ali, but the signature of our Agent Abdul Latif was on the document itself, and therefore the latter's behaviour in neither reporting it at the time (in 1898) nor subsequently (1902) can hardly be regarded as quite straightforward.

It will be seen that whereas the original lease was dated the 18th Zilkaadeh, 1315 (the 10th April, 1898), the document admitting Nakhoda Ali was written a few days later, *i.e.*, during the following month, Zilhijjeh (from about the 21st April to the 19th May, 1898). This is consistent with the reference made to it in the statement of Esa-bin-Abdul Latif now forwarded (*vide* II *a* (ii)).

I now come to the correspondence with Lieutenant Gabriel, His Majesty's Consul, Bunder Abbas, from which it will be seen that the dragoman of the German Consulate at Bushire (a responsible person, who was placed in charge of the German Consulate during Dr. Listemann's absence and with whom His Majesty's Minister, in connection with the wreck of the "Teutonia," desired me to correspond as the official representative of German interests) on his way down to Shargah with the direct letters of the 19th June from Dr. Listemann to the two Sheikhs, called at Bunder Abbas and endeavoured to induce Nejef-bin-Nakhoda Ali to sign a document to the effect that the contract concluded between Hassan and the German firm was made with his consent. Nejef refused however, and has since lodged a formal complaint with His Majesty's Consul claiming a share of proceeds of the sale of oxide and the ownership of the implements now at the island, together with other separate claims.

It is clear from Esa-bin-Abdul Latif's recorded statement that the partners, Hassan, Abdalla-bin-Hassan, Esa-bin-Abdul Latif, and Nakhoda Ali Ahmed Saleh, and, later, Sheikh Sagar, all started with equal shares and endowed with equal rights under each share. Subsequently when the share of Sheikh Sagar passed to Yusuf-bin-Abdalla and from him to Hassan Samayieh the latter acquired a double share in the profits, but otherwise the equality of his position and of obligation in relation to his co-sharers was just the same as before. It is also clear from Nakhoda Ali's deed of partnership that the partners were all aware, and agreed, *inter se*, that the cognizance and consent of all partners was obligatory. This was obviously necessary as the partners were scattered, at Shargah, Lingah, and Bunder Abbas, and any one of them might be hearing of openings for sales and need to communicate with the others.

By their action in sending the Consulate dragoman to Bunder Abbas to endeavour to induce Nejef-bin-Nakhoda Ali to sign a document, probably to be antedated, testifying to his cognizance and approval of the German contract, the German claimants have surely committed themselves to the recognition both of the fact that general consultation was necessary and that Nejef-bin-Nakhoda Ali had inherited his father's share in the Concession and his rights under it.

These two points seem to be of no little importance.

It is to be noted that, if we may judge from the translation supplied with the German Case, the documents with Nejef-bin-Nakhoda Ali and Hassan Samayieh respectively are not quite identical.

(Signed) P. Z. COX.

February, 29, 1908.

Mr. T. Malcolm to Major Cox.

(Private.) *Bushire, August* 28, 1906.

As to the lease of Abu Musa Mines originally given by the Sheikh of Shargah to Haji Hassan Samayieh my name is not mentioned therein, but subsequently another lease in which my name was also included was obtained under the seal of the Sheikh and his brother, and of Haji Hassan and his son Abdulla and Haji Nakhoda Ali. I cannot just now lay my hands on that document especially because my Persian Mirza who kept the correspondence is now no more in my service, and I do not know where he has placed or misplaced the said lease. The parties interested in the mines of Abu Musa according to the lease are as follows: Sheikh of Shargah, his brother, Haji Hassan Samayieh, his son Abdulla, Haji Nakhoda Ali and myself. Each one share, total six shares. I may mention that Haji Hassan Samayieh who controls the business had entered into the contract with M. Wonckhaus without my knowledge.

Lieutenant Gabriel to Major Cox.

(Confidential.) *Bunder Abbas, November* 28, 1907.

With reference to recent proceedings in connection with the Abu Musa Oxide Concession, I have the honour to report that Abdulla-bin-Hassan Samayieh, accompanied by the Munshi of the German Consulate at Bushire, arrived here by mail steamer on the 25th and left for Dubai on the night of the 26th instant.

2. Hearing that these two men were engaged in business with Mejef-bin-Ali (the Bunder Abbas Hamal Bashi) I instituted inquiries and found that they were endeavouring to persuade Nejef to sign a document to the effect that the contract concluded between Hassan-bin-Ali Samayieh and the German firm, was made with his full consent.

3. Further inquiries have elicited the fact that Nejef's father, Haji Nakhuda Ali, was a joint partner with Hassan-bin-Ali Samayieh, his son Abdulla and Esa-bin-Abdul Latif, in the Concession originally granted by Sheikh Salim of Shargah, and that on Haji Nakhuda Ali's decease some two and a-half years ago, his share in the partnership descended to his son, Nejef-bin-Ali above-mentioned.

4. As he was not consulted by Hassan-bin-Ali Samayieh at the time of entering into the contract with Wonckhaus, and seeing that Hassan has failed to remit to him any share of the profits derived from the Concession, Nejef has refused to sign the document now produced by Abdulla-bin-Hassan.

5. I have succeeded in obtaining a copy of Haji Nakhuda Ali's deed of partnership, as held by Nejef, and submit the same herewith for your information.

[This document is in triplicate, one copy remaining in the hands of one person.]

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

The object of writing this Deed of Agreement is that I, Nakhoda Ali-bin-Ahmed Saleh, have joined in partnership with Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Samayieh, Abdullah-bin-Hassan, and Esa-bin-Abdul Latif in the lease of the red oxide mines, &c., in the Abu Musa Island, which I have leased from Sheikh Salim-bin-Sultan at 250 French dollars per annum, and that I, Nakhoda Ali, have agreed to supervise the working of the oxide mines. Whatever may be the expenditure, it should be borne by all, and whatever may be the income, it should be [distributed] amongst all.

I have likewise agreed to share the ground-rent arrangement which they have made with Sheikh Salim at 100 dollars per annum for the landing of muhar, zanni-shells, and other merchandize, which we may land on the Island of Abu Musa. The sale, transport, and shipment should be done with the knowledge of all.

On these terms the partnership was agreed upon, and so none of us should contravene them.

Let it not be hidden.

Zilhijjeh, 1315 (*May* 1898).

(Signed and sealed) ALI AHMED SALEH.
HASSAN-BIN-ALI SAMAYIEH.
ABDULLA-BIN-HASSAN SAMAYIEH.
ABDUL LATIF-BIN-ABDUR RAHMEN
(on behalf of Esa-bin-Abdul Latif).

Lieutenant Gabriel to Major Cox.

Sir, *Bunder Abbas, February* 17, 1908.

I have the honour to invite a reference to my letter, dated the 28th November, 1907, on the subject of the unsuccessful attempt made by the German Consulate, Munshi, and Abdullah-bin-Hassan Samayieh to induce Nejef-bin-Ali to sign a document to the effect that he was cognizant of, and consented to, the Agreement between Hassan-bin-Ali Samayieh and the German firm of Wonckhaus.

2. In view of the persistent refusal of Hassan-bin-Ali Samayieh to produce any statement of account for the information of his co-concessionnaires, and of his unauthorized action in granting a monopoly to the German firm, Nejef-bin-Ali has now lodged a formal complaint at this Consulate against Hassan-bin-Ali Samayieh, who is a British subject. This Petition I inclose in original with a rough translated purport for your information.

3. In view of this representation, I have the honour to suggest that, pending a settlement of account between my petitioner and Hassan-bin-Ali Samayieh, such of the mining implements as remain at Abu Musa, be retained in custody, with a view to eventual sale, and the handing of proceeds to Nejef-bin-Ali.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. H. GABRIEL, *Lieutenant, Assistant-Resident and His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Bunder Abbas.*

Rough purport of a Petition from Nejef-bin-Ali, Persian subject, of Bunder Abbas, to Lieutenant Gabriel, dated February 16, 1908.

(After compliments.)

My father for some years performed service for the British, and as Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Samayieh, of Lingah, is a British subject,* I therefore petition to you as follows:—

Concerning the Abu Musa oxide, for which there were four concessionnaires, among whom I hold the deed of partnership of my father. My father had no other heir but myself, and therefore after his death Haji Hassan-bin-Ali acknowledged my right of partnership as acquired through my father. At the time when Hassan entered into the agreement with Messrs. Wonckhaus he gave me no information whatever on the subject. Subsequently I made an arrangement with Haji Amin-ut-Tujjar to sell him oxide and sent word to Hassan to this effect. Hassan then wrote me that he had made a contract elsewhere, and would inform me regarding it later. As proof that I did not in any way agree to this contract made by Hassan, I point to the fact that it did not bear my signature, and when, some months later, Abdullah-bin-Hassan and the German Munshi came and asked me to sign it in token of assent, I refused to do so, as I had not been consulted in the first place. As further proof of my right in the Concession, I may mention that in 1904 Abdullah-bin-Hassan had a case in Calcutta against Messrs. Sassoon concerning the Abu Musa oxide, but seeing that the oxide had been sold in the name of my father, the case could not be proceeded with until I had furnished a power of attorney for the Calcutta Court—a copy of this is doubtless on your Consulate records. (Note by His Britannic Majesty's Consul: The Consulate fee-book shows that Nejef paid 5*s.* fees for the execution of a power of attorney on the 29th October, 1904.) Now I complain that from the time that Hassan has been actively engaged in the oxide work of Bu Musa, I have not received 1 dinar of the proceeds; although all the work on the island formerly devolved upon my father, who himself found the implements, &c., for working the oxide, which implements are even now at the island.

Besides all this, there were 250 carpets which belonged to my father, and which were sent to Calcutta for sale. Abdullah-bin-Hassan wanted to settle up the account for them in Calcutta, but until I gave a power of attorney they would not settle with him. Hassan subsequently collected all the money, but I have never been able to recover any of it from him.

Now I pray you of your goodness to look after my rights and to obtain me justice against Hassan.

---

* I am not sure if these words are advisable or necessary.—P. Z. C.

Major Cox to Lieutenant Gabriel.

(Telegraphic.) *Bushire, February* 18, 1908.

Your telegram of the 28th November.

Please ascertain from Nejef-bin-Ali the precise connection which Mr. Malcolm has with the concern.

Lieutenant Gabriel to Major Cox.

(Telegraphic.) *Bunder Abbas, February* 20, 1908.

Please see your telegram dated the 18th February. A sum of 1,000 rupees towards working expenses was originally contributed by Malcolm, and it was then agreed among the concessionnaires that one-fifth share of the profits should be given to him on condition that he should furnish barges and coolie labour for the work. As, subsequently, he did not comply with the condition, concessionnaires had no further dealings with him in the matter.

Abdul Latif to Major Cox.

(After compliments.) *Shargah, 17th Moharrum*, 1325.

With the highest respect I beg to represent that I have learnt that Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid, in pursuance of the advice of the British Government, has arranged that Hassan-bin-Ali Samayieh, should the German firm ask him to ship the oxide which is lying on the beach of the island and ready for shipment, should be permitted to ship it on specific conditions. Seeing that I was originally a partner in the said Concession, I have thought it necessary to make the following representation to you: It is now ten years since the commencement of the lease, and in the beginning it was agreed between us partners that no sale or transaction should be completed without consultation with all. And in this past period Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Samayieh extracted a large amount of oxide from the mines of Abu Musa Island, and he had been always accumulating it against the time that he might find a purchaser, so that the oxide might be ready for sale. Thus I opine that from the commencement up till now he has sold probably 8,000 tons, and now there is probably available in the island some 6,000 tons or more, which they have extracted from the mines a long time since. Out of that is the quantity which, as mentioned above, they have brought down to the sea-shore for shipment by German ship. I have not ceased to ask him (Hassan) to render an account, but have not obtained it, and Haji Hassan has not given any one anything whatever; and I fear that, by reason of the termination of the Concession it is probable that Haji Hassan will put the whole of this oxide to his own credit, and seeing that this oxide, which is available there, was extracted before the incidence of Hassan's Agreement with Wonckhaus, which I did not agree to, and in any case previous to the signature of the deed of lease by Sheikh Sagar, I consider myself entitled to my share in all the oxide that has been extracted. I have therefore informed you, and beg from your kindness that Haji Hassan should be called upon to place his accounts before from first to last, so that he may not alter or change the account, and that there be a division according to shares, so that each may take his share.

II c.- (i.) *Copy of Transfer Indorsement, dated October* 10, 1907, *between Hassan Samayieh and Brown.*

[Not printed.]

II c.— ii.) *Sheikh Sagar's Letter of Protest against same.*

Sheikh Sagar-bin-Khalid to Major Cox.

(After compliments.) *19th Moharrum*, 1326.

As you are aware on the 19th Moharrum, 1325, we decided to annul the deed of contract for the oxide contract of Abu Musa, which was in the hands of Haji

Hassan-bin-Ali Samayich and his partners, and subsequently we expelled his workmen from the island. We now learn that Haji Hassan-bin-Ali Samayich, on the 10th October, 1907, that is to say, after eight months after the annulment of the Concession, sold a share in the Oxide Company which had formerly belonged to Yusuf-bin Abdulla. How could this person possibly sell a share in a concern which a long time since had been done away with wholly and entirely. And seeing that the procedure of Haji Hassan is against all principles, and his motive is to create confusion, it is necessary for me to inform you that I am unable to accept or agree to this action, and in view of the fact that the buyer and seller are dependents of the British Government, I request that you will take steps for the suppression of these objectionable proceedings.

III.—*Evidence recorded regarding Repulsion of German Dhow from Abu Musa on October 23, 1907, in course of which some shots were fired.*

Statement of Gulam Hassan.

Gulam Hassan states on solemn affirmation:—

I have been living on Abu Musa as caretaker of girdens and flocks for the last twelve or fifteen years.

The following are the circumstances under which shots were fired by Sheikh Sagar's guards in connection with the arrival of Abdalla-bin-Hassan Samayich in a "boom" (pattern of native craft) from Lingah. The vessel arrived about noon and dropped anchor off the spot where the oxide is shipped from about 300 yards to the westward of the heaps on the seashore. A jolly-boat full of people put off from her after she had anchored and came towards the shore.

At this time there were only ten or fifteen men present out of Sheikh Sagar's guard, the rest were over at the village. Some of those present were now on the seashore in front of the oxide heaps and some above them on the rocks at the side.

Those on shore shouted to the people in the boat not to approach but as she came on one or two shots were fired from the rocks near the big oxide heap. They were not fired at the boat or dhow but in the air.

The German was in the boat, and at the time one Haji Ali, whom I understand to be the German's clerk, was standing up in the bows of the boat ready to jump off as the boat neared the shore, but I myself called out to him, "Don't attempt to land, as there is no permission for it." I heard no answer. Then the guards on the shore called out, "If you want to ask or see anything send a man ashore, he can see and go back."

Two negroes, whose names I do not know, then jumped into the water and swam ashore. They only remained a few minutes. They were led up to the huts where Sheikh Abdulla-bin-Ahmed-bin-Sultan was—(he was in charge of the guard from Shargah)—and they asked him what was the position of affairs and why had the shots been fired. He replied, "We are ordered not to let anyone land; if you don't like it go and get permission from Sheikh Sagar." They then returned to the boat, and the boat to the boom.

As the dhow did not show any signs of departing the guard feared she might be intending to stay till dark and try and effect a landing, so about 4 P.M. they began shouting to the dhow, warning her to be off; at this time there were waves and some surf. Soon afterwards, I being in the huts at the time, I heard three or four shots fired by our men, but I did not see what at.

The dhow then, I believe, moved from her place and went further round to the right, but I did not see any more of her myself.

Dated Abu Musa, 17th February, 1908.

(Signed) P. Z. COX.

Statement of Mattur-bin-Shamhan.

Mattur-bin-Shamhan states on solemn affirmation:

I was one of the guard which Sheikh Sagar sent over to Abu Musa and was present on the occasion when shots were fired in connection with the presence there of a dhow from Lingah. The dhow arrived about noon and anchored opposite the oxide heaps on the shore. The guards who had gone over from Shargah were about eighty in all. Of these about thirty were present at the oxide heaps when the boom arrived. After she had anchored a rowing-boat put from her containing about ten persons. As they got near we recognized Abdalla-bin-Samayich and a native clerk of the Germans, who was known by sight to some of us. I did not notice the German himself.

When we saw Abdalla some of us called out "Don't come near, don't come near Abdalla." He merely answered by calling out and gesticulating to his boatmen to row harder. We shouted "We will fire at you if you attempt to approach." Abdalla then said to his rowers; "Don't mind what they say they will not shoot." We repeated that we would fire. He replied "Fire away," we then fired four shots in the air over their heads. I did not fire myself.

We should have fired straight at them had not Sheikh Abdalla-bin-Ahmed who was in charge of us, given us orders (which he sent through me) to fire in the air.

On our firing they turned back a little and called out to us, "What is this all about?" We replied, "If you want to get news, send two men ashore. On that they sent two negroes (one named Salim), who jumped into the water and swam ashore. They said, "Why do you stop us from coming ashore seeing that the island belongs to the German and Hassan-bin-Samayich." We replied, "The island belongs to Sheikh Sagar." The negroes said that Abdalla-bin-Hassan had not told the German that, and from what they said it appeared that they had brought him, the German, on false pretences.

After this conversation we told them they must return to the boom; and we warned them that if the boom did not depart before sundown we should have to fire on her. They then went off to her.

The boom did not move, however, and we feared that after night fall she might endeavour to make a landing. Accordingly Abdalla-bin-Hamed told three of the guard to go to the cliff and fire some shots. They, however, fired six shots above the boom. It was not intended that they should fire at the boom as a matter of fact, I did hear one shot strike her, or strike something other than the water. The man who fired that shot was Abdurrahim-bin-Saif, of the Hoti tribe, who let off his rifle before getting it to his shoulder.

After this the boom weighed anchor and got off just at sunset, but they only moved a little way and anchored again opposite the mud inclosure farther up.

Four of us then went along the shore parallel and stayed there until three hours after sunset (about 9 P.M.). Then seeing that they were apparently intending to pass the night there, our men fired two more shots in the air above the dhow. She then took her departure. Our object was to frighten the visitors away.

Dated Shargah, 21st February, 1908.

(Signed) P. Z. COX.

IV.—*Nationality of Mr. T. Brown and Haji Ali Tashnikar.*

The Question of Mr. T. Brown's Nationality.

The Government of India will remember that, in my telegram dated the 12th February, I expressed doubts as to Brown's nationality being British, as stated in the German case, the facts being, so far as my knowledge went—

1. That he had not registered himself in Bushire as a British subject.
2. That neither his accent nor his bearing, when in Bushire from time to time, gave one any reason to regard him as British.

3. That to the best of my belief M. Wonckhaus or Mr. Brown himself had in conversation, soon after my arrival here, mentioned his being a naturalized German.

4. That the German Consul, Dr. Listemann, who has previously joined my dinner party on Christmas night, expressed his inability to accept our invitation this year, because he was expecting the "German community" to spend Christmas with him. One of his guests was Mr. Brown.

5. That Mr. Marling, in his despatch No. 281, dated the 31st December, 1907, to His Majesty's Secretary of State, had quoted Baron von Richthofen, the German Minister, as saying that the Sheikh of Shargah "had fired on a German subject named Brown."

6. That there were other incidental references on my record to Brown, or Braun, "the German."

7. Finally that, though he came to Bushire a few days after the firing incident at Abu Musa, he made no report or complaint to me on the subject, nor did he do so at Lingah to the Residency Agent.

There were some grounds, therefore, for the uncertainty that existed. On my making inquiries at Lingah, however, I was assured by Khan Saheb Agha Badr that when Brown first joined Messrs. Wonckhaus' firm at Lingah from Europe, he possessed a British passport, and that clue enabled me to trace the reference to him on the Residency records.

It now appears that on the 15th June, 1901, Mr. Brown passed through Bushire by direct steamer from Europe, and, having landed while the ship was lying in port, he called on the Extra-Assistant Resident and asked for a British passport.

In support of this request he declared that he had been born of English parents at Hemelengen, near Bremen, and in proof of his statement produced a certificate purporting to have been recorded by the Provost of Dundee certifying the British nationality of one John Brown, whom the applicant claimed as his father. A copy of this certificate is on my record, and I attach a duplicate of it.

When producing this document, Mr. Brown stated that he had obtained it in order to avoid compulsory military service in Germany, which he would otherwise have been obliged to undergo, he having been born and bred in Germany.

On the strength of the said document a British passport was issued to Mr. Brown.

Before granting him a passport it might have been well had the Residency asked him to produce a birth certificate, for, as it is, we have only his word for it that he is the son of the John Brown figuring in the Dundee certificate.

Be that as it may, however, I presume that, for purposes of the present case, we must accept the view that he is actually a British subject, and on the whole it seems advantageous to us that we should do so.

For instance, whereas, in case he were a German, the German Government would, perhaps, be in a better position to argue that the transfer by Hassan Sammyieh on the 10th or 16th October was a valid contract, now that Brown is admittedly a British subject the transaction becomes one between two British subjects, and the British Government are the sole judges of its legality.

(Signed) P. Z. COX.

March 1, 1908.

City Chambers, Dundee, May 22, 1901.

I, William Hunter, Lord Provost and Chief Magistrate of the City and Royal Burgh of Dundee, certify that John Brown, Manager of the Jute Spinnerei and Weberei Hemelengen, Bremen, Germany, if a British subject, and resided down to about 1874 in Dundee in that part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland called Scotland, and that he is worthy of faith and good credit.

In faith and testimony whereof I have caused the seal of the said City and Royal Burgh of Dundee to be affixed hereto this 22nd day of May in the year 1900.

(Signed) WILLEAM HUNTER,
Lord Provost and Chief Magistrate of the City and Royal Burgh of Dundee.

Identity of the German Subject said to have been with Mr. Brown when he visited Abu Musa, and was fired upon on October 23, 1907.

The other doubtful "German subject" who accompanied Mr. Brown to Abu Musa was one Haji Ali Tashanker, mentioned in Dr. Listemann's letter of the 19th November to the Sheikh of Shargah.

In answer to my queries our Lingah Agent said Haji Ali was not a Persian, but was believed to come from "Tunis." He could not tell authoritatively however, and I have instructed him to make further inquiries.

He is, perhaps, a native of German East Africa.

(Signed) P. Z. COX.

March 1, 1908.

[11068] No. 4.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 1.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 13th February, relative to affairs of Arabia.

India Office, March 31, 1908.

Inclosure 1 in No. 4.

Government of India to Major Cox.

(Confidential.) *Simla, June* 7, 1907.

I AM directed to refer you to the endorsement from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated the 11th May, 1907, with which was forwarded a copy of a Report, No. 4, dated the 17th February, 1907, from the Acting British Consul at Jeddah to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople, in the last paragraph of which it was stated that an Englishman, who had accompanied the Koweit Haj caravan, was living in Kasim.

2. I am to inquire whether you are aware of the foundation for the report made, and, if not, whether you could institute inquiries in the matter. The Political Resident in Turkish Arabia is also being asked to furnish such information on the subject as he may be able to procure.

Inclosure 2 in No. 4.

Government of India to Major Ramsay.

(Confidential.) *Simla, June* 7, 1907.

I AM directed to inform you that in a Report submitted by the Acting British Consul at Jeddah to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople, it was stated that an Englishman, who had accompanied the Koweit Haj caravan, was living in Kasim.

2. I am to request that you will furnish any information you may be able to obtain with regard to the rumour. The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf has also been addressed on the subject.

Inclosure 3 in No. 4.

Major Cox to Government of India.

Bushire, June 21, 1907.

WITH reference to Foreign Department letter dated the 7th June, 1907, I have the honour to state that I think the report which reached His Majesty's Acting Consul at Jeddah regarding the alleged presence of an Englishman with the Koweit–Mecca caravan and sojourn in Kasim clearly refers to the incident reported in my Report, dated the 30th December, 1906, to the Foreign Department.

Inclosure 4 in No. 4.

Major Ramsay to Government of India.

Baghdad, July 10, 1907.

WITH reference to your Confidential letter, dated the 7th June, 1907, I have the honour to inform you that I have not been able to learn anything definite about the presence of a European at Kasim. I hear, however, that a report reached Bagdad from Nasariyah on the Euphrates, that a European had arrived at Kasim, that the tribesmen had not allowed him to settle there, and that nothing could be found out as to what had become of him.

I have asked His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah to let me know if he can obtain any information on the subject.

Inclosure 5 in No. 4.

Major Ramsay to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Baghdad, December 4, 1907.

Sir,

IN continuation of my letter dated the 10th July, 1907, I have the honour to report that Mr. Consul Crow informs me that he has not heard anything of a European recently being in Nejd. I, too, have not been able to obtain any detailed or reliable information on the subject. There is a man living in the Muntafik country known as Abdalla-el-Fathal. I believe that he claims to have been an American subject, but Mr. Van Ess, an American missionary living at Bussorah, tells me that he thinks Abdalla-el-Fathal is an Englishman by birth. He has become a Mahommedan and has lived amongst the Arabs for about nine years. I have been told that his name was originally Williamson; one story is that he was at one time in the Aden police, another story is that he was employed in Egypt and absconded from there after having murdered a man. I cannot hear anything to show that this man has recently been in Nejd.

2. I am inclined to think, however, that there is some truth in the information which has reached the Government of India. Some months ago I met a Sheikh from Nejd and he told me that a European had been wandering about his country. The Sheikh said that he did not know whether the foreigner was an Englishman or not, but he said that he appeared to be a wealthy man, interested in surveying, and willing to buy engraved stones at high prices; he was said to employ an interpreter. The Sheikh said that the foreigner had invited him to his camp, but that he had not been able to accept the invitation.

3. A short time ago an Indian resident of Bagdad was going out to meet a number of Sheikhs from the west and I asked him if he could obtain any corroboration of the story told above. He informs me that the foreigner is supposed to be an Englishman, that he excavates as well as surveys, that he was at Aja and Selma in the Jabal Tai (places mentioned by Tweedie at p. 39 of his book on the Arabian horse), and that the last news of him was that he had gone to visit Ibn Saoud.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RAMSAY.

[11244]

No. 5.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 2.)

Sir,

India Office, April 1, 1908.

WITH reference to your letter, dated the 31st December, 1907, relating to the Muscat Arbitration Award, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Morley to transmit herewith, to be laid before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of papers received from the Government of India regarding the settlement arrived at between the British and French Consuls at Muscat.

As Sir E. Grey is aware, it was laid down in the Memorandum communicated to M. Geoffray on the 24th October, 1905, that the result of the Conference between the two Consuls should be referred to their respective Governments for approval. Should Sir E. Grey see no objection, Mr. Morley would suggest that the French Government should be approached with a view to the simultaneous acceptance by the two Governments of the settlement which Major Grey has now reported.

It will be seen from the Viceroy's telegram of the 15th March that the Government of India approve the settlement, and await orders as to the Proclamation which it is proposed should be issued by the Sultan of Muscat.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 5.

Major Grey to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Muscat, February 8, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your information, a copy of a letter dated the 8th instant, and its inclosures, which I have addressed to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Inclosure 2 in No. 5.

Major Grey to Major Cox.

(Confidential.)

Muscat, February 8, 1908.

WITH reference to the instructions contained in telegram dated the 13th ultimo, from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, I have the honour to forward copies of the documents in connection with the settlement of the French flag question in accordance with the judgment of The Hague Tribunal.

2. At my first interview with M. Laronce on the 18th January I showed him a copy of the Memorandum communicated to the French Ambassador by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the 6th August, 1907, and parts of the French despatch of the 5th November, 1906, remarking that I had nothing to conceal, and that our Governments were evidently anxious for a settlement to be arrived at as soon as possible.

3. As a sequel to this interview, I received on the 20th January an amended list of dhows and dhow owners, which, as will be seen from the correspondence, I succeeded in inducing M. Laronce to reduce still further. This list, as it now stands, is satisfactory, particularly as one or two of the persons named therein are said to be only awaiting the publication of the necessary permission to resign their authorization.

4. The Proclamation submitted herewith in English and Arabic is sufficiently brief, and contains all the information necessary to define the conditions of authorization to fly the French flag. It has been drawn up to the satisfaction of His Highness the Sultan and the French Consul, and I trust will have the approval of the Government of India and yourself, in which case I respectfully request the favour of being supplied with 100 printed copies of the Arabic version for circulation in Oman. M. Laronce and I do not consider it necessary that the Proclamation should be countersigned by us.

5. The Sultan is much pleased with the settlement arrived at, and regards with

satisfaction the prospect of a cessation of the worry and annoyance which he has experienced in the past in connection with this question.

6. These final negotiations, and the preparation of the necessary documents, have been somewhat delayed by my having been indisposed.

7. Copies of this letter and its inclosures have been forwarded to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, and, in accordance with the instructions contained in the telegram from the Government of India in the Foreign Department of the 29th November, 1905, a copy of inclosure has been dispatched to the Political Secretary at the India Office direct.

Inclosure 3 in No. 5.

Major Grey to M. Laronce.

Monsieur et cher Collègue, *Mascate, le 17 Janvier*, 1908.

COMME suite à ma lettre du 15 Octobre dernier, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que les instructions nécessaires à l'égard de la question des boutriers me sont parvenues, et que je suis à votre disposition pour la solution de cette affaire.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) W. G. GREY.

Inclosure 4 in No. 5.

M. Laronce to Major Grey.

Monsieur et cher Collègue, *Mascate, le 17 Janvier*, 1908.

J'E m'empresse d'accuser réception de votre lettre en date de ce jour relative au règlement de la question des boutriers.

Si cela vous agrée, nous pourrions nous entretenir de ce sujet dès demain, à 3 heures de l'après-midi, à mon Consulat. Dans le cas contraire, soyez assez aimable pour m'indiquer vous-même un autre rendez-vous.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) R. LARONCE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 5.

M. Laronce to Major Grey.

Monsieur et cher Collègue, *Mascate, le 20 Janvier*, 1908.

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception de la lettre que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser le 17 courant relative au régime des boutriers Mascatais Français. A la suite de la conversation que nous avons eue avant-hier sur cette affaire, j'ai la satisfaction de constater que l'accord le plus complet s'est fait sur tous les points et qu'il ne nous reste plus qu'à régler certains détails.

Le Mémorandum du Foreign Office qui m'a été transmis par le Gouvernement Français concorde absolument avec la pièce dont vous avez bien voulu me donner lecture, ainsi que vous pourrez vous en rendre compte par l'annexe dont copie est ci-jointe.

Selon le désir exprimé par Sir E. Grey, je m'empresse de vous adresser :—

1. Une liste pour néant des boutres appartenant à des Français.

2. Une liste des propriétaires indigènes dont les navires sont autorisés à arborer le pavillon Français en vertu des Articles 1 et 2 de la sentence arbitrale de La Haye (1re partie).

3. La liste des protégés Français au titre Zanzibarite en vertu de l'Accord signé à Londres le 13 Mai, 1904.

En ce qui concerne la Liste No. 2, j'ai procédé de nouveau à un examen minutieux et approfondi des titres de chacun de boutres et j'ai été amené à en rayer un certain nombre. D'autres de ces navires ont été vendus ou ont été détruits par suite d'accidents

dus à la navigation. C'est ainsi que si vous comparez la liste d'aujourd'hui à celle que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous transmettre en annexe à ma lettre du 4 Mars, 1906, vous pourrez constater que le nombre des boutres Mascatais admis au pavillon Français est tombé de cinquante à vingt-sept. Dans ce nombre ne sont pas compris les dix boutres appartenant aux protégés Français de la Liste No. 3.

Dans le cas où vous auriez quelque nouvelle objection à formuler, relativement à la Liste No. 2, je suis tout disposé à l'entendre, pourvu que cela ne nous entraîne pas à discuter la question de principe.

Le 24 Octobre, 1905, Lord Lansdowne avait suggéré au Gouvernement de la République que les Consuls des deux pays soient invités à se concerter sur la meilleure manière de faire connaître aux sujets du Sultan les résultats de l'arbitrage. Nous avons donc été amenés, s'il vous en souvient, à examiner cette question au mois de Novembre de la même année et voici ce qui avait été convenu à l'époque. Une Proclamation serait faite à Mascate et à Sour par le Sultan, basée sur les six paragraphes de la sentence arbitrale et contresignée par nous. Ce document nous serait soumis au préalable. Il conviendrait d'y ajouter les dernières dispositions contenues dans le Mémorandum remis par le Foreign Office le 6 Août, 1907, à l'Ambassade de la République à Londres et d'y joindre la liste définitive des boutriers et de leurs navires.

Je vous prie, Monsieur et cher collègue, de vouloir bien me donner acte pour la bonne forme de la présente dépêche.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) R. LARONCE.

Inclosure 6 in No. 5.

Lists of Dhow Owners drawn up by M. Laronce.

1re Liste.—Liste des Boutres appartenant à des Français résidant dans l'Oman.

Néant.

2e Liste.—Boutriers autorisés à arborer le Pavillon Français en vertu des Articles 1 et 2, 1re partie, de la Sentence Arbitrale de la Haye.

No.	Propriétaires.	Date de l'Octroi du 1er Titre de Navigation au Propriétaire.	Boutres.
1	Mohammed-bèn-Abdallah-ben-Sultan ..	Djibouti, 1889	Selamti.
			Fath-es-Selam.
			Mouth-Sahel.
			Fath-el-Moumin.
2	Abdallah-ben-Khamis-ben-Ali	Djibouti, 1888	Fath-el-Kérim.
			Marseille.
			Saad-el-Kérim.
			Trieste.
3	Abdallah-ben-Khamis-ben-M'sellem ..	Mayotte, 1890	Fath-el-Kheir.
			Fath-el-Kérim.
4	Salem-bèn-Selim-ould-Séhélé	Mayotte, 1880	Fath-el-Kheir Selamti.
5	Djouma-ben-Said-ould-Belal	Obock, 1880	Djouhan.
6	Saleh-ben-Mohamed-bèn-Rachid ..	M'roni, 1885	Yad-el-Karim
			Fath-el-Rahman.
7	Seyyid Ali-ben-Ahmed	Mayotte, 1885	Samahan.
			Fath-el-Kheir.
8	Salem-ben-M'sellem-ben-Rohyia ..	Mayotte, 1875	Zaher.
			Fath-el-Kheir.
9	Selim-ben-Thabet-el-Moukadmi ..	Madagascar, 1880 ..	Fath-el-Kheir.
			Saad-el-Kérim.
10	M'barek-ben-Ahmed-ould-Rézik ..	Nossi Bé, 1871	El Khadra.
11	Abdallah-ben-Said-ould-Saber	Mayotte, 1891	Saad-es-Selam.
12	Hadadi-ben-Nasib	Majunga, 1889	Yasmin.
			Fath-el-Kheir.
13	Seif-ben-Soulelman	Mayotte, 1891	Sahaja.
14	Abdallah-ben-Mohammed-ben-Rachid Temmami	Grande Comore, 1887 ..	Fath-el-Rahman.
			Fath-el-Kheir.

3e Liste.—Protégés Français au titre Zanzibarite en vertu de l'Accord signé à Londres, le 13 Mai, 1904.

No.	Propriétaires.	Date de l'Octroi du 1er Titre de Navigation au Propriétaire.	Boutres.
1	Mohammed-ben-Sélim-oued-Aboud ..	Mayotte, 1863	Saint-Joseph. Fath-el-Kheir, Samhan.
2	Ali-ben-Said Temmami	Mayotte, 1886	..
3	Mohammed-ben-Rachid-el-Malky ..	Majunga, 1890	Fath-el-Kheir. Selamti. Sahala.
4	Mohammed-ben-Rachid-el-Rofiy ..	Mayotte, 1880	..
5	M'barek-ben-Mohammed-el-Amri ..	Mayotte, 1888	Yasmin. Fath-es-Selam.
6	Djouma-ben-M'barek	Grande Comore, 1880 ..	Fath-el-Kheir. Fath-es-Selam.

(Signé) R. LARONCE,
Le Consul de France.

Muscate, le 20 Janvier, 1908.

Inclosure 7 in No. 5.

Major Grey to M. Laronce.

Monsieur et cher Collègue, *Muscate, le 23 Janvier*, 1908.

J'AI l'honneur de vous accuser réception de la lettre, ainsi que les trois listes, que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser en date du 20 courant, et de vous en remercier. J'ai remarqué la réduction qui a été faite dans la liste des boutriers Mascatais autorisés à arborer le pavillon Français, et vous pouvez vous assurer que je ne manquerai pas de signaler au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la conciliation que vous avez montrée dans cette circonstance.

Toutefois, sans vouloir vous entraîner à discuter la question de principe dont il s'agit, je profite de l'invitation que vous m'avez proposée pour faire les observations suivantes relativement à la Liste No. 2.

Selon les renseignements qui m'ont été donnés par Salem-ben-Sélim-oued-Séhélé, Rachid-ben-Sélim-ben-Thabet (fils du boutrier No. 9), et les Scheiklis de Sour, à l'occasion d'une visite, il paraît que :—

1. Salem-ben-Mohammed-ben-Rachid, le No. 6, ne possède qu'un boutre.
2. Salem-ben-M'sellem-ben-Rebyia (No. 8) ne possède qu'un boutre, le "Zafer"; l'autre ne lui appartient pas.
3. Sélim-ben-Thabet-el-Moukheini (No. 9) n'en possède qu'un, le "Fath-el-Kheir." C'est son fils qui m'en avait assuré.
4. Abdallah-ben-Mohammed-ben-Rachid (No. 14) ne possède que le "Fath-el-Kheir."

D'ailleurs, le No. 12, Hodeid-bin-Nasib, n'a pas de boutres actuellement. Cet homme, qui se trouve à Bu Abali près de Masnau, fut fait prisonnier avec les autres Arabes en 1902 par les Portugais à Sanuco pour le délit de Traite des Esclaves, et depuis cette époque-là ne possède plus d'embarcations.

Je vous serai très reconnaissant de vouloir bien prendre en considération les renseignements que j'ai obtenus, et qui, je puis dire, sont de la plus grande exactitude.

Veuillez &c.
(Signé) W. G. GREY.

Inclosure 8 in No. 5.

M. Laronce to Major Grey.

Monsieur et cher Collègue, *Muscate, le 24 Janvier*, 1908.

PAR lettre en date du 23 Janvier, vous avez bien voulu remarquer que des réductions considérables avaient été faites dans le nombre des boutres Mascatais admis à arborer le pavillon Français. Néanmoins, vos observations tendent encore à diminuer de six le nombre de ceux-ci. Je ne discuterai pas l'exactitude des renseignements qui vous ont été fournis. Je dirai seulement que les miens ne concordent pas tout à fait, et qu'ils n'émanent pas seulement d'une source indigène.

Cependant, pour bien marquer mon désir de conciliation et pour en finir une fois pour toutes de cette question, je consens à n'attribuer qu'un seul boutre aux propriétaires qui portent les No. 6 (Salem-ben-Mohammed-ben-Rachid), No. 8 (Salem-ben-M'sellem-ben-Rebyia), et à rayer le nom de Hodeid-ben-Nasib, No. 12.

En revanche, je vous demande de maintenir deux boutres au No. 9 (Sélim-ben-Thabet-el-Moukheini) et au No. 14 (Abdallah-ben-Mohammed-ben-Rachid Temmami). En ce qui concerne le No. 9, je puis en effet affirmer que les deux boutres inscrits sont bien sa propriété personnelle. J'ai reconnu et visité moi-même ces deux boutres lors de mes différents séjours à Sour. Mon prédécesseur, M. Ottavi, avait fait de même. Quant à la déclaration du fils de l'intéressé, elle ne me surprend pas. Ce jeune homme est venu ici au mois d'Août dernier, tandis que les deux boutres en question se trouvaient mouillés en rade de Mattrah, et il m'a demandé d'inscrire le "Said-el-Kérim" à son nom—ce que j'ai refusé de faire. Il considère l'un des boutres comme lui appartenant, mais son père est d'un tout autre avis.

Je demande également le maintien de deux boutres au No. 14 (Abdallah-ben-Mohammed-ben-Rachid Temmami). Cet indigène réside plus souvent à la Grande-Comore, où il se trouve actuellement, que dans l'Oman. S'il est exact que depuis deux années le "Fath-el-Kheir" ait seul fréquenté l'Oman, le "Fath-el-Rahmin" pourrait y venir d'un moment à l'autre. Il y a donc intérêt à ce qu'il ne soit pas inconnu.

En résumé, sur la réduction de six boutres proposés, j'en accepte quatre et je demande le maintien de deux. J'espère que la modération de mes prétentions ne vous échappera pas et que cet arrangement aura votre approbation.

J'attacherais du prix à connaître votre réponse avant le départ du prochain courrier, afin que je puisse écrire à Paris que tout est terminé.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) R. LARONCE.

Inclosure 9 in No. 5.

Major Grey to M. Laronce.

Monsieur et cher Collègue, *Muscate, le 7 Février*, 1908.

EN réponse à votre lettre en date de ce jour, je m'empresse de vous signaler mon approbation de l'arrangement que vous proposez relativement à la réduction des quatre boutres ainsi que le nom de Hodeid-bin-Nasib. Cette liste est alors définitivement fixée.

Quant à la Liste No. 3, c'est bien entendu que les six indigènes y compris sont des protégés Français. Mais on m'assure que Mohammed-ben-Sélim-oued-Aboud ne possède que le "Saint-Joseph" actuellement, et que Mohammed-ben-Rachid-el-Malky n'a pas un seul boutre depuis longtemps. Le Sultan craint que peut-être un de ses sujets n'aurait pris, ou n'aurait l'intention de prendre, un titre de navigation au nom de l'un de ces individus pour un boutre qui lui appartient, ce qui constitue l'abus dont Sa Hautesse se plaignait autrefois. Je me permets, alors, de vous prier de vouloir faire la plus grande circonspection à l'avenir à cet égard.

J'espère vous écrire demain de ce qui concerne la Proclamation qui doit être faite par Son Altesse le Sultan d'après notre accord originaire.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) W. G. GREY.

Inclosure 10 in No. 5.

Major Grey to M. Larence.

Monsieur et cher Collègue, *Mascate, le 7 Février*, 1908.

COMME suite à notre entrétien du 1er courant, j'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre sous ce pli une copie de la Proclamation en Anglais et en Arabe.

Nous pouvons nous féliciter maintenant de la solution de cette question, qui a divisé nos deux Consulats depuis si longtemps, et du fait que les difficultés n'existeront plus, ni pour nous, ni pour nos successeurs. Je vous prie d'agréer mes meilleurs remercîments de la conciliation que vous avez montrée dans nos négociations.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) W. G. GREY.

Inclosure 11 in No. 5.

Proclamation from Faisal-bin-Turki.

To all who may see it.

WHEREAS in time past difficulties had arisen in my dominions on account of the issue of papers by the French Government to certain of my subjects authorizing them to fly the French flag on their dhows, I had requested the English Government to regulate and settle the matter with that of the French. The two Governments referred the general question to the Court of Arbitration at The Hague, and the judgment of that Court was as follows:

1. Before the 1st January, 1892, France was entitled to authorize vessels belonging to subjects of His Highness the Sultan of Muscat to fly the French flag, only bound by her own legislation and administrative rules.

2. Owners of dhows who before 1892 have been authorized by France to fly the French flag retain this authorization as long as France renews it to the grantee.

3. After the 2nd January, 1892, France was not entitled to authorize vessels belonging to subjects of His Highness the Sultan of Muscat to fly the French flag except on condition that their owners or fitters-out had established or should establish that they had been considered and treated by France as her protégés before the year 1863.

4. Dhows of Muscat authorized as aforesaid to fly the French flag are entitled, in the territorial waters of Muscat, to the inviolability provided by the French-Muscat Treaty of the 17th November, 1844.

5. The authorization to fly the French flag cannot be transmitted or transferred to any other person or to any other dhow, even if belonging to the same owner.

6. Subjects of the Sultan of Muscat who are owners or masters of dhows authorized to fly the French flag or who are members of the crews of such vessels, or who belong to their families, do not enjoy, in consequence of that fact, any right of exterritoriality, which could exempt them from the sovereignty, especially from the jurisdiction, of His Highness the Sultan of Muscat.

Founded upon the above judgment an arrangement has been agreed upon between the two Governments as follows:

1. The following is a list of those of my subjects who are authorized to fly the French flag on the dhows mentioned against their names—

1. Mohammed-ben-Abdallah-ben-Sultan-el-Ghailani	Selmati, Fath-es-Selam, Mesh-Sabel, Fath-el-Mouin,
2. Abdallah-ben-Khamis-ben-Ali-el-Moukheini	Fath-el-Kerim, Marseille, Saad-el-Kerim, Tunis,
3. Abdallah-ben-Khamis-ben-M'sellem-el-Moukheini	Fath-el-Khir, Fath-el-Kerim,
4. Salem-ben-Sultan-oued-Sehibi-el-Araimi	Fath-el-Khir Selmati,
5. Djoma-ben-Sadoun-el-Hadad-el-Araimi	Djelaia,
6. Salem-ben-Mohammed-ben-Rachid-el-Araimi	Yad-el-Kerim,
7. Seyyid Ali-ben-Ahmed Zahali	Saadan, Fath-el-Khir,
8. Salem-ben-M'sellem-ben-Gelaya-ben-Moukheini	Zahar,
9. Selim-ben-Thabet-el-Moukheini	Fath-el-Kerim, Saad-el-Kerim,
10. M'barek-Bel-Ahmed-ben-el-Rezik-el-Araimi	El Khadra,
11. Abdallah-ben-Sadoun-el-Saadi	Saadan-es-Selam,
12. Seif-ben-Sarmin-ben-el-Riach	Sfaha,
13. Abdallah-ben-Mohammed-ben-Rachid Temimi	Fath-er-Rahman, Fath-el-Khir,

2. In the event of any dhow in the above list being sold, lost, or wrecked, the owner may fly the French flag on the dhow which replaces it, but the above number must not be increased.

3. Upon the decease of any owner mentioned in the above list authorization to fly the French flag ceases for his dhow or dhows.

4. Any of the above-mentioned dhow owners are at liberty to surrender their authorization to fly the French flag at any time.

5. The above-mentioned are forbidden to pass on a French flag for use by any other person. In the event of this order being disobeyed, both the giver and the receiver will be severely punished.

6. In accordance with clause 6 of the judgment of The Hague Court, the above-mentioned persons, their nakhudas and crews, are subject to my sovereignty and jurisdiction alone while on land; but, in cases of crimes committed by any of them while on board one of the above-mentioned dhows, duly flying the French flag, on the high seas or in the territorial waters of Oman, the matter will be inquired into by the French Consul at Muscat on the return of the dhow, and the Consul will send the delinquents to me for punishment if necessary.

7. Should any dhow mentioned in the above list come into the possession of an unauthorized person its authorization to fly the French flag ceases on its transfer.

In an Agreement signed at Zanzibar in 1904 between the English and French Governments it was arranged that certain subjects of Zanzibar were to be regarded during their lifetime as protégés of France "à titre Zanzibarite." Six of those persons are in the habit of visiting Oman; their names are therefore published here for information, with the dhows which they possess.

1. M'barek-ben-Salim-el-Mohammed-el-Ghailani	Saint Joseph, Fath-el-Kheir, Sam-Sam,
2. Ali-ben-Said Temimi	
3. Mohammed-ben-Rachid-el-Malky	Fath-el-Kerim, Selmati, Sahaba,
4. Mohammed-ben-Rachid-el-Rotly	
5. M'barek-ben-Mohammed-el-Amri	Yamain, Fath-es-Selam,
6. Obeid-el-ben-M'barek-el-Ghailani	Fath-el-Kerim, Fath-el-Kheir,

Should any subject of mine attempt to obtain a paper from the French Consul for a dhow of his own, representing it as belonging to one of the above persons, he will be severely punished.

Inclosure 12 in No. 5.

LIST, as finally agreed upon by the British and French Consuls at Muscat, of Muscat subjects authorized to fly the French flag in accordance with the provisions of The Hague sentence, with the names of their dhows.

No.	Owners.	Dhows.	Remarks by Political Agent, Muscat.
1	Mohammed-ben-Abdallah-ben-Sultan-el-Ghallani	Fâthet-Kerim Fath-es-Selim Mouth-Sahel Fath-el-Moumin	Of these dhows two belong to Mohammed, the others are the property of his cousins, but he is supposed to have a share in them.
2	Abdallah-ben-Khamis-ben-Ali-el-Moukheini	Fath-el-Kerim Murseille Said-el-Kerim Faous	Two are his own property, the other two belong as above to relatives, but he claims a share.
3	Abdallah-ben-Khamis-ben-M'sellem-el-Moukheini	Fath-el-Kheir Fath-el-Kerim	Correct.
4	Salim-ben-Selim-ould-Schélé-el-Arabi	Fath-el-Kheir-Selamti	Ditto.
5	Djouma-ben-Said-ould-Belal-el-Arabi	Djouhara	Ditto.
6	Salem-ben-Mohammed-ben-Rachid-el-Arimi	Yad-el-Kerim ..	Ditto.
7	Seyyid Ali-ben-Ahmed Zahab ..	Sanahan	This owner intends to renounce his authorization.
8	Salem-ben-M'sellem-ben-Rebyia-el-Moukheini	Fath-el-Kheir Zaher	Correct.
9	Sélim-ben-Thabet-el-Moukheini ..	Fath-el-Kheir Saad-el-Kerim	Accepted as correct in view of M. Larence's explanation.
10	M'barek-ben-Ahmed-ould-Rézik-el-Arabi	El Khadra	Correct.
11	Abdallah-ben-Said-ould-Saber ..	Said-es-Selam ..	Ditto.
12	Seif-bin-Soulaiman-el-Jiadi	Sahala	Ditto.
13	Abdallah-ben-Mohammed-ben-Rachid Temimi	Fath-er-Rahman Fath-el-Kheir	Accepted as correct in view of M. Larence's explanation.

List of French protégés "à titre Zanzibarite" in virtue of Agreement of May 13, 1904.

1	Mohammed-ben-Selim-ould-Aloud-el-Ghallani	Saint Joseph Fath-el-Kheir Soudan	Said to possess the "Saint Joseph" only, but M. Larence explains that the others do not visit Oman.
2	Ali-ben-Said Temimi ..		
3	Mohammed-ben-Rachid-el-Malky ..	Fath-el-Kheir Salamti Sahala	Said to have no boats, but M. Larence explains as above.
4	Mohammed-ben-Rachid-el-Rotby ..		
5	M'barek-ben-Mohammed-el-Amri ..	Assmin	Do not visit Oman.
6	Djouma-ben-M'barek-el-Ghallani ..	Fath-es-Selam Fath-el-Kheir Fath-es-Selam	Ditto.

[11195] No. 6.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 28th February, and to the Viceroy, dated the 31st ultimo, relative to the situation at Abu Musa.

A copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations and Director of Naval Intelligence.

India Office, April 1, 1908.

Inclosure 1 in No. 6.

Government of India to Mr. Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *March 28, 1908.*

ABU MUSA Island. Your telegram dated the 20th January.

According to telegram from Major Cox, the 16th April next is probable date on which German vessel will reach Abu Musa Island. Major Cox recommends that British Representative should proceed with Royal Indian Mail steamer "Lawrence," as it may possibly be difficult, in view of urgencies elsewhere, for navy to provide ship to remain at Abu Musa during German vessel's visit. We have agreed, in anticipation of your concurrence.

Inclosure 2 in No. 6.

Mr. Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, March 31, 1908.*

ABU MUSA. Your telegram dated the 28th instant.

I approve employment of Royal Indian Mail steamer "Lawrence."

[11269] No. 7.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 81.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, April 2, 1908.*

DISORDERS at Van.

His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Van mentions that the chief instigators of disorders directed against the Armenians are certain officials.

The Grand Vizier has to-day sent instructions to the Vali to warn them that unless they immediately desist they may expect the severest punishments.

Captain Dickson reports under date of the 30th March that, though the Armenians continue to be alarmed, the situation at Van is less critical.

[11328] No. 8.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 3.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, and with reference to Asiatic Turkey print of the 3rd February, section 1, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India dated the 5th March relative to the building operations of the Nakib of Bagdad.

India Office, April 2, 1908.

Inclosure 1 in No. 8.

Major Ramsay to Government of India.

Bagdad, January 25, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of my despatch dated the 25th January, 1908, which I have addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

2. The last reference to this subject is your indorsement dated the 6th January, 1908.

Inclosure 2 in No. 8.

Major Ramsay to Sir N. O'Conor.

Bagdad, January 25, 1908.

IN continuation of the correspondence ending with your Excellency's telegram, the 13th December, 1907, I have the honour to submit a further report regarding the house built by the Nakib, close to the Residency.

2. After receiving the permission of your Excellency and of the Government of India to come to terms with the Nakib, should such a course be possible, I made arrangements to discuss the matter with the Nakib, and I have now the honour to inform your Excellency that the matter has settled to the satisfaction of both the Nakib and myself. I inclose, for your Excellency's information, a translation of my letter, dated the 16th January, 1908, to the Vali of Bagdad and a copy of his reply, dated the 23rd January, a sketch of the plan referred to in my letter is also inclosed.[9] It will be observed that I have accepted terms far less exacting than those proposed by Colonel Newmarch, but I do not propose to trouble your Excellency with the reasons that led me to do unless your Excellency thinks that they ought to be placed on record.

3. Your Excellency perhaps considers that I have attached undue importance to the question of the house. I have tried to look at the matter from an impersonal point of view, and what seemed to me important officially was, not that the Resident should be inconvenienced by the Nakib's house, but that it should be publicly known that we had made a determined effort to interfere with the building and had failed to attain our object. I trust your Excellency will consider the present settlement satisfactory. I have reason to think that the Nakib is contented with my proposals, and I have got as much as I thought it right to demand. I feel that I should not have got this without your Excellency's valuable support, for which I beg permission to offer my thanks.

Inclosure 3 in No. 8.

Major Ramsay to Vali of Bagdad.

Bagdad, January 16, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to address your Excellency, in continuation of the correspondence ending with Colonel Newmarch's letter, dated the 16th August, 1905, regarding the house which the Nakib Sahib has been building close to the Residency.

2. Some weeks ago your Excellency mentioned the subject to me and intimated that it would be a great pleasure to your Excellency if the matter could be brought to a conclusion satisfactory to all parties. Since that time I have been considering how far I could go to meet the wishes of the Nakib Sahib, and I have now the honour to inclose a sketch* (it does not pretend to be drawn to scale) showing the Nakib's house in its present condition as seen from the roof of the Residency. I also inclose a statement of the conditions on which I am prepared to withdraw all objections to the completion of the house.* I hope that your Excellency will agree that I have shown a readiness to meet the Nakib Sahib half-way, and I have reason to hope that the Nakib Sahib will accept the conditions now suggested. I shall be glad if your Excellency in reply to this letter will let me know whether this is the case.

Your Excellency will observe that I have not attempted to argue the merits of the case or to go into the question of legal rights. I think that any difference of opinion between the Nakib Sahib and the British Consul-General can better be decided by an appeal to our mutual wish to oblige each other and to your Excellency's friendly intervention.

Inclosure 4 in No. 8.

Vali of Bagdad to Major Ramsay.

(Translation.) *January* 23, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 16th January, 1908, inclosing a statement containing some conditions in connection with the house which the Nakib has been building close to your Consulate-General.

* Not printed.

In reply, I beg to inform you that the Nakib has agreed to the conditions laid down in the said statement, on the understanding that you will withdraw all objections to the completion of his building as you stated.

[11325] No. 9.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 3.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 12th March, relative to the situation in Nejd.

India Office, April 2, 1908.

Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

Captain Trevor to Government of India.

Bushire, February 16, 1908.

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with Government of India letter, dated the 3rd January, 1908, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the communication which has been received from Major S. G. Knox, Political Agent, Koweit, in reply to an inquiry regarding the present situation in Nejd.

Inclosure 2 in No. 9.

Major Knox to Major Cox.

Koweit, February 1, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your office indorsement, dated the 23rd January, 1908, calling for a report on the present situation in Nejd with special reference to Sheikh Mubarek's intervention in the feud between Bin Saud and Bin Rashid.

2. As will no doubt have been gathered from the diaries of this Agency, Sheikh Mubarek, or rather his Agent, Abdul Aziz-ul-Hassan, did intervene effectually and somewhat treacherously by detaching the Untair tribe from Bin Rashid, and generally by lulling the party's suspicions by false assurances of benevolent intervention, while at the same time he informed Bin Saud that it was a good opportunity to attack his enemies.

3. My personal opinion is that Sheikh Mubarek was behind the scenes the whole time, that he encouraged the Bin Rashid faction to make head against Bin Saud with a view to showing the latter Chieftain that he was not strong enough to stand alone, and was still in need of Mubarek's assistance, and that, when he saw that matters had gone far enough, and that Bin Saud had learnt his lesson, he shamelessly deceived Bin Rashid and his friends and delivered them to Bin Saud.

4. I have little hesitation in expressing the opinion that Sheikh Mubarek will continue to interfere in Nejd politics as an intriguer, but at the same time I do not think that there is the slightest reason to fear a repetition of an expedition from Koweit after the Jarif disaster; and it would be a mistake to treat too seriously his pretensions to act as keeper of the peace between Bin Rashid and Bin Saud, and to go security for the observance of the conditions published with each of the hollow truces patched up between them every few months.

5. The present news from Nejd is very scanty, and I have heard nothing that would lead me to anticipate at present any further disturbance of the peace.

[11393] No. 10.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 82.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Pera, April 3, 1908.*

ACTING Consul-General at Bagdad, who is proceeding to Bussorah on Lynch's steamer "Blosse," reports that the vessel was fired on by Arabs near Amari. One fireman badly wounded and three passengers also wounded. Incident was reported to the Turkish authorities who have placed troops on board, and the vessel is proceeding to Bussorah accompanied by Turkish gun-boat.

[11393] No. 11.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, April 3, 1908.*

ATTACK on Messrs. Lynch's steamer.

I request that you will call the attention of the Porte to the incident reported in your telegram No. 82 of to-day's date, and represent that the Arabs should be captured and punished.

Messrs. Lynch, with whom we are communicating, will in all probability make a demand for compensation for the passengers and firemen who were wounded.

You should press for immediate payment of compensation, for which His Majesty's Embassy was instructed to ask for the mother of Mr. Glanville. What is the result of the representations made on this subject, and what is the amount which has been claimed?

[11620] No. 12.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 84.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, April 4, 1908.*

IN reply to the inquiry in your telegram No. 64, as to the amount of compensation claimed on behalf of Mrs. Glanville for the murder of her son at Maghil, I have the honour to report that the Embassy has frequently pressed the Porte for the payment of 500*l.*

Though it is improbable that a settlement can be effected until the termination of the proceedings against the murderers, the trial of whom is about to reach its final stage, I shall not fail to press for the prompt satisfaction of the claim.

[11622] No. 13.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 85.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, April 4, 1908.*

I HAVE called the Grand Vizier's attention to the attack on Messrs. Lynch's steamer near Amara (see your telegram No. 64), and his Highness assures me that Nazim Pasha has been instructed to proceed to the scene of the attack, that troops have been sent there, and that all other measures necessary to insure the safety of navigation are being adopted. An inquiry will also be held with a view to fixing the responsibility and punishing the guilty.

Since reporting the occurrence, I have received further details from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah. Two separate attacks were made, though in the second there was no casualties. It appears that the Arabs are dissatisfied at innovations introduced by Nazim Pasha affecting the system of land tenure, and that this incident is the result.

[11662] No. 14.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 57. Commercial.)
Sir, *Pera, March 31, 1908.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 52, Commercial, of the 18th March, I have the honour to transmit copy of a further despatch from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Diarbekir on the possibilities of agricultural development and openings for British capital in his district.

There would, I think, be difficulties in the way of the establishment of a model farm such as Mr. Heard suggests, and the purchase of land by Englishmen would certainly meet with every possible obstacle from the Turkish Government, but Mr. Heard's suggestions regarding the sale of agricultural machinery might be well worth the consideration of home manufacturers, and it is useful to note the direction taken by German activity in this branch of trade. Mr. Heard's suggestions as to catalogues are also practical.

If Messrs. Lynch establish agents in Upper Mesopotamia manufacturers might work through them, and this idea has been mentioned to Colonel Picot, who is still here.

I would suggest that this and Mr. Heard's previous despatch should be shown to Mr. George Lloyd.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 14.

Despatch from Vice-Consul Heard respecting possibilities of Agricultural Development in the District of Diarbekir.

AT present everything points towards a period of agricultural prosperity in the Diarbekir district. During the past year, as already mentioned, some 30,000*l.* worth of corn was exported to the neighbouring Vilayets of Bitlis, Van, and Kharput. It is probable that the current year will see a further increase in the amount exported, and the demand for imported corn in Bitlis, if not in other districts, is likely rather to increase than decrease in succeeding years. Cultivators have not been slow to avail themselves of the demand for grain existing elsewhere, and considerably more corn is being sown at present than in ordinary years.

Model Farm in Diarbekir.

Agricultural prospects being thus promising, it is suggested that an opening might be found to exist for the establishment of a model farm in this district. After a couple of years, not only should the farm itself yield a profit, but the value of scientific agricultural methods having been shown by actual results, it is probable that the "model farmer" would receive pressing invitations from local landowners to undertake the cultivation of their properties on modern principles. He would then be able to teach the natives how to prepare and fertilize the soil, how to irrigate it, and how to reap and thresh their grain with a minimum of labour and a maximum of profit. He might also experiment with new cereals, and improve the staple of the cotton by proper culture. He could also do a large business as agent for selling agricultural machinery, which would first of all be seen at work on his own farm, and, later on, on those of the landowners who secured his services. There could be no better way than this for advertising British machinery, as it would be permanently on exhibition in full working order, and the results of its work would be plain for every one to see.

Moreover, by keeping a supply of spare parts, the British agent would be able to repair the machines of native farmers when damaged, which would be a great inducement to the latter to purchase British in preference to foreign machines, which, when damaged, might become altogether useless.

Land Investment.

Finally, he would be in a position to ascertain in which districts the most potentially fertile soil was to be found, and he might quietly purchase large tracts of country for himself or for third parties in England. The remarkable cheapness of land here would seem to make the question of land investment worth considering from the point of view of the speculator who can afford to await the development of the country, which, some people appear to think, will begin after the construction of the Bagdad Railway. In any case land values are hardly likely to fall much lower than they are at present, and the purchaser would probably be able to sell out at any time with little loss, possibly with a profit, if he grew tired of waiting for the hoped-for development.

For instance, land in the immediate neighbourhood of the town can be bought for £T. 10–15 per kilé. The kilé is a somewhat indeterminate measure, indicating the amount of corn which can be sown over a certain area, and may be reckoned roughly as equivalent to 4 acres. Two hours from the town the average price per kilé is from £T. 1 to £T. 2. In the rich agricultural districts of Silivan and Bisheri the average price is about the same, that is to say, roughly, between 5*s.* and 10*s.* per acre. In Sewerek, where there is somewhat less security, the price would probably be from £T. ¾ to £T. 1½ per kilé. Land round Nissibin could, not long ago, have been obtained for next to nothing, but since the prospect of the Bagdad Railway passing through that neighbourhood has become known, it is believed that certain people have been buying up land in this region. Probably, however, it could even now be obtained for £T. 1½ to £T. 2 per kilé, though if it became known that a European was the purchaser fancy prices would very likely be asked. The Vice-Consulate, however, would probably be in a position to put intending purchasers in the way of secretly acquiring land through third parties.

It may be observed that in this country it is customary for wealthy landowners to buy up a village, with all the land appertaining to it, for a lump sum. The village itself is thrown in for nothing.

Whether a model farm run by an Englishman on the lines suggested above would prove a success would depend a good deal on the attitude of the Government towards it. Probably, if he began in a quiet way and made it plain that his main object was to show the advantage of new methods of cultivation and to encourage the sale of machinery, he would not meet with much official opposition. He would have one great advantage over the native cultivator, and, indeed, over any other foreign settler not enjoying local Consular protection, namely, that in case of robbery or other damage suffered at the hands of lawless Kurds he would be able to obtain reparation through the influence of His Majesty's Vice-Consulate. The Kurds, however, are very chary of molesting those who enjoy foreign protection for fear of unpleasant consequences, and, unless the "model farmer" elected to establish himself in one of the more disturbed districts, it is quite likely that he would not be molested in any way. The mere fact that the Government had allowed a model farm to be established by a foreigner would give rise to the idea that it enjoyed, in a sense, official favour and protection.

Need of Agent for Agricultural Machinery.

As already stated, it is most urgent that an agent should visit this country without delay, supplied with samples of British agricultural machinery. As the result of inquiries in the districts of Diarbekir, Silivan, Kharput, Moush, Arjish, and Adeljivas (in Van) and Sert, it has been made clear that a promising field for the sale of such machines exists, once the natives have been shown their use and instructed in the manner of putting them together. This latter point is a *sine qua non*. In Arjish, for instance, a machine described as a "light inclosed gear sweep-rake reaper," obtained from America at a cost of £T. 50, is still lying idle, as the purchaser has never been able to put it together and set it going. A rich Sheikh of Diarbekir, on the other hand, displaying an initiative hitherto unknown in this country, ordered last year a number of agricultural machines from an agent in Constantinople to the value of £T. 220. These were accompanied by an engineer (a German), who, at a cost of £T. 50, came out to put them together. The Sheikh is reported as being enthusiastic at the performances of his machines, which include, it is stated, some seventeen ploughs of various kinds, drills, reapers, a sod-crusher, a threshing-machine, and a wind-pump. The importance of making native cultivators familiar from the start

with English types of machinery is obvious, and, as English goods have already a reputation for durability and finish above all others, it would be more difficult for foreigners to enter into competition with British importers, once the latter had obtained a start.

The models brought by the agent should include ploughs (of various types), harrows, drills, sod-crushers, reapers, threshing-machines, corn-crushers, rice-huskers, milling plant, churns, wind-pumps, well-boring plant, &c. These should of course be accompanied by horse-power machinery with the necessary gearing, and perhaps a small petrol engine, to supply motive power for standing machinery. It may here be mentioned that whilst cheapness is desirable, durability is essential. In certain countries cultivators can afford to purchase cheap, light American machines of limited durability, as by the time they are worn out the owners have got their full value out of them in work, and can afford to scrap them and purchase new ones. Not so here, however, for the native husbandman would wish his plough or reaper to last as long as possible in view of the great trouble and expense of procuring new ones, owing to the difficulties of transport. Should he break them, or find them wear out quickly, he might be inclined to condemn them as useless, and set his face against such unprofitable and costly contrivances.

The agent might with advantage bring out parts for his own carts and put them together at Alexandretta, as the native type of cart is unsuitable for carrying heavy loads. He should also be supplied by his employers with a number of illustrated catalogues printed in Turkish and Armenian (that of Messrs. Mouradyan Frères, No. 31, Rue Mahmoudié, Galata, may be recommended as a model), which should be distributed amongst native merchants and landowners throughout the districts of Diarbekir, Kharput, and Sert (if necessary through His Majesty's Vice-Consulate) some time previous to his arrival. On arrival at Diarbekir he could purchase several large marquees of local make, establish himself in the neighbourhood of the city, and invite an inspection of his machines in working order. If possible, he should arrive not later than June, when harvest begins, and, after a month spent at Diarbekir, he might move on to Kharput and establish his exhibition there.

The same process might with advantage be followed in Moush, to which district another agent might proceed viâ Trebizond and Erzeroum. A particularly strong demand for agricultural machinery should be found in Moush, as most of the land has now fallen into the hands of a group of Moslem landowners, who have become wealthy through corn speculation and other methods. This fertile district, however, is rapidly being deserted by the agricultural population, and the landowners should therefore find labour-saving machinery of great use in cultivating the land which is thrown on their hands without labourers to work it. The projected visit of an agent with agricultural machinery was, indeed, emphatically approved of by various Moush Notables when suggested to them last year.

A model farm in this district might prove a profitable undertaking, did the political situation allow of it. This, however, is doubtful.

Using Moush as a centre, agencies for the sale of agricultural machinery might be established in other parts of the Bitlis Vilayet, and even in Van, if the way were prepared beforehand by dispatching catalogues to prospective agents in these districts, through His Majesty's Vice-Consulate in Bitlis. The latter would probably find it worth while to visit the exhibition in Moush, if given sufficient notice of its arrival.

In a subsequent report it will be shown that a market for textile machinery, &c., might be created in Diarbekir and Kharput. There is no reason why the agent bringing agricultural machinery should not include other classes of machinery (provided he understood their use) amongst his exhibits. It should be remembered that the greater the number of firms represented the less would be the proportionate expense borne by each firm in financing the undertaking.

There is little doubt, too, that most if not all of the models brought out could be disposed of after the agent's departure to local buyers, which would assist in defraying the costs of the enterprise.

(Signed) W. B. HEARD.

11659] No. 15.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 163.)

Sir, *Pera, April 1, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Van reporting on the details of the Armenian revolutionary organization, which is of special interest in view of the recent occurrences in that town.

Captain Dickson's statement that "practically the whole male Armenian population are enrolled as members of the Society is important, as it is for this reason that the Vali of Van is treating them as suspect now, and that the attitude of the Moslems is so threatening.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 15.

Vice-Consul Dickson to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 6.)

Sir, *Van, March 2, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to submit a few details of the Armenian Tashnak organization, with the hope that they may interest your Excellency, in case you are not already conversant with them.

The policy of the Society is determined by two central Committees, the Eastern and Western, having equal power.

The head-quarters of the Western Committee is in Switzerland, at Geneva, and its duties are principally concerned with advertising the movement in Europe, and collecting money; they have a printing press.

The Eastern Committee is at Tiflis, Place Erivan, next door to the "Typographie Géorgienne" and the "Eglise Etchmiadzin." The principal members of this Committee are Dr. Hamo Anganginian, Yadishi Topgian, Armak Vramian, and Armen Karo.

This Committee spreads the revolutionist propaganda in Russia, enrols young Armenians for service if required, collects money, buys and steals arms and ammunition and passes them through to Turkey. As it also has charge of the Russian revolutionary movement in the Caucasus, to which many of the terrorist atrocities and assassinations are due, it leaves the local Committee at Van a fairly free hand in Turkish affairs, except in questions of high policy, which are decided by the Eastern and Western Committees. It would appear that the permission of the Eastern Committee has to be obtained before assassinating Turkish officials.

In connection with the Eastern Committee, there are four local Committees in Turkey, with their head-quarters at Van, Moush, Erzeroum, and Trebizond. The two latter are pacific, and confine themselves to spreading the propaganda and collecting funds. At Moush there are two chiefs, one a Russian and one a Turkish Armenian.

Van is the most important revolutionary centre in Turkey, and here there are seven members of the Committee—four active, Aram, the Doctor, Sarkis, and Ishkan; the other three are passive. The Committees of Moush, Erzeroum, and Trebizond are subservient to the Van one.

In addition to the four chiefs above mentioned, there are at Van thirty armed revolutionary soldiers, of whom twenty-five are Russian and five are Turkish Armenians. During the winter, the whole of these "fedai" reside in Van, distributing themselves about the various houses in the Armenian quarter of the garden town, moving about only at night, and then only by the gardens and by-paths, it is said that they never sleep two days running in the same house. Although practically every Armenian sympathizes in secret with them, many of the richer Armenians in Van find their presence inconvenient and compromising.

When spring makes the roads and hills practicable for travelling, unless they have any special object in hand, like the Moush and Sassun rebellion, the active

"fedai" divide into bands under their four chiefs, each taking a district, which they tour, spreading their propaganda in the villages, enrolling names, collecting money, selling arms and ammunition to the villagers, teaching them to handle and shoot with the rifle, &c. Usually one of the chiefs remains at Van, and they keep up a constant communication by means of couriers between the bands of Van and Tiflis, and thus can always concentrate if required.

In addition to these thirty soldiers, practically the whole male Armenian population are enrolled as members of the Society, the younger as active members, some with a rifle and cartridges hidden in their houses, the others to be supplied with them by the Committee when called out. The remainder are enrolled as passive members, and are made to contribute in various ways to the cause.

From statistics, which I have reason to believe are as accurate as can be obtained, I learn that at present the "fedai" Committee have hidden in and around Van sufficient arms for 1,000 men. At Salmas, on the Persian frontier, they count on 500 armed men. From Russia, in case of necessity, they count on 2,000 armed men. Thus altogether they have in Turkey, Persia, and Russia sufficient arms and ammunition for 3,000 men, while their supply of men to carry these arms is almost unlimited.

Formerly the Committee used to send bands of Russian "fedai" over into Turkey; they have now stopped this, and are devoting themselves almost entirely to the propaganda, collecting depôts of arms and ammunition, and trying to win over the Kurds and Young Turks. Now and then a particularly unpopular official or Armenian may be assassinated, but otherwise their present policy is to lie quiet and do everything in their power to gain the co-operation of the Moslems. This is shown by the numerous pamphlets which they are publishing at present, nearly all of which are addressed to the Moslems. The *entente* which they had formed with the Moslems during the time of the late Ali Bey had been entirely ruptured by the recent events, and the Turks are now bitter against the "fedai" for having deceived them by collecting depôts of arms unknown to them. The "fedai" are now very busy trying to explain matters and regain the confidence of the Moslems, as they realize that without Moslem co-operation and support their cause is hopeless. Personally, I think that they will be a long time in doing this, and I doubt that they will ever succeed. However, the double check to their policy and to their storing of arms, &c., leads me to think that they will do their best for the present to prevent any active events which might hinder their *rapprochement* with the Turks.

I inclose a translation of one of their many recent pamphlets to give an idea of their present views.

The Turkish Government attaches a lot of importance to the fact that all the "fedai" chiefs and most of the soldiers are Russian subjects, and that all the 200 rifles recently captured are the latest pattern Russian service rifles. However, I understand that the "fedai" have as much difficulty in gun-running in Russia as in Turkey, and that all the rifles are stolen. In one case, at the depôt of the fortress of Alexandropol, some two years ago, by bribing some of the guard and drugging others, the "fedai" managed to carry off nearly 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition in a night.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BERTRAM DICKSON, *Captain, R.E.A.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 15.

Pamphlet issued by the Armenian Tashnak Organization.

NOUS ET NOS ADVERSAIRES.

(Traduction.)

LES malheureux événements derniers, suite de la furie et de la folie d'un insolent, en vue de posséder quelques pièces d'or du Gouvernement despote et d'avoir des décorations vides et des emplois distribués largement et en grand nombre dans notre pays, ont éclairé bien des choses pour nous et pour les peuples.

Il n'y a pas de malheur sans bonheur; ceci est vrai surtout pour nos compatriotes Turcs.

Les nombreuses armes et munitions cachées dans la terre et dans des coins invisibles, ressuscités, ont terrifié ceux-ci.

Tous les sages et savants s'étant réunis ont trouvé le secret des secrets, et le dernier résultat des prophéties court au public.

Hier les révolutionnaires nous prêchaient accord, entente, alliance, et activité de toutes les nations unies.

Mais pourquoi tous ces préparatifs secrets et pour qui toutes ces armes? La conclusion est si simple.

Les révolutionnaires Arméniens ont désiré de nous tromper, ils nous ont bercés par les chants et rêves de "l'accord et l'entente," mais eux ont préparé secrètement des armes du sang, pour se lever contre nous, les Turcs, et pour nous massacrer.

Mais tout a été compris et découvert, toutes les secrètes prédictions.

Qu'veut dire, donc, que nous autres Arméniens nous sommes doublement lâches, pour avoir d'abord fait dormir nos compatriotes Turcs par les belles idées de l'entente et l'accord cordiaux, et les ayant trompés, nous avons préparé d'autre part des armes, aux moyens desquelles nous voulions les massacrer.

Qu'il nous soit permis de dire que nous ne nous laisserons jamais aller à une telle bassesse, et nous ne nous permettons jamais aussi de s'occuper de la tromperie sous le masque de la justice.

Il est temps, croyons-nous, à ce qu'on comprenne qui nous sommes et qui sont nos adversaires et nos ennemis. Lorsque nous disons "nous," il ne faut pas comprendre les "Tachnaks" ou d'autre partie Arménienne révolutionnaire, mais bien tous les Ottomans, c'est-à-dire, tous les Turcs, Arméniens, Albanais, Arabes, Grecs, Assyriens, lesquels, vivant dans l'Empire Ottoman, sont l'objet des pillages, de la ruine, et des persécutions du Gouvernement despote. Privés de la liberté, de la lumière, et des droits élémentaires de l'homme, ceux-ci sont rôtis sous les feux des souffrances, douleurs immenses, insupportables, mais prenant conscience de leur situation amère, se révoltent contre le despotisme et le régime actuel, et au prix de leur sang ils aspirent à avoir pour tous liberté, équité, et humanité.

Ceux-ci, nous comptons nos ennemis, et nos adversaires tous ceux qui veulent assurer durer l'existence du Gouvernement despote d'à présent pour conserver leurs fonctions et situations et profiter, et les vénaux, usuriers, qui nous pillent illicitement et par force.

Tous ceux qui sont de la partie du Gouvernement actuel, tous ceux qui, profitant de l'anarchie du pays, pillent les pauvres, tous ceux qui sont contre la liberté et l'équité, ceux-là tous, appartenant à quelque nation qu'elle soit, Arméniens, Turcs, Arabes, Assyriens, Albanais, Grecs, sont et seront toujours nos ennemis et nos adversaires.

Qu'ils se rangent sous notre drapeau, sans distinction de race ni de religion, tous ceux qui aspirent à la liberté et à l'équité, et tous ceux qui, dégoûtés du Gouvernement despote, aspirent à sauver de la servitude, du pillage, et du brigandage tous les peuples.

Nous sommes liberté, lumière, équité, et loi.

Et nos adversaires sont despotisme, obscurités, servitudes, pillage, et injustice.

Nous sommes des travailleurs, nous sommes les souffrants de notre pays, nous soufflons le feu dans les cendres de notre pays, nous sommes des inventeurs.

Et nos ennemis sont des fainéants et vénaux, des vendeurs de notre pays aux étrangers, nos massacreurs, et ce sont eux qui nous assujettissent à la famine.

Nous sommes des gens qui travaillent, mais nous manquons de pain; nos adversaires sont des paresseux, mais ils sont toujours rassasiés, riches, et dépensiers. Ce sont donc deux armées ennemies, l'un en face de l'autre.

Le Gouvernement et ses employés ont des armes, des soldats, et des lois, qu'ils autorisent à nous massacrer et piller.

Jadis nous étions condamnés à supporter sans réplique tous les déshonneurs.

Mais aujourd'hui les temps sont changés, nous exigeons liberté, nous désirons équité et loi.

Le Gouvernement ne veut pas nous accorder ceci de bon gré. Il a déchiré la guerre aux Arabes et Turcs exigeant équité et loi.

Les prisons d'Erzéroum sont remplis de Libéraux Turcs.

Les déserts de l'Arabie ont été colorés par le sang des Arabes exigeant équité.

La guerre est épidémique—Turcs, Arméniens, Assyriens, Arabes, Macédoniens, Grecs s'en sont levés en masse et ils se battent.

Liberté, équité, droits élémentaires de l'homme, pour l'acquisition desquels tous les armes sont sacrées et enviables.

Le Gouvernement, par tous les moyens illicites à sa disposition, a massacré les Erzéroumiens et en a rempli les prisons pour la seule raison qu'ils ont osé lever la voix et protester contre les injustices.

Renverser les forces du Gouvernement tyrannique, c'est notre but à nous tous, et, pendant le temps pour y arriver, de profiter de tous les moyens et armes, c'est notre unique et inviolable droit et devoir.

Il ne peut être arrivé à la liberté sans armes, sans sang.

Armes, armes, et toujours armes, voilà l'unique moyen de notre affranchissement.

Nous nous sommes armés, nous nous sommes approvisionnés de munitions, nous tâcherons désormais aussi d'avoir des armes, aux moyens desquelles arriver à la liberté, à l'équité.

Ceux qui acceptent nos buts, qu'ils se rangent sous notre drapeau; ceux qui sont amoureux de la liberté, qu'ils se procurent des armes.

Ceux qui désirent voir disparaître le Gouvernement oppresseur, qu'ils, avec armes et forces, combattent avec nous la tyrannie.

Les armes étaient pour mettre fin aux oppressions, les armes étaient pour l'acquisition de la liberté; la perte des armes, c'est le retard de l'arrivée de l'équité.

Les armes étaient pour nos ennemis.

Avec ou contre nous.

Avec nous, à bras armés, pour se défendre; contre nous, ami de l'injustice et des oppressions.

Voici notre demande, voici nos désirs

(Comité Central de la Révolution Arménienne "Tashnak" de Van.)

[11864] No. 16.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received April 6.)

3, Sutter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, April 6, 1903.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th instant, regarding the attack on the steam-ship "Blosse Lynch."

Telegraphic advices from our agent in Bussorah inform us that the captain of the "Blosse Lynch" telegraphed from Amarah on the 2nd instant that the "Blosse Lynch" had been fired upon by Arabs below Amarah, and that one fireman and three passengers were wounded. The steamer anchored and obtained Turkish troops, and then proceeded to Bussorah under escort of the Turkish gun-boat "Aloos." They were under fire from the Arabs for thirty minutes, but no further casualties occurred, and the "Blosse Lynch" reached Bussorah on the 3rd instant. One native passenger is dead.

Our agent states that the disturbed district covers a distance of thirty hours' steaming; that all traffic is suspended; that the authorities consider a guard of fifty soldiers and the escort of the "Aloos" as sufficient measures for the protection of the steam-ship "Blossé Lynch" on the return voyage; but that His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah informs him by letter that he cannot give an assurance that those proposed measures are adequate for the safety of the steamer, mails, &c. He therefore feels himself constrained to refer to us for instructions, and meantime the steam-ship "Blosse Lynch," with merchandize, 400 passengers, and the mails, is detained at Bussorah.

The steam-ship "Mejidieh," with cargo, passengers, and homeward mails, is due to leave Bagdad for Bussorah to-morrow.

Our agent urges that the services of the "Comet" should be made available for the protection of the British mails and communications pending stronger measures. We think such action would be most desirable if it can be arranged.

An interruption of our steamer service involves very serious loss and inconvenience to British trade, which has already suffered heavily of late from the troubles in Persia.

The officers, crews, and steamers of the Company are exposed to great risk in these circumstances, and we anxiously await information as to the steps which can be taken for their adequate protection, in order that we may advise our agents accordingly.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. W. MACLEAN, *Secretary.*

[11864]

No. 17.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 68.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, April 7, 1908.*

ATTACK on "Blosse."

With reference to your telegram No. 86 of the 6th April, the service of Messrs. Lynch's steamers is suspended.

The agent of the firm at Bussorah presses for assistance of "Comet" until stronger measures can be taken for protection of British mails and communications.

Please furnish me with your views and those of His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad.

[12178]

No. 18.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 167.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 5, 1908.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 77 of the 27th ultimo, and to my subsequent telegrams respecting the situation at Van, I have the honour to transmit the accompanying summary of a telegram from the Vali, communicated to me by the Grand Vizier, in which the Vali reports the measures taken immediately after the outbreak of the 23rd ultimo with a view to preventing a renewal of the disorders.

No action has yet been taken by the authorities against either Mussulmans or Armenians, though the Grand Vizier assures me that as soon as the situation is under control the principal agitators will be brought to justice. I am disposed to think that the Vali's temporizing policy is the best, and I have therefore refrained from pressing for the immediate punishment of the officials named by Captain Dickson (see my telegram No. 81 of the 2nd instant). The Grand Vizier tells me, however, that he has already arranged for the dismissal of one of the worst offenders, the President of the Court of Appeal, though he thinks it best to defer for the moment announcing this penalty, for fear of increasing the excitement at Van.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 18.

Summary of a Telegram addressed by the Governor-General of the Vilayet of Van to the Grand Vizier, dated March 14 (o.s.), 1908.

RÉPONSE au télégramme Vézériel en date du 13 courant.

Le Commandant Militaire, qui lors de l'incident se trouvait dans sa résidence située dans ces parages, ayant naturellement eu le premier connaissance du fait, s'est rendu en personne sur les lieux et y a rétabli la tranquillité en faisant circuler des patrouilles. Je me trouvais en ce moment au Conak Gouvernemental distant d'une heure du théâtre de l'incident. Mis au courant de ce qui s'était passé, j'ai dépêché immédiatement au Bazar des agents de police et des gendarmes; ceux-ci ramenèrent à leurs maisons les quelques centaines de personnes qui s'étaient attroupées. Je me suis rendu sur les lieux de l'incident, après avoir pris toutes les dispositions énergiques nécessaires pour maintenir l'ordre et la sécurité, en faisant circuler partout des patrouilles composées de soldats, de gendarmes et d'agents de police, et conjuré ainsi des éventualités fâcheuses, telles que l'attroupement des Musulmans et des Chrétiens, déjà surexcités par les intrigues et agissements des Comités Arméniens. En route je rencontrai les Consuls étrangers, qui sortaient de chez le Commandant Militaire, et qui, informés des dispositions déjà prises, me remercièrent.

Une enquête rapide m'a fait apprendre que celui qui s'était rendu coupable de blessures a pu prendre la fuite et se réfugier dans les quartiers Arméniens. Elle a établi, en outre, que les Arméniens, qui avaient décidé de blesser le rapporteur David, n'avaient pas manqué de prendre des dispositions pour susciter des troubles; c'est ce qui a créé des difficultés.

Le devoir du Gouvernement d'apaiser les esprits, tant des Musulmans que des Arméniens, était rendu plus difficile à cause de l'étendue de la ville et de ses alentours et de la surexcitation provoquée chez les Musulmans par les préparatifs criminels des Arméniens, qui avaient amassé une grande quantité d'armes et qui tiraient, de différentes maisons, des coups de fusil et de revolver; néanmoins, il ne s'est produit que quelques crimes isolés.

S'il y a eu, en cette occurrence, comme on l'a prétendu, quelque négligence de la part des gendarmes et des agents de police, c'est parce que ceux-ci sont, pour la plupart, recrutés parmi les indigènes et que, au moment de l'incident, ils étaient disséminés dans toute la ville et les environs, ce qui rendait leur tâche fort difficile. J'ai décidé de soumettre la question du recrutement de ces agents à la Commission de Réorganisation qui doit se rendre dans cette région pour régler cette question dans tous ses détails.

Voici les mesures qui ont été prises pour empêcher le retour de pareils incidents:

Les autorités ont fait évacuer, sur certains points, des maisons, et les ont transformées en Corps de Garde, dont le nombre a ainsi été augmenté. Un détachement de soldats a été envoyé à la commune d'Ertchik. Des détachements seront également dirigés sur d'autres localités aussitôt que j'aurai reçu les renforts attendus. Enfin, les instructions nécessaires ont été transmises aux autorités des Sandjaks et des cazas.

Demain, une Commission, composée du Commandant Militaire, des officiers et des fonctionnaires supérieurs du vilayet, se réunira pour adopter les mesures propres à assurer le rétablissement de l'ordre et de la sécurité publics, l'apaisement des esprits, ainsi que pour ramener la concorde et la bonne intelligence entre les diverses communautés. La Commission aura également à s'occuper de la réouverture du Bazar, qui demeure fermé depuis l'incident, et à aviser au nécessaire afin que chacun puisse vaquer à ses affaires.

[12220]

No. 19.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 9.)

Sir, *India Office, April 8, 1908.*

IN continuation of my letter of the 25th ultimo, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Morley to transmit herewith, to be laid before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy regarding the action to be taken in the case of the ill-treatment at Lingah of a British-protected Bahrein subject by the Persian authorities, who declined to admit the good offices of the British Agent on his behalf.

Mr. Morley would be glad to be favoured with Sir E. Grey's views on the recommendations of the Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Mr. Morley sees no objection to the demands that Major Cox proposes he should address to the Persian official in charge of the Gulf ports, compliance with which would bring the incident to a satisfactory close. But it is necessary to contemplate the contingency of a failure to comply, and the terms in which the Persian Government are to be informed of the demand to be made locally by Major Cox require careful consideration. It would, in Mr. Morley's opinion, be desirable that His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran should be in a position to indicate, in the event of redress being refused, the nature of the steps that His Majesty's Government will take to enforce their right to protect Bahreinese in Persia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 19.

Government of India to Mr. Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April 5, 1908.*

LINGAH: Ill-treatment of Bahrein subject. Your telegram dated the 24th ultimo.

Following telegram, dated the 28th ultimo, received from Resident, Persian Gulf, who was consulted:—

"Persian Government official in charge of Gulf ports was away on Mekran Coast when I received telegram dated 16th instant from Tehran Legation. I thereon informed him that I should have to move His Majesty's Minister at Tehran to take more comprehensive action unless I received positive assurances from him by telegram that at the Naoroz he would remove his subordinate at place mentioned, or undertake to call there on his return journey and bring subordinate to his bearings in this and other matters. It is now past Naoroz, but I have since been assured in two or three telegrams by his Excellency, who has been at Chahbar until now, that he will call *en route* at the place mentioned and settle to my satisfaction this and other matters. I recommend, as subordinate is hostile, that authority be now given me to inform official in charge of Gulf ports that I have been directed to insist on monetary restitution and compensation in the present case, and on removal of his subordinate, and his non-re-employment in Persian Gulf. This will, in my opinion, meet present case, in conjunction with protests of His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran."

On the same day Major Cox telegraphed again as follows:—

"Position in regard to general question is as follows: Before constitution and freedom of press were inaugurated, we were able by friendly and informal means to effect a reasonable amount of intervention locally, although claim to ownership of Bahrein has never been relinquished by Central Government. Ignorant local officials, inflated with anti-foreign newspaper articles and nationalist sentiments, and often prompted directly by foreign agents and by members of Young Turkish party, have, since Parliament and freedom of press were instituted, laid themselves out to dispute our right to give protection in Persia to subjects of Trucial Chiefs and of Bahrein.

"The necessity of our asserting ourselves in this connection is thus becoming daily more urgent, and I therefore recommend that, if state of affairs admits it, we should now inform Persian Government that we are obliged to intimate that, as their local officials are no longer sensible enough to admit as heretofore our reasonable and informal intervention, we shall intervene in future on behalf of subjects of Trucial Chiefs and of Bahreinese to the same extent as in case of British Indian subjects, and that such steps as may be necessary to make good our intervention will be taken."

I regret delay in repetition of these telegrams, both of which were repeated to Tehran by Resident in Persian Gulf.

[12221] No. 20.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received April 9.)

3, *Sutter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London,*
April 8, 1908.

Sir,

WITH further reference to the attack on the P.S. "Blosse Lynch," I beg to inform you that I have received a further message from our agent at Bussorah, urging that prompt and decisive measures should be demanded of the Sublime Porte, as otherwise future trouble is almost inevitable. There are seven European passengers at Bussorah awaiting passage to Bagdad by the "Blosse Lynch."

I have received anxious inquiries from shippers here, who have sold Bagdad produce on this market for shipment this and next month, and may sustain heavy losses if protracted interruption of traffic on the river should make it impossible to fulfil their contracts in time.

On the other hand, our agents abroad are awaiting instructions as to when they should again dispatch the steamers.

There is a grave responsibility in requiring our British officers and native crews to expose their lives and the property of shippers and the Company to undue risk. We are still anxiously awaiting information as to whether such measures are being taken as will justify my Board in directing that the service should be resumed.

The attack in this instance appears to have been directed especially against the British steamer, and the Company will now be heavily handicapped in securing

passengers and cargo on account of the superior risk which will be attributed to their service.

The position of affairs on the Tigris has been markedly unsatisfactory since the attack on Maaghil in February 1906. Since then two of the Turkish steamers were attacked in May 1906, and the P.S. "Khalifah," of this Company, was fired upon on the 30th May, 1906, and later we have been warned that further attacks were meditated.

We have already experienced difficulty in obtaining officers owing to the unusual danger to which these attacks have exposed them, and the superior inducements, compared to similar employments, we have to offer them constitute a direct tax on this Company resulting from the failure of the Turkish Government to maintain order. I am therefore directed to ask His Majesty's Government to support a substantial claim for the pecuniary and moral damage sustained by the Company through this attack.

It appears to us that the Turkish Government is more disposed to see these Arab tribes mutually weaken themselves by dissensions than to accept the task of reducing them to order. The tribe whose claims in regard to the local matters in dispute have been disregarded by the Turkish Governor seeks means to embarrass that Governor. The plan of attacking the Turkish steamers failed of the desired effect in Constantinople; therefore resort is had to attack upon our steamers, which causes a sufficient embarrassment of the local Governor to produce a temporary adjustment of the grievances of the tribe without, so far, entailing subsequent penalty. It is to be anticipated, therefore, that these attacks will recur from time to time. The only real sufferer is British commerce.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. W. MACLEAN, *Secretary.*

[12270] No. 21.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 91.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, April 9, 1908.*

I HAVE consulted Major Ramsay as to the desirability of sending the "Comet" to patrol the Tigris and protect the British mail steamers which you suggest in your telegram No. 86 of the 7th instant. We consider that it is inadvisable, as it might lead to a much more serious incident. If it should become necessary to keep the Porte up to the mark in its efforts to restore security, I will use it as a threat.

I have received the following telegram from the Acting Consul-General at Bagdad:—

"Lynch's steamer the 'Medjidieh' left this morning (i.e., 8th April) accompanied by the 'Burhanieh' with 150 soldiers on board. On the 6th the Vali had promised that the 'Medjidieh' should be escorted by Turkish troops from Kut to Amara, but yesterday he made this new arrangement, as it was thought undesirable that soldiers should be carried on board a British ship. After the two vessels had started, Lynch's agent received instructions from London that the 'Burhanieh' was to wait here, as His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah was not in a position to give assurances that the river was safe. He therefore telegraphed to Kut to stop the 'Medjidieh' there. She will thus be unprotected, as the 'Burhanieh' will continue her journey, and the agent asks that instructions may be sent to the local authorities to furnish her with a guard at Kut.

"Nazim Pasha has, the Commander-in-chief informs me, telegraphed to the Vali to convey to me an expression of his regret at this attack, and his assurances that he will do all in his power to maintain order."

It seems probable that when Lynch's London office sent instructions to Bussorah to detain the "Medjidieh" there, they were not aware that she was to be accompanied by a Turkish steamer with 150 soldiers on board, but the Grand Vizier is sending instructions to Kut in the sense desired.

The origin of the outbreak seems to be the resentment of the Arabs at a scheme of Nazim Pasha's to divide the Government land, which hitherto has been leased to the Sheikhs, into allotments rented by individual tribesmen, and also at his having allowed strangers from Nejd to acquire land in the district.

[12220] No. 22.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, April 9, 1908.*

PLEASE refer to the telegrams of 28th March from Resident at Bushire respecting Bahreinese at Lingah.

We do not see any objection to action which Cox proposes to take locally, but careful consideration will have to be given to the terms in which we inform the Persian Government of the demand he is to make. It would be desirable in the first place that we should know what action would be recommended by you in order to uphold the right of the British Government to afford protection in Persia to Bahrein subjects should redress be refused.

[12277] No. 23.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 168.)
Sir, *Pera, April 6, 1908.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 86 of the 4th instant, I have the honour to report that the details given by Mr. Consul Crow respecting the attack on Lynch's steamer show that she was fired on first about half-an-hour after leaving Amara, when there were four casualties, one of the wounded being a Persian woman who has since died, and another a Bahrein woman who is not likely to recover. The stoker was also severely wounded. The steamer reached an encampment of Turkish troops about three-quarters of an hour later and took eight soldiers on board, and from that point she was escorted by a Turkish gun-boat. There was more firing between 8·30 and 9, to which the gun-boat replied, but there were no further casualties. Mr. Crow reports the danger zone to extend from Sheisad above Amara to Abu Sidra below, a distance which takes forty-eight hours to cover steaming upstream.

The Vali has offered the escort of the gun-boat for the return journey, but Mr. Crow thinks it doubtful whether the steamer should undertake the journey. The Vali of Bagdad has been informed by Lynch's agent that he will not dispatch the next boat to Bussorah on the 7th instant unless he receives assurances that the river is safe, and the Bussorah agent has been instructed not to allow the "Blosse" to return to Bagdad unless he receives similar assurances at Bussorah.

Mr. Crow thinks the attack due to some change made by the Turkish Commissioner in the treatment of the tribes, which I have asked him to explain, as I do not at present know what change is meant.

As I have already told you, the Grand Vizier assures me that he is having everything possible done to insure security of navigation, that Nazim Pasha, the Turkish Commissioner, has been directed to go to the spot and that troops have been sent there, and that an inquiry will be held with a view to having the culprits punished.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[12323] No. 24.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received April 10.)

3, Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, April 9, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th instant on the subject of the attack on the steam-ship "Blosse Lynch."

I beg to transmit for your information further telegrams received to-day from our agents abroad, as follows:—

Bagdad, April 8.—"'Mejidieh' left escorted by 'Burhanieh' with 120 soldiers. Wired Coot to remain there. Bussorah wire broken. Reply by telegraph 'Blosse Lynch's' movements. Officials at this end refuse to put guards in 'Mejidieh.'"

Bussorah, April 9.—"Bagdad telegraph 8th. 'Burhanieh' and 'Mejidieh' left this morning. Just received London instructions detain 'Mejidieh.' Wired Coot to detain there. 'Burhanieh' carried 120 soldiers partly armed, and was to accompany 'Mejidieh' to Amarah. Officials here refuse guards on 'Mejidieh.' Nothing fresh Bussorah."

Our duty to the public, who will suffer serious loss through delay in expedition of their goods, demands that we should resume our service at the earliest moment. If we accept what our agents on the spot consider to be inadequate precautions proposed by the Turkish authorities and dispatch our steamers, the lives of a score of British subjects, and of an uncertain number of British Indian subjects, may be endangered. The navigation of the Tigris is at all times difficult, and steamers frequently run aground. To carry out anchors to kedge off a grounded steamer under fire would be a very difficult operation; those on board would be in a critical position unless a sufficient force were at hand to protect them. We have conceived it our duty under these circumstances to ask advice from His Majesty's Government, and trust soon to have your reply.

We desire at the same time to record our view that it depends greatly on the manner in which this incident is carried to a conclusion whether British lives and property on our steamers will not be exposed to still greater danger on some subsequent occasion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. W. MACLEAN, *Secretary.*

[12270] No. 25.

Foreign Office to Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.

Gentlemen, *Foreign Office, April 10, 1908.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge receipt of your letters of the 8th and 9th instant on the subject of the attack recently made by Arabs on your P.S. "Blosse Lynch."

A telegram has now been received from Mr. Barclay, His Majesty's Minister at Constantinople, to the following effect:—

His Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Bagdad reports that the Vali promised your agent on the 6th instant that the steamer "Medjidieh" should receive an escort of soldiers on the journey from Kut to Amara. His Excellency stated later that as there were objections to placing Turkish troops on a British vessel, the steamer "Burhaniya," carrying 150 soldiers, should convoy your ship "Medjidieh."

After both ships had sailed, your agent received your instructions to detain the "Medjidieh" as Mr. Crow at Bussorah could give no assurances as to the security of the river. Your agent accordingly telegraphed orders to detain the vessel at Kut. As the "Burhaniya" was to continue her course beyond Kut, your vessel would be left without a guard, and your agent, therefore, requested that instructions might be issued from Constantinople to supply your steamer with the necessary guards at Kut.

Nazim Pasha is reported to have requested the Vali to express to His Majesty's Acting Consul-General his regrets at the incident, and to have stated that he would do his utmost to preserve order.

Mr. Barclay reports further that the Grand Vizier is sending instructions that the necessary guard is to be furnished at Kut. He adds that after consultation with His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad, who is now at Constantinople, he would deprecate the dispatch of the "Comet," as such a step might possibly lead to much more serious incidents, but he considers that the mere threat to employ her, which he will use if necessary, would be sufficient to induce the Ottoman Government to continue to do its utmost to render the river again secure for navigation.

In these circumstances His Majesty's Government are unable to authorize the employment of the "Comet" for the purpose proposed.

I am to add that copies of your letters will be sent to His Majesty's Minister at Constantinople.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[12484] No. 26.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received April* 11.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of telegrams to the Viceroy, dated the 6th instant, and from the Viceroy, dated the 9th instant, relative to the situation at Abu Musa.

A copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations and the Director of Naval Intelligence.

India Office, April 10, 1908.

Inclosure 1 in No. 26.

Mr. Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, April* 6, 1908.

ABU MUSA Island. Your telegram dated the 26th March.

It is necessary to permit all oxide already excavated to be removed, in view of terms of Foreign Office despatch No. 9, dated the 9th January last, to His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. Arrangements should be made by Major Cox for carrying out, without prejudice to ultimate settlement, the work of cleaning, bringing stuff to shore, &c. Would it not be possible to extend these arrangements so that supply of oxide to firm contemplated in my telegram dated the 18th March might be provided for?

Inclosure 2 in No. 26.

Government of India to Mr. Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April* 9, 1908.

FOLLOWING telegram, dated the 6th instant, received from Resident, Persian Gulf, regarding Abu Musa Island:—

"German steamer has left for Abu Musa Island with R.I.M.S. 'Lawrence.' In a communication received on the 1st instant, German Consul pressed again that weight of oxide lying inland at mine should be estimated; I replied, however, that only 2,000 tons odd lying on beach were governed by my negotiations with Sheikh, and that if any access were permitted to minerals or mine I could not guarantee safe operations of present steamer. Present steamer will not be able to remove all oxide on beach, which, according to latest news from island, is nearer 3,000 than 2,000 tons."

I am consulting Major Cox on suggestion at close of your telegram of the 6th instant, which has been communicated to him for necessary action.

[12551] No. 27.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 11.)

(No. 95.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, April* 11, 1908.

ATTITUDE of Persian Government with regard to the protection of Bahreinis.

I would suggest that, to enforce our rights in this matter (see your telegram No. 76 of the 10th April), an island in the Gulf, for preference Kais or Hormuz, might if necessary be occupied.

I duly addressed to the Persian Government a note as authorized in your telegram No. 67 of the 26th March. I have this morning received a reply, stating that "you will admit that the proprietary right of the Persian Government is not a matter to be disputed." The note adds that the Government has sent to Lingah instructions "to do the most justice and to make reparation."

In view of this, I propose to personally give the Minister of Foreign Affairs a strong warning this afternoon that the refusal to recognize our protectorate may entail grave consequences.

[12552] No. 28.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 11.)

(No. 96.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, April* 11, 1908.

BAHREIN.

I have warned the Persian Government that I was convinced of the intention of His Majesty's Government to settle the question definitively, and strongly urged on them (see my telegram No. 95 of the 11th April) that compliance on the part of the Persian Government was necessary. A good deal of impression was, I think, produced by my arguments. I think also that, if I were authorized to make the threat suggested in my immediately preceding telegram, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and his colleagues would find the necessary courage to face the Medjliss. At present both he and his colleagues are too much afraid of it to comply with our demand, and defend their conduct before it by explaining the true situation, although Mushir-ed-Dowleh is, I think, perfectly aware that the Persian claim to Bahrein is quite untenable.

I suggested to his Excellency that he should inform me in a note that the local authorities in the Gulf had received the instructions which we desired, but that Persian claims should not be mentioned in it. I could not get him to actually promise to do this, but he promised to consult his colleagues and to send me another reply to my note.

[12671] No. 29.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 15.)

(No. 60. Commercial.)

Sir, *Pera, April* 7, 1908.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 49, Commercial, of the 7th ultimo, I have the honour to forward copies and a summary of the Reports received from His Majesty's Consular officers for the month of February 1908 on the progress of the improvements in the Turkish Customs. The Report from Bagdad is for the month of January.

There is nothing to add to previous Reports on the general working of the custom-houses. As regards new buildings, satisfactory progress has been made with those actually in hand except at Trebizond. The foundations of the new buildings on the Stamboul quay have been laid, and the walls have risen about 18 inches above the ground. The buildings at Mersina have been completed and opened. Those at Smyrna continue to make satisfactory progress. I have inquired of the Central Customs Administration as to the cessation of work on the transit store at Trebizond, and learn that a serious hitch has arisen. Recent expert opinion has satisfied the Administration that the position of the new store is extremely unsuitable owing to the difficulty of access from the sea caused by the deposits of sand brought down by the adjoining stream called Deirmen Déré. This difficulty could only be met by the construction of an extremely costly quay, and the Administration is therefore considering plans for constructing a new store as an enlargement of the present custom-house buildings. I have not yet received Mr. Jones' Report as to the soundness of the reasons for abandoning the store already begun.

There is little new to report on the progress of the plans for the buildings contemplated in other places. The Bagdad plans have been referred to the Porte, the proposed expenditure being in excess of the allocation. No definite decision has been come to regarding the site of the new building at Salonica, apparently owing to the Civil List's opposition to the course which the Customs Administration recommends. The tenders for the pier at Alexandretta are under consideration at the Ministry of Public Works.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 29.

Summary of Consular Reports respecting Progress of Improvements in Customs.

Alexandretta.

[No. 15 of February 29, 1908.]

NOTHING to report.

Bagdad.

[No. 143/19 of February 17, 1908.]

The plans for the new custom-house and quay have been sent to Constantinople, and are satisfactory. Provision for private stores is desirable. The building can be begun as soon as orders are given; the quay not before July or August 1908.

Bussorah.

[Telegrams of March 21, 1908, and No. 27 of March 30, 1908; despatch No. 16 of February 27, 1908.]

The deepening of the Ashar Canal is important, and the erection of a new crane is not a satisfactory substitute. Digging is now, however, impossible until midsummer. The Vali has turned his attention to the damage caused to merchants' goods by rain.

Beirout.

[No. 20 of March 7, 1908.]

No progress since last report.

Jaffa.

[Despatch of March 14, 1908.]

No change since last report, except that custom house accounts are being kept on a new system.

Mersina.

[No 3 of March 18, 1908.]

The new custom-house has been opened. The Director is very satisfactory. The construction of the promised pier is much to be desired.

Salonica.

[No. 31 of March 4, 1908.]

Nothing to add to previous reports.

Smyrna.

[No. 27 of March 14, 1908.]

Nothing important to report. An attempt by Jewish brokers to influence valuers successfully combated. The Public Debt representation has got a chair, and is allowed to be present at valuation of goods. Building proceeds satisfactory.

Trebizond.

[No. 17 of March 7, 1908.]

Little progress has been made with the transit store, and the work was suspended a fortnight ago. It has been decided to make the new landing-stage shorter. Official and alleged real explanations of this decision.

Inclosure 2 in No. 29.

Acting Consul Catoni to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 15.)

Sir, *Alexandretta, February* 29, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I have nothing to report respecting custom-house improvements at Alexandretta.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. CATONI.

Inclosure 3 in No. 29.

Acting Consul-General Ramsay to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 143/19.)

Sir, *Bagdad, February* 17, 1908.

IN continuation of my despatch dated the 7th January, 1908, I have the honour to report that on the 15th February the Nazir of the custom-house sent one of his assistants to show me the new plan of the Bagdad custom-house, which he said had been dispatched to the Central Customs Administration on about the 29th January, 1908. The Nazir had promised to let me see the plan before it was sent, but his omission to carry out his promise is not important, as I have no objection to urge against the plan as now prepared. It provides for a quay of 180 metres long, and though it does not actually provide for private stores, there is a long building which can be adapted for this purpose, and I understand from the man who brought me the plan that it is intended to use this building for private stores. I venture to suggest, however, that your Excellency should bring to notice the need for private stores. If orders on the subject were sent to Bagdad I should probably be able to arrange details with the Nazir.

2. The building of the quay cannot be taken in hand until July or August, 1908, as the work can only be done when the river has permanently gone down to its lowest level. The rest of the building can be taken in hand as soon as orders are received and funds are made available. The building as proposed will require a considerable amount of corrugated iron sheeting, a number of iron supports, and perhaps some Portland cement. The Nazir is going to give me the specifications for these articles and a note of the quantities required, which information I will send to the Board of Trade with a view to tenders being offered as soon as it is decided to carry out the work. I shall, therefore, be much obliged if your Excellency can let me know by telegram if the plan now sent is approved, and if funds have been made available.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RAMSAY.

Inclosure 4 in No. 29.

Consul Crow to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 16.)

Sir, *Bussorah, February 27*, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the translation of a letter received from the Vali containing a belated inquiry as to whether goods are damaged in the custom-house owing to their being left in the open, together with a copy of my reply.

In my telegram No. 85 of the 10th December, 1906, to His Majesty's Embassy, I drew attention to this matter. Instructions from the Central Customs Administration have at length permeated to the office in Bussorah.

The rainfall from the 1st November, 1906, to the 28th February, 1907, was 4·87 inches; that for the same period 1907–8 was 1·53 inches.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

Inclosure 5 in No. 29.

Vali of Bussorah to Consul Crow.

(Translation.) *February* 9 (22), 1908.

IT having been reported that merchants' goods at the custom-house are left in the mud and earth, and that the owners suffer loss thereby, the Mudir of the custom-house asks to be informed whether British subjects have any complaint to make on the subject or not, in order that the necessary steps may be taken.

Inclosure 6 in No. 29.

Consul Crow to Vali of Bussorah.

(No. 21.)

Sir, *Bussorah, February 27*, 1908.

IN reply to your Excellency's letter of the 9th (22nd) February, I have the honour to state that last year, owing to heavy rain, merchants' goods left in the open at the custom-house were damaged, and many complaints were received. This year, thanks be to God, the scarcity of rain has protected merchants' goods from destruction.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

Inclosure 7 in No. 29.

Consul Crow to Sir N. O'Conor.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Bussorah, March* 21, 1908.

A CRANE would not serve any very useful purpose, as when the river is high it is really not required; and when it is low, lighters could not approach it. The river is now rising, so digging will not be possible unless it is done soon.

All canals are dug out occasionally, but the Ashar Canal has been neglected for a long time. I will try to obtain the support of the Director of the Bagdad Customs, and will ask the Mudir here to report on the subject.

Inclosure 8 in No. 29.

Consul Crow to Sir N. O'Conor.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Bussorah, March* 30, 1908.

THE proposed digging of the Customs canal has been rendered impossible by a sudden rise of the river. I would suggest that the Mudir be instructed to have the work done in the middle of the summer, when the river will have fallen.

Inclosure 9 in No. 29.

Consul-General Drummond Hay to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 20.)

Sir, *Beirout, March 7*, 1908.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 13 of the 10th February, concerning the Beirout custom-house, I have the honour to report that no progress has been made since that date.

I have, &c.
(For the Consul-General),
(Signed) C. E. D. RAWLINS.

Inclosure 10 in No. 29.

Acting Vice-Consul Falanga to Sir N. O'Conor.

Sir, *Jaffa, March* 14, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to confirm my last Report of the 10th ultimo on the Customs improvements at Jaffa, and to mention that since that date no changes have taken place in the carrying out of the transactions of that establishment.

Upon orders received from the General Direction at Constantinople the accounts at the custom-house will be kept, beginning from to-day's date, the 1st (14th) March, in a different manner, which will show the daily balances of all the imports and those of the exports separately for each article landed or shipped, and also the daily totals of the amounts encashed on each article.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. FALANGA.

Inclosure 11 in No. 29.

Vice-Consul Loiso to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 3.)

Sir, *Mersina, March* 18, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that on the 14th instant took place the inauguration of our new custom-house building in the presence of the Vali, who came from Adana for this purpose. The ceremony took place without any official invitation. Goods and offices have now been transferred in the new building. I take the opportunity to mention that the custom-house Director is a good person desirous to render every facility to commerce, there is every hope that the service will be in good order, and will give no reason for complaints. I may add that it will be agreeable to commerce if the custom-house Administration will keep the said Mudir to his post.

As regards the landing-stage, which is very needful to facilitate the landing and embarcation of goods, although its construction has been promised for a long time, there is no probability whether same will be done.

I have, &c.
(Signed) T. LOISO.

Inclosure 12 in No. 29.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 31.)

Sir, *Salonica, March* 4, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I have nothing to add this month to the previous despatches from this Office in regard to the Customs Administration in this port.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HARRY H. LAMB.

Inclosure 13 in No. 29.

Consul-General Heathcote-Smith to Sir N. O'Conor.

Sir, *Smyrna, March* 14, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to state to your Excellency that the only incident of note during the last month in connection with the custom-house has been an attempt of certain Jewish brokers to install themselves alongside the official estimators, and try to influence these latter when they are at their work.

On receiving complaints from several merchants as to this, I made representations at the Customs, and the Jews have been removed.

The Ottoman Public Debt representative has now received a seat in the "Bureau de Correspondence" of the Import Department, and has obtained the right to be present when goods are being valued. His powers are otherwise unchanged.

The extension works are progressing satisfactorily.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. E. HEATHCOTE-SMITH.

Inclosure 14 in No. 29

Consul Jones to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 17.)
Sir, *Trebizond, March* 7, 1908.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 12 of the 6th ultimo, I have the honour to report that but little progress has been made in the work of construction of the new depôt for goods in transit.

The floor of the Department marked IV in the plan forwarded with my despatch No. 82 of the 14th December, 1907, is nearly half filled in.

It appears that about a fortnight ago orders were received from the Central Administration of Customs for the suspension of the work of building the new depôt in question.

With regard, however, to the construction of the new iron landing stage considerable progress has been effected. In addition to the twenty-four iron bars reported in my despatch No. 12 as having been placed in position forty-two more have been so fixed, making a total of sixty-six, *i.e.*, eleven rows of piers now in position.

In this connection I have the honour to forward herewith a plan showing the position and form of the new landing stage, which was intended to have a length of 60 metres.

The iron piers of the stage marked B in the plan are placed six in a row at intervals of 2 metres, the total breadth of the stage being thus 10 metres, while the distance separating each row of piers from the next is also of 2 metres.

Having received an intimation to the effect that it had been decided to reduce the length from 60 to 30 metres, I called upon the Director of Customs here to inquire whether that was the case, and was referred by that official to the authorities of the municipality, to whom I then applied, and was informed that, although the original intention had been to take the stage out to a length of 60 metres, there was a likelihood that the length might be reduced, as it had been found that the depth of water at a distance of 60 metres was hardly more than that at 30 metres.

I should add that the Customs authorities informed me that although the municipality was building the new landing stage it was the intention of the Customs Department at Constantinople to buy the construction when completed.

Shortly afterwards I was informed by his Excellency the Vali that the reason for this change in the original plan, whereby the length is reduced to the half of that at first designed, is to be found in the fact that the stone jetty, marked A in the plan herewith inclosed,* does not extend further out to sea than 30 metres, and that the utility of the new stage depends on the length of that jetty, which must be at least as long as the proposed stage if the latter is to be of any use in stormy weather. The jetty, it was added, is in a condition of disrepair, which can only become worse as time goes on, unless steps are to be taken to repair it thoroughly. Three Departments, viz., the Customs Administration, the Local Government, and the Military Authorities, are interested in the question of the repair of that jetty, but there appears to be some

* Not printed.

difficulty in the way of their obtaining the requisite authorization from Constantinople for the execution of the work.

On the other hand, I have the honour to add that subsequently I was informed from another source that the real reason of the unwillingness of the municipality to carry out the original design of making the new landing stage of the length of 60 metres is to be found in the fact that they hope by economising the use of the iron bars sent from Antwerp for the building of the landing stage in question, to keep enough to serve for the construction of another similar stage to be placed near the new depôt for the storage of goods in transit.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. FRANCIS JONES.

[12669] No. 30.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 176.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April* 8, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Jeddah respecting the attitude of the Bedouins towards Europeans and the Hedjaz Railway.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 30.

Consul Monahan to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 9.)
Sir, *Jeddah, March* 19, 1908.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 3 of the 3rd ultimo, I have the honour to report that about a week ago a young Dutchman, in the employ of the British firm, C. R. Robinson and Co., leading shipping agents here, went to Rabigh in a sailing boat on a pleasure trip, meaning to take the opportunity to inspect the locality, where 40,000 tons of railway material are expected to be landed, but armed Bedouins at Rabigh, understanding that he had come on business connected with the railway, would not allow him to land or even come up on deck and look at the coast, and with threats, or perhaps rather with warning, that other Bedouins, bad men, might catch him, forced him to sail back to Jeddah. The firm do not desire to make any complaint against Bedouins nor against local authorities, as the voyage was not official, but this reception given to the first European seeking to land at Rabigh seems to deserve to be noted. I have received from Messrs. Harling and Struckmann, of Hamburg, a letter dated the 27th January, 1908, stating that they were negotiating with two British shipping concerns about shipping eighty trucks for Rabigh, and asking me to inform them, Messrs. Harling and Struckmann, of the authority dealing with the matter. I replied to them through the Commercial Intelligence Branch of the Board of Trade, London, advising them to communicate through the British Consulate, Constantinople, with the Hedjaz Railway Commission at Constantinople, as I was not sure of the proper address and description of that Commission. The local authorities at Jeddah have just now received an order from the Vali to collect 600 hand-carts or wheelbarrows for carting sand at Rabigh.

The Bedouin feeling against the railway is shown by the above incident of the Dutch gentleman, and by the following remarks heard in Jeddah lately from a somewhat important Bedouin, formerly a noted robber: "These Nasranis (Nazarenes, Christians) have brought plague and cholera in their bottles (Bedouins consider all doctors Christians), and now with the smoke from the black chimney of the railway will poison the whole country." The Bedouin has perhaps a confused mind, or perhaps he, like many Bedouins, does not look upon the Osmanlis as Mussulmans. The Jeddah Meccan road is now open (see my despatch No. 6 of the 14th instant) to the extent that caravans can travel in the daytime. But there is in Jeddah a vague apprehension of trouble from Bedouins, and I have been advised not to ride to even 2 miles' distance from the town, and to avoid approaching any Bedouin tents.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. MONAHAN.

[12598] No. 31.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 187.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, April 8, 1908.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 92 of the 21st February, forwarding an official announcement relative to alleged military preparations by Russia and Turkey, I have the honour to transmit herewith the translation of a further communiqué which has appeared in to-day's press.

It will be seen that the Turkish Government have spontaneously assured the Russian Government that there has been no concentration of Turkish troops near the Russian frontier, and that all recent military movements are connected solely with the possibility of disorders occurring in Turkey itself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

Inclosure in No. 31.

Official Communiqué published March 26 (April 8), 1908.

IN view of the fresh reports which have appeared in the newspapers respecting military preparations by Turkey near our Caucasus frontier, we are authorized to state that the Ottoman Government (as it did a month and a-half ago), upon its own initiative, has again informed the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, through its Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, that the information respecting Turkish military preparations being made which continues to appear in the press is not in accordance with facts. On the authority of the formal declaration of the Turkish Ambassador here, no steps of any kind for the concentration of troops near the Russian frontier have been taken, and no preliminary instructions of any kind with a view to such a concentration have been issued. All recent military measures, including the despatch of several battalions to Van, have been caused, according to the explanation of the Turkish Government, solely by apprehension of disorders in that district.

[12858] No. 32.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 19th March, relative to Sheikh Mubarak's properties at Fao.

India Office, April 11, 1908.

Inclosure 1 in No. 32.

Captain Trevor to Government of India.

Bushire, February 15, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copies of the correspondence which has passed between His Majesty's Consul, Bussorah, the Political Agent at Koweit, and this Office on the subject of Sheikh Mubarek's properties at Fao.

2. Major Cox had not time to deal with this question before his departure for Lingah and Henjam, but he has desired me to forward the correspondence, and no doubt, if he has any comments to make, he will address you on the subject as soon as possible after his return from tour.

Inclosure 2 in No. 32.

Major Cox to Consul Crow.

(Telegraphic.) *Bushire, January 12, 1908.*

A COMPLAINT is made by the Sheikh of Koweit that the local authorities at Bussorah are causing him loss by obstructing the repair of his bunds at Fao. He states that now they demand that he should leave a space of 600 metres clear on the north and south sides of the fort. He protests against this on the ground that it is a new and unnecessary demand which is calculated to cause him considerable loss of revenue and cultivation. He begs that you will give him your friendly offices in inducing the Vali to refrain from obstructing him in the yearly repairs to his bunds.

Inclosure 3 in No. 32.

Consul Crow to Major Cox.

(Telegraphic.) *Bussorah, January 13, 1908.*

I WILL do what I can in connection with your telegram of the 12th January, but I am not sanguine of success.

Inclosure 4 in No. 32.

Major Cox to Consul Crow.

Bushire, January 14, 1908.

MANY thanks for your wires regarding the "Sicilia's" movements and Sheikh Mubarek's date gardens. This Fao property of his is a great nuisance; but, in view of recent developments, I suppose we must do our best for him, and I hope you will be able to make some impression on the Vali. Have you ever been to the spot?

The 600 metres clear now demanded by the Vali is much more than ever asked for before and means the surrender to inundation of a large number of date palms.

Inclosure 5 in No. 32.

Consul Crow to Major Cox.

Bussorah, January 24, 1908.

YOUR telegram of the 12th January and letter of the 14th January about Mubarek's land at Fao.

Vali says he will do his best to smooth over difficulties, provided no harm is done to the fort, but he states Mubarek is reclaiming new ground and not merely repairing old "seddas" as represented. He has recovered this year from the river 30,000 square dras (that means a patch of about 130 yards by 85 yards, the land dra being 19 inches) on the north side of the fort, and opened a channel besides near the fort itself. Before land is reclaimed from a river in Turkey it is usual to obtain permission from Government and pay something for it. This has not been done. The matter is engaging the attention of the Palace, and they are in correspondence with the Vali on the subject. The Vali has replied to the Palace telegrams that he is making the necessary inquiries. The whole question has been referred by the Vali to the Administrative Council, and he proposes to send a member of the Council to Fao to survey the place. The Vali will let me hear further when the matter has been gone into.

I suggested privately that the Vali should tell me how much royalty the Turkish Government wanted, as I might then be able to facilitate matters, and Mubarek would do well to consult the Vali direct as to permission and payment. His statement to us seems disingenuous. I am a little embarrassed by Mubarek himself, who during the feast (the 14th January to the 19th January), began his work again in spite of orders not to, and would pay no attention to what the Turkish Government said. Your telegram to me was dated the 12th January, so Mubarek took the law into his own

hands about two days after your reference to me. He is really an "impossible client"!

What is the Arabic of your translation "600 metres clear space"? I fancy there may be some error. Our surface measure here is the "dra," which is 19 inches. There is a lineal dra of 36 inches, but used for cloth only. The metre is not used locally for land measure, though, if measured by the military people, the 600 (?) in the perimeter of the fort may well be the metre as we know it.

I will do what I can, but you see it is not easy under existing conditions.

Inclosure 6 in No. 32.

Major Cox to Consul Crow.

Bushire, January 28, 1908.

MANY thanks for your letter of the 24th January regarding the Fao properties.

"Mittr" was the word used to me, both by the Sheikh and his writer, who, after my interview, brought me the old partition deed and went into explanations with plan and pencil. The word "zira" was never used, and it seemed clear to me that they knew and were using the French word "metre."

I am sending your letter over to Knox, who is now back.

I hear from Fao that the Turks have demolished one of the offending bunds, but in his letter received last night Knox makes no mention of this.

It is, as you know, very difficult in these matters to get our friends to be at all precise, but I went over the fort "clearance" point again and again to make sure that I had the right details, as stated by Sheikh Mubarek at the time.

Inclosure 7 in No. 32.

Major Knox to Major Cox.

Koweit, February 3, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the translation of a letter handed to me by Sheikh Mubarek this morning on the subject of wanton destruction of his property at Fao by Turkish soldiers.

2. It would appear that the lands on which this outrage was committed lie between the telegraph office and the Turkish fort at Fao. The reason given, I understand, by the Turkish authorities is a twofold one: (1) that, for the safety of the fort, a clear space of 600 metres is required; (2) that Sheikh Mubarek has inclosed newly-reclaimed land without paying the usual taxes and without obtaining the necessary permission from Government. To these reasons may be added a third, viz., that Sheikh Mubarek received orders not to construct the embankments under dispute.

3. With reference to the first reason, Sheikh Mubarek claims that the limits of the fort were laid down long ago in writing in his possession, and that he has no knowledge why these limits have been enlarged, and that he has been given no opportunity of representing his—the proprietor's—views, and has received no compensation for this clearance, which would render desolate a large portion of his land.

4. As regards the second reason, there appears to me to be no comparison between the so-called high-handedness of Sheikh Mubarek in erecting a small embankment that cannot possibly in peace time be a serious menace to the safety of the fort, and that could easily be removed if real encroachment is proved and adjudicated on, and the wanton damage done to valuable property by the fort soldiers in letting flood water on to the gardens. Such damage is irreparable, for the chance of Sheikh Mubarek obtaining compensation from the Turks is small indeed. Sheikh Mubarek declares that the bunds are eleven years old, and that they have merely been repaired. He also informs me that he and the fort military authorities built them together eleven years ago.

5. As regards the third reason, it would be interesting to learn when Sheikh Mubarek received clear official instructions that he was not to build the embankments, and, even if he did so contrary to orders, he may plead that it is impossible to obey such orders, as he cannot stand by and see his property go to ruin for want of proper repair. His constant complaint to me is that the Turks will not allow him to exercise the right that each and every one—the meanest proprietor on the river—has, viz., to protect his property against the devastation not only of the river, as in the case of more fortunate proprietors higher up river, but also of the sea.

6. It is perhaps worth noticing that the Kaimakam of Fao, the highest local civil authority, is apparently on Sheikh Mubarek's side in this affair.

7. The letter, of which a translation is forwarded, may read strangely and appear peremptory in tone, but too great importance should not be attached to that, as Sheikh Mubarek was perfectly friendly in discussing the matter, and the ambiguous phrase about searching for a way to preserve his honour is simply a vague threat intended to produce an impression, and there is not the slightest doubt that Sheikh Mubarek thoroughly appreciates the advantages that accrue to him from our protection of Koweit.

Inclosure 8 in No. 32.

Sheikh Mubarek-us-Subah to Major Knox.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.) *20th Thi-ul-Haj (February 1, 1908).*

BEFORE this we have informed the Consul-General and yourself about the interference of the Turkish Government in the cultivation of my land and the preservation of my land by embankments from the damage caused by water, and the Consul-General said that he would inform the Consul of Bussorah of the news. Now the Turkish soldiers who are in their fort at Fao by night burst on to my lands and broke the bunds that protect my lands from the water in about forty places, and the water came in on my date trees and destroyed a portion of my date trees, and it may be further anticipated that more damage may be done, and the Kaimakam of Fao informed the Vali, and also my agents informed the Vali by telegram, and the Vali did not stop this business, and your Honour knows that I and my town and my property which is in Bussorah and all that concerns me is in your protection, and such matters are happening to my harm both in possessions and honour, and if your protection is only for the town of Koweit, the protection of Koweit does not benefit me at all. What benefits me is the preservation of my honour. If I do not obtain from your protection my honour, at least you might demand from the Turks that they should treat me as well as they do all their proprietors of land, and not permit that such occurrences should take place upon me and I should endure them for many days and with patience as in the case of the occasion which happened last year on my Fao property and I informed you of it. My agents drove them off my property and they destroyed of my date crop 6,000 (?) by thieving. I informed you of the matter, and you yourself from Bushire went to Fao and came here, and we informed you of the affair which had happened. Then when matters of this kind happen and no protection is obtained from you for my honour and property, I shall be compelled to look out for myself a condition that will protect my honour and my property and my land. Then it is incumbent on me that I should present this before you. Then, so that your knowledge may embrace this affair, I have presented this letter to you and await your order, and may you remain guarded.

Inclosure 9 in No. 32.

Major Knox to Consul Crow.

Koweit, February 2, 1908.

I HAVE received copies of your letter to Cox of date the 24th January, together with his letter of the 14th January and final reply of the 28th January. I now send you a translation of Mubarek's letter handed to me by him to-day. He is just sending his steam-launch up to Fao with the famous Abdul Aziz-bin-Salim to see what can be done.

2. I followed your suggestion and told Mubarek that he would do well to consult the Vali as to permission and payment. Mubarek scouted the idea that he was reclaiming new land from the river, and maintained, as he did before Cox, that he was merely repairing old bunds, and that he and the military authorities had built them together eleven years ago.

Mubarek may be an impossible client, but it would appear from his letter that he has the Kaimakam, who is supposed to be the chief civil authority in Fao, on his side, and the high-handedness of erecting a low embankment in peace time, which can do little or no harm to the safety of the fort and which can easily be destroyed if there is any real encroachment, would seem as nothing compared to the high-handedness of the

soldiers, who let in flood water and destroy valuable property before there has been any real adjudication.

It does seem to me that there is all the difference in the world between the two actions; one is a slight encroachment which can easily be remedied, and the other sounds like a wanton destruction of property for which there is not the least chance of getting compensation. Mubarek, too, may quite reasonably say that his action in spite of orders to the contrary was forced upon him by floods, which even the Vali of Bussorah cannot control.

Inclosure 10 in No. 32.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *Bushire, March* 10, 1908.

MY letter dated 15th February last.

According to later reports parties have come to an understanding, and matter is not pressing.

[12551] No. 33.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 15, 1908.

WITH reference to your letter of the 8th instant, relative to the ill-treatment inflicted on a Bahreini by the Persian authorities at Lingah, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith decyphers of two telegrams from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran on the subject.*

Mr. Secretary Morley will observe that the Persian Government have informed Mr. Marling, in a note, that instructions have already been sent to Lingah to make reparation and do justice to the injured man, but that they have at the same time reiterated their claim to the ownership of the Island of Bahrein.

Mr. Marling has, however, discussed the question with the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has promised to address to him a further note, in substitution for that already received, from which, it is hoped, all mention of this pretension will be absent.

It appears to Sir E. Grey that an act of reparation and justice to the injured man constitutes in itself a recognition of the right of His Majesty's Government to protect Bahreinese subjects, and that, if the expression complained of does not occur in the amended note of the Persian Government, there will be no need to effect or to threaten the occupation of an island in the Persian Gulf to enforce the claim, as suggested by Mr. Marling.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive an expression of Mr. Morley's opinion on this subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[13546] No. 34.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 189.)

Sir, *Pera, April* 15, 1908.

WITH reference to Sir N. O'Conor's despatch No. 777 of the 20th December, 1907, respecting the Heraklea coalfield, I have the honour to report that the Ottoman Government have not acceded to the request of the French Embassy that the French group interested in the mines might be allowed to form a Company to work them. On the contrary, the Porte has made a counter-offer to buy up the French interests for 45,000,000 fr. This offer has been emphatically rejected by the French Ambassador, and the Porte has been informed that the French market will be closed against any financial operation designed to raise money for such a purpose.

* Nos. 27 and 28.

Meanwhile, therefore, the situation remains unchanged, although an Imperial Iradé was issued on the 5th instant transferring the mines, which have hitherto been worked on leases, from the Ministry of Marine to the charge of the Ministry of Commerce and Public Works, and directing that no new permit for working may be given except under Iradé, that the rights of the present workers may not be transferred to a third party except by way of sale to a Company to be formed under the auspices of the Agricultural Bank, and that no land may be sold within the limits of the mining area.

A technical Commissioner has proceeded in consequence of this Iradé to survey the mines, and furnish a full report to the Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[13865] No. 35.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 74.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, April* 22, 1908.

MILITARY preparations by Turkey.

In a conversation which I had with M. Isvolsky to-day, his Excellency was at a loss to explain the mobilization by Turkey at Erzeroum of practically the entire IVth Army Corps. Both he and the Russian General Staff were uneasy at this. The attitude of Russia had been a passive one, but if these inexplicable preparations by Turkey continued she would be forced to resort to precautionary measures of some kind in self-defence.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

[11244] No. 36.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, April* 22, 1908.

WITH reference to my note of the 17th January last, communicated on the subject of the use of the French flag by dhows belonging to subjects of the Sultans of Muscat and Zanzibar, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of correspondence which has passed between His Majesty's and the French Consuls at Muscat,* showing that a settlement of this question has now been reached.

Your Excellency will observe that this correspondence includes the English text of a Proclamation which it is proposed to issue in English and Arabic in the dominions of the Sultan of Muscat to give effect to this settlement. This Proclamation sets forth the text of the judgment pronounced on this subject by the Court of Arbitration at The Hague, gives a list of those subjects of the two Sultans who are entitled to the use of the French flag, with the names of the dhows by which it may be flown, and enumerates the rules by which these persons are bound.

I have the honour to state that His Majesty's Government are fully satisfied with the solution of this question, which has now been so happily arrived at by the efforts of Major Grey and M. Laronce, and trust that the French Government will regard it with equal favour.

As soon as I have the honour to receive through your Excellency an expression of the approval of the French Government, I shall not fail to take the necessary steps to cause telegraphic orders to be addressed to the Government of India to arrange for the issue of the Proclamation without further delay.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

---

* See Inclosures Nos. 3 to 11 in No. 5.

[11051] No. 37.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 23, 1908.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 31st ultimo, in which you forward a number of documents relating to the Red Oxide Concession on the Island of Abu Musa.

I am to state that, as these papers have only been subjected to a cursory examination in your Department, some delay must ensue before the draft reply can be properly prepared; it will, however, be submitted for the observations of Mr. Secretary Morley as soon as possible.

In the meantime I am to state that, in view of the long interval of time which has elapsed since the German Case was forwarded to your Department, Sir E. Grey is strongly of opinion that some temporary arrangement should be decided upon without delay, in order to furnish Messrs. Wönckhaus with a limited supply of red oxide from Abu Musa every month, to enable this firm to fulfil their contracts. The arrangement would, of course, be made without prejudice to the final adjudication of the case.

I am accordingly to suggest, for the consideration of Mr. Morley, that it might be expedient to instruct the Government of India to formulate proposals for such a supply being placed at the disposal of Messrs. Wönckhaus without delay. I am further to suggest that the telegram on the subject might advantageously be marked "Urgent."

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[14063] No. 38.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 24.)

Sir, *Admiralty, April* 23, 1908.

WITH reference to Admiralty letter of the 20th instant, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that His Majesty's ship "Royal Arthur" was unable to visit the Farsan Islands, owing to the state of the weather rendering navigation dangerous.

I am, &c.
(Signed) C. I. THOMAS.

[14040] No. 39.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received April 24.)

3, *Salter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London,*
Sir, *April* 23, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th instant, informing us that order seems to be restored on the Tigris, and that the arrangement objected to by the tribes has been cancelled.

The failure of the local authorities to exact adequate penalty in the cases of the murder of Mr. Glanville at Maaghil in February 1906, and of the attack on the P.S. "Khalifah" in May of the same year, and the fact that this failure has not involved them in serious consequences, have furnished them with ground to assume that no injury to their own prospects will result from damage done to this Company's property and rights. Moreover, the recent attack on the "Blosse Lynch" has evidently produced the result desired by the tribes, so that we anticipate they will employ the same tactics on the next occasion upon which they may be dissatisfied with the Turkish Government, unless in the meantime the local authorities are obliged either to bear themselves, or to inflict on the tribes, some really adequate punishment for the injury done to this Company. I am therefore directed again to press on your consideration the claim for damages put forward in my letter of the

8th instant. We observe that other Governments are now vigorously pressing the Porte in regard to similar matters.

I am, &c.
(Signed) H. W. MACLEAN, *Secretary.*

No. 40.

[Nil.]

[14321] No. 41.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 200.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April* 20, 1908.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 82 of the 3rd instant and subsequent telegrams respecting the recent attack on the "Blosse Lynch," near Amara, on the Tigris, I have the honour to report that I learn from the Grand Vizier that the punitive measures undertaken against the offending tribesmen have so far resulted in the death of six Arabs.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[14323]

No. 42.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 202.)
Sir,

Pera, April 21, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of three despatches from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum respecting the outrages committed on Armenians in the Mutessariflik of Moush by Kassim Bey of Khevner.

I have made repeated representations to the Ottoman Government in regard to the crimes of Kassim Bey and the iniquity of his pardon, and the Russian Ambassador has addressed the Porte in writing on the subject, with the result that his pardon has been suspended and his supporter, the Mutessarif of Moush, Safvet Pasha, removed from office. In place of the latter Kemal Pasha, ex-Mutessarif of Elbasan in the Vilayet of Monastir, has been appointed, and I learn that he is likely to co-operate well with the Acting Vali of Bitlis, Feizi Bey, for the restoration of order and tranquillity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 42.

Consul Shipley to Sir N. O'Conor.

(No. 9.)
Sir,

Erzeroum, March 14, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith, the copies of a despatch, as marked in the margin,* which I have received from Mr. Safrastian, Dragoman in charge of His Majesty's Vice-Consulate at Bitlis, giving an account of a conversation which he has recently had with Feizi Bey, the Acting Governor-General of that Vilayet, in which the latter expressed himself in very strong terms respecting the pardon recently granted to the notorious Kassim Bey of Khevner which he attributed to the intrigues set on foot by the Mutessarif of Moush. Mr. Safrastian further informed me privately that Feizi Bey, in the conversation above referred to, went so far as to ask him to telegraph the above facts to me with a view of enlisting your Excellency's intervention; a request, however, to which he, Mr. Safrastian, felt himself unable to accede as he had no means of telegraphing except *en clair*.

There can be little doubt that the pardon accorded to Kassim Bey, which may possibly have been due to the exploits of the latter against his quondam allies the revolutionaries, referred to by Mr. Safrastian in his despatch of the 18th January last, is peculiarly ill-timed at the present juncture and is the more discouraging as Feizi Bey, according to Mr. Safrastian, appears to be making most praiseworthy efforts to introduce something like order among the Kurds in his district. As it is, I have just been informed by Mr. Safrastian by telegram, that Kassim Bey has been continuing his excesses since his pardon, and that no less than three Armenians have recently met with their death at his hands.

The outspoken comments which were further made by Feizi Bey to Mr. Safrastian in the conversation above alluded to with regard to the notorious Hassananli Hamidié Major Riza Bey, show clearly the illusory nature of the suggestion made by the Mushir Zekki Pasha to the effect that such Armenians who may have complaints against the latter should proceed to Erzeroum for the purpose of laying them before the court-martial which, according to Feizi Bey, is shortly to be held in this city to inquire into his conduct. In support of the assertion of Feizi Bey that no Armenian would venture on such a course I need only quote the remarks made to me in this connection by Nouri Bey, ex-Governor-General of Erzeroum, reported by me to your Excellency in my despatch No. 12 of the 7th March of last year, viz.: that "he (Nouri Bey), was well aware that no one in the districts inhabited by these [Hamidié] regiments would dare to give adverse evidence in a case in which one of their number was the defendant."

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. S. SHIPLEY.

---

* Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian, February 22, 1908.

Inclosure 2 in No. 42.

Consul Shipley to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 12.)
Sir,

Erzeroum, March 24, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the copies of a despatch received by me yesterday from Mr. Safrastian, Dragoman-in-charge of His Majesty's Vice-Consulate at Bitlis, giving the details of the murder under peculiarly atrocious circumstances by Kassim Bey, of Khevner, of five Armenians, three of them being presumably the persons referred to in his telegram to me of the 12th instant, and reported by me in my despatch No. 9 of the 14th of the same month.

As will be noticed, Mr. Safrastian states that these outrages by Kassim Bey are now apparently being committed under the protection of the Government, and as a sign of the former's energetic efforts in the eradication of the Armenian revolution. Whether Mr. Safrastian's supposition in this respect be well founded or not there can be no doubt of the connivance of the Mutessarif of Moush in the excesses and depredations of which Kassim Bey is the author if, as the Acting Vali, Feizi Bey, gave Mr. Safrastian to understand, the proceeds are being shared in by the former. Under these circumstances, and as Feizi Bey himself seems powerless to act in view of the connivance of the Mutessarif of Moush above referred to, I would venture to urge the necessity of the removal of that official as a first step towards the punishment of Kassim Bey, or, at least, of procuring the cessation of his outrages on the defenceless Armenians.

Mr. Safrastian further refers to a momentary panic among the Christians of Bitlis consequent upon the alleged receipt of an Imperial telegram to the Mussulmans of that city having reference to the recent events at Van. The allusion, however, in the telegram in question to the Armenians, as given by Mr. Safrastian, would appear to be somewhat ambiguous, and I am requesting the latter to furnish me with a further explanation, especially as he appears to be of the opinion that the report of its receipt has already had a most injurious effect on the Mussulman part of the population.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. S. SHIPLEY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 42.

Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul Shipley.

Sir,

Bitlis, March 7, 1908.

IN reference to my despatches of the 15th and 22nd February last, I have the honour to report that the conditions in which the Armenians are living in the eastern part of the plain of Moush, is going from bad to worse.

After being favoured by the Imperial pardon, Kassim Bey, of Khevner, had gone to Moush to express his gratitude to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, and to the Mutessarif of Moush, by whose efforts, no doubt, he was granted a pardon. He was instructed at the same time, I presume, as to how to proceed in future in dealing with the Armenian population in this region. So, as soon as he came back to his village, escorted by zaptiehs, he recommenced to perpetrate the most violent outrages ever witnessed upon the unoffending population, this time apparently under the protection of the Government.

A week ago his Kurds entered at daylight the house of one Armenian Rasho, in Ardonk, whose wife was young and beautiful. They tried to violate the woman in her husband's presence, who, however, had done all he could to save his wife. Upon the resistence of the husband the Kurds withdrew, and entered, I am told, the house of one Ohan to require some hundred piastres. The proprietor escaped, telling that he is going out to borrow money. On his not coming back the Kurds violated his old wife, and went away. After two days Kassim Bey himself arrived in the village, and ordered the above-mentioned men to be brought into his presence, as well as three other Armenians from various villages, who had been many years in his service, and his protégés.

When the five men were ready, he ordered his Kurds to shoot them down on the 4th instant before his eyes. He then armed by his own rifles seven innocent Armenians from various villages who had refused to pay the sums exacted from them or who had.

young wives, and he himself took them to Moush, with the five corpses of the killed, to show his energetic efforts in the eradication of Armenian revolution.

Two messengers arrived here yesterday, sent by the villages in question, to call the attention of the Consulates on the lamentable conditions prevailing in their district. I venture humbly to bring forward only some paragraphs of their statements, which they made to me in desparate sighs.

"Our mothers and wives are being violated in our presence; we are being killed when we attempt to protect them. Money, corn, and all that we are supposed to possess are required from us, and if in consequence of our utmost misery we refuse, we are accused as Fedais and killed without any scruples. The tax-collectors see by their own eyes that we are on the brink of starvation; they do not leave us alone in our infernal sorrows. God only knows what crimes are being perpetrated at present on the women and men. We complained to the Government against the oppressions of Kassim Bey, and the result turned out to be his pardon, and still unknown severity in his ill-treatment against ourselves. We don't know to whom we are to go. We tried to emigrate to Russia, we were not allowed to go; we made an attempt at conversion to Islam, and were reprimanded by the Church authorities; and to fancy that this is just the beginning!"

In a further interview, the Acting Vali gave me to understand confidentially that the Mutessarif of Moush and his *alter ego*, Khalil Effendi, the ill-reputed Mayor, are sharing all robberies of Kassim Bey, and working instead to get a decoration for him. If the present state of affairs will be allowed to go on for another short time, I stated, 40 per cent. of the Armenian population in Moush will leave their homes next spring.

The wildest rumours are in circulation here as regard the latest events at Van. A growing excitement is being perceived among the Moslems here against the Armenians, and the unusual whispers of the former are causing anxiety and suspicion among the latter. I have just heard from a Turkish source, which I consider to be trustworthy, that two days ago a telegram has come here from the Palace conveying to the Mussulman people the Imperial salutations, and telling them not to be disturbed by the abominable plot of the Armenian brigands in Van, that the Imperial army is in a position to restore order and tranquillity in case of need, and that they must behave well with the Armenians.

It is reported that at noon of yesterday, Friday, the Mosques were unusually crowded, and the Imperial telegram explained to the people. The bazaars were at once deserted by the Armenians, and fears of an attack were prevailing. The bazaars were, however, strongly patrolled by gendarmes, as is the case for last few days, and it is to be hoped that there is no foundation whatever of any fear or suspicion on the part of Armenians.

In case, however, of any riot taking place in this connection, I venture to express the humble opinion that much of the future occurrence is to be attributed to the alleged Palace telegram, which it seems, has roused all predatory instincts of Moslems in slumber for the last few years.

A few days ago severe shocks of earthquake have occurred in Khizan (Caza of Bitlis), and all people are camping out at present. Neither loss of life nor important damage is reported, but great distress and misery is prevailing there. Before the earthquake, I had seen two Armenian Notables of Khizan (one of them the Protestant preacher), who among other things told me that some Armenian villages in Khizan are entirely depopulated in the course of the last two or three years, and that since September last, at least thirty Armenian women and men had embraced Islam in order only to avoid starvation. There is, no doubt, some exaggeration in the statement as regards the deaths from starvation, but all the same it proves, in my humble opinion, by what strides the political persecutions and misery are destroying the Armenian people as a national entity in this vilayet.

The Commission of some minor officers, the arrival of which I had the honour to telegraph on the 7th ultimo, has done not much so far. They were to make inquiries in the Gendarmerie Office and replace old and ignorant officers by suitable ones. The Acting Vali told me that there is a desire to dismiss Izzet Pasha, the present old and useless Commandant of gendarmerie here, who cannot even write his name, and replace him by a young officer, preferably by one of the Macedonian gendarmerie. A change most desirable, of course, and imperatively needed in face of the anarchic state of that department.

During the last fortnight large convoys of military ammunitions are passing through Bitlis, *en route* for Vezinó, on the Persian frontier, a Staff officer told me

confidentially. I am also informed that groups of Redifs, each from twenty to seventy persons are going to Van from Moush, Bulanik, &c., by the northern shore of the lake. I am writing this to His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Van, trusting that he is interested to hear such information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. S. SAFRASTIAN, *Dragoman*.

Inclosure 4 in No. 42.

Consul Shipley to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 14.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, April 3, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the copies of a despatch, as marked in the margin,* which I have received from Mr. Safrastian, Dragoman in charge of His Majesty's Vice-Consulate at Bitlis, giving an account of certain further outrages on Armenians committed by Kassim Bey of Khevner, whose proceedings have formed the subject of Mr. Safrastian's despatches of the 18th January, 15th and 22nd February, and 7th March last.

This latest despatch of Mr. Safrastian shows very clearly the consequences to the Armenian villagers of any attempt on the part of the revolutionaries to enter into relations with individual Kurdish Chiefs or to place any reliance on the sympathies of the latter for there can be now little doubt, if Mr. Safrastian's information be correct, that this Kassim Bey, who was reported by Mr. Heard in his despatch No. 18 of the 3rd November last to be in bad odour with the Government on account of these quasi sympathies, is now being employed by the latter in the work of hunting down his former allies, with apparently full license while so doing to deal with the Armenians as he thinks fit. The stamping out of the revolutionary movement may no doubt be regarded as a matter of first necessity by the Turkish Government, but, without going into the question how far the continued existence of this movement may be due to the apparently callous indifference of the latter to the sufferings of its Armenian subjects, it would, I venture to think, in its own interest, and, in order not to drive the Armenians to a state of desperation, do well not to make use of instruments of Kassim Bey's description.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. S. SHIPLEY.

[14251] No. 43.

Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 203. Confidential.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, April 22, 1908.*

M. ISVOLSKY mentioned to me to-day that he was perplexed by the military preparations which Turkey was undertaking, as she had practically mobilized the IVth Army Corps at Erzeroum, and was very active on the Persian frontier. Notwithstanding the assurances which on two occasions had been given by Hussny Pasha that these preparations were not directed in any way against Russia, it was difficult to explain them, especially those at Erzeroum, in any other sense than as threatening the Russian frontier. The recent movements of Turkish troops, moreover, into Persian territory or to localities in the neutral zone were of a strategical character, and turned the flank of the Russian defences. He was quite at a loss to conceive what object the Ottoman Government had in view. He had in his recent speech taken especial pains to adopt pacificatory language towards Turkey; in fact, many organs of public opinion considered that he had been too solicitous in regard to Ottoman susceptibilities, and the Russian Government had carefully abstained from making any moves on their side. His Excellency explained that all the Russian Government had done was to replenish military stores and to replace armaments, but these were merely normal measures which took place periodically.

The Russian General Staff was now becoming uneasy, and was requesting him to take diplomatic steps to cause a suspension of the Turkish armaments. If they continued Russia would be forced to adopt some precautionary measures in self-

* Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian, March 14, 1908

defence, as she could not passively await the development of preparations which were as inexplicable as they were disquieting.

I may add that I have been informed that the Grand Duke Nicolas Nicolaievitch, who left quite recently for the Crimea, may very possibly inspect the Russian defences in the Caucasus and on the Turkish frontier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. NICOLSON.

[14452] No. 44.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 27.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 24th instant, relative to affairs at Abu Musa.

India Office, April 25, 1908.

Inclosure in No. 44.

Government of India to Mr. Morley.

(Telegraphic) P. *April* 24, 1908.

FOLLOWING telegram, dated the 17th instant, received from Resident, Persian Gulf, to whom your telegram, dated the 6th instant, regarding Abu Musa Island, was repeated:—

"Abu Musa Island. Your telegram dated the 9th instant.

"1. Esa-bin-Abdul Latif and Nejef-bin-Nakhuda Ali will be alarmed, and the latter probably will be thrown into arms of Brown, by the knowledge that oxide near mine is to be removed by Hassan or Wönckhaus. Can I give them the assurance, with reference to their claims dated, respectively, the 17th Muharram and the 16th February, that British Government will guarantee payment of the sum due on their shares, if their right to share of value of this oxide is subsequently proved?

"2. Are further mining operations contemplated by His Majesty's Government in mentioning extension of arrangements? Until all mineral now lying at the mouth of mine has been transported to sea-coast and weighed, I am of opinion that anything in direction of further mining is to be deprecated. Mining might recommence under new management as soon as ground around mine has been cleared of mineral in dispute.

"3. No instructions as to institution of suit by persons mentioned in first clause, against Hassan, have yet been received by me, and almost all account books will, I apprehend, have been falsified.

"4. It is announced by Abdulla-bin-Hassan that he has received an appointment to Trucial Coast, where, in future, German ship will call, as agent for German firm. Permission to remain in their territories will not, I anticipate, be granted him by Trucial Chiefs."

We should be glad to receive instructions on our telegram, dated the 22nd ultimo, regarding suit against Hassan. We endorse suggestions in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Major Cox' telegram.

[14611] No. 45.

Mr. D. Fraser to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

Sir, *Aleppo, April* 11, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to address you in regard to the attack which was made upon me in Mesopotamia last Christmas Day, and to request your assistance in applying to the Turkish Government for compensation for the injuries I have received. I beg to

inclose, for your information, a statement which fully details the circumstances, and I would particularly draw your attention to that part of the statement which suggests that I have been made the victim of local politics.

Having addressed His Majesty's Consul here on the subject, I have received from him the inclosed reply, which informs me that my case is somewhat weakened by the fact that I was travelling without escort. But it will be seen by the statement that I endeavoured without success to obtain escort when the nature of the country suggested its advisability. Under the circumstances I therefore leave it to your judgment, provided you are prepared to be kind enough to assist me in the matter, whether my application should be put before the Turkish Government in the shape of a definite claim, or laid before the Sultan as a case in which His Majesty might be good enough to grant compensation.

I am now much recovered, but my constitution has been greatly shaken, and it is doubtful whether I shall ever enjoy the same health and strength as before. Whatever time and future operations may do I am maimed for life, and will never be able to use my hands effectively. My capacity to follow my profession of war correspondent and travelling journalist is greatly reduced, if not gone altogether, and I am afraid I shall be compelled hereafter to seek a livelihood where bodily activity is not essential.

To estimate damages for loss of time and for permanent injury to health and body is impossible, for money can hardly compensate me for what I have gone through, or for physical disability in the future. But as it seems necessary to indicate a sum that would be acceptable to me, I would suggest that 150*l.* per annum, represented by a capital sum of 5,000*l.*, would be a moderate amount of compensation under the circumstances.

I would like to take this opportunity of stating that, with the exception of the delay in taking steps to assist me from Urfa, I have received nothing but kindness and attention from the Turkish authorities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) DAVID FRASER.

P.S.—Copies of this correspondence have been forwarded to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople and to the Consul at Aleppo.

D. F.

Inclosure 1 in No. 45.

Statement by Mr. D. Fraser.

I LEFT Constantinople on the 9th November, 1907, and travelled by train to Eregli. There the Turkish authorities furnished me with a zaptieh, who accompanied me during the first day's journey across the Taurus. On arriving at the halting-place the zaptieh arranged for relief in the morning. When morning came I waited two hours for the new zaptieh, but as he did not appear I proceeded without him, expecting that he would catch us up on the road. He did not follow, however, and I had to travel the remaining three days to Adana without escort, there being no more gendarme stations on the road.

At Adana I had my teskari *visé* for Aleppo; besides which the authorities sent a man to inquire where I was going and what was my business. There being no suggestion of providing me with a guard, I went on without one and arrived safely at Aleppo. At Aleppo I discussed my contemplated journey along the track of the Bagdad Railway with the Vali and his Secretary, to whom my exact route and the date of my departure were made known. Again there was no suggestion of an escort, and I left for Bagdad without.

Hitherto I had refrained from application for a guard, for the reason that the gendarmes furnished by the Government are sometimes troublesome, particularly when required to travel off the main roads. It is the experience of travellers that zaptiehs frequently disappear altogether, while they are liable to make difficulties with servants if their wishes about route are not observed. In addition to losing the zaptieh on the Eregli–Adana road, I may mention a further experience. When travelling between Urfa and Aleppo, under circumstances referred to hereafter, the Government furnished me with four zaptiehs. At Birejik, despite official letters, I could only obtain a single man to replace the four. When we started in the morning the single zaptieh was

not forthcoming, and the next 50 miles of the journey was accomplished without any guard whatever. It might here be mentioned that travellers from Aleppo to Bagdad invariably proceed without escort, and, although the route usually followed is different, it remains that the country I wished to pass through was reported on all hands as perfectly secure for European travellers.

From Aleppo I travelled north-east, crossed the Euphrates near Terabulus, where the Germans plan to bridge the river, and proceeded due east, having travelled for seven days in populated country, where there was no difficulty in finding the way. From Harran eastward, however, I was told that habitation ended entirely, and that the country was pure desert, where only an occasional shepherd might be encountered. This decided me to apply for escort at Harran, where, according to my information, was a Kaïmakam, Turkish troops, and a head-quarters of Hamidié.

When four hours distant from the district of Harran I asked the way, and was told that there were two Harrans, old and new. I explained that I wanted to go to the one where was the Kaïmakam and soldiers, and we were accordingly directed for the village of Ain-el-Russ, beyond which was the village where the officials were stationed. We camped for the night at Ain-el-Russ, and in the morning proceeded to Aktchi-Kalaah. There we went straight to the soldiers' barracks, but found only two in occupation. They stated that the rest of the soldiers and the Kaïmakam had recently been transferred to Urfa, 36 miles distant. The soldiers said that they were without horses, besides which they could not come with us without orders. They accompanied us into the village to try to get guides. One man, for a consideration, consented to guide us to Ras-el-Ain, three days' march, and actually went to get his horse ready. He came back soon afterwards, however, and stated that he was afraid to go on account of Ebrahim Pasha's men. We spent about two hours at the village of Aktchi-Kalaah endeavouring to obtain escort or guides. Failing to obtain either, other than an Armenian boy to show us the ford at the river distant about 1 mile, we proceeded without, trusting to the compass and to the advice of nomads whom we might encounter for reaching Ras-el-Ain.

When 6 miles east of Aktchi-Kalaah we were overtaken by a horseman who stated that he was one of Ebrahim Pasha's men, and that he was bound for his master's encampment, nine hours distant. This man was armed with a Martini carbine, and equipped with two bandoliers full of cartridges. Knowing that Ebrahim's men were armed with Martinis I assumed that his statement was true, though my servants were suspicious. As I had hoped to see Ebrahim Pasha at some stage of my journey, I asked the man if he would guide us to his master. He agreed, and we made a slight deviation to the south. After some time in his company he rode forward and surveyed the country for a rising. He then returned to a distance of 80 yards and demanded 40*l.* for his master, Ebrahim Pasha. I declined to pay anything and was riding towards him, when he fired and wounded me in the right arm and left hand. As I continued riding towards him he fired a second and a third time, without causing further damage than the wounding of one of the horses. I now realized that I was helpless, and told the muleteers to tell the man that I would give him all the money I had. The muleteers took a bag containing 17*l.* or 18*l.* from my pocket, and placed it on the ground some distance from where I lay profusely bleeding. The robber took the bag, and a pair of saddlebags that had fallen from the wounded horse, and soon afterwards left us, apparently alarmed by the information imparted to him by the muleteers, that I had been killed. Handfuls of tobacco having stopped the bleeding of my wounds I was then helped on a horse and we commenced the return journey, arriving at Aktchi-Kalaah three hours after the occurrence.

My Greek servant now wrote a letter to the German Hospital at Urfa, stating that I was dangerously wounded and in urgent need of attention. A substantial fee was offered to a messenger to take the letter and deliver the same night. The messenger, curiously enough, was the man who earlier in the day had backed out of acting as our guide. There being a bright moon I hoped the doctor would be able to travel during the night and reach me in the morning. The messenger, however, did not reach his destination until sunrise of the following morning, and then took the letter, not to the German Hospital, but to one Nedeem, who owns the village of Aktchi-Kalaah, and whose house was actually next door to the German Hospital. The letter was handed to the Turkish authorities in the course of the morning, and in the afternoon at three o'clock a carriage was dispatched for me, with a Turkish doctor and other officials. Meanwhile, the information that a foreigner had been wounded spread all over the bazaars of Urfa, and eventually reached the ears of Miss Shattuck, the well-known American missionary lady. Miss Shattuck immediately sent to the Mutessarif to know

if it was true that an Englishman lay wounded at Harran. The reply came that the Government had no information on the subject, though by that time the Turkish doctor had actually been dispatched by the official who gave this reply. Miss Shattuck, however, became anxious on account of the circumstantial rumours that reached her, and sent Mr. Gracey of her mission to Dr. Vischer of the German Hospital, with the result that both gentlemen very kindly started out at night on their own initiative. Meanwhile, the Turkish party travelled until dark, when despite good roads and the presence of a moon they halted for the night, within a few miles of where I was lying in a dangerous condition.

During this long delay I remained at Aktchi-Kalaah suffering great pain, and in much apprehension as to the consequences of leaving my wounds without medical attention. After two nights had gone by and no succour had arrived, I decided that the only course was to make for Urfa. No vehicle of any kind was available, and I was compelled to ride, though in high fever. We started on the morning of the 27th December, and after an hour's riding encountered the Turkish party, who thereupon took me to Urfa, and handed me over to the German Hospital.

The dilatoriness of the Turkish officials on this occasion was the cause of much of the illness I subsequently suffered, for had they shown anything like promptitude the German doctor would have reached me on the evening of the 24th. The fact that I was compelled to make the eight hours' journey to Urfa, in a shaky carriage, without previous medical attention, further affected my condition. The behaviour of the Mutessarif in denying to Miss Shattuck all knowledge of there being a wounded Englishman at Harran deserves notice. If he had admitted knowledge when questioned aid would have reached me a great deal sooner than it did. The officials at Urfa are very much in the hands of the man Nedeem, the owner of the village of Aktchi-Kalaah. It is openly declared by Ebrahim Pasha that Nedeem, through his villagers, directly instigated the attack upon me, his object being to discredit Ebrahim Pasha. Colour is given to this statement by the fact that the Turkish officials, immediately after the occurrence, made careful search at Aktchi-Kalaah and the neighbourhood for information in regard to the identity of the robber, but profess to have found nothing. The robber having now been caught by Ebrahim Pasha—where the Turks had failed—is now at Aleppo, where he has confessed, and stated that he slept the night at Aktchi-Kalaah and went after me in the morning. He has distinctly stated that he was advised to do so by a man who said that I was a Russian whom he might easily kill and rob. There is no doubt that it was known in the village who the guilty man was, and it is curious that the Turkish officials could find out nothing when they made their investigation. Further, the incident of a man agreeing to accompany us, and suddenly changing his mind, suggests that there was design behind the whole affair.

While lying at Aktchi-Kalaah a Turkish officer came to me and made a statement, which shows that the authorities had an eye upon me, and intended that I should be escorted when necessary. This man told me that a telegram had been sent from Aleppo to Urfa notifying the officials there of my coming, and instructing them to furnish me with escort. In accordance with the telegram instructions had been sent to him to look out for me at Harran. The officer, however, with some sixteen soldiers, had been in another part of the district when I passed through, so had not been able to carry out his orders. This telegram to Urfa might well have suggested to Nedeem his opportunity, while it is curious that the Turkish officer at Harran, in view of the known animosity to Ebrahim Pasha of all Turkish officials in this part of the world, should have been conveniently out of the way when I passed through.

It is now over fifteen weeks since I was wounded, and I am still far from recovery. I am, for instance, unable to tie or untie a button of any kind, whilst my left hand is still bandaged to the finger-tips. On arrival at Urfa I was in a very bad condition, and the doctor was afraid that tetanus would ensue. That fear being allayed, they next thought that it might be necessary to amputate right arm and left hand owing to the inflammation and the danger of gangrene spreading. Meanwhile, large abscesses developed in both arm and hand, dangerous hæmorrhage took place, while I had continuous fever for over a fortnight. I got no rest whatever without opiates. About the 9th January danger of serious consequences was greatly reduced and I began to mend. After five weeks at Urfa, during which it had been necessary to administer chloroform to me over a dozen times, it was decided to send me to Aleppo, as the German doctors were going on leave to Europe.

On reaching Aleppo it was found that my left hand was in a very bad condition, and I was subjected to an operation that lasted two hours. The hand was full of

smashed and decayed bone, which the Urfa doctors had been unable to locate owing to the inflammation. After this operation I suffered great pain for four weeks, and obtained no rest except by aid of opiates. At the end of March I was subjected to a minor operation, lasting twenty minutes.

My present condition is that the bone and wounds in the right arm are mended, but the skin nerves of three fingers are destroyed, permanently or not cannot be said at present, tendons of the thumb are damaged so that it is almost useless, while tendons of the other fingers are tied in the healed wound, leaving the fingers stiff and with limited play. Another operation will be necessary, but whether or not it will benefit the hand cannot yet be said. I can write with some difficulty, but the value of the hand can be gauged by the fact that the tieing of a button is completely out of my power.

Regarding my left hand, the first finger has been amputated; the second remains, but is quite useless, as the bone of two joints is gone, the finger being left only as an ornament to the hand. Tendons of third finger are tied in the healed wound. All fingers are absolutely stiff. There is still a deep wound in the hand, which continues to suppurate freely. The hand is, of course, quite useless, and has to be carried in a sling.

Since my writing the above, another abscess has appeared in my left hand, which will delay the healing of the wounds for ten days, if it does not have more serious consequences.

Inclosure 2 in No. 45.

Consul Longworth to Mr. D. Fraser.

(No. 177.)

Aleppo, April 11, 1908.

Dear Sir,

I HAVE received your letter of yesterday's date inquiring whether anything can be done by this Consulate to obtain for you such compensation as you believe is usually given to travellers robbed and attacked in Turkey.

In view of the fact that you were travelling without escort on an unfrequented and unguarded road between Harran and Ras-el-Ain, I doubt greatly whether the Ottoman authorities can well be held responsible for the murderous assault and serious injuries sustained by you at the hands of a nomad Arab, named Muannek, now in prison at Aleppo.

The circumstances of the attack, moreover, so far has hitherto ascertained, in no way establishes the fact that any Government Agent foresaw, permitted, or instigated the assault upon your person. Unless therefore evidence to that effect be obtained, it will be difficult for me to advance officially your claim without being so instructed by the Foreign Office or His Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople.

I am, &c.

(Signed) H. Z. LONGWORTH.

[14649]

No. 46.

Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received April 29.)

3, *Sutter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London,*
April 27, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your information, a report, dated the 4th April, from our agent in Bussorah regarding the attack on P.S. "Blosse Lynch."

The information furnished by our agent strongly confirms the representations we have made to you regarding the danger to which our fleet is exposed, and the probability, almost certainty, of further attacks unless those responsible for the present outbreak are adequately punished.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. W. MACLEAN, *Secretary.*

Inclosure in No. 46.

Extract of Letter from Messrs. Lynch Brothers, Bussorah, dated April 4, 1908.

CAPTAIN MACONAGHY, of the Bagdad Residency, Mr. and Mrs. Cree, and Agha Hussein, all British subjects, were passengers by the P.S. "Blosse Lynch," and the captain, three officers, and two engineers were British subjects also. The native passengers carried that trip numbered 239 persons, and the native crew 46.

We understand that Nizam Pasha, who has authority to act without reference to Constantinople, and is at present in Amarah, has been redistributing the Government properties which are annually rented by the Arab Sheikhs around Amarah, and a large tract formerly rented by Sheikh Ghudban has been handed over to Sheikh Nefeesi. Nizam Pasha appears to have acted without reference to or advice from the local authorities at Bussorah.

This redistribution was decided on on the 1st instant, and the "Blosse Lynch" was attacked on the 2nd instant.

It was exceedingly fortunate that a Turkish encampment and the gun-boat "Aloos" was only forty minutes' steaming from the point where the firing first commenced, otherwise the Arabs would have followed the "Blosse Lynch" by cutting across bends, and would probably have succeeded in capturing the ship. All the woodwork on the starboard side of the "Blosse Lynch" is riddled with bullet-holes.

Captain Maconaghy speaks most highly of the conduct of Captain Cowley and his officers at such a critical and trying time.

The two European engineers stood by their engines while the firing lasted, although many shots passed through the engine-room, very fortunately without touching the main steam-pipe.

We consider a great mistake is being made by our Government in treating these disturbances as if the Turks are governing the country. They have no real power outside the principal towns, and keep up a semblance of authority only by siding with the most powerful local Sheikh upon all questions which are likely to be disputed by the weaker party.

When the Sheikhs have some combination among them, as in the case of the Muntifik Arabs, they pay no taxes whatever, and the Turks discreetly leave them alone.

The attacks on our steamers are undoubtedly made to secure British intervention, either directly or indirectly. No doubt it will be indirect in the present instance, as the representations of the Embassy at Constantinople will result in Nizam Pasha receiving instructions to restore the *status quo.*

Unfortunately this is no remedy, as the danger will inevitably recur now the Arabs have grasped the fact that any pressure brought to bear upon them by the Turks can be released by attacking one of the British steamers.

If it is a recognized fact that it is impossible to quell these disturbances by force, then we consider the least our Government can do is to see that our steamers are properly guarded against the possibility of attack.

We have asked for the services of the "Comet" because she has two machine guns, and a small field gun to fire shrapnel, together with a few trained men, could be obtained to supplement her crew from one of the Persian Gulf squadron.

If this were arranged, we consider the danger from attack would be greatly lessened, as the "Aloos" has no modern guns on board except rifles, and is of little use for practical purposes.

[14687]

No. 47.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 29.)

Sir,

India Office, April 29, 1908.

IN reply to your letter of the 23rd instant as to Abu Musa Island, I am directed to inclose copy of a telegram from the Viceroy on the subject,* and the draft of a

* Printed elsewhere.

telegram which, subject to the concurrence of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Secretary Morley proposes to send in reply."

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[14687] No. 48.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 30, 1908.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th instant, relative to the question of the red oxide mines in Abu Musa Island.

I am to inform you in reply that Sir E. Grey concurs in the terms of the telegram which Mr. Secretary Morley proposes to address to the Viceroy in reply to his Excellency's telegram of the 24th April on this subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[14866] No. 49.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 1.)

Sir, *India Office, April* 30, 1908.

IN reply to your letter dated the 15th April, 1908, as to the ill-treatment of a Bahreini at Lingah, I am to say that Mr. Secretary Morley concurs in the view of Secretary Sir E. Grey that an act of reparation and justice to the injured man would constitute in itself a recognition of the right of His Majesty's Government to protect Bahreinese subjects, and that, if the claim of the Persian Government to the ownership of the Island of Bahrein be not reiterated in their amended note, there will be no need to effect or to threaten the occupation of an island in the Persian Gulf.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[14853] No. 50.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 1.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 30th April, relative to the appointment of an Italian Consular Representative at Muscat.

India Office, April 30, 1908.

Inclosure in No. 50.

Government of India to Mr. Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April* 30, 1908.

YOUR telegram dated the 8th April. Italian Consular Representative at Muscat.

Resident in Persian Gulf telegraphed on the 20th April as follows:—

"Italian Representative at Muscat. See telegram dated the 18th instant from Political Agent, Muscat.

"No adequate grounds for acceptance of Consul or for Commercial Treaty with Italy appear to exist. How will Sultan be able to refuse to accept Russian or German

* Printed elsewhere.

if we now advise him to consent? Object aimed at would be much more likely to be effected by trusted and secret native Agent. I would suggest that, at any rate pending completion of Arms Conference, we should get matter delayed."

We agree with suggestion made in Resident's last sentence, as result of Conference may be that Muscat will cease to be emporium of arms. For reasons given by Resident we also agree that it is desirable that Italian Government should be induced to substitute native news-agent for Consular officer.

[14938] No. 51.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 113.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, May* 1, 1908.

PROTECTION of subjects of Trucial Chiefs and of Bahreinis. My telegrams Nos. 95 and 96 of 11th April.

According to report from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire, Deputy Governor of Lingah recently took off mail steamer five subjects of Shargah and imprisoned them without reference to the Residency Agent.

The question of our right to protect the subjects of Trucial Chiefs might, I think, advantageously be settled at the same time as the question of protection of Bahreinis; but, unless we show determination, there is reason to think that the Persian Government is inclined to be stiff-necked about Bahreinis.

[15111] No. 52.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 101.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, May* 2, 1908.

HAVING read in the Confidential Print Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 74 of the 22nd April, I inquired of His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum whether he could see any signs of mobilization on the scale alluded to by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and I have just received his reply to the effect that there appears to be no such mobilization.

[15123] No. 53.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 115.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, May* 2, 1908.

MY telegram No. 113 of the 1st instant.

Following telegram received from His Majesty's Consul-General, Bushire:—

"Present Deputy at Lingah will be removed, and Governor will send a man by next Lingah boat to replace him.

"With regard to the case of Shargah subjects, the Governor promises that on the return of his Deputy he will take severe notice of his conduct. He says, on the other hand, that in regard to the Bahreini case he can do nothing. He is on no account to allow Bahreinis to be treated otherwise than as Persian subjects, and has received categorical instructions to this effect both before and since the present case arose. Same difficulties will, I fear, recur with increasing frequency, under circumstances explained in my telegram No. 275 of the 28th March, until we oblige the Persian Government to recede from this position by some public act of compulsion."

[15116] No. 54.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 116.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, May 2, 1908.*

PROTECTION of Bahreinis. My immediately preceding telegram and your telegram No. 92 of the 1st instant.

I have not been given an amended note, and the general question of the protection of Bahreinis remains practically unaltered, though we have succeeded in obtaining substantial justice in the Lingah case. Cox's view has my entire concurrence, and I would strongly urge that, if the Persian Government continues obstinate, coercive measures be taken.

(Repeated to Bushire and India.)

[14040] No. 55.

Foreign Office to Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 2, 1908.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge receipt of your two letters of the 8th and the 23rd April respectively relative to the attack recently made by Arabs on your P.S. "Blosse Lynch," and to inform you that copies of those communications have been forwarded to His Majesty's Minister at Constantinople.

In the former of those letters you ask His Majesty's Government to support a substantial claim for the pecuniary and moral damage sustained by your Company through this incident.

In reply, I am to inform you that such a claim is not sufficiently defined to allow of it being presented to the Ottoman Government.

Sir E. Grey would, therefore, desire that you should furnish a claim for some definite sum, estimated by your Board, for the loss sustained owing to the attack upon your vessel.

Upon receipt of this claim, Sir E. Grey will, if it appears to him to be reasonable, forward it to His Majesty's Minister at Constantinople, with instructions to present it to the Sublime Porte.

I am to take this opportunity to inform you that, from a despatch just received from Mr. Barclay, Sir E. Grey learns that, according to information furnished by the Grand Vizier, the punitive measures undertaken against the offending tribesmen have so far resulted in the death of six Arabs.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[15165] No. 56.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 214.)
Sir, *Pera, April 28, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 131 of the 11th instant, forwarding copies of two letters from the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company respecting the recent attack by Arabs upon their steamer the "Blosse Lynch" on the 2nd instant in the neighbourhood of Amara. I observe that the Company ask His Majesty's Government to support a substantial claim for pecuniary and moral damage.

There is no evidence so far as I know to support the Company's surmise that the attack was specially directed against a British ship; indeed, Mr. Consul Crow telegraphed on the 11th instant that a local sailing boat had been attacked and plundered above Amara on the 4th instant, nor was it only the running of British steamers which was interrupted, for at one time river traffic was entirely stopped.

The risks which, according to the Secretary to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, make it difficult to obtain officers are inseparable from the navigation of the Tigris, and the superior inducements which have to be offered to

them constitute an item of expenditure which I presume was not overlooked when the rates for freight were fixed.

The measures so promptly taken by the Turkish authorities to protect the Company's steamers, to restore security of navigation, and to punish the offending Arabs, leave no ground for any suspicion of connivance at, or toleration of, the attack on the part of the authorities.

In these circumstances, I venture to offer my opinion that the Company's claim for moral and pecuniary damage is a weak one. It would certainly be resented and strenuously resisted by the Ottoman Government, and as a deterrent for future attacks of the kind it would, in my opinion, be superfluous, the Turkish Government being already as anxious as the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to avoid such incidents.

I do not therefore propose to present a claim on the Company's behalf unless instructed to the contrary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[15170] No. 57.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 219.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 28, 1908.*

WITH reference to Mr. Consul-General Smith's telegram of the 22nd instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Colonel Surtees, Military Attaché to this Embassy, showing the absence of Turkish military activity on the Russian frontier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 57.

Colonel Surtees to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 15.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April 28, 1908.*

CERTAIN sensational telegrams having recently appeared in the British and foreign press relative to a supposed state of tension between Russia and Turkey, it is perhaps right that I should report that I have entirely failed to discover any foundation whatever for the idea so far as regards Turkey.

There is no evidence that Turkey has moved a single man in the direction of the Russian frontier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. CONYERS SURTEES, *Colonel,*
General Staff, Military Attaché.

[15174] No. 58.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 223.)
Sir, *Pera, April 28, 1908.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 167 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to report that it appears from a telegram received yesterday from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Van that the situation in that town is still far from satisfactory. The bazaar is still closed, and until business is resumed there is likely to be great want. Captain Dickson anticipates that some of the Armenians may open their shops after the Easter holidays, but, although he does not seem to fear further massacres, the Armenians are still frightened owing to rumours, which he is not able to substantiate, that a secret society has been formed by Bashi-Bozouks to murder them in the bazaar. The Vali informs him that further reinforcements of troops are expected to arrive at the end of this week, when he will take steps to punish the Armenians and the Bashi-Bozouks.

Captain Dickson adds that there are reports of Kurdish pillage and outrage in the neighbourhood.

I shall bring the substance of this telegram to the notice of the Grand Vizier, who informed me yesterday that 85 per cent. of the shops in the bazaar were already open, and I shall urge his Highness to see that when the necessary reinforcements have reached Van the Armenian revolutionaries are not the only persons to be punished, and that the Mussulmans responsible for the indiscriminate killing on the 23rd ultimo do not go free.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[15392] No. 59.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 230.)
Sir,

Pera, April 30, 1908.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 219 of the 28th instant on the subject of Turkish military preparations, I have the honour to transmit herewith two despatches from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum showing that such activity as there is there is connected with the reinforcement of the troops in the Vilayet of Van, and this will no doubt be the explanation given by the Ottoman Government to any question from the Russian Government in the sense of Sir A. Nicolson's telegram No. 74 of the 22nd instant.

On the other hand, as it is quite probable that a Russian invasion would come through Persian territory and the region round Van, the Russian Government may well, if such an invasion is in their minds, believe that the Turkish preparations are directed against them—defensively, if not aggressively.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 59.

Consul Shipley to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 17. Confidential.)
Sir,

Erzeroum, April 14, 1908.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 13 of the 30th ultimo, and to my telegrams of the 6th and 9th instant respectively, on the subject of recent military movements, I have the honour to report to you that the 1st (Baibourt) Battalion of Redifs of the 52nd Regiment left this town yesterday for Van with an effective of some 600 men. Further, the 2nd (Tortoum) Battalion of Redifs of the 51st Regiment and the 2nd (Izpir) Battalion, also of Redifs, of the 52nd Regiment are now in Erzeroum, and are, I understand, only awaiting the completion of the necessary approvisionment to be dispatched to the same destination.

I may add, in confirmation of my telegram of the 6th instant above referred to, that, though I have been carefully watching the situation, I have not been able to discover any sign of military activity having for its objective any other direction than Van. Reports, however, to which I alluded in my despatch No. 11 of the 23rd March last, are still current here of extensive movements of troops on the Russian side of the frontier, and I gathered from a conversation which I recently had with Ahmed Pasha, the Commandant of the Erzeroum garrison, that these reports were, in his opinion, not altogether without foundation, and that certain preparations were in fact being made, with what object, however, he was unable to say.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. S. SHIPLEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 59.

Consul Shipley to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 19.)
Sir,

Erzeroum, April 20, 1908.

IN my despatch No. 17 of the 14th instant, I had the honour to report to you that the 1st (Baibourt) Battalion of Redifs of the 52nd Regiment left Erzeroum for Van on the 13th instant. This, I find, was an error which I now beg to correct, the battalion leaving on that day being the 2nd (Tortoum) Battalion of Redifs of the 51st Regiment.

Among other departures of troops from Erzeroum for Van during the past week have been those of the Kizkin Battalion of Redifs, accompanied by Brigadier-General Djelal Pasha, and of the 1st (Baibourt) Battalion of the 52nd Regiment which left yesterday, having each an effective of about 600 men.

With regard to the Kizkin battalion above referred to, I should mention that it should not be confounded with the 2nd (Izpir) Battalion of the 52nd Regiment, which is still at Erzeroum. As far as my present information goes this Kizkin battalion is a new formation made up chiefly of men from that district, and is intended to take the place of the 4th (Karakilissé) Battalion of the 51st Regiment, the majority of the men of which, I am told, claimed exemption from service on account of their being already enrolled in the Hamidiés.

Up to date, therefore, the following four battalions have left for Van, viz.:—

1st Battalion regulars of the 25th Regiment.
2nd Battalion (Tortoum) Redifs of the 51st Regiment.
Kizkin Battalion of Redifs.
1st (Baibourt) Battalion of the 52nd Regiment.
With one battery of mountain guns.

The Izpir battalion, as above stated, is still at Erzeroum, and I hear that the 3rd (Gumushkhané) Battalion of the 52nd Regiment is shortly expected.

The Brigadier-General Djelal Pasha above alluded to was formerly "Commandant de Place" at Erzeroum, from which place he was sent to Sassoun during the troubles there in July and August of the year 1903. After a short period of service at Broussa he returned to Erzeroum and was sent to Bitlis about a year and a-half ago to serve on a military Commission with Emmer Djemil Pasha, Brigadier-General of Artillery. It is said here that he has been sent to Van to act in place of Lieutenant-General Mahmond Pasha. From such slight personal acquaintance as I have with him he does not strike me as possessing any exceptional ability, but Captain Dickson will possibly be in a position to give fuller information in this respect than myself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. S. SHIPLEY.

[15571] No. 60.

Memorandum communicated by Rifaat Bey, May 6, 1908.

L'AMBASSADEUR de Turquie a l'honneur d'informer son Excellence Sir Edward Grey que, d'après les renseignements fournis par le Gouverneur-Général du Vilayet de Bassorah, cinq fonctionnaires Britanniques, qui étaient arrivés à Koweit dernièrement à bord d'un bâtiment de guerre Anglais, s'étaient rendus à dos de chameau, et, escortés d'une trentaine d'individus appartenant à diverses tribus, au village d'Intaa, sis entre Koweit et Nedjed, où ils avaient logé chez le Cheikh Ibn Habib, et qu'ils y avaient procédé à une distribution d'armes et de cadeaux à quelques habitants. Le Consul Britannique à Bassorah, interpellé sur leur personnalité, a répondu qu'ils sont des fonctionnaires Anglais détachés pour servir dans les Indes.

Une telle pénétration des fonctionnaires Anglais à l'intérieur du Vilayet de Bassorah et la distribution des armes de leur part ne devant se faire, l'Ambassadeur de Turquie a pour instructions de son Gouvernement d'appeler, d'une manière toute amicale, l'attention de son Excellence sur les faits susmentionnés.

Ambassade Impériale de Turquie, Londres,
le 5 Mai, 1908.

[15589] No. 61.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 6.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 4th May, relative to the situation at Abu Musa.

A copy of the inclosure referred to by Major Cox is also sent. It will be observed that this is included in the papers relative to Abu Musa, sent in a separate communication of to-day's date.

A copy of the telegram has been sent to the Director of Military Operations and Director of Naval Intelligence.

India Office, May 6, 1908.

Inclosure 1 in No. 61.

Government of India to Mr. Morley.

(Telegraphic) P. *May 4, 1908.*

OUR telegram dated the 24th ultimo, Abu Musa Island. Resident, Persian Gulf, telegraphed the 29th ultimo as follows:—

1. "Loading carried out undisturbed by German steamer 'Louise.' Amount was removed which Hassan and Wönckhaus have mutually accepted as 1,810 tons, ship being unable to take whole quantity. They estimate as 400 tons the balance left on beach."

2. "See Inclosure 3 to my letter of the 21st ultimo. German ship hoisted Turkish flag at the fore on the 12th instant, while she was loading at Abu Musa Island in presence of Residency Agent. All knowledge of this was denied by dragoman of German Consulate when our Agent asked him what it meant. Individual who made similar inquiry was informed by Hassan and Abdullah that pirate ports and Abu Musa belonged to Turkish Government, and that the flag had therefore been hoisted although no Turkish official was on board. The 12th April was the only occasion on which flag was hoisted."

Letter from Resident cited in above telegram was forwarded with letter of 2n ultimo from Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, to Politica Secretary, Indin Office.

Inclosure 2 in No. 61.

Residency Agent, Lingah, to Major Cox.

(After compliments.) *March 6, 1908.*

I HAVE heard that Haji Hassan-bin-Someiyeh and Abdullah-bin-Hassan have remarked to a certain person that the German Wönckhaus is communicating with the Turkish Government in regard to the Abu Musa Island with a view that the Turkish Government may take their part in the matter.

Although this does not seem to be true, but in my opinion this report indicates (to the fact) that the staff of the Wönckhaus Company have supplied to the German Government certain information about the Oman ports and the Abu Musa Island, so that they (German Government) may instigate the Turkish Government to make some communications on this subject.

I have reported this to you, it being my duty to report such news as I may hear.

[16063] No. 63*.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 232.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May 2, 1908.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 720 of the 26th of November, 1907, respecting the situation at Diarbekir, I have the honour to transmit copy of a despatch from Mr. Heard reporting the result of the Commission of Inquiry sent there by the Turkish Government, which has been that Ibrahim Pasha has been exonerated and the Notables condemned but pardoned.

As you will see, Mr. Heard is anxious to pay a visit to Ibrahim Pasha, but I have told him that I do not consider such a visit desirable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 63*.

Vice-Consul Heard to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 13.)

Sir, *Diarbekir, April 8, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to confirm the information communicated in my despatch No. 11 of the 1st instant with regard to the telegram received here on the 30th March, conveying the Imperial decision on the report of Tal'at Pasha's Commission, with the following additional details.

The message was somewhat as follows:—

"Although the Council of Ministers has decided that the following Notables of Diarbekir—Pirinji, Oghlu Aarif (?Oghlu Nyazi); Jezirćli, Oghlu Aziz (and his brother); Haji Ibrahim; and Haji Jirjis, Oghlu Ghani, should be punished, yet, seeing that his Excellency Ibrahim Pasha has been exonerated, the Imperial clemency has been extended to them for this time."

This is a severe blow to the Notables. An additional sting is imparted by the omission of their titles of Bey and Effendi, and by the substitution of the word "Oghlu" for "Zadé" (son of), whereas Ibrahim Pasha is given his title of Excellency, and is not pardoned, but exonerated.

The reason for their pardon is not quite clear. It is perhaps thought that their presence here is useful as a counterpoise to the influence of Ibrahim Pasha, who might some day become inconveniently powerful. Possibly also their record for loyal anti-Christian sentiment, which has not diminished since the massacre of 1895, in which they took a leading part, has not been forgotten. (Ghani Bey, it may be mentioned, is not classed with the others in this connection.)

The discomfiture of his enemies cannot fail to enhance the prestige and influence of Ibrahim Pasha, tempered though it be by the quartering of troops in Sewerek and Veranshehir. It may be reasonably hoped that tranquillity may now continue to prevail south of the Karajadagh, as it has done more or less since the first unsuccessful demonstration of the Notables against Ibrahim Pasha, reported in Mr. A. Shipley's Nos. 26 and 27 of the 7th and 12th August, 1905. As I endeavoured to show in my despatch No. 13 of 17th July, 1907, Ibrahim Pasha, after having secured the adhesion of the Karagetchi and a section of the Shammar Arabs, became so powerful that his enemies began to grow afraid to attack him, and he thereafter entered on a period of more or less peaceful consolidation of his extensive dominions. That he has been able to restrain the warlike and predatory instincts of his vast and heterogeneous following to the extent that he has done argues a strength of character and intellect of a high order.

Most of the sweeping accusations recently brought against him either refer back to a period anterior to the era of peaceful development above alluded to, or are based on evidence which has not been clearly substantiated (see my despatch No. 5 of the 10th February). I must, however, admit that I am not in a position to say what has been the condition of the southern districts adjacent to those of his chief enemies the Anizé and Baraza during the last few years.

In my humble opinion, which will probably be shared by few people here, Ibrahim Pasha is a power which makes on the whole for peace and order over a large area of country formerly much disturbed, and his removal would no doubt bring about a conflict of warring elements which would throw the southern portion of the vilayet into a state of anarchy, lasting perhaps for years.

(Confidential.)

Should a favourable opportunity present itself, I would humbly suggest that I should pay him a visit and convey to him a friendly message from His Majesty's Embassy on the lines laid down in a despatch dated 20th September, 1907, from his late Excellency Sir Nicholas O'Conor. That such a message would tend still further to strengthen the friendly sentiments which the Pasha entertains towards England there can be little doubt.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. B. HEARD.

[14323] No. 62.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 169.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 7, 1908.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 202 of the 21st ultimo, respecting the outrages committed on Armenians in the Mutessariflik of Moush, by Kassim Bey of Khevner.

I approve your action in making repeated representations on the subject, and I request that you will continue to do what may be possible in order to secure the appointment of better officials to replace Kassim Bey and Safvet Pasha.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[15116] No. 63.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 7, 1908.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 30th ultimo, relative to the right of His Majesty's Government to afford protection to Bahreinis in Persia, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith decyphers of three telegrams from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran,* dealing with this matter and with the kindred question of similar rights claimed and exercised in respect of subjects of Trucial Chiefs.

With regard to the protection of Bahreinis, Mr. Secretary Morley will observe that His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire is strongly of opinion that, until the Persian Government are obliged by some public act of compulsion to recede from the position which they have adopted, cases similar to that at present under consideration are likely to recur with increasing frequency, a view which is supported by Mr. Marling.

I am to state that, for several reasons, it appears to Sir E. Grey to be inopportune to raise this question in its general aspect at the present moment, and that he is therefore disposed to avoid doing so unless the assertion by the Persian Government of their present pretention renders such a step inevitable.

He therefore proposes, in the first instance, to instruct Mr. Marling to press the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to send to him without further delay the amended note which his Excellency promised to address to him, and, if its terms are unobjectionable, to take no further action for the present.

Sir E. Grey considers that it need not be insisted that this note should recognize specifically the right of His Majesty's Government to protect Bahreinis, but that it will be sufficient if it contains no expression which can be understood as disputing that right.

In view, however, of the categorical instructions reported to have been sent by the Persian Government to the local authority at Bushire not to allow Bahreinis to be treated otherwise than as Persian subjects, Sir E. Grey thinks that it would be well that Mr. Marling should be instructed to state that, if any further case of this kind arises, His Majesty's Government will feel compelled to take steps to vindicate their position.

Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive an expression of Mr. Morley's views regarding these proposed instructions.

With reference to the question of the protection of the subjects of the Trucial Chiefs, I am to state that Sir Edward Grey is disposed to rest satisfied with the assurances given to Major Cox by the Governor at Bushire that he will take severe notice of the conduct of the Deputy Governor of Linga in the case of the five subjects of the Sheikh of Sharga, and I am to inquire whether Mr. Morley concurs in this view.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

---

* Nos. 51, 53, and 54.

[15761] No. 64.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 233.)

Sir, *Pera, May 3, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit copies of two despatches from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Van.

In the first of these despatches Captain Dickson gives a detailed account of the disorders which occurred in Van on the 23rd March last, and of the events of the next few days. Captain Dickson seems to have shown good judgment and resource in circumstances of peculiar difficulty, and I venture to hope that his action will be held to merit your approval.

In his despatch No. 10 Captain Dickson gives a résumé of recent events. I prefer not to comment on the somewhat unfortunate tone of this despatch further than to state that I am confident that the measures taken by the Porte on the representations of the three Embassies, lacking in energy though Captain Dickson seems to have thought them, were those best calculated to save the situation. These measures may be recapitulated as follows: The despatch of reinforcements to Van, the countermanding of the Hamidieh troops which had been summoned, the decoration of the Commander of the troops for his energy in arresting the massacres, and the menace formally conveyed to the agitators of the severest penalties if they did not at once desist.

The latest news from Van (see my despatch No. 223 of the 28th ultimo) shows that, though Captain Dickson does not anticipate further massacres, the position is still far from satisfactory, and one cannot but feel some anxiety as to what may occur when the authorities feel strong enough to proceed against those responsible for the disorders.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 64.

Vice-Consul Dickson to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 9.)

Sir, *Van, April 6, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to submit to you a detailed account of recent events in Van.

The fear I expressed in my No. 3 of the 9th February and my No. 4 of the 17th February, 1908, that an attempt on the part of the "fedai" to assassinate the traitor David would lead to further disturbances, has been realized in a manner even more serious than I anticipated, in that David has been killed and a massacre has resulted.

Ever since he turned informer and gave the information that led to the capture of the "fedai" ammunition on the 6th February, David had been made a sort of national hero among a certain clique of Turks in Van, a clique composed mostly of officers of gendarmerie and police and employés of the Courts of Justice. At the head of them were Istinaf Reissi, President of the Court of Appeal, the head Mudir of the post, and Ahmed Bey, the Commandant of Gendarmerie. These men have a very bad reputation in Van, and exert a very evil influence on the Vali, round whom they would appear to have formed a sort of "camarilla."

David was petted and almost worshipped, holding receptions every day, which were the fashionable rendezvous of Van. These people seemed to have gone quite mad in their adoration of this traitor, Ahmed Bey giving out right and left that if the "fedai" touch him the Turks would massacre all the Armenians in Van.

My colleagues and I, realizing the danger, tried our best to get the Vali to hide David, or to send him out of the way for the time being; but, while always agreeing with us verbally, he never acted on our recommendation. David, meantime, made a

practice of denouncing sundry of his old associates who came under his notice, and several arrests were made in consequence.

Towards the end of February I had an interview with the chiefs of the "fedai," viz., Aram, Serkis, Ishkhan, and a man known by the soubriquet of "the doctor." I put it to them that, without serving any good purpose to themselves, they were by their presence endangering the whole innocent population of Van, and counselled them to leave. They would not give me any assurance about this, and asserted that all the advice they had had from previous Consuls had turned out badly for them when acted on. I also warned them that, if they attempted to kill David, in the present state of Moslem feeling there would certainly be a massacre. They answered that it was the duty of the Government to prevent any such thing. I informed them that, if a massacre did come about thus, the blame would rest entirely with the "fedai," and that I should take care to inform my Embassy of this, so that they should have no mistaken sympathy.

Though the "fedais" refused me any definite pledge, I believe that my words had some effect on them, as I am informed that Aram, Ishkhan, and some twenty of the "sworn soldiers" left Van for Karchigan on the 18th March, before any disturbance took place, and that orders had been given by the Committee that for the present David was not to be assassinated.

Hence it would appear that his assassination, which took place on the 23rd March, was not performed at the orders of the "fedai" Committee, though there is no doubt that it was a result of their previous instigation.

The actual murderer is a youth of 17, named Dadjat Tirlamasian, an "enrolled member," but not a "sworn soldier" of the "fedai," and by profession an ironworker's apprentice in Van. I am informed that he asked Aram (the chief of the "fedai" Committee) for permission to go and kill David.

This was refused him, and he was forbidden to entertain the idea, yet he made up his mind notwithstanding to perform the act by himself. From a cross-examination of some twenty-four survivors of the massacre, all of whom were witnesses of one episode or another in it, I have gained the following story:—

On the 23rd March, at about 4·30 P.M., Tirlamasian was in a small Moslem bazaar in the garden town called Hamam Kapisi, near to the house of Ahmed Bey, Commandant of Gendarmerie, in which David resided. Whether he was there by accident or was lying in wait for his intended victim, is not clear. David, who was standing in the bazaar with an officer of gendarmerie, named Haji Husni Effendi (his escort of two zaptiehs being present also), noticed Tirlamasian, and called him to come and speak to him. The two conversed for a few minutes, after which the youth pulled out a Browning pistol and fired three pistol shots at David, who fell. The assassin then made off up the main street, turning round every now and then and firing the pistol to keep off pursuers. After running about 200 yards he turned into some gardens and so escaped. The two zaptiehs in attendance, the Haji Husni, and a brother of his who was present, made a half-hearted attempt to follow and catch the murderer, the zaptiehs firing their rifles, but ineffectually, killing only an old woman in the street. Immediately that the first shot was fired and David fell, the Armenian shop-keepers in the bazaar (of whom there were a few only), started shutting their shops, which is the work of a couple of minutes. They were attacked by the Turks while doing this, and only two Armenians of all that were within 200 yards of the spot seem to have escaped. Of these, one lies badly wounded in the American hospital, the other found a refuge in the house of a friendly Turk, whose door was next his shop.

It appears that Haji Husni Effendi lost his head, and shouted out "Kill all the Armenians!" The zaptiehs, of whom some five were there, repeated the cry, and Ahmed Bey, who then arrived and heard that David was shot, also lost his head, and shouting "Kill all; they are all 'fedais,'" jumped into a cab and hurried to the city, carrying the news. It being evening, the Armenians were just commencing to return from the city to their homes in the Armenian quarter of the garden town. There are two roads from the city to the "gardens," the main road, which passes through Hamam Kapisi, and the Arak road, which passes by the military school. Each of these is about 4 miles long, and the houses and quarters along them are Moslem. Thus the Armenians, in getting to and from their houses to the city, have to walk some 4 miles through Moslem quarters.

The news spread rapidly all down the main road to the town (being probably carried by Ahmed Bey), and at various points on the road, such as by the house of

Adosh Effendi and the mills, where a crowd of Mussulman idlers is usually to be found. Armenians returning to the city were attacked and killed by Moslems. As a rule, sticks, stones, and khanjars were the instruments used, fire-arms being employed in only a very few cases, and it is a curious fact that all the corpses were immediately hidden in gardens and houses. Several individual Armenians escaped by flight, some returning to the city, and some being sheltered in Mussulman houses on the road. Several fugitives tried to take shelter in the Vali's house, and in the post of zaptiehs by it, but were refused admittance in each case.

Those who applied to the Firek were more fortunate, as he, when he found out what was going on, took all who applied (some fifty) into his house, and himself came out into the road, and walked up to Hamam Kapisi, damning and cursing all the Turks, zaptiehs, Bashi-Bozouks, &c., everywhere dispersing them, and in fact, stopping what was fast becoming a very serious massacre. I have no hesitation in saying throughout the whole of these events the Firek, Mahmud Pasha, has been the one factor that has worked steadily for the upholding of order, and the prevention of a general massacre. If he had not, by his action on the evening of the 23rd, stopped the slaughter, and if he had been a weaker man, and had winked at the doings of the Bashi-Bozouks, I have no doubt that the Moslems would have finished off the larger part of the Armenian population of Van.

At the time of the assassination of David, my colleagues and I were together at the French Consulate. We immediately proceeded to the spot, and arrived at Hamam Kapisi at the same time as the Firek.

Between Hamam Kapisi and Hach Peghan were three corpses, which had not been removed, but by the time we reached Hamam Kapisi all had been hidden, though traces of blood remained in several places.

We walked down to the Firek's house with him, and heard from him that he believed there were not more than thirty-six killed (*i.e.*, in that immediate neighbourhood), and that he had sent for troops to patrol the roads.

These presently arrived, and were set to work, besides serving as patrols, in dispersing the crowds and escorting groups of frightened Armenians to their quarters.

These precautions, though they stopped the massacre from becoming general, did not prevent many individual murders, as the Bashi-Bozouks stood in small groups at street corners, posing as inoffensive loungers when the soldiers passed, and becoming formidable again as soon as any Armenians appeared. After dark, the patrols returned to the barracks.

Our interview with the Firek had left us with the impression that the outbreak had been of a merely local character, and was finished; nevertheless, my colleagues and I decided to ride round the town and see that all was well.

I had returned to my house for a horse, when firing broke out in the direction of Arak Church; riding quietly down thither, I found, on arriving at the Arak Bazaar, that it was deserted, except for a few weeping women, who said that a massacre was going on in the city road. Hearing shots, I galloped off in that direction, and saw some eight or ten armed young men on the road, who, at the sight of me, made off across the fields to the southern bank of the stream and the Moslem quarter of Shabania. Cantering round, I intercepted them as they joined some groups of Turks (nearly all young men), who were armed, all of them with khanjars, and many with rifles and cartridges which had very much the appearance of "regulation" weapons lent for the occasion.

Here I stopped and tried to question one particular man, armed with a rifle and two bandoliers, whom I had noticed in the Armenian quarter. Though he was in Turkish civilian dress, he declared himself a soldier; on my asking him to what battalion he belonged, he ran away; a Redif, whom I mistook for a sentry, refused to stop him, and the crowd of Turks became very menacing. Their leaders being two men named Tewfik and Our Ogli Omar, whom I shall have occasion to mention again. I talked quietly to these men, and heard from an Armenian a little later that the young man I had first stopped was a certain Haji Bekr Ogli, the leader of the Bashi-Bozouks of the quarter, and the most incorrigible character in Van.

Riding on through the outlying Armenian quarter of Clordar, I found that the inhabitants as a rule had fled, and that the remainder—women for the most part—were in a state of panic, and exaggerated the number of their killed. There was no visible signs of Bashi-Bozouks being in the quarter at the moment.

By the time I got back to the Arak road and thence went on towards the city, nearly all the corpses had been hidden; I saw four, however, at one spot near the military school, which were being removed by Bashi-Bozouks and zaptiehs; all four had been

stripped naked. It was then quite dark, so there may very possibly have been others that I did not see.

As a matter of fact, the news of David's assassination seems to have taken about about half-an-hour to travel from Hamam Kapisi to Arak and Shabania. Hearing that the massacre had actually begun at the former place the Bashi-Bozouks of Shabania (the most fanatical and rowdy quarter of Van), who were instigated by their Muttar Our Ogli Omar, and headed by Haji Bekr Ogli and Kuchuk Agha Zadi Raif, came across to the city–Arak road, and waylaid the groups of Armenians returning by that route. Small parties of Bashi-Bozouks similarly waylaid the Armenians at the house of Sabujian, the house of Yerim Batman, and the military school, and parties of Armenians were killed at each place. Some ran back to the city and escaped; others left the road, taking to the fields towards Shabania (of these latter, the band under Haji Bekr Ogli killed a good many), and several were sheltered by Turks in their houses.

At the military school was a party of soldiers, who took no part in the slaughter, though they looked on without interfering. Tahir Bey, Colonel of the cavalry, whose is next the military school, rescued some seventeen Armenians, and sent eight soldiers to escort them to their quarter.

When this party arrived at the house of Sabujian, the Bashi-Bozouks told the soldiers that it was impossible for them to go any further, as the Armenians would kill them; the soldiers turned back accordingly, and the Bashi-Bozouks then attacked the Armenians; three were killed, and the others escaped into their quarter, the soldiers apparently making no attempt to stop this proceeding.

This state of affairs went on all night, the stray Armenians who had hidden coming out and trying to sneak home, and being waylaid and killed at street corners by individual Bashi-Bozouks. My Russian colleague saw two men killed under his eyes, and rescued two others, on the main road, after dark. Many Armenians, however, were sheltered by Turks, particularly by officers, in their own houses.

The redifs, of whom about 1,000 were billeted in the town, under no control from their officers, seemed inclined to make common cause with the Bashi-Bozouks against the Armenians. This was natural, as they are mostly Kurds, and men of low stamp and bad record, from the districts of Vostan and Karchikan; the Nizam troops, on the other hand, behaved well, and took no part in the massacre.

On the 24th March I rode early in the morning to Clordar, where I found many Armenians menaced by the Shabania Bashi-Bozouks. I had asked the Vali to send troops to protect this isolated quarter, but none were there. Panic of course was general in all Armenian quarters, but things remained outwardly peaceful. In the city, about 500 Armenians had remained all night in the bazaar, and I requested the Vali to order an escort to conduct these people to their homes. This the Firek himself undertook to do, and the Mukhtars of the Armenians was ordered to collect the men, but it was actually done by the French and Russian Consuls before the escort arrived. They conveyed these people to their own homes. In all the Armenian quarters of the town the general unrest was evidenced by the men gathering in crowds at the street corners and market places, there keeping up one another's fears by constant talk, being convinced that a general massacre was intended. It is noteworthy that during the massacre itself, and during all the days of strained suspense that followed it, the Armenians have made not a single attempt at resistance, and the "fedais" have made no appearance, either in person or in counsel.

Meeting my two colleagues we went together to the Vali, and presented to him the following demands for the immediate protection of the menaced inhabitants of the Christian and "mixed" quarters:—

1. That posts of soldiers should be immediately stationed at Arak, Clordar (Kharaba Mahalasi), Norshen, Hakavank, and the bazaar; each post to be under the command of an officer, who should be responsible for the tranquillity of the quarter in his charge.

2. That the men responsible for the massacre should be arrested, particularly Mahmud, son of Haji Bekr, the leader of the Bashi-Bozouks in the Shabania quarter, and Kiamil, formerly a colji of the Régie at Erzingan.

That the Mustantik, Tewfik Effendi, of Shabania, should be reprimanded.

3. That the assembly of Bashi-Bozouks (particularly at Hamam Kapisi), and their entry into the Christian quarters, should be put a stop to.

4. That all assistance and facilities needful should be given to those who had been trying to discover missing friends.

5. That attention should be paid to the fact that we had no confidence in the

police; or zaptiehs, in that they had not made any effort to prevent, and had even taken part in and instigated, the massacre of the 23rd.

6. That search should be made for the bodies of the dead.

In reply, the Vali readily promised to execute Article 1 (posting of troops), and this was done by the following morning. As regards 2, arrest of Turkish agitators, and 3, dispersal of Bashi-Bozouks, his Excellency promised to carry them out, but declared his inability to do so immediately, owing to the excitement existing among the Mussulmans. Article 4 he accepted, and this was carried out in a half-hearted way; 5, dealing with the untrustworthiness of the police and gendarmerie, caused him, he declared, great astonishment; little was done in the matter of 6, and not one single corpse was found, though on private investigation I have been informed where many were buried by Bashi-Bozouks.

As one of my own servants (my cook) was among the missing, I sent my dragoman in the course of the morning to ask the Vali and Commandant of Gendarmerie to accord facilities for the recovery of his body. They did not admit that he was dead, and placed every obstacle in the way of search. He was killed just outside the house of the Commandant of Gendarmerie, and from information since received I believe that his body was at the moment in that official's garden.

At my request Drs. Ussher and Raynolds, of the American Mission, compiled a "nominal roll" of the dead and missing in some of the quarters. These amounted to 33 killed, 6 wounded, and 20 missing. A revised list, of which I inclose a copy,* gives—killed, 42; wounded, 6; missing, 29. This does not include villagers who may have been in Van.

In the evening a rumour reached me from a Turkish source that the Bashi-Bozouks and Redifs of Clordar were planning an attack on the Armenians. On my informing the Vali and Firek, ample precautions were taken, and the attempt was frustrated.

On the morning of 25th March the situation appeared decidedly less grave, though the presence of a number of beggars at the various Consulates warned us that if the tension were prolonged starvation would soon be felt in that portion of the populace that lives "from hand to mouth," particularly as the stores of wheat are all in the city and the Moslem quarters, and many of the bakeries were being closed for want of flour.

Towards noon the barometer inclined again to "stormy"; a messenger from the Vali informed me that an attack of the Armenian "fedai" on the Moslems was expected at noon (*6 à la Turque*), and that all precautions had been taken for its repulse. The origin of this rumour seems to have been the fact that a large, but perfectly peaceful, meeting of Armenians had been held in Norshen to discuss the sending of a telegram to the Sultan.

The Vali stated further that, while this menacing attitude of the Armenians continued—for he heard that the "fedai" had taken up positions for the defence of their quarter—he could order no arrests of Moslems, and that he must request that no foreigners should enter the Mussulman districts. When things were quieter he would take measures to punish the "fedai" and to pursue the instigators of the massacre. The Vali's messenger also added that the condition of David (whose wounds had been reported as slight) was, in fact, extremely critical, and that a menacing crowd had gathered at Hamam Kapisi. Owing perhaps to the inclemency of the weather, this soon dispersed, but disquieting rumours continued to circulate, and the authorities of the German and American missions came to ask advice on the reception of refugees into their houses. Many Turks resident in the Armenian quarter left it for other places in more or less of fear.

On the 26th March I met the Notables of the Armenians at the American mission to discuss the feeding of the poorer Armenians. In the course of our discussion I pointed out that, from the Turkish point of view, the massacre of the 23rd March was only reasonable retaliation of the "fedai" outbreak of the 6th February, and that the Mussulmans claimed that the Armenians who killed Turks should be punished before the case of Turks who killed Armenians should be considered. The Notables urging that they were not responsible for the action of the "fedais," I rejoined that so long as the "fedai" were sheltered by all Armenians, it was impossible for the Turks to draw any distinction between them. The Notables then admitted that though, at the request of the Vali, they had persuaded most of the "fedai" to leave Van after the events of the 6th February (see p. 2), yet now they were grateful for the protection that their presence affords.

* Not printed.

This last statement I believe to contain some truth; it is the imagined presence of the "fedai" coupled with the apathy of the Nizam troops, that has prevented the Bashi-Bozouks from making an attack on the Armenian quarters.

Even these better educated Armenians have the idea that in their present struggle with the Turk they are entitled to rights analogous to those of a belligerent Power. They hold, that is (and this in all good faith), that the "fedai" are in the position of an Armenian army engaged in war with the Ottoman Empire, and therefore, though the Turks have a right to use force against avowed "fedais" (even this is barely acknowledged by some), they have no such right to molest "civilian" Armenians, no matter what assistance in the way of shelter, information, &c., the last may give to the "active army."

This absolutely ridiculous idea was propounded to me also by the "fedai" leaders during my interviews with them, and it is probably from them that the others have imbibed it. Of course, I pointed out to them that the "Societies" are not an independent Power, but, at best, rebels against a recognized Government, and that no Government would admit that sheltering rebels and conspirators was anything but a criminal offence. Further, I urged that on their own showing the "fedais" were breaking the laws of civilized warfare, in that they wore no uniform, and pass whenever possible, as peaceful citizens. Naturally, my arguments quite failed to convince them.

After again impressing on the Notables the immensity of the obstacles which the attitude of the "fedai" and of the mass of Armenians in sheltering them, put in the way of a peaceful solution of the difficulty, I turned to the discussion of the problem I wished to put before them, viz., the provision of food for the poorer Armenians during the continuance of the tension.

As it was estimated that there was not more than twenty-four hours' food then remaining in the Armenian quarter, I promised to see the Vali, and to endeavour to get him to arrange facilities for buying and transporting corn.

Returning to the Consulate, I heard the disquieting news that David was dying, and that in consequence Ahmed Bey and his clique were openly threatening massacre. Meeting my colleagues for discussion in view of a situation that we all admitted to be serious, we dispatched a joint note to the Vali urging energetic action, and the arrest of certain instigators of massacre. It was at this time that I dispatched my second telegram to your Excellency, reporting the gravity of the situation owing to the critical condition of David and the evil influence of the Turkish Notables, and urging the need of Imperial support for the Vali.

Late in the evening David died, but owing to the firm attitude of the troops, and the inclemency of the weather and the time of night, nothing outrageous took place, though a few isolated murders occurred in outlying quarters.

During the evening information reached me from a prominent Mussulman tending to show that the Vali was being kept in ignorance of the real facts of the situation by his surroundings.

Two cliques in particular are said to be exerting an evil influence on him, though not on the Firek, viz., the "Hamam Kapisi clique," of whom the chiefs are Istinef Reissi, Ahmed Bey, and the Bash-Mudir of the post, and the Shabania clique, led by Tewfik Effendi and Ouc Ogli Omar, the latter of whom has some local fame as a smuggler of tobacco.

Among the Turks, says my informant, the general feeling is against the massacre, and they would rejoice at a return of tranquillity and a recommencement of business.

These complain of the "weak and unenergetic" policy of the Vali; the Bashi-Bozouks are hardly 5 per cent. of the population, though many Redifs sympathize with them.

They have made attempts to gain influence with the regular troops and with the peaceable Turks of Shamiram Alti, but failed, many Armenians during the massacre finding a refuge in the latter district.

This independent information bears out the conclusions to which I had already come independently, viz.:—

1. That the Turks were by no means unanimous for a general massacre.

2. That if the instigators from the Hamam Kapisi and Shabania cliques (who for the most part are employés of the Government, and not natives of Van) were punished or sent away, the majority of the Turks would be satisfied, as what they wanted was peace.

3. That without the aid of troops or other reinforcements the Bashi-Bozouks would be kept by the fear of the "fedais" from any attack on Armenian quarters.

4. That the troops would be firm if no unforeseen event, *e.g.*, killing of Mussulmans by "fedais," should occur to rouse them.

5. That this firmness of the troops rose more from apathy than any lively desire to protect Armenians, and that they could not be relied upon to resist the Bashi-Bozouks even if ordered to do so.

6. That the Bashi-Bozouks were capable of evolving some incident in such a manner as to involve the troops and secure their support.

7. That the Vali was weak and timid, and imagined the Bashi-Bozouk party to be much stronger than was in fact the case; hence he was afraid to take any measures against them, particularly as the two cliques mentioned formed a sort of Camarilla round him.

The Vali was in a pitiable state of nervousness, not sleeping at all, pacing up and down in front of his house all the night, and tending to put himself almost entirely in the hands of the Camarilla.

The 27th March saw no new development of the situation. My colleagues and I met and decided that, until we should receive news from Constantinople, we could take no further collective steps, but that I should see the Vali unofficially and urge upon him the need of a provision of corn for the Armenian quarter. I was also to express our opinion to him on the matter of the Camarilla by whom he had allowed himself to be surrounded, and to request him to withdraw his prohibition of the entry of Europeans into the Mussulman districts so far as to allow Dr. Ussher of the American Mission to visit his patients.

The Vali, who imagined I had come with an ultimatum, received me with great nervousness, and I explained to him that the clique in whose hands he is, and whose names I append, do not represent the feelings of the mass of the Turkish population.*

I endeavoured to show him that the Turks generally do not desire a massacre, but peace and open markets, and he pointed out that many fugitive Armenians had been sheltered by Turks, and that almost all of those killed had met their deaths at the hands of the servants and adherents of the Camarilla. The two cliques, having their head-quarters at the two points (Hamam Kapisi and Shabania), where most of the murders had taken place, had instigated almost all the disorder.

The Vali argued that no Camarilla existed, and that while no Turk desired massacre, they all desired the punishment of the Fedais. He would endeavour, he declared, to force the organizers of the revolutionary movement to quit the country, so that Turk and Armenian could live in peace as of old; at the moment, however, Tirlamasian, the murderer of David, was sheltered with other assassins in the Armenian quarter, where the inhabitants were actually in arms against the Government.

His speech seemed to me to show that he was entirely in the hands of the Camarilla, and was being purposely misinformed by them.

With regard to the arrangements for obtaining corn for the Armenians, the Vali placed every obstacle in the way, saying that it was not his duty to provide corn for feeding revolutionaries, that innocent Armenians had all the corn they required, and that the wheat in the Agricultural Bank was not intended for such a purpose, &c. After a long discussion, he agreed to my arrangement, "if it could be managed," and promised to let me know. It was, however, two days before he vouchsafed me any definite answer.

He assured me that orders had been sent to all outlying districts for the Kurds to keep quiet, and that outside the town there was no disturbance. I reminded him of the necessity of protecting the villages, especially at the present moment, the season of ploughing and sowing, if he wished to avoid the great danger of famine.

From the Vali I went to the Firek, who was loud in his complaints of the Camarilla, their influence on the Vali, and the weakness of the Vali himself.

* Names of Camarilla.

Hamam Kapisi clique (illegible)

Ishak Effendi.
Ahmed Bey and his brother.
Haji Hilmi and his brother.
The Bash-Mudir of the post.
Medenah Mahmoud.
Rizvan Zadi Sadik.
Rizvan Zadi Abderrahman.
Hussein Bek Zadi.
Hadji Izzet.

Shabania clique.

Mustantik Tewfik Effendi.
Our Ogli Omar.
Hâji Bekr Ogli Mahmud.
Kuchuk Agha Zadi Rajil.

The Camarilla, said the Firek, opposed him, because he had striven to protect the Armenians, and were even attempting to excite the soldiers against him, by withholding their pay. They were also, by means of false information, inciting the Vali to adopt their oppressive policy. The Firek further declared that he was standing alone against the Vali and the Camarilla, the latter of whom were also sending false reports to Constantinople. The Sultan, he assured me, never ordered any oppression of Armenians, but was misinformed, the Camarilla identifying all Armenians with "fedais."

Recently, Kiamil Effendi, Mudir of Archag, a supporter of the Camarilla, had been repeatedly telegraphing to him to send troops for the punishment of the Armenians in that district, but he had always refused to send them.

That day, when sending Redifs to Bashkala, he had given the officer in command instructions to investigate the state of affairs, and report to him. He (the Firek) asked me if I could arrange to investigate this matter, and I promised to do so, despatching three men that night to inquire.

The Firek declared that if he had a free hand, he would at once arrest several members of the Camarilla, and more particularly take steps against Istinef Reissi.

Meanwhile, petty slanders against Armenians, all intended to provide an excuse for a general attack on them, continued to circulate, *e.g.*, it was falsely reported that two Mussulmans, going to grind corn at the suburban village of Koribash, had been robbed and chased by Armenians of the village, and that a "tzigane" (gipsy) had been murdered by an Armenian in the bazaar.

The only acts of violence perpetrated during the day were the wounding of an Armenian woman, who was carrying food from the Armenian quarter to the prison, and the murder of two Armenians in Clordar. Several desultory shots were fired during the night.

About this time, the impression steadily gained ground that the Vali was deceiving us, and was only waiting for the arrival of troops before ordering an attack on the Armenians, as he was telling the Camarilla to be patient, and wait, and he would get orders later to deliver a general attack on all "fedais." This idea was borne out by the telegram from the French Embassy, which stated that the Vali had received the necessary instructions "to re-establish order" and that "troops were to be sent for that purpose."

It was reported that this reinforcement was to be some regiments of Hamidieh, notorious for the part they played in the massacres of 1895.

On the same day, another attempt was made by the Bashi-Bozouks to advance from Clordar, but this was checked by the troops, who by this time were in occupation of the heads of all the roads leading into the Armenian quarter.

On the 28th March, the Vali informed me that there were 100 chuls of corn at a village some 7 miles away, and gave my cavass an escort to go out and buy it and bring it in. This was accomplished, though the work took two days, owing to the obstacles placed in his way by various officials.

The disquieting impression of the previous day was strengthened by various events during the passage of this one. Dr. Ussher, of the American Mission (who had gone to the Vali with a note from me, asking that he might be provided with safe-conduct to the city and other quarters to see his patients there), reported on his return that he had found the Vali at the Hukumet, surrounded by a crowd of some 1,000 Bashi-Bozouks, who were demanding rifles under pretext of self-defence, and declared further, that on his return, he met several of these gentry, carrying Government rifles; word was also brought that the members of the Camarilla had telegraphed on their own account to Constantinople, to the effect that if the Vali did not take the necessary measures against the Armenians they would do so themselves, and that they were using threats to the same purpose to the Vali. Even more formidable was the confirmation of the intelligence that Kiamil's Bey's regiment of Hamidieh (that of the Shivili ashiret) had been ordered to Van, and might shortly be expected to arrive.

Stories of sporadic cases of murder in outlying districts continued to come in, though by this time only a few Armenians remained outside the shelter of their own quarter. Five of the "sworn soldiers" of the "fedai" were reported to have left Van for the neighbouring villages of Sirki and Shusuntz, which were threatened by the Kurds, and I heard that Tirlamasian, whom the "fedai" chiefs had refused to recognize or protect, on account of his disobedience, was roaming the gardens alone.

Everything tended to show that the Vali (who was falling more and more under the dominion of the Camarilla) was coming to believe the assertion that all Armenians ought to be regarded as "fedai," and that he intended to take measures against them

as such as soon as he should have sufficient force at his command. Of course, the Bashi-Bozouks and other turbulent classes were looking forward to this as a time of licensed pillage and murder, not having any intention, for all their pretended zeal, of exposing themselves to any "fedai" bullets that they could reasonably avoid.

The Vali, misled by his *entourage*, had been sending garbled accounts of matters to Constantinople representing the affair as another "fedai" outrage, and concealing the culpability of the Bashi-Bozouks.

The only measures taken has been directed against Armenians, whose quarter of the garden city (Norshen), into which by this time all the Armenian inhabitants of Van had crowded, was practically surrounded by the troops, and its inhabitants were forbidden to quit it.

Outside Norshen there was absolutely no security for an Armenian, the Bashi-Bozouks circulating everywhere, and whereas they had been at first but a small percentage of the Mussulman population, the fanatical preaching of the agitators, and the false reports they spread of an intended attack by "fedais" on the true believers, gained them adherents steadily among the moderates. The firm attitude of the Firek, however (who maintained the fullest control of the troops) was a tower of strength, and he constituted the only encouraging feature of the situation. The "fedai" of all ranks had occupied tactical positions and were prepared for resistance, and the danger of absolute famine approached nearer.

On Sunday, the 29th March, M. Calvière, the French Consul, visited the Vali on our behalf, to ask him—

1. What means he proposed to take to insure tranquillity?
2. How long the state of siege, then existing, was to continue?
3. Was it a fact that the Hamidieh had been ordered to Van and arms distributed to the Bashi-Bozouks?
4. What steps would be taken to supply food to the Armenian quarter?

To (1) the Vali replied that it was his intention, as soon as order had been re-established and the bazaar opened, to arrest and punish the revolutionaries. That done, the Turks would be calmer, and he could punish the assassins and those who had instigated them.

To (2) he had summoned three Armenian Notables, and they had engaged to open the bazaar on the following day, under proper escort.

To (3) he admitted that Hamidieh had been summoned, but denied the distribution of arms to the Bashi-Bozouks.

To (4) he regretted the miscarriage of the arrangements made with me, and promised to provide corn from the Government stores.

As regards the first two Articles, it soon appeared that the Armenians had not understood them in the same sense as the Vali, as in the evening one of the Armenian representatives, Torzibashian by name, called on me on behalf of the others, and assured M. Calvière and myself that no one would venture to the bazaar till the instigators had been punished, and then only on a Consular guarantee of safety. When he asked our advice, we said that we had none to give; and when he asked us if we could give the guarantee sought, we replied that we must refer that matter to our Embassies.

The next day, in spite of their promises to the Vali, none of the three Armenians went to the city, one being ill in bed for the occasion. After consulting with my colleagues, we called several of the leading merchants, to see if the deputation of the preceding evening really represented the feelings of the Armenians, and they all unanimously protested, without even a question on our part, that no Armenian would go to the bazaar until the leading culprits had been punished and assurances given from the Consuls.

Having ascertained this, we called on the Vali to see if anything could be arranged.

On this occasion, we found the Vali in a much more reasonable and statesmanlike frame of mind than had been the case previously. His orders from Constantinople had now probably come to hand, and in the light of them he felt more free of the Camarilla (the evil character of whose influence we were soon to see he had come to understand), and more able to show his own character as a kindly and well-meaning, but not very strong, Turkish gentleman.

We asked him what measures he had taken for the opening of the bazaar, and he said that he had arranged it all with the Armenians, and was surprised that none of them had gone down to the city that day. We then told him what the Armenians had asked us, and tried to get him to give some sign of intention of punishing the assassins. This he said he could not do, and, in fact, that he could take no steps until the bazaar had been opened, though promising that the gendarmerie should secure the safety of the merchants, and that the "proper authority" should conduct "inquests" on the dead bodies and punish the guilty.

We pointed out that an inquest would smack of rather grim comic opera, when the corpses (having all been concealed by Government agents) were not forthcoming; when the equivalent of the coroner was the man who had himself instigated the crime, and the only witnesses available (other than the corpses of the victims) were the actual assassins. Further, we showed him that he was, in fact, proposing that the unhappy Armenians should be escorted to the bazaar by one chief promoter of the massacre, Ahmed Bey, and that the inquiry into the matter should be conducted by another, Istinef Reissi, and it was ridiculous to offer as a concession such terms as these. He put forward various pleas, *e.g.*, fear of what the Turks would say, the impropriety of proceeding in any way but by due form of law, &c.

Meantime, the general political situation had been improving; the wave of fanaticism which the murder of David had provoked was subsiding, and influences making for peace were regaining strength. Principal among these was the power of the Firek, now much increased by the news of the decoration that was to be conferred on him by the Sultan, news of which reached us on the 30th March.

Your Excellency's second telegram, informing us that reinforcements of regular troops were on the way, and that the Vali was only temporizing till they should arrive, also strengthened our hands by the assurance thus given that the Porte was accepting the account of events given by the Embassies, and not that of the Camarilla.

The fact that Hamidieh had been ordered to Van was a little ominous, all Armenians assuring us that their arrival would accentuate all the existing panic.

I had represented this to the Firek, but with little profit, for he was anxious to show that Hamidieh, properly officered, could observe military discipline.

However, by the 31st March, it may be said that the danger of attack on the Armenian quarter had for the time passed. Three problems remained:

1. The difficulty of restoring sufficient confidence to the Armenians to enable them to open the bazaar, particularly in the light of the expected arrival of Hamidieh.
2. The difficulty of providing food for the population in the interval that must elapse before the return of normal conditions.
3. And most important. The dangers brought about by the fact that when the reinforcements shall reach him, the Vali will feel bound to take active measures against the "fedai."

On the 1st April I had a long and very friendly interview with the Vali, who admitted that at least some high officials, notably Ahmed Bey and Haji Husni, had "acted imprudently," though he was still unable to realize the guilt of men like Istinef Reissi.

His absolute amazement at the number of the dead (about seventy) showed how little the Camarilla had allowed him to know of the real facts.

We then spoke of the future, and of the necessity, when the troops shall arive from Erzeroum, of searching the Armenian quarter, and arresting the "fedai," and also punishing the Moslem culprits.

1. I urged on him the advisability of not driving the Armenians to despair by attempting to arrest all (4,000 young men at least) who have been in any way compromised by the "fedai" propagandas, and pointed out how he might perform a courageous act of mercy and carry out a useful stroke of policy by proclaiming a free pardon for the bulk of the men who had brought themselves under the law, arresting or outlawing only known agitators.
2. I suggested that if at the same time permission was obtained from the Porte for Armenians to leave the country in search of work, this would ameliorate the appalling economic condition of the vilayet, and by so doing would destroy that discontent which gives strength to the revolutionary movement.
3. I also suggested that a better patrolling of the frontier, in conjunction with the Russian and Persian Governments, would in great measure prevent the smuggling of weapons into the province.
4. I urged the rigorous applications of Article 28 of Reforms *re* the carrying of arms.

The Vali expressed approval of the suggestions, particularly of 2, which he had been turning over in his mind for some time since we first suggested it to him.

We discussed the possibility of procuring the surrender of all or some of the rifles now in Van by the promise of a free pardon to those producing them. It is, however, doubtful if much will be effected in this direction.

On the 2nd April nothing of importance occurred. No Armenians went to the bazaar, in spite of a Proclamation ordering all to do so, on pain of being fined. On the 3rd (the bazaar still being unopened) I received your telegram informing me that the instigators of the massacre were to be reprimanded, but not giving me any instructions. I also heard that the "fedai" were counselling the Armenians not to open the bazaar.

Dr. Raynolds, of the American Mission, came and asked me if I would not give some advice on that point to the many Armenians who were asking him what the British Consul said upon the subject. I wrote him a letter (copy inclosed) to say that I was officially advised, and my personal opinion was, that the Vali and the Government were doing all in their power to protect the Armenians, and that my personal opinion was that the Armenians should go to the bazaar.

Shortly after this the Firek called on me, on behalf of the Provincial Government, to ask me to use my good offices in inducing the Armenians to open the bazaar. We had a long and interesting conversation about the various measures already suggested and taken to combat the revolutionary movement, and he quite agreed with me as to their advisability.

I asked him what measures he proposed taking against the "fedai" when the reinforcements arrived, and he said that he had not thought about it yet.

I hope that the ignorance which both he and the Vali assume as to their future plans does not mean that they have some evil end in view, as one idea is that some day, when the Armenians are in the bazaar, the troops will surround the whole Armenian quarter and ransack it, while detaining its owners in the city. This drastic measure might be possible in a civilized country, but with Turkish troops and officials it is not advisable.

I told the Firek of the letter that I had sent to Dr. Raynolds, and he approved very highly.

On the strength of this a few Armenians went to the bazaar on the next day (Saturday, 4th April), the road being carefully patrolled by regular troops. To-day (6th April) I am informed that many more are going.

The definite countermanding of the Hamidieh regiment, referred to above, will also have its effect in easing the situation, as it becomes known.

Your telegram of the 4th April, informing me on the authority of the Grand Vizier that the reinforcements of troops may be expected here "to-day," has come to hand; the troops have not arrived, and in light of the facts that they are being drawn from Erzeroum, and that the post is taking at present three weeks to travel from that city to Van, and that only one battalion of the six under orders has as yet even started, I hope that this statement of the Grand Vizier's is not to be taken as an index of the reliability of the information that he usually supplies to the Embassies.

We may now say that (barring the arising of a fresh cause of disturbance) this incident may be considered as closed. The question of the immediate future is, What action will be taken by the authorities against the Armenians when the expected reinforcements actually arrive and they feel free to act?

I have, &c.
(Signed) BERTRAM DICKSON,
Captain, R.F.A.

Inclosure 2 in No. 64.

Sketch Map of Van.

[Not reproduced.]

Inclosure 3 in No. 64.

Joint Note addressed by Consular Representatives to Vali of Van.

M. le Gouverneur-Général, *Van, le 24 Mars*, 1908.

NOUS venons d'apprendre à l'instant que des redifs, à l'insu de leurs officiers, ont décidé, d'accord avec les Bachi-Bozouks, d'attaquer et de massacrer, cette nuit même ou demain matin à l'aube, des Arméniens. Le signal serait donné par trois coups de fusils.

Bien que cette nouvelle ne soit qu'un simple bruit, nous avons jugé utile de la porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence. En conséquence, nous vous prions de vouloir bien faire surveiller le quartier de Haraba Mahalessi, qui, d'après nos renseignements, est le principal lieu de réunion des Bachi-Bozouks.

Nous avons porté ce qui précède à la connaissance de Ferik Pacha.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) P. CALVIÈRE, *Consul de France.*
R. TIÉRÉMIN, *Consul de Russie.*
B. DICKSON, *Consul d'Angleterre.*

P.S.—Prière de recommander sévèrement à l'officier responsable chargé de la surveillance du quartier d'Arack de veiller à ce que les boutiques situées sur le marché de ce nom ne soient pas pillées. Nous avons reçu des plaintes à ce sujet.

P. C.
R. T.
B. D.

Inclosure 4 in No. 64.

Joint Note addressed by Consular Representatives to Vali of Van.

M. le Gouverneur-Général, *Van, le 13 (26) Mars*, 1908.

EN présence de la gravité exceptionnelle de la situation, il est indispensable de prendre immédiatement des mesures sévères et énergiques en vue de réprimer les troubles de quelque côté qu'ils se produisent.

Dans l'intérêt de la tranquillité et de l'ordre, nous jugeons nécessaire d'arrêter sur-le-champ les personnes suivantes, qui sont connues comme agitateurs ou qui cherchent à provoquer et à amener des conflits sanglants: Mahmoud Hadji Bekir Oghlou, Kutchug Agha Zadé Raïf, Emner Effendi, et Tewfik Effendi, tous quatre de Chabania.

Nous jugeons également nécessaire, en faisant des réserves sur les mesures qu'il sera nécessaire de prendre dans l'avenir, de réprimander énergiquement à Istinef Reïssi et Hadji Husni, et de leur ordonner de se renfermer dans l'exercice strict de leurs fonctions et de ne pas continuer à encourager les fauteurs de désordre.

En outre, nous vous prions très instamment de télégraphier aux Caïmakans et Moudirs de villages de veiller à la protection, à la sécurité des habitants des villages et de faire donner des ordres en ce sens aux chefs des régiments de Hamidiés.

Nous tenons à remercier votre Excellence de ce qu'elle a bien voulu faire jusqu'à ce jour pour le maintien de la tranquillité publique, mais en ce moment nous jugeons que tout acte de faiblesse de sa part serait une faute et engagerait grandement sa responsabilité.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) P. CALVIÈRE, *Consul de France.*
R. TIÉRÉMIN, *Consul de Russie.*
B. DICKSON, *Consul d'Angleterre.*

Inclosure 5 in No. 64.

Vice-Consul Dickson to Dr. Raynolds.

Dear Dr. Raynolds, *Van, April 3*, 1908.

WITH respect to the various Armenians who have asked you to ask me whether they should go down and open the bazaar, I can only say that, officially, I am advised

and am of opinion that the Porte and the Vali are doing all in their power to protect the Armenians and restore tranquillity, while personally I am of opinion that the Armenians should open the bazaar.

Believe me, &c.
(Signed) BERTRAM DICKSON,
Captain, R.F.A.

Inclosure 6 in No. 64.

Vice-Consul Dickson to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 10.)

Sir, *Van, April* 6, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to submit a résumé of the recent events in Van.

Since the 6th February, when David, the Armenian revolutionist, turned informer with the resulting capture of arms, and the attack on the troops by the "fedai," when some seventeen soldiers and gendarmes were killed, a certain section of the Turks in Van, mostly employés, have been discontented with the quiet non-aggressive action of the Vali towards the Armenians, to my mind the only possible manner of dealing with a difficult question. A certain clique of these Turks, headed by Istinef Reissi and Ahmed Bey, Commandant of the Gendarmerie, have been for some time fomenting the Moslems against the Armenians, and Ahmed Bey and others gave it out openly that if the "fedai" touched David they would massacre all the Armenians. These people held frequent meetings in cafés and in private houses, and it was rumoured that some independent action by Bashi-Bozouks was brewing against the Armenians in the bazaar.

On the 23rd March matters were brought to a head by the assassination of David by an Armenian free lance (not a "fedai") in broad daylight, in a small market in the Moslem quarter, and in front of Ahmed Bey's house. This started an outbreak of fury, instigated by Ahmed Bey, by small bands of Bashi-Bozouks, who attacked the Armenians, who happened to be in the Moslem quarters at the time, on their way to and from the city. Owing to the spirited personal action of the Ferik, Mahmond Pasha, a serious massacre was arrested, and only some eighty Armenians were killed. The Vali, an excellent man in quieter times, was completely unnerved, and, being on strained terms with the Ferik, owing to the Ferik, who had done most of the work in the events of the 6th February, not having been rewarded, while the Vali had received the "bala," he easily fell a prey to the evil councils and lies of the instigators of this massacre, who now formed a sort of Camarilla round him. He was purposely misinformed of the real state of affairs, and I am assured that he was told that there had been another attack by "fedai" on Moslems, in which David had been wounded and several Moslems and Armenians killed by the "fedai." I have been told this story in good faith by several Turkish officials. The Vali also imagined that there was a great fear of an attack by the "fedai" on the Moslem quarter. As a matter of fact, throughout the whole of these events there has not been a single case of resistance by Armenians, those massacred were killed like sheep, and the "fedai" have not made any appearance either in person or in councils.

With his mistaken idea of the situation (it was some days before we realized that he was being really misinformed), the measures taken by the Vali to restore order were entirely wrong, and were, without exception, directed against the timorous Armenian. Troops were placed round the principal Armenian quarter (to which nearly all the Armenians had fled) to prevent the Armenians attacking the Moslems, but as (thanks to the Ferik) they equally prevented the Moslems from attacking the Armenians, the situation was saved.

In the interval between the massacre and David's death, and for some few days after, the situation was critical, and every one, Turk and Armenian alike, seemed to be waiting for the signal for a general massacre. This was helped by the Vali's promises to the Camarilla (I am now given to understand that he was only temporizing), the ordering of Hamidieh troops to Van, the fact that no single measure had been taken either to punish the murderers or to restrain the agitators.

From a lack of instructions of any sort from our Embassies, and a fear that they were accepting the misrepresentations of the Vali, my colleagues and myself had our hands tied, officially, and had to do the best we could unofficially to amend the situation, by friendly counsels and information to the Vali and Ferik, a certain amount of bluffing, and keeping our Embassies informed of the true state of affairs.

Probably owing to orders from Constantinople, possibly to a small extent to our advice, the Vali gradually began to appreciate the real situation, and things began to improve slightly. This improvement was aided by the fact that every one was sick of the suspense, and the fanatical fury of the Moslems, not having anything to vent itself on for some days, was cooling down.

On the 20th March the Vali called three representative Armenians and naïvely told them to make friends with the Moslems, and that they must open the bazaar the next day. They said that they could not until something had been done to punish the murderers.

Later they came to my colleagues and myself and said that no one would go to the bazaar until the culprits were punished and the Consuls gave them some assurance. We told them that it was not our business, that they must please themselves, &c. (The reason for their asking this, I understand, was that after the affair of the 6th February the Vali asked us to get the Armenians to open the bazaar. Being satisfied with the Vali's good intentions in this instance, we used our influence, with a satisfactory result.)

My colleagues and myself saw the Vali and tried to persuade him to do something to show the Moslems that this massacring habit was not to be encouraged. We were unsuccessful, as he would only promise that, after the bazaar was open, when things were quiet, reinforcements of troops had arrived, and the "fedai" had been punished (all rather uncertain accomplishments), that he would punish the Moslem culprits according to the law (still more uncertain).

We asked for instructions (*vide* my cypher telegram of the 29th March), the answer to which, advising me that the murderers, &c., were to be reprimanded, I received on the 3rd April.

In spite of the Vali's efforts, the bazaar was still closed on the 3rd April, when the Ferik called on me, on behalf of the Provincial Government, to ask me to use my influence with the other Consuls and the Armenians to get the bazaar opened. He promised me all sort of protection and concessions to the Armenians. As the general impression was that without our assistance the bazaar would not be opened, on the night of the 3rd April I wrote a letter to Dr. Raynolds, of the American Mission in Van, which appears to be what every one wants, and certainly will not entail any responsibility on the Embassy should another massacre of Armenians occur.

The next day some few Armenians went down and opened their shops, while I am informed that to-day many more are going down.

For the moment the incident may be considered closed, though what will happen on the arrival of reinforcements, and steps are taken against the Armenians to punish them for being massacred, remains to be seen.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BERTRAM DICKSON,
Captain, R.F.A.

[15998] No. 65.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 11.)

(No. 101.)

Sir, *Tehran, April* 24, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to report that, in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 67 of the 26th ultimo on the subject of the protection of Bahreinese in Persia, I addressed the note of which a copy is inclosed herewith to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and, in presenting it to his Excellency, said that I hoped the Persian Government would view the matter in a reasonable light, and refrain from again putting forward claims to the sovereignty of Bahrein based on no better grounds than the Treaty of 1822, which had not only never been ratified, but had also been repudiated by both the Persian and British Governments. His Majesty's Government, I felt sure, were very much in earnest about the matter, and would not listen to frivolous arguments any longer. Mushir-ed-Dowleh promised to give the question his best attention, and to do all he could to bring about a settlement. I was therefore considerably surprised when I received his note of the 9th instant, copy inclosed, in which, after stating that the Persian Government, out of its constant regard for the peace of "its" subjects, had sent strong orders to the local authorities

to make reparation, and do the man justice if he had been illegally treated. His Excellency reaffirms that Bahrein is a possession of Persia.

Mushir-ed-Dowleh's note reached me on the same day as the telegram No. 76 of the 10th April, in which you were so good as to ask what measures I could suggest to enforce the Persian Government's compliance with our demands, and, as I had occasion to see his Excellency that afternoon, I took the opportunity to explain to him the disappointment I felt at his written reply, and to warn him that, from the nature of the telegram that I had just received, it was evident that His Majesty's Government intended to have the question satisfactorily and definitively settled. I pointed out to his Excellency that for more than 100 years we had had Treaty relations with Bahrein, which was strong proof at least that Bahrein was not dependent on Persia, that for at least the same period of time Persia had never made the smallest effort to assert her pretended rights, and that by our Treaty of 1880 the Chief of Bahrein had placed his foreign relations in our hands, and that finally, within the last few years, Persian subjects who had got into trouble in the island had received protection from us. It seemed to me that the Persian Government would be singularly unwise if, by insisting on a shadowy right, they ran the risk of unnecessarily offending a friendly and powerful neighbour, on whom they were now depending for the settlement of a serious frontier question, and whose assistance in financial matters they might be driven to seek at an early date. Persia would be well-advised to yield on a point which was not of the smallest real importance to her, and it appeared to me that the simplest way out of the difficulty would be for him to address me another note, stating merely that he had given the necessary orders to the local authorities in the Gulf, and wherever else Bahreinese are likely to be found, that the representations of our Consular officers on behalf of Bahreinese are to be accepted without reserve. His Excellency said he would send me another reply to my note of the 30th March, though he would not say of what character it would be, as he must first consult his colleagues, and must also look up the history of the case. I think that Mushir-ed-Dowleh perfectly well understands that the Persian claim to Bahrein is worthless, but both he and his colleagues are too much afraid of the criticisms of the Medjliss to give way on their own responsibility, and shrink from the task of explaining the situation to them frankly.

On the 20th instant I received a visit from Nizam-es-Sultaneh, and, after explaining the situation to him, expressed the hope that he would use his influence over his colleagues to bring the question to a satisfactory solution. His Excellency, who, from his long connection with Bushire, has a wonderful knowledge of Gulf affairs for the last fifty years, told me a long, rambling story of how, in the year A.H. 1275 (A.D. 1858), two emissaries had come to Persia from Bahrein with an offer to pay tribute in return for the privilege of a Persian Resident in the islands, and how the idea eventually ended in fiasco. (The nature of the circumstances in which this appeal to Persia was made is outlined in Whigham's "Persian Problem," pp. 32–34.) The Prime Minister, indeed, showed clearly that he only told the story to indicate how absurd in his eyes the Persian claims were, and suggested that if I encountered further resistance from the Minister for Foreign Affairs I should ask his Excellency what he would do if a Persian subject got into difficulties in Bahrein; surely then he would have to ask for British assistance.

I mentioned this conversation to Mushir-ed-Dowleh when I saw him on the 21st instant, and his Excellency replied that, whatever Nizam-es-Sultaneh may have said to me, he had talked in quite a different strain at the Council of Ministers, when he had strongly upheld the Persian claim, and when I rejoined that Mr. Churchill had been present at the interview the Minister exclaimed: "Ça, c'est bien; Nizam-es-Sultaneh, on ne peut jamais croire à ce qu'il dit!"

Mushir-ed-Dowleh said he was still preparing his reply, to which I rejoined that I thought he would be wasting his time, as no citing of isolated incidents such as that related by Nizam-es-Sultaneh could possibly weigh against a series of recorded Treaties between His Majesty's Government and the Chiefs of Bahrein.

As regards the measures to be taken to enforce compliance with our wishes, I ventured to suggest the occupation of Hormuz or Kais primarily on the ground that it is in the interests of our prestige with the protected Chiefs in the Gulf that we are now demanding the recognition of our right to protect Bahreinese from the Persian Government, and that local action, if necessary, appears to me best calculated to produce this effect. Hormuz Island appears to me to be preferable to any other, as being so close to Bunder Abbas that the many Bahreinese who frequent that port must carry the news of our energetic action on their behalf to their own country, and

for the same reason the maximum impression would be produced on the local authorities. It is also possible that a proof of our readiness to protect our friends may induce Muin-et-Tujjar to see the wisdom of coming to terms with Messrs. Ellinger.

Failing Hormuz, I suggested Kais Island as there has recently been a disagreeable incident there for which I have not yet obtained more than a formal apology, when shots were fired on a boat conveying the assistant of the Agency of Lingah, who was proceeding to the island to investigate the grievances of some British Indians resident there.

I have little doubt but that a formal threat to employ force will induce the Persian Government to give way.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES M. MARLING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 65.

Mr. Marling to Mushir-ed-Dowleh.

Your Excellency, *Tehran, March 30, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that, according to a report recently received from the British Agent at Lingah, a Bahrein subject has been flogged, imprisoned, and otherwise molested by the Deputy Governor of that town, who, moreover, declined to accept the intervention of the said British Agent.

I have to remind your Excellency that by a note dated 19th February, 1906, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, acting under the instructions of his Government, informed the Imperial Persian Government that His Britannic Majesty's Government consider the island of Bahrein and its inhabitants to be under British protection, and I have now received further instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to draw your Excellency's attention to this case, and to protest against the arbitrary action of the Governor of Lingah in punishing a British-protected subject of Bahrein and in refusing to admit the good offices of the British Resident.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES M. MARLING.

Inclosure 2 in No. 65.

Mushir-ed-Dowleh to Mr. Marling.

Tehran, April 9, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 30th March respecting a certain Bahreini at Lingah, and in reply I have to state that, having always regard for the peace of its subjects, the Persian Government has sent a strong telegram to the proper authorities to make reparation and to do the man perfect justice in case he has been illegally ill-treated. But with regard to the Island of Bahrein and its inhabitants, to which you had referred, I have the honour to call your attention to the various notes on the subject addressed to your predecessors by the Foreign Office, and I am sure that, after a reference to the notes and careful consideration of the arguments put forward by the Imperial Government as to its right over the place in question, you will admit that the proprietary right of the Persian Government over the island is not a matter to be disputed.

I have, &c.

[16064] No. 66.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 234.)

Sir, *Pera, May 4, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to forward copies of telegrams from the Vali of Van, which have been communicated to me by the Grand Vizier. These documents are of interest

as showing the dimensions to which the revolutionary movement is believed by the Turkish authorities to have attained in the frontier district.

As regards the proposed mobilization of the Hamidié troops in the vicinity of the frontier, I should mention that on learning from His Majesty's Vice-Consul that some of these irregulars were expected in the town of Van, I pointed out to the Grand Vizier that their presence there would be likely to lead to a renewal of the recent disorders, and he informed me that he had already given orders that they were not to enter the town.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 66.

Telegrams from the Governor-General of Van.—(Communicated by the Grand Vizier to Mr. G. Barclay.)

(1.)

Le 27 Mars (9 Avril), 1908.

LE Gouverneur intérimaire de Hekkiari me fait savoir qu'environ 6,000 révolutionnaires Arméniens se sont rassemblés sur le territoire Persan dans l'intention criminelle d'attaquer dans cinq ou six jours les villages Musulmans se trouvant dans le voisinage de la frontière. Ils se sont mis en communication avec Van pour que l'attaque ait lieu simultanément le même jour.

Il a été prescrit au Commandant de la division militaire de procéder à la distribution des fusils aux Rédifs qui n'en ont pas encore reçu et de mobiliser le régiment Hamidié.

(2.)

Le 29 Mars (11 Avril), 1908.

Le Commandant de la division militaire vient de me faire savoir qu'il estimait comme certain que jusqu'à l'arrivée à destination et leur mise en position le long de la frontière des troupes déjà expédiées d'Erzeroum et de celles qui seront envoyées sous peu du même quartier, les agitateurs rassemblés sur le territoire Persan s'introduisent à Van en se faufilant par quelques points de la frontière et qu'il serait impossible d'empêcher leur irruption si les régiments Hamidiés dont les circonscriptions militaires se trouvent à proximité de la frontière ne sont pas mobilisés. Il préconise l'adoption des mesures propres à enrayer le mal; dans le cas contraire, il déclinerait toute responsabilité morale qui pourrait découler de la non-observation de la frontière.

Notre Consul-Général à Khoy et à Selmas m'avise de son côté que les révolutionnaires se sont rassemblés pour franchir la frontière par petites bandes afin de fomenter des désordres à Van et engage le Gouvernement à prendre des mesures édictées par les circonstances.

Il est par conséquent de toute nécessité de faire hâter l'envoi des troupes pour qu'on puisse renforcer les postes d'observation sur la frontière avant que les routes deviennent praticables.

(3.)

Le 8 (21) Avril, 1908.

Les émissaires envoyés de Hekkiari dans le but de reconnaître la situation sont rentrés et rapportent ce qui suit:

Dans chacun des villages Persans Heftvan, Housrem, Savra, et Zilman, se trouve une bande de cinquante agitateurs environ; toutes les populations des villages Arméniens sont armées; les révolutionnaires qui s'étaient, il y a quelque temps, rassemblés dans les dites localités se sont introduits par petites bandes à Van et se sont plus tard ralliés aux habitants d'Izvanik après avoir passé par Roumié sous la conduite du Chef Samson; Miguirditch, qui se trouve à Selmas, se propose de se transporter dans deux ou trois jours à Van par la route d'Ifaya; les émissaires révolutionnaires arrivés de Russie se trouvent auprès de Samson; 600 Mausers Allemands ont été introduits de Russie pour être distribués aux habitants des autres villages; des

investigations ont démontré à l'évidence que le Gouvernement Russe favorise par tous les moyens les dits révolutionnaires et leur prête assistance.

Des ordres réitérés ont été transmis aux autorités et au Commandant de la division militaire de redoubler de vigilance et d'empêcher les agitateurs de passer sur notre territoire.

(4.)

Le 10 (23) Avril, 1908.

Le temps se faisant beau, une velléité d'agression se manifeste chez les Kurdes, velléité qui pourrait produire une mauvaise impression.

En vue d'empêcher les Kurdes de se livrer à des actes répréhensibles nous avons pensé qu'il serait une mesure plus efficace d'envoyer le Commandant de la brigade de cavalerie en garnison à Van à la tête d'une force suffisante de cavalerie aux localités où les Kurdes se montrent remuants, pour leur faire des remontrances sévères et serrer de près ceux d'entre eux qui persisteraient dans leur attitude.

Cet avis a été communiqué au Commandant en chef du IV^e^ Corps d'Armée.

En attendant, les gendarmes qu'on a pu détacher du régiment résidant dans le chef-lieu du vilayet ont été, comme par le passé, expédiés en trois colonnes vers les dites localités.

(5.)

Le 15 (28) Avril, 1908.

Grâce aux mesures efficaces qui ont été prises successivement en vue de maintenir l'ordre et la sécurité tout sujet de crainte et de panique se trouve écarté. Il n'est pas probable qu'il en soit autrement tant qu'il n'y aura pas de provocation.

Ceux qui entretiennent des relations avec les agitateurs sont ceux qui ne sont pas sûrs d'eux-mêmes.

Les articles manufacturés et autres capitaux engagés dans le commerce appartiennent à quelques gros négociants et leur remboursement est subordonné à des paiements semestriels. Or, ceux des débiteurs de ces gros négociants qui ne cherchent pas d'occasion dans le désordre, et ceux qui ne se laissent pas tromper par les agitateurs, et, enfin, tous les autres Arméniens des deux sexes, circulent avec toute liberté. Les Arméniens qui se rendent aux sièges de leur occupation font des affaires. Des artisans, comme joailliers, menuisiers, tailleurs, cordonniers, et autres, profitent de la tranquillité pour rentrer dans leurs pertes.

Il est vrai qu'une certaine stagnation s'était produite dans le cours des affaires à la suite des derniers incidents; mais l'ordre et la sécurité renaissant immédiatement, tous les habitants se sont de nouveau mis à vaquer à leurs affaires. Ceux qui ont eu à souffrir des désordres doivent en chercher la cause parmi eux-mêmes.

Au fur et à mesure que les routes redeviennent praticables la reprise des affaires redouble en même temps.

Le fait que des centaines d'Arméniens travaillent aux côtés des Musulmans dans des constructions et des jardins appartenant à ceux-ci constitue une preuve éclatante de ce que l'état actuel des choses ne recèle aucun motif de crainte ni de panique.

Le Gouvernement ignore que des démarches aient été faites auprès des Consuls. Nous avons demandé des renseignements à ce sujet à un négociant des plus notables du pays. Il nous a affirmé qu'aucune démarche de ce genre ait eu lieu, mais que seulement tout de suite après l'incident il a été voir les Consuls, sur leur propre invitation, pour les entendre dire qu'ils ont entretenu le Gouvernement au sujet de l'ouverture du bazar. Il a eu outre ajouté qu'il ne comprenait pas bien l'utilité qu'il y aurait pour les Arméniens de s'adresser aux Consuls.

Les troupes Impériales dont on attend l'arrivée n'ont pas été requises pour persécuter les gens honnêtes et paisibles, mais bien pour infliger des punitions exclusivement aux bandits dont les actes contre la sécurité publique sont établis par des preuves multiples, à leurs complices, et aux auteurs de crimes, et par ce moyen assurer la tranquillité aux populations fidèles. Les gens honnêtes en paraissent reconnaissants, tandis que les fauteurs de troubles s'en lamentent et se montrent déconcertés.

Quant à la cherté des denrées, elle n'est que la continuation du renchérissement qui s'est produit au cours de l'hiver. C'est pour couper court à cette continuation que nous avons fait venir du blé par les soins de la Banque Agricole. Grâce à cette mesure les prix ont pu être maintenus.

Le Vilayet de Van est une province qui manque de ressources pour la main-

d'œuvre et possède par conséquent beaucoup d'indigents. Ceci explique le grand nombre de mendiants. C'était bien dans le but de procurer du travail aux pauvres que le Gouvernement avait entrepris de faire venir des bateaux à vapeur et d'exploiter des puits de pétrole. Les sollicitations au secours ne s'adressent pas seulement aux Consuls; des centaines de pauvres gens viennent toutes les semaines au siège du Gouvernement et à mon domicile privé pour demander des secours.

Ce qui précède est l'expression véridique de la situation.

La vigilance la plus parfaite est exercée constamment pour maintenir l'ordre et la sécurité dans le pays.

[16068] No. 67.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 238.)

Sir, *Pera, May 5, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, in which he reports a considerable increase in the garrison of the fort at Fao.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 67.

Consul Crow to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 20.)

Sir, *Bussorah, March 21, 1908.*

THE 3rd Battalion of the 43rd Regiment, under command of Mehemet Effendi, left Kurna for Amara last week.

On the 16th December, 1907, 280 time-expired men left Bussorah for Bagdad.

I learn from Fao that the garrison of the fort has been increased to about ninety men, the usual strength being fifteen men. No guns have been landed at the fort, as far as I am able to ascertain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. CROW.

[16073] No. 68.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 243.)

Sir, *Pera, May 6, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of two despatches which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah reporting on the recent attack on the "Blosse Lynch" and the disturbances on the Tigris. I have approved Mr. Crow's action in this matter.

I have taken the opportunity of urging on the Porte the advisability of acquiring patrol boats for the Tigris, and have reminded the Grand Vizier of Messrs. Thorneycroft's tender, pointing out, however, that no firm would be likely to accept the terms offered by the Porte, as reported in Mr. Crow's No. 1 to your Department of the 31st March.

His Highness did not seem to be fully conversant with what had passed in regard to Messrs. Thorneycroft's tender, but promised to look into the matter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[16072] 67a.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 242.)

Sir, *Pera, May 6, 1908.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 230 of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum, reporting the dispatch of further troops for Van and the calling out of reservists at Bitlis.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 67a.

Consul Shipley to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 20.)

Sir, *Erzeroum, April 25, 1908.*

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch No. 19 of the 20th instant, I have the honour to report to you that the 2nd (Izpir) Battalion of Redifs of the 52nd Regiment left this town yesterday for Van.

The 3rd (Gumushkhané) Battalion of the 52nd Regiment, to which I referred in my above-mentioned despatch as being expected here shortly, has not yet arrived, but certain of its officers, I am informed, are at Erzeroum awaiting further orders.

Mr. Safrastian, Dragoman in charge of His Majesty's Vice-Consulate at Bitlis, reports under date of the 11th instant that the reservists of that town, amounting to some 400 men, have been called out, but had not as yet received their arms. He reports further that the Redifs of Moush and Sairt are said to have been also called out, and to be holding themselves in readiness.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. S. SHIPLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 68.

Consul Crow to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 24.)

Sir, *Bussorah, April* 3, 1908.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 2nd April and No. 28 of the 3rd April, respecting the attack on the "Blosse Lynch," I have the honour to inclose copies of reports by Captain McConaghy's, His Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Bagdad, who was on board, and by Captain Cowley, the master of the vessel.

You will observe that the two attacks were most deliberate, and had it not been for the assistance of the Turkish gun-boat "Alus," the "Blosse Lynch" would never have got through the second. The conduct and coolness of Captain Cowley, his officers, pilots, and quartermasters, are beyond all praise, and they deserve some recognition of their services. I visited the vessel on her arrival here; she has been pierced by bullets in about fifty different places. The Vali, under instructions from Nazim Pasha, the Commissioner, who is now at Amara, called on me to express his regret at the occurrence, and I took Lynch's agent and Captain Cowley to the Vali and discussed with his Excellency the measures to be adopted for the return journey of the vessel. I have asked that at least fifty soldiers to be placed on board her, and that the "Alus" may accompany her from Abu Sidra, below Amara, to Umm-el-Henna, above it. This is the extent of the Beni Lam tribes' habitat, and this tribe, or a section of it—the Azerij—and their leader, Gadban, seem, according to the Vali and Captain Cowley, who knows the country thoroughly, to be the persons responsible for the outrage.

Nazim Pasha has been adopting half-measures and upsetting the country by turning out certain Sheikhs and putting others in their places in the Seniye lands, and the aggrieved Arabs have expressed their disapproval by making a demonstration against one of our ships. They choose an English vessel in preference to a Turkish one, as they think the complaint will carry more weight. Both the Turks and we ourselves are very much at their mercy, and I can only suggest that the unpopular reforms and changes which Nazim Pasha has effected by force at Amara should be cancelled and the *status quo ante* restored. Coercion seems ill-advised under the circumstances.

Nazim Pasha directed the Vali to inform me that he would punish the offenders, and the Vali seems ready to guarantee the safety of the vessel on her return. I warned Lynch's agent against relying too much on any such assurance.

I inclose a letter received from Messrs. Lynch's agent, and, in reply to his request for my assurance contained in the last paragraph, I propose to tell them that their own Directors must decide whether they will dispatch or detain the "Blosse Lynch," after considering the measures taken by the Turkish authorities for the protection of the vessel.

I should deprecate employment the "Comet" to protect the British traffic, if this is suggested, as I think the protection she is capable of affording would be wholly inadequate against the Arabs in force, and her presence might augment the catastrophe and lead us into serious complications. The question of providing shallow-draught gun-boats for river protection is, I understand, still under consideration. It is very necessary to provide them, and I hope the Turkish Government may be induced to grant money for the purpose, and not leave the cost to be met from the Bussorah Treasury, which has no funds for the purpose. Nazim Pasha's experiments in attempting to collect outstanding debts due to the Government among the Arabs are singularly unsuccessful.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 68.

Report by Acting Consul-General McConaghy respecting the Firing by Arabs on the P.S. "Blosse Lynch" on April 2, 1908.

ON the morning of the 2nd April, 1908, the P. S. "Blosse Lynch" left Amara at 5 A.M. About 5·30 A.M. Arabs begun to fire on the ship. They ran along the right bank and fired, others joined them from some tents. The firing lasted for some ten minutes and was considerable. I was called on by Mr. Foreman, chief engineer, to see one of the stokers, who was dangerously wounded in the head. After seeing him I saw three deck

passengers; one, a Persian lady, was very badly wounded in the foot, in fact the foot was nearly severed from the leg. I feel sure this was caused by an expanding bullet from a Mauser rifle. This woman was in a very bad condition and died a few hours afterwards. The second passenger wounded was also a Persian and the son of the wounded woman, he was shot through the right shoulder. The third was a woman from Bahrein and was wounded in two places, one in the left thigh and the other in the right ankle; in both these cases the bullets had passed through, making entry and exit wounds.

About 6·15 A.M. the "Blosse Lynch" arrived at a Turkish encampment on the left side of the river. I went with Captain Cowley, the commander of the "Blosse Lynch," and interviewed the Colonel, Ismail Bey, in command of the troops (about 500). Captain Cowley told him that as his ship was carrying the English mails she must proceed. The Colonel gave orders for some soldiers to come on board and also ordered the Turkish gun-boat "Alus" to accompany us through the danger zone. The Arabs could be seen collecting round some flags. About 8·15 A.M. we got under way and proceeded down river followed by the gun-boat "Alus." We had eight soldiers on board.

Captain Cowley saw that all the passengers were put under cover and that bags of wheat were placed round the bridge for protection. About 8·30 A.M. the Arabs commenced firing on the "Blosse Lynch." Directly the Arabs started to fire the gun-boat opened fire too, both with her guns and with rifles. The soldiers on the "Blosse Lynch" also fired. The Arabs kept well under cover, and kept up a heavy fire on the sides. A great number of shots struck the "Blosse Lynch" altogether and, this time, the firing must have lasted nearly half-an-hour, but luckily there were no more casualties on the "Blosse Lynch." About 9·15 A.M. the gun-boat signalled that we were past the danger zone and we stopped in order to return the soldiers to the gun-boat.

The firing on the "Blosse Lynch" was most deliberate, and there could have been no mistaking her for a Turkish boat owing to her having two funnels. Before closing this Report I should like to mention how well Captain Cowley, the officers, pilots, and quartermasters behaved in carrying on the ship and in seeing after the protection of a large number of deck passengers.

(Signed) C. B. McCONAGHY, M.B., *Captain, I.M.S.,*
Agency Surgeon, 2nd Class.

April 3, 1908.

Inclosure 3 in No. 68.

Report by Commander Cowley.

Dear Sirs, *April* 2, 1908.

I WISH to report that we left Amara on the morning of Thursday the 2nd April at 5 A.M. At 5·35 A.M. Arabs on the right bank commenced firing on the ship, some were lying down on the bank and others ran out of their tents loading and firing as they ran towards the ship. Very many shots were fired, probably over 100, and the firing lasted altogether about fifteen minutes.

The ship was struck all along the starboard side, three passengers and one fireman were wounded; one of the wounded, a Persian woman, has since died.

At 6·15 A.M. we brought up alongside a Turkish encampment, where the Turkish gun-boat "Alus" was at anchor. I went ashore with Captain McConaghy and saw the Colonel in command of the troops and reported the matter. I informed him that we carried the mails and must proceed as soon as possible, so he gave me eight soldiers and ordered the "Alus" to accompany us.

I then went on board and made the ship as safe as possible, putting all passengers down the holds and protecting the bridge with bags of wheat. At 8·15 A.M. everything was ready and we proceeded with the "Alus" astern. At 8·30 A.M. the Arabs began firing on us again, the ship was struck in many places but this time no one was injured. We replied to the fire and the "Alus" also fired her cannons and kept up a rifle fire till we got clear of the disturbed district. The firing lasted this time about half-an-hour. The "Alus" then signalled to us to stop, and at 9·15 A.M. we returned the soldiers to her and went on.

I remain, &c.
(Signed) C. H. COWLEY.

Inclosure 4 in No. 68.

Messrs. Lynch Brothers to Consul Crow.

Sir, *Bussorah, April* 3, 1908.

WE regret to report that the disturbances near Amara which resulted in an attack on the "Khalifa" on the 31st May, 1906, have again commenced and the "Blosse Lynch" was fired on yesterday by Arabs, who killed one native passenger, dangerously wounded a fireman and two other passengers also.

We inclose the Report sent on to us by Captain Cowley, which gives details of the occurrence. We consider the Turkish authorities at Amara have been guilty of culpable negligence in allowing the "Blosse Lynch" to proceed from Amara without any warning that trouble was imminent. Had this alone been given, the commander of the steamer could have remained at Amara and made arrangements for the protection of the lives and property under his control. The absence of any information whatever resulted in the steamer being entirely unprotected and defenceless against the present attack, and the Arabs were thus emboldened to run alongside the river bank and to reload and discharge their rifles at the "Blosse Lynch." We deplore the fact that nothing whatever was done to punish those who were concerned in the attack on the "Khalifa" in 1906, as we are convinced that, had prompt measures been taken then to demonstrate to the Arabs that our steamers could not be fired on with impunity, the present attack resulting in loss of life would never have occurred.

Under these circumstances we beg to suggest that as local authorities have once again given proof of their incapacity to protect a British steamer, that the British Government provide the necessary protection against further attacks until such time as the Turkish Government have punished those who have been concerned in the present attack.

We are detaining the "Blosse Lynch" in Bussorah until we receive your assurance that adequate steps have been taken to prevent any further attack and that you consider it safe for the vessel to proceed with the British mails on board.

(Signed) SAMUEL DODS,
Agent for Lynch Brothers.

Inclosure 5 in No. 68.

Consul Crow to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 29.)

Sir, *Bussorah, April* 11, 1908.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 24 of the 3rd April on the subject of river disturbances, I have the honour to transmit herewith, copies of correspondence with Messrs. Lynch Brothers agent, together with the translation of a letter received from the Vali.

Messrs. Lynch's agent was informed, with reference to his letter of the 5th April, that his protest and request for a guarantee of indemnity would be forwarded to the Turkish authorities, if submitted in Turkish and signed by him in the usual way. He has not yet sent it in.

As regards Nazim Pasha's explanation of the attacks on the "Blosse Lynch," as contained in the Vali's letter, his statement should be read in conjunction with the Reports of Captain Cowley and Captain McConaghy, copies of which were inclosed in my previous despatch. I hear, on excellent authority, that firing still continues on such sailing vessels as venture out in the disturbed area and that members of their crews have been killed and wounded. No Turkish steamers are running between Bussorah and Amara or, I believe, between Amara and Kut and river traffic is at a standstill. As long as this lasts Gadban's expressions of fidelity and obedience are hardly reassuring.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

Inclosure 6 in No. 68.

Consul Crow to Messrs. Lynch Brothers.

(No. 18.)

Gentlemen, *Bussorah, April 5, 1908.*

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3rd instant. From my interview with the Vali, at which you assisted with Captain Cowley, you will have understood that the Turkish authorities are willing to do all that is possible to secure navigation.

The Vali, at the request of Nazim Pasha, called on me to express his regret, and the Commissioner himself has been instructed to proceed to the scene of the occurrence, with a view to punish the culprits, and troops have been ordered thither.

The Vali says he will send fifty soldiers with the "Blosse Lynch," and have the vessel accompanied by the "Alus" from Abu Sidra to Umm-el-Henna, as suggested by Captain Cowley. His Excellency thinks these measures are sufficient to insure the safety of the "Blosse Lynch" on her return journey, and Nazim Pasha is of the same opinion.

As regards the assurance from me for which you ask in the last paragraph of your letter, I have to state that I can give you no such assurance. It must be left to your own Directors to decide whether they will dispatch or detain your steamer, after considering the measures taken by the Turks for the protection of the river.

In the event of your dispatching the "Blosse Lynch," the Vali requests you to give him a day's notice, in order that he may make the necessary arrangements for her escort.

I am, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

Inclosure 7 in No. 68.

Messrs. Lynch Brothers to Consul Crow.

Sir, *Bussorah, April 5, 1908.*

WE beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date, and thank you for the information contained therein. With regard to the proposed measures which his Excellency the Vali and Nazim Pasha think are sufficent to insure the safety of the "Blosse Lynch" on her return journey, we shall be glad to hear if, in the event of our Directors accepting these measures, the Turkish Government guarantee our Company for all consequences that may arise from any further attack. We personally consider the risk, pending a guarantee from the Turkish authorities, too great for our Directors to accept, and meantime we consider sufficient grounds exist for us to hold the Turkish Government responsible for loss arising from the detention of our steamers, until such time as the Turks guarantee the safety of the river for our steamers. We shall be obliged if you will kindly advise the responsible authorities of this protest.

Also we hold ourselves relieved under clause 5 of our Mail Agreement from maintaining regular communication between Bussorah and Bagdad and *vice versâ*, owing to political disturbances which render the river unsafe for traffic and over which our Company have no control, which kindly note.

We have, &c.
(Signed) SAMUEL DODS,
Agent for Lynch Brothers.

Inclosure 8 in No. 68.

Vali of Bussorah to Consul Crow.

(Translation.)

Sir, *March 27 (April 9), 1908.*

YOU wrote to ask me whether it was safe for the "Blosse Lynch" to start. I have received a telegram from the Reform Commissioner of Irak, who states that the rebels, collected on the banks of the Tigris, having discovered that the troops, which were being dispatched by river, were intended for them, and thinking that some of

their enemies were on board the "Blosse Lynch," which passed at the time, opened fire on her, but the troops came up at once and the "Blosse Lynch" was escorted by the "Alus" and brought through safely.

His Excellency the Commissioner goes on to say that Gadban, in reply to the communications addressed to him by the Mutessarif, having announced that he will always serve with fidelity, it is unlikely that any mischief will occur. Nevertheless, in view of the present circumstances, it would be quite impossible to give any definite assurance.

Still, placing a detachment of soldiers on board the "Blosse Lynch" and escorting her with the gun-boat "Alus," as you requested, are measures which should protect the vessel against every emergency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HASSAN.

[16647] No. 69.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 14.)

Sir, *India Office, May 13, 1908.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th instant, relating to the protection in Persia of Bahreinis and subjects of the Trucial Chiefs.

As regards Bahreinis, Viscount Morley agrees that it would be inopportune at the present moment to insist on a formal recognition of the British right of protection, and that no further action will be necessary if the terms of the amended note, promised by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, contain no expression denying that right. But it seems to Lord Morley that it would be desirable to postpone, till after the receipt of the amended note, the communication which it is proposed Mr. Marling should make to the Persian Government as to the intention of His Majesty's Government to take steps to vindicate their position if further cases of the kind arise. Such a communication might be regarded as a challenge, and so make it more difficult for the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to word the note in the terms we desire.

As regards subjects of the Trucial Chiefs, Lord Morley agrees that the assurances given to Major Cox by the Governor of Bushire are sufficient to meet the needs of the particular case in question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[16706] No. 70.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 15.)

Sir, *India Office, May 14, 1908.*

WITH reference to your letter dated the 31st March last, regarding the appointment by the Italian Government of Cavaliere Francesco Crispi to be their Consular Agent at Muscat, I am directed to inclose copy of telegraphic correspondence with the Government of India on the subject.

Viscount Morley is disposed to concur in the view of the Government of India, and would suggest that, if the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sees no objection, the Italian Government should be approached with a view to their substituting a native news agent for the Consular officer referred to.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 70.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April 8, 1908.*

MUSCAT. Please see note of the 2nd January from Italian Ambassador, forwarded with letter of the 7th February from Political Secretary, India Office.

Italian Government now inform Foreign Office that they have appointed as their Consular Agent at Muscat Cavaliere Francesco Crispi, Captain, Royal Colonial Troops.

They ask for our local co-operation, both in respect of arms traffic and of Consular Agent's ordinary duties.

I should be glad if your views as to reply to Italian Government could be telegraphed at an early date.

Enclosure 2 in No. 70.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April* 30, 1908.

YOUR telegram dated the 8th instant: Italian Consular Representative at Muscat. Resident in Persian Gulf telegraphed on the 20th instant as follows:—

"Italian Representative at Muscat. See telegram dated the 18th instant, from Political Agent, Muscat.

"No adequate grounds for acceptance of Consul, or for Commercial Treaty with Italy, appear to exist. How will Sultan be able to refuse to accept Russian or German, if we now advise him to consent? Object aimed at would be much more likely to be effected by trusted and secret native Agent. I would suggest that, at any rate pending completion of Arms Conference, we should get matter delayed."

We agree with suggestion made in Resident's last sentence, as result of Conference may be that Muscat will cease to be emporium of arms. For reasons given by Resident, we also agree that it is desirable that Italian Government should be induced to substitute native news agent for Consular officer.

[16647] No. 71.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.

(No. 100.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, May* 16, 1908.

WITH reference to your telegrams Nos. 113, 115, and 116.

Protection of subjects of Trucial Chiefs.

The needs of the individual case in question appear to be sufficiently met by the assurances which the Governor of Bushire gave to the British Consul-General, provided that they are duly carried out.

Protection of Bahreinis.

The Persian Government should be urged to send without delay the note in its amended form; unless, however, any expression is contained in it which it would be possible to construe as disputing our right, we are at present reluctant, unless fresh cases occur, to raise the general question.

[16928] No. 72.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 109.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, May* 17, 1908.

FOLLOWING from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Van, dated the 16th instant:—

"I received a few days ago a visit from the Vali and the Commandant, who came to ask me what I considered the best means of destroying the Armenian revolutionaries in the town. I said that I thought the best plan would be to surround the Armenian quarter with troops so as to prevent the revolutionaries moving about, and to issue a Proclamation promising a free pardon to those who surrendered arms, ammunition, &c., and to use troops for the protection of informers against the vengeance of the revolutionaries.

"On the strength of this advice the Vali posted a Proclamation stating that it was clear that there were revolutionaries in the Armenian quarter, and that if they were not surrendered at once, together with all arms and ammunition, stern measures would be taken; at the same time the quarter was surrounded by troops and cannon. Before taking further action the Vali summoned thirty Armenian Notables, and, after repeating to them the language of his Proclamation, said that the troops had been

placed there to protect them from the vengeance of the 'fedais'; but that, if he were obliged to make a search, he would not be responsible for the consequences. He added, however, that he would try to obtain the pardon of any native revolutionaries who surrendered their arms, provided that they were not wanted by the police for other political offences. The Notables have, however, informed the Vali to-day that no Armenians would confess to being revolutionaries or to having arms and ammunition in their possession, but promised, if the Vali would make out a list of persons who had been denounced as revolutionaries, to try to induce them to surrender. This the Vali has refused to do, and has demanded the surrender of arms, &c., by 5 P.M. to-morrow.

"The Armenians are in a panic, and the bazaar is closed.

"The authorities have taken measures with a view to prevent the Bashi-Bozouks from taking any part in the search."

I have telegraphed to Captain Dickson instructing him to act in concert with his Russian and French colleagues and to avoid all isolated action, and informing him that I was making representations to the Grand Vizier urging him to send instructions to the local authorities to take every precaution to avoid bloodshed during the search.

[16960] No. 73.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—Received May 18.)

(No. 252.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May* 12, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to transmit copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Van, in which he describes the serious economic situation in the vilayet as due entirely to the attitude of the Government in its dealings with the Armenians and the fedai. With a view to stopping the fedai movement, which Captain Dickson points out is responsible for much of the oppression from which the Armenians are suffering, he suggests: (1) That the restriction against Armenians going to seek work in Russia and elsewhere should be removed; (2) that determined steps should be taken to arrest the professional fedai, while a free pardon should be given to those who, while innocent of any active revolutionary work, are suspected of having had relations with the fedai; and (3) that the frontier should be better patrolled to prevent the entry of arms and fedai from Persia and Russia.

I fear that it would be useless to endeavour to induce the present Government to remove the restrictions which at present prevent Armenians from circulating freely within the Empire and from leaving the country in search of work, and I doubt whether, even were this restriction removed, the Russian Government would be willing that they should seek work in Russian territory, for I gather from M. de Zinoview that the unemployed Armenians are already a source of trouble in the Russian frontier districts.

As regards Captain Dickson's third suggestion, it would, in my opinion, be rash to urge the Ottoman Government to institute a better patrol of the frontier, as my representations might easily be made a pretext for further aggression on Persian territory, and I am enjoining upon Captain Dickson caution in recommending this course to the Vali.

No doubt Captain Dickson is acting wisely in advising the Vali to deal leniently with those Armenians who have merely incurred suspicion and have taken no active part in the revolutionary movement.

Latest advices from Van show that as yet no steps have been taken to punish either the fedai or the Moslem agitators in connection with the recent disorders.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 73.

Vice-Consul Dickson to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 12.)

Sir, *Van, April* 13, 1908.

WITH reference to the appalling economic state of this vilayet and the prospect this year of a serious famine, both of which are due entirely to the attitude of the

Government in its dealings with the Armenians and the fedai, I have the honour to present for your consideration a few suggestions and remarks.

The Christian inhabitants of Macedonia, and their methods of governing them, have caused so much worry and European interference to the Turks that they may be pardoned the desire to try to keep their Asiatic possessions free from similar intervention.

As far as I am aware, Van has the largest percentage of Christian population of the Asiatic vilayets; at any rate, if not the largest, it is certainly the noisiest and most difficult to control. Of the Christians in the vilayet the Assyrians are a quiet, peaceable, agricultural people, with no national aspirations, no wealth, no intrigues, and are not likely to get the Turks into much trouble. On the other hand, the Armenians, who form by far the larger part of the Christian population, are an intriguing, unsympathetic race, with high national aspirations and a number of revolutionary organizations, whose main object is, or was, to endeavour to attract European intervention to gain the same. Thus the Turks may be excused their desire to suppress this source of trouble.

From what the late Ali Bey, Vali of Van, told me, I understand that the Porte realizes that the Armenian question no longer interests the Powers, and that the Porte does not wish to raise it. Thus her policy since the massacres of 1895 has been to reduce the Armenians to a state of utter impotency and helplessness without attracting the attention that such old-fashioned methods as massacres would force. This policy will account for the paradoxical manner in which the Armenians are sometimes treated. For example, the Vali has to make the vilayet pay its way, and, realizing that the Armenians are the money-making and paying part of the population, he at times will give them a certain amount of encouragement and protection for purely selfish ends; but he has his hands tied by orders and restrictions from Constantinople, which he is obliged to follow in spite of his own conviction of their inadvisability for the best interests of the vilayet. It is these orders given by people at Constantinople, who do not know, or do not wish to know, the real state of affairs, that have reduced the Van Vilayet to the appalling state that now exists.

Before the advent of the telegraph the Valis were more or less independent of Constantinople, and things were much better. At that time, before the massacres, the Armenians were rich, owning villages, lands, sheep, oxen, &c., all the trade was in their hands, the trade was far larger, and they travelled freely about the country. The villagers tilled their own lands and lived in comparative peace with the Kurds. The surplus of young men used to leave the country to work in Russia, Constantinople, Roumania, &c., returning to their villages after earning sufficient to live on.

Since the massacres of 1895 the Porte has been employing this system of organized oppression with the result above mentioned. The principal means are:—

1. Heavy taxation without any compensating justice or security for life or property, and bad administration.
2. Prohibition to Armenians to leave the country in search of work.
3. Unrestrained tyranny and pillage by Kurds, even encouraged by the Government.

A combination of (1) and (3) has reduced the villagers to bankruptcy. Their lands are all mortgaged or sold to Kurds, and they live a hand-to-mouth existence, borrowing seed from the Kurds and Turks at rates of 200 and 400 per cent. Trade and industry are absolutely stagnant, and there is no work for the young men. At the present there are thousands of unemployed without a chance of ever finding work under present conditions. The Armenians are a prolific race, and without massacres or plagues their population increases rapidly; it seems the only pleasure they have left. As the country becomes more impoverished daily, the already small demand for labour decreases. This increasing supply and decreasing demand, which has been going on for the last ten years, is one of the main reasons for the present state of affairs and is one of the best recruiting agents for the fedai.

The Armenians by their revolutionary organizations have played into the hands of the Turks and estranged the sympathy of Europe, which they had hoped to gain. The Turks are able to hide all their oppressive and repressive measures under the mask of stamping out fedai, and in this they are even encouraged by the Powers, so that so long as the revolutionary movement is prominent among the Armenians, so long will their gradual extermination continue, with the approval of Europe, until they are reduced to a state of so little importance that they will no longer be a menace to the Turks for European intervention. Whether the Powers are knowingly parties to this policy

I am unaware, but if they are not, and do not desire its quick realization, I believe there is little time to spare.

If something could be done to stop the fedai movement it would help the Armenians in two ways—first, by taking from the Turks their excuse for oppression, and second, by relieving the innocent Armenians of the incubus that the fedai is to them.

The drastic measures that the Turks would like to employ do no good, and only stimulate the movement. The natural suggestion would be for the Turks to improve their administration, but I am afraid that is too much to ask. I make the following suggestions, which I have already discussed with the Vali, as ones which might do some good and need not frighten the Chancelleries:—

1. Removal of the restriction against Armenians going to seek work in Russia and elsewhere.

2. Determined steps taken to arrest the professional fedai and certain known local instigators, those unable to be caught to be outlawed, while a free pardon be given to the hundreds of young Armenians suspected of having had relations with the fedai.

3. A better patrolling of the frontier to prevent the entry of arms and fedai from Persia and Russia.

With regard to question (1): If something could be done to give the young Armenians work and enable them to earn a living the situation would be vastly relieved. I understand that Russia will accept them willingly as workers, but not as emigrants. Were this restriction removed it would allow these unemployed to go to Roumania or the Caucasus and other places to work, obtaining money which would be sent to their families in Van. After some years' exile they would return to Van with their savings, buy back their lands, and start afresh in their villages. It seems reasonable to expect that these men would prefer remaining in peace with their money and families than mixing themselves up with revolutionary plots, where they would have everything to lose and nothing to gain. I have studied this question with my colleagues here, and I have discussed it several times with the Vali and Ferik. At first they were both against it, but now they have both come to agree that it would be a good thing for the vilayet. So much so that the other day the Vali quoted me the case of his cook, an Armenian, who used to earn 5*l.* a-month in Constantinople, and now only gets 1*l.* here, having been sent back to his native vilayet by the restriction. There are many similar cases of craftsmen here who find no scope for their craft, and simply swell the ranks of unemployed labourers.

The Vali informs me that he doubts that the Porte would remove the restriction, as it imagines that allowing the Armenians to go to Russia, where there is a Revolutionary Committee, would stimulate the movement. This seems to me to be wrong, and the Vali and Ferik themselves admit it.

These starving unemployed have already been enrolled as fedai; they have absolutely nothing to look forward to from the Government, which prevents them from working, and the highfalutin ideals of the fedai propagandists give them castles in the air to think about, so that they fall an easy prey to the Van Committee which works among them, one might say almost unmolested, owing to the uselessness of the local gendarmerie. The getting work to occupy their minds, saving money, and obtaining a stake in their country, seem to me to outweigh the chance of their becoming more mixed up in the fedai movement by their stay in Russia.

The Turks attach great importance to the fact that the larger number of the professional fedai in Van are Russian Armenians or Armenians who went to Russia as children, and use this to point out that if they allowed the Armenians to go to work in Russia they would all become professional fedai. The case is different. These fedai are men who have no ties, family or proprietary, in Turkey, and nothing to fear from the Turks as long as the Turks do not catch them. For the most part they are men whose parents were killed during the massacres, or who fled to Russia, leaving behind all their worldly possessions, and thus have a great debt against the Turks. The case of the Turkish Armenian going to work in Russia and returning to his wife and family with money to start afresh is quite different, as were he to become fedai his family and property would suffer.

At present many young Armenians go to Russia to work without permission. They go surreptitiously, travelling by night, and generally paying Kurds to conduct them. It frequently happens that they are caught and killed by the gendarmes. (On

the 14th March last a band of twelve was surprised at Archag and three killed. These men, having left the country, are outlawed as fedai, and cannot return. This seems to me a far surer way of stimulating the movement.

If the Armenians were permitted to go to Russia, passports would be given; this would enable the authorities to exercise a control, and only the fedai and undesirable persons would then try to cross the frontier without passports.

In conclusion, I believe that the removal of this restriction would go a long way towards improving the economic state of the vilayet, and at the same time decrease the revolutionary movement. Two days ago the Vali called on me to discuss these questions, and he told me in confidence that if the Embassies suggested it to the Porte, and the Porte were to ask him his opinion on the advisability or not, he would reply in the affirmative.

With regard to suggestion (2), as I explained in my No. 6 of the 2nd March, there are, or were, some thirty-five fedai soldiers in Van, mostly foreigners, while practically all the young Armenians are enrolled, willingly or otherwise, as members. That the Government must do something to punish the Armenians and fedai for the events of the 3rd February is evident, but whom to punish, and how, will be difficult to decide. They cannot punish the whole male Armenian population, and under present conditions they cannot catch the real culprits. Owing to the information given by the traitor David, the Turks captured many lists of names and other compromising documents, so that they now have a pretty good idea as to who are the chief agitators in the vilayet.

On the other hand, the Armenians do not know who have and who have not been denounced, so that every one with a guilty conscience imagines that the Government knows him to be under fedai influence and intends his arrest. I believe there are thousands of young Armenians who have had relations, more or less, with the fedai who are in hiding on this account. If the Government would promulgate a pardon to these gentry, while arresting or outlawing the real fedai and local agitators, it would relieve the present situation of suspense and distrust. The troops, when strong enough to prevent the Bashi-Bozouks and Kurds from interfering, might systematically search the Armenian quarters for the culprits; and from conversations I have had with prominent Armenians, and even with the fedai chiefs, I am led to believe that no organized resistance would be made, while if the pardon to the minor delinquents were previously given no resistance at all would occur, as the real fedai would leave the town, and the remainder would probably be more easily arrested. Without this pardon, I fear that many hot-headed young Armenians, who at the present moment are firmly convinced that the Government means massacring them all, and who, since the massacre of the 23rd March and the present crisis, have been armed by the fedai to resist Moslem attacks on the Armenian quarter [?]. If the troops commence to search their quarter, these youths, thinking the Government wishes to arrest them, may, as a last resource, be induced to defend themselves and lead to complications. I mentioned this suggestion in cypher telegram of the 30th March, and I have had many conversations with the Vali and Ferik about it, and I have hopes that they will take my advice.

For suggestion (3) the most desirable solution would be, if some arrangement could be arrived at between Russia, Turkey, and Persia, to insure all three combining to prevent the passage of arms and fedai over their frontiers. At present Persia is the delinquent. Few fedai pass direct from Russia to Turkey, the usual method being to cross from Russia into Persia, where no difficulties are met; they rest at Salmas, and then cross over into Turkey, with the aid of the border Kurds. If the Persians could be persuaded to discountenance this, it would be a severe blow to the fedai. Unfortunately I fear the prospects of such an arrangement are faint. Failing this, it remains to the Turks to patrol their frontier better. The cordon of troops they have had on the frontier for this purpose is entirely inadequate, and its sole purpose seems to be to annoy harmless travellers on the main roads, while bands of pillaging Kurds or fedai are allowed to pass with impunity by the less frequented roads.

To insure an effective cordon more troops would be required, and these should be distributed about the villages on the less frequented roads.

To sum up, the economic situation of the vilayet is appalling, and it would be relieved by the removal of the restriction against Armenians leaving to find work. Though the local authorities are in favour of this, they fear that the Porte will say that this would stimulate the revolutionary movement, whereas, although in some few individual cases it might produce harm, in thousands of others it would produce nothing but good results, and in my opinion is the only practical measure, under the

circumstances, to relieve the situation, a good and just administration being seemingly impossible.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BERTRAM DICKSON.

[16963] No. 74.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May 18*)

(No. 255.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May 13, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of two despatches from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum respecting the distress caused in that vilayet by the high price of food-stuffs. As Mr. Shipley stated that the Vali had appealed in vain to the Central Government for funds to enable him to buy seed for distribution among the villagers, I took an opportunity of urging the Sublime Porte to extend some assistance to the vilayet in its urgent need, and I am happy to say that a sum of £T. 15,000 has now been sent to Erzeroum through the Agricultural Bank for disposal by the Vali.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY

Inclosure 1 in No. 74.

Consul Shipley to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 15.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, April 9, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to report to you that a somewhat serious state of affairs, calling, I venture to think, for immediate and earnest attention on the part of the Government, has been created in this vilayet from an economic point of view by the present almost unprecedentedly high prices of food-stuffs and forage of all kinds, and this notwithstanding the fact that the harvest of last year, as reported by Mr. Young in his despatch No. 67 of the 28th October last, was not at all a bad one. Thus, wheat which last autumn was sold in the Erzeroum market at about 4*s.* 8*d.* the bushel of some 64 lbs., has now gone up to 9*s.* per bushel, with a corresponding increase in the price of bread of from 2¾*d.* per oke of 2¾ lbs. to about 5*d.* per oke, at which it now stands. Similarly the price of barley has during the same period increased from about 1*s.* 8*d.* per bushel of 56 lbs. to no less than 5*s.* per bushel, while hay and straw have also gone up in practically the same proportion. As, owing to the snow, the live-stock in this district is unable to graze for a period of nearly five months, it will readily be understood what a serious loss the increase in the price of the two last-named commodities has occasioned the peasants. Fortunately the spring is at length at hand, or the consequences would be likely to prove still more disastrous.

As regards the increase in the price of bread, it is, I need hardly say, the poorer classes of the population—both Mussulman and Christian—who are most immediately affected, and the amount of the distress prevailing may be estimated by the fact that certain of the Armenian school-children even have had to be provided with bread by the Metropolitanate. The approaching summer, by facilitating the importation of grain from other vilayets more fortunately situated, may possibly afford some relief, though I am told that this hope is but a slight one; but, failing this, the distress above alluded to is likely to become still more acute, as I see otherwise no prospect, at any rate until next harvest, of any appreciable fall in prices, unless, indeed, the matter is taken in hand by the authorities with a view of applying a remedy. One of the worst features, perhaps, in the situation is that, as reported by Mr. Young in his despatch above referred to, there appears to be an ample supply of wheat in the vilayet and in the granaries of Erzeroum itself, and that the present scarcity has, I am informed, been largely brought about by artificial means, or, in other words, by the operations of a few wealthy speculators, who last autumn, having formed themselves into a ring, made large purchases of grain and forage, which they have been withholding for the purpose, of course, of controlling the market and enhancing the prices. That they have been able to do this so effectually, notwithstanding the fact that their operations did not pass unperceived by the population, as is shown by the riot which took place in September last, is due partly to the chronic state of poverty of the majority of the peasants, which tempted the latter to sell, and

partly to the general paralysis of the Local Government during the harvest months of last year. It is further to be noted that an operation of the kind above referred to is greatly facilitated at Erzeroum by the fact, of which the operators are of course well aware, that during a period of some five months every year competition by means of the importation of grain from outside is rendered practically impossible owing to the extreme difficulty of the communications and the consequent great increase in the cost of transport. The most obvious way of preventing the formation in future of these rings would be that the Government should either keep a reserve of grain itself or should provide Erzeroum with easier means of access to the sea, and in the meantime, in view of the exceptional circumstances, it might fairly be expected to come to the aid of the population by making purchases itself for resale on easier terms to the latter.

Serious, however, as the outlook may be said to be, it is rendered still worse by a general shortage of seed for the spring sowing, due to the fact that the villagers have been obliged to encroach on their stores for food for themselves and their families. As this shortage, unless a remedy is speedily found, means a deficiency in this year's crops, I need not enlarge upon the consequences to the people next winter should the present scarcity be followed up by a failure in the harvest. The Governor-General, Abdul Wahab Pasha, with whom I have spoken on the matter, has assured me that he is fully alive to the danger, and that he has been repeatedly urging on the authorities at Constantinople the necessity of furnishing him with funds for the purpose of procuring seed for distribution among the villagers. Whether his Excellency, however, whose health is by no means good, will succeed in obtaining the necessary funds seems to me to be very doubtful. Up to the present I can see no indication that such distribution is being taken in hand, and the situation is further aggravated by the fact that the Agricultural Bank, which, every spring, is accustomed to make advances to the villagers of grain for sowing purposes, has this year, I am informed, declined to do so owing to an embargo having been laid on the stores by the military authorities to insure a sufficient supply of provisions necessitated by the various movements of troops referred to by me in previous despatches.

I should add that a similar state of scarcity is prevailing over a large part of the vilayet. The distress among the Armenians in Khinis, however, seems to be particularly widespread and acute, and I am informed that several deaths have occurred owing to privation and want of proper nourishment. This district is subject to the depredations and exactions of the Kurds, and here, as in Mousb, there can be no permanent improvement in the situation without a radical change in the policy of the Government towards the latter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. S. SHIPLEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 74.

Consul Shipley to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 21.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, April 25, 1908.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 15 of the 9th instant on the present high prices of food-stuffs and shortage of seed corn over a considerable portion of this vilayet, I have the honour to report to you that, in an interview which I had a day or two ago with the Governor-General, Abdul Wahab Pasha, I took an opportunity of asking the latter whether the representations which he was good enough to inform me he had been making to the Central Government at Constantinople, with view of remedying the last-mentioned state of things, had led to any result. The reply, as I feared would be the case, was in the negative, his Excellency adding that a deaf ear had been turned to all his appeals for funds to enable him to come to the assistance of the peasants. He had, he said, absolutely no money at his disposal, and the only remaining expedient, I gathered from some further remarks of his Excellency, would be to effect a loan with the branch of the Imperial Ottoman Bank established in this town, but any attempt in this direction, he was well aware, would be entirely useless unless supported at head-quarters in Constantinople.

There seems, therefore, every likelihood of the people being left to shift for themselves, and under these conditions I hardly see how a deficiency in this year's crops is to be avoided. Some of the villages, especially those in the immediate vicinity of Erzeroum, are no doubt better off than others, and even in the poorer districts the more wealthy among the peasants may be able to effect practically the usual amount of sowing. But,

then allowing for this, the fact that seed corn is now selling at nearly 9s. the bushel, or practically double what it was last year, can scarcely, as far as the poorer class of agriculturists are concerned—and these, unfortunately, form the large majority—fail to reduce seriously the area under cultivation. It must further be borne in mind that, in a province almost purely agricultural and pastoral as that of Erzeroum is, the smallest diminution in the annual yield makes itself at once felt, and even in the best seasons the margin left over for the poorer cultivator is by no means large.

With regard to the question of distribution of seed corn from charitable sources, referred to in your telegram of the 11th instant, and in my telegram in reply of the 13th of the same month, the need of money on the part of the Administration appears to be so pressing that I fear that no guarantee could be given that some, at any rate, of such relief, if given on a large scale and without personal supervision, would not fall into the hands of the tax-gatherers. A member of the American Mission in this town has informed me that he has been distributing seed corn among the Armenian villages in Khinis from sums which have been placed at his disposal by charitable persons in England and America, nor had he as yet had any reason to complain of the authorities on the above score. But the amount which he had been able so to distribute was comparatively insignificant, and he added that some five years ago, when engaged on similar relief work in Mousb, cases of confiscation by tax-gatherers had come within his own personal knowledge.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. S. SHIPLEY.

[16965] No. 75.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 257.) *Pera, May 13, 1908.*
Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 202 of the 21st ultimo, in which I informed you of the action taken by the Embassy to obtain the suppression of Kassim Bey, the persecutor of the Armenians of Mousb, I have the honour to transmit copy of a further despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum, inclosing reports from the dragoman at Bitlis, respecting the proceedings of this miscreant.

My representations could scarcely have had their effect when these reports were written, but you will notice in the last, which is dated the 11th April, that Kassim Bey was then keeping quiet. As Mr. Shipley points out, the only other satisfactory feature in these records is the continued energy displayed by the Acting Vali of Bitlis.

The statement as to the expected return of Tahir Pasha to Bitlis at an early date is no doubt erroneous.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 75.

Consul Shipley to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 22.) *Erzeroum, April 27, 1908.*
Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the copies of three further despatches, which I have received from Mr. Safrastian, dragoman in charge of His Majesty's Vice-Consulate at Bitlis, on the deplorable state of the Armenians in his district.

The distress in Khizan to the south of Bitlis, referred to in his despatch of the 11th instant, appears to be particularly great, and to be further aggravated by the fact that the distribution of relief by the American missionaries has been prohibited by the authorities of that district. The prevailing state of misery would also now seem to have extended to the town of Bitlis itself, and the only redeeming feature in fact to which Mr Safrastian would appear to be able to point is the energy which the Acting Vali, Fedzi Bey, continues to display in his efforts to maintain order, notwithstanding the difficulties in his way.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. S. SHIPLEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 75.

Mr. Safrastian to Consul Shipley.

Sir, *Bitlis, March 28, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to report as follows upon the present situation of the Armenians in the Plain of Moush:—

After the short repose of a few days reported by my despatch of the last week, Kassim Bey has come out again to oppress the Armenians of the eastern part of the plain. Since his last murder at Mushegshen (my despatch of the 14th instant), nobody else is assassinated, but he is going on calling always at villages followed by several Kurds and extorting heavy sums of money from them under threats of life. Except the cash money exacted from the so-called well-to-do, their presence in villages costs to Armenians rather unbearable sums. In the course of the current week, the villagers of Vartenis, they told me, had spent 8 Turkish liras to feed Kassim Bey and his ninety Kurds during two days, besides the clothing and ornaments which Kurds require for their own girls or wives. This organized robbery on the part of Kassim Bey will plunge the villagers still more deeply into debts, and will push them with more rapidity to a state of starvation. The few independent Armenian farmers who exist still in that region are in danger of the final ruin. They told me that one Tigran, of Ardonk, who possessed plough buffaloes and oxen, was compelled to sell some of them in order to pay the 6 liras which Kassim Bey was requiring from him lately. Some quantity of corn of an Armenian of Vartenis, buried in a wall, was discovered at random, and the whole corn seized by Kassim Bey, &c.

Some fugitives of the mentioned place had gone to home to see their families. They had, however, not even been able to enter the villages, hearing that Kassim Bey was in the neighbourhood, so they came back again here.

The exodus of Armenians from the district in question, anticipated on so many occasions, has begun on a large scale. As the snows are thawing now at daytime, and therefore a hard surface is being formed at night, whole families are running away secretly, and going some to the country of Haideranli Hussein Pasha, of Patnotz (Van), others taking the road to the Vilayet of Erzeroum.

The Public Prosecutor of the Vilayet of Sivas, who arrived here some time ago on a mission of inspection, has gone to Moush to inquire, it is said, into the affair of Kassim Bey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. S. SAFRASTIAN, *Dragoman.*

Inclosure 3 in No. 75.

Mr. Safrastian to Consul Shipley.

Sir, *Bitlis, April 4, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to report as follows upon the present state of things in this vilayet.

On the Sunday last eight Armenians were arrested and imprisoned here, after their houses being inspected by the police. In some of the searched houses some books have been found, and only in one a revolver and a few rifle cartridges were discovered and taken away. The arrested men are rather honourable persons and some of the leading merchants of the town. Two days ago a monastery near the town was searched, and again arrests in the town.

The Acting Vali informed me that the Government is in receipt of certain reports ("ikhbars"), on the strength of which the arrests have been effected. He stated at the same time that, notwithstanding the fact of this question's being insignificant one, he was bound to offer attention to a communication, in order not to be held responsible in future.

This arbitrary step of the Government has produced a great consternation among the Christian population. As a first result, the few Armenian merchants who had already placed orders with their agents at Constantinople to buy goods have countermanded the given orders by telegraph.

For the last few months the general despair and hopelessness amongst the Armenians has reached to the highest pitch. Months before the meeting of the Second Hague Peace Conference false hopes were scattered, at least all over this vilayet, that the

Powers were going to consider the question of reforms in the Conference. The subsequent disappointment, however, was soon forgotten by the publication of the Anglo-Russian Convention of the August last. Widespread rumours and comments were in circulation at that time to the effect that there were still additional and unpublished dispositions in the Convention, touching the matters of the Near East. Months went on and nothing came out of all these unfounded expectations.

In the course of the current year the outrages perpetrated by Kassim Bey, of Khevner, upon the Armenians of the Plain of Moush; the hostile feelings among the Moslems here against the Armenians, roused by the wildest rumours concerning the events at Van; the prevailing stagnation of commerce and the other activities of life; the public insecurity and the possible state of anarchy, as was the case in the autumn past, which probably will recommence with the approaching spring; and, as the ending scene, the recent discouraging arrests and searches in the town have pushed the Armenians to the worst pessimism as to their nearest future.

From the leading Notables and merchants downwards to the daily bread-winners, all think about one thing alone, namely, to emigrate to other vilayets, or to America, if they can afford the expenses of the journey. Hands seem to have been tied by the fetters of gloomy forebodings, few people showing intention to undertake business.

It is to be hoped, however, that the order will be maintained more or less by the most praiseworthy efforts of the Acting Vali, by whose strong steps a crisis was avoided last autumn. Otherwise, I am afraid that hundreds will leave the town by the earliest opportunity.

Situation in Moush.—From various quarters there are proofs that Kassim Bey, of Khevner, and all his Kurds are keeping quiet now, it is understood, under the strict orders of the Government of Moush. But, as I had the honour to report by my preceding despatch, wholesale fights are going on from various villages. All their provisions being exhausted by Kurds, they will die from starvation if they remain at home.

The Acting Vali told me that Savfet Pasha, the Mutessarif of Moush, is going soon to be dismissed and recalled.

(Confidential.)

Hilmi Bey, an official of the Treasury here, who is in contact with the best sources of information, told me yesterday that the Public Prosecutor of Sivas, sent to Moush to inquire into the question of Kassim Bey (my despatch of the 28th ultimo), has telegraphed here privately that a serious anti-Christian agitation is prevailing among the Mussulman population at Moush. In order to prevent the alleged outbreak, I presume, Izzet Pasha, the Commandant of Gendarmerie here, was suddenly sent to Moush on the 1st instant, accompanied by some thirty gendarmes. Feizi Bey stated that Izzet Pasha was dispatched to Moush to support the proceedings of the Public Prosecutor of Sivas, and that there was no other reason. I am unfortunately not in a position to say anything positive about the state of affairs at Moush, except that the sudden dispatch of the old and diseased Alai Bey to Moush may have probably some ground.

Travellers state that some fifty Armenians have lately been imprisoned in Bulanik, most probably on revolutionary grounds.

Winter is going on still severely in various parts of the vilayet. For the last few days it is snowing here as it did in January, and there is a thick layer of snow on the earth. Prices are high as before, some victuals and fuel standing at the highest prices possible in these countries. Partial emigration of the neighbouring villagers is growing daily, who are going indiscriminately southwards to Diarbekir, where there is work to find and the bread is very cheap.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. S. SAFRASTIAN, *Dragoman.*

Inclosure 4 in No. 75.

Mr. Safrastian to Consul Shipley.

Sir, *Bitlis, April 11, 1908.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 14th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the reservists of this town were called out in the course of the current week, amounting to some 400 soldiers. These Redifs are so far dressed only, but not armed. In the districts of Moush and Saird also the Redifs are reported to have been called out some days ago, and are standing on a footing ready to any eventuality.

Kassim Bey, of Kheiner.

Kassim Bey seems to keep quiet and behave more or less well. The Acting Vali told me that Mushir Zekki Pasha, of the IVth Army Corps, is openly protecting him with all his powers, and that on his (Acting Vali's) attempting to institute a judicial proceeding against Kassim Bey the former is threatening to him with disguised violence.

Situation in Khizan.

A rich Kurd of Bitlis, who for the last three weeks has gone to Khizan for shooting, has written a letter to the Protestant pastor here, asking for some relief for the starving Armenians, describing to him at the same time the deplorable famine which prevails in that district. He has written that on his way to Khizan he had seen three Armenians dying from starvation in Gatine, a village in the nahié of Tadig. He, being a Kurd and of the oppressive type of Sclandar, talks awfully on the situation in Khizan, concluding his letter by the words that "if this state will go on any longer, the Christians will be exterminated ('mahv') from long starvation," &c.

Again, according to the latest trustworthy information, conversions of Armenians to Islam are taking appalling proportions all over Khizan; the Armenian village of Taroniz is reported to be on the verge of embracing Islam *en masse*, to relieve itself of the unceasing persecutions and irresistible starvation.

The American missionaries here had sent a small sum of relief to Khizan to be distributed among the most needy cases. I hear at the last moment that the distributors have been forbidden by the local authority to distribute it. After consulting with the missionaries, I will bring the matter to the notice of the Acting Vali if they desire it, and urge him to send orders to Khizan to the effect that the distributors may be allowed to do their work.

Misery in the Neighbourhood.

The general distress and misery in the other parts of the vilayet are of the most lamentable nature. The conditions of ever-growing starvation are getting worse and worse every day and most ruining in their immediate consequences. As I have had the honour to refer to this matter in my previous despatches, gangs of half-starved and naked Armenians—men, women, and children—coming from Bulanik, Akhlat, and the neighbouring villages, are passing through Bitlis to go down to Bisheri and Diarbakir and find some livelihood in those districts; and I know only of those emigrants who pass through this town.

The price of corn is down to 18 piastres the kel. In Bulanik and Kelazgerd, however, it has been raised to 20 piastres—an unprecedented price for the latter districts.

Still more menacing is the famine of the fodder. Cattle and sheep are living now on fresh boughs cut from willow and other trees. A freezing wind is blowing still in the neighbourhood of Bitlis, which delayed much the thaw. In my humble opinion, the agriculture will heavily pay for this: firstly, because the sowing will be rather late; and, secondly, as the cattle are weakened by the prevailing famine, they will be able to open only shallow furrows, and the seed is likely to be less fruitful.

Tahir Pasha, the Vali of Bitlis, has telegraphed to his wife that he has left Sarai (Van) a few days ago, and that he will reach Bitlis shortly.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. S. SAFRASTIAN, *Dragoman.*

[17089] No. 76.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 18.)

Sir, *India Office, May 15, 1908.*

IN continuation of the correspondence forwarded with the letter of this Office, dated the 11th ultimo, as to the dispute regarding the property of the Sheikh of Koweit at Fao, I am directed by Viscount Morley to inclose, for the consideration of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegram from the Government of India, dated the 23rd ultimo, supporting a recommendation of the Political Resident at Bushire that the Turkish Government should be moved to agree to the

Sheikh's request for the appointment of a Committee to adjudicate on the subject on which not only he and the Turkish authorities, but the British Government also, should be represented.

The proposal in the form in which it has been made by the Sheikh may perhaps be considered impracticable. But Lord Morley considers it desirable, from the point of view of local British interests at Koweit, that the Sheikh's complaints should be represented to the Turkish Government with a view to the protection of his rights, and he would be glad to be favoured with Sir E. Grey's views on the subject.

A copy of Lord George Hamilton's telegram of the 14th February, 1899, referred to in the Viceroy's telegram, is inclosed for convenience of reference. Also copies of further papers on the subject inclosed in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 9th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 76.

Government of India to Mr. Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *April 23, 1908.*

AFFAIRS in Koweit.

We would invite reference to letter of the 3rd February last from Political Agent, Koweit, to Resident, Persian Gulf, forwarded with weekly letter of the 19th ultimo, from our Foreign Secretary, relating to destruction by Turkish soldiers of Sheikh's property at Fao.

Following telegram, dated the 12th instant, now received from Major Cox:—

"I found Sheikh of Koweit greatly aggrieved by action of Turks in regard to his Fao estate when I visited him a few days ago. He requests that Porte may be pressed by us to consent to meeting at Fao of a Committee consisting of a representative of Vali, a representative of Sheikh Mubarak, and either Major Knox or Mr. Crow on our behalf, who would examine position on the spot in the light of documents in Sheikh's possession. Mubarak will have no further grievance if he is shown to have encroached or to have exceeded his rights. On the other hand, he urges that compensation should be insisted on, and a guarantee obtained from the Turkish Government giving him immunity from future arbitrary oppression, if demolition of his dyke by the Turks proves to have been unjustifiable, as he contends. I hope that it will be possible to recommend proposed course to His Majesty's Government, as request of Sheikh seems reasonable."

In his telegram of the 14th February, 1899, Lord George Hamilton, in approving the ratification of our Agreement with Koweit, authorized a hope that His Majesty's Government would do what they could to protect Sheikh in matter of Fao estate being held out to Mubarak. We support Major Cox's recommendation in view of this assurance.

Inclosure 2 in No. 76.

Lord George Hamilton to Government of India.

(Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, February 14, 1899.*

YOUR telegram of the 12th: Koweit Agreement.

You may ratify it, and as regards estates of Mubarak and brothers near Fao, a hope may be held out to the Sheikh that we will do what we can to protect them.

Inclosure 3 in No. 76.

Major Cox to Government of India.

Bushire, March 15, 1908.

IN continuation of my telegram dated 10th March, 1908, I have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copies of the

communications which I have received from the Political Agent, Koweit, on the subject of Sheikh Mubarak's difficulties with the Turks in connection with his Fao properties.

Inclosure 4 in No. 76.

Major Knox to Major Cox.

Koweit, March 3, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that this morning Sheikh Jabir-bin-Mubarak paid me a visit.

2. In the course of the interview I happened to ask casually, mentioning that I had omitted to make inquiries from his father, how the matter of Turkish interference with the Sheikh's Fao properties had terminated, and how matters stood now.

3. I was hardly prepared for the reply, which was that everything was quite quiet, and that nothing had happened in the past to justify all the fuss and trouble that his father had been making. A few inquiries and remonstrances were made, and hence all this complaining. Sheikh Jabir informed me that he did not tell his father this, but was letting me know privately.

4. I was obliged to reply that no doubt the Sheikh felt justified in making an outcry even on the slightest threat of Turkish encroachment, as, if it was not for his persuading the English to make inquiries, these slight threats might develop into serious complications.

5. The idea of Sheikh Jabir making such an unfavourable criticism of his father's actions is so novel that I refrain from further comment until the situation develops.

Inclosure 5 in No. 76.

Major Knox to Major Cox.

Koweit, March , 1908.

IN confirmation of my Confidential letter dated the 3rd March, 1908, on the subject of Sheikh Mubarak's Fao properties and Turkish encroachment, I have the honour to inform you that this afternoon when I visited Sheikh Mubarak, the latter informed me spontaneously that the trouble appeared to be over for the time, as he had written to his Excellency the Wali of Bussorah explaining the circumstances, and a Turkish Committee had sat on the question and decided that the embankments need not be interfered with, but had also expressed the opinion that they obstructed the view from the fort, and that the repair of the embankments should not be permitted.

2. The Sheikh informed me that repairs were carried out three or four times yearly, as needed, but he did not ask me to take any steps towards the rescinding of the order.

Inclosure 6 in No. 76.

Memorandum by the Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, dated March 4, 1908.

(Confidential.)
(Extract.)

° ° ° ° °

8. *Anti-English Stories.* I have not heard anything of these for a long time, but the following two stories are now being commonly circulated. First that Sheikh Mubarak, of Koweit, claimed some land which had recently been thrown up by the sea, adjoining his property near Fao. Mazim Pasha claimed this on behalf of the Turkish Government, and when the Sheikh was obdurate, Mazim Pasha sent the Turkish gun-boat "Alus" to uphold the rights of the Sultan. It is said that the "Alus" found a British man-of-war on the spot, which prevented the "Alus" from taking any action.

The second story is that Sheikh Mubarak has a small fort on his lands near Bussorah, and that Mazim Pasha heard that it was full of arms; he therefore called on the Sheikh to hand up the arms, and threatened to take them by force. The Sheikh

is reported to have said that he would not give up the arms, and to have warned Mazim Pasha that he was raising rather important questions. It is said that when Mazim Pasha sent soldiers to take the arms, they found the British flag flying on the fort. I do not know whether there is any kind of foundation for these stories; perhaps the Sheikh of Koweit has recently taken to using the trucial flag on his vessels.

[14611] No. 77.

Foreign Office to Mr. D. Fraser.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 18, 1908.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 11th ultimo, requesting his support in an application to the Ottoman Government for compensation on account of injuries received by you in consequence of an attack made on you by an Arab horseman in the neighbourhood of Urfa on the 25th December, 1907.

I am to inform you, in reply, that, after careful consideration of the statement inclosed in your letter, Sir E. Grey is of opinion that no claim *ex debito justitiæ* presented to the Ottoman Government on your behalf would have any chance of success.

It is unusual to travel in the interior of Turkey without an escort, and it was especially undesirable to do so on a journey such as you were making, in view of the fact that you were not following the main route. So far as Sir E. Grey is able to perceive, you had no intimation either from the Vali or from His Majesty's Consular authorities, or even good reason to believe, that the district through which you were about to travel was safe for any one without an escort; and that you, yourself, realized the danger would appear from the fact that you spent two hours at Aktchi Kalaah endeavouring to find an escort.

Sir E. Grey cannot but consider it unfortunate that you did not wait until some guard was forthcoming, since the presence of one zaptieh, or even of a guide furnished by the local authorities, would have sufficed to fix on the Ottoman Government the responsibility for what afterwards occurred. As, however, you left Aktchi Kalaah unattended, except by your own servants, and in the absence of any proof that negligence or want of proper care on the part of the authorities contributed to the possibility of this lamentable outrage, it does not appear that the Sublime Porte can in any way be held responsible for the consequences of your action.

With regard to the advisability of applying to the Sultan for compensation on your behalf as an act of grace, I am to state that as such action on His Majesty's part would constitute a precedent which might be made the basis of similar claims in future, it is unlikely that such a request would be favourably entertained. Sir E. Grey is, however, in consultation with His Majesty's Minister at Constantinople as to whether any steps of the nature indicated can usefully be taken on your behalf.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[17217] No. 78.

M. Cambon to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 19.)

M. le Secrétaire d'État, *Londres, le* 18 *Mai*, 1908.

VOTRE Excellence avait bien voulu me communiquer, par sa note du 22 Avril dernier, copies des lettres échangées entre les Consuls de France et de Grande-Bretagne à Mascate, au sujet de l'Arrangement relatif aux boutres portant pavillon Français, et du projet de Proclamation qui doit être publié dans le Sultanat pour faire connaître les termes de cet Arrangement.

Mon Gouvernement avait eu connaissance, par l'intermédiaire de M. Lecomte, des documents en question; il se félicite de l'accord qui s'est établi, grâce à l'esprit de conciliation dont ont fait preuve nos Agents à Mascate, et il me charge d'annoncer à votre Excellence qu'il approuve le texte de la Proclamation; il n'y aurait donc aucun inconvénient à ce que cette dernière fût publiée à bref délai.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) PAUL CAMBON.

[17364] No. 79.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 20.)

Sir, *India Office, May 20, 1908.*

IN continuation of previous correspondence ending with the letter of this Office dated the 6th May, 1908, as to the supply of oxide from the Island of Abu Musa to Messrs. Wönckhaus, I am directed by Viscount Morley to inclose, to be laid before Secretary Sir E. Grey, copy of a telegram from the Government of India, dated the 15th May, 1908.

Major Cox reports that for the next three or four months no serious operations are said to be possible for transporting the accumulated minerals from inland to the beach, and that Messrs. Wönckhaus are understood to have no intention of taking more minerals in the near future.

In these circumstances no further action seems required at present in the matter of the temporary arrangements for supplying Messrs. Wönckhaus with oxide contemplated in your letter of the 23rd ultimo.

It will be observed that the Government of India suggest that the German Government should be told how the matter stands, and asked as to the date, &c., of any further shipments to be made by Messrs. Wönckhaus. It might suffice, pending the submission of the reply to the German case, that Major Cox should be instructed to ask Messrs. Wönckhaus' local representative to give due notice when the firm intend to resume operations, with a view to the necessary arrangements being made.

Lord Morley would be glad to be favoured with Sir E. Grey's views as to the course to be followed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 79.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *May 15, 1908.*

ABU MUSA. Your telegram dated the 1st instant.

Resident, Persian Gulf, telegraphed on the 9th instant as follows:—

"It is clear that the introduction of another agent for transport of minerals accumulated near mines would complicate accounts and operations, owing to the fact that price per ton paid by German firm includes delivery on board, and that Hasan has possession of transport and loading gear. In these circumstances I visited Lingah, and proposed to Hasan that he should proceed with transportation of accumulated minerals from inland to beach, after giving me a suitable undertaking as before. He replied, after consulting Brown, that, owing to excessive heat or drought, no serious transport operations will be possible for next three or four months, and that work has always been suspended during the summer in the past. Hasan further stated that, whereas German firm have hitherto always given him three or four months' previous notice of their wish to send a ship, he has always been told by Brown that latter is not aware of any intention to take more minerals in the near future on the part of his principals. Secretary of State's instructions that a limited quantity should be made available each month would scarcely appear, therefore, to be applicable to local circumstances. I suggest, therefore, for consideration, that the German Government should be apprised of the above facts, and that they should be informed that there remain on the beach some 400 tons of oxide, and, according to Hasan's estimate, about 2,000 tons of saleable quality near the mine.

"German Government might be requested to ascertain and inform us approximately of the following points:—

"1. The number of instalments in which German firm will desire to ship this amount of oxide;

"2. The amount of oxide which the next ship will require; and

"3. The probable date contemplated for her arrival."

The course which Major Cox suggests might be followed, unless you see any objection.

[17624] No. 80 A.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 84.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, May 22, 1908.*

INCIDENTS on Russo-Persian frontier. My despatch No. 210 of the 30th ultimo. Following official announcement has been made here:—

On the 20th instant a communication was addressed by Russian General to the Governor-General of Tabreez, to effect that unless an indemnity was received for loss of Russian lives and property, Russian troops would cross the frontier and satisfaction would be exacted, if necessary, by execution of those concerned, and by destruction of villages. Persians were given until mid-day to-day to reply. Persian Legation here is in communication with Russian Government on the subject.

[17753] No. 80 B.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 23.)

(No. 85.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, May 23, 1908.*

INCIDENTS on Russo-Persian frontier. My immediately preceding telegram. Russian demands for indemnity.

A request made by Persian Chargé d'Affaires for delay of fifteen days was referred to Governor of Caucasus, who has given his consent.

[17370] No. 80.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 20.)

(No. 112.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, May* 20, 1908.

I HAVE received the following telegram from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Van.

The search for the revolutionaries connected with the recent disorders began on the 19th instant.

Aram and twelve of the chief native "fedais" had been hiding in an underground catacomb, and, this place having been disclosed to the authorities by an informer, these men were all taken prisoners without their being able to fire a shot.

Their capture has dealt a severe blow to the cause of the revolutionaries, and the search is likely to be successful, as it is carried out in an orderly way.

It is reported that Aram is supplying information to the authorities.

[17807] No. 81.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 25.)

(No. 260.)
Sir, *Pera, May* 16, 1908.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 257 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to transmit copy of a further despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum inclosing reports from the dragoman of the Vice-Consulate at Bitlis.

The dismissal of the Mutessarif of Mush and the proceedings against Kassim Bey which Mr. Safrastian relates are a satisfactory result of the representations of the Russian Ambassador and of this Embassy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 81.

Consul Shipley to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 24.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, May* 5, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the copies of two despatches which I have received from Mr. Safrastian, dragoman in charge of His Majesty's Vice-Consulate at Bitlis, in the latter of which he reports that the Mutessarif of Mush has been finally dismissed and recalled.

Mr. Safrastian's despatch of the 18th April, after dealing with the interpretation of the allusion to the Christians contained in the Imperial telegram to the Mussulmans of Bitlis referred to in his despatch of the 7th March last, is mainly concerned with the case of the eight Armenians whose arrest at Bitlis was reported by him in his despatch of the 4th ultimo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. S. SHIPLEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 81.

Mr. Safrastian to Consul Shipley.

Sir, *Bitlis, April* 18, 1908.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 7th ultimo, and your letter of the 7th of the same, I have the honour to state that in saying "that they (Moslems) must behave well with the Armenians" my meaning was based on the local experience and conception according to which such Imperial telegrams, as on some previous occasions, have been construed—at least, by both peoples here—as some kind of warning to the Mahommedans to be ready for any eventual occurrence. It is said that that

particular manner of expression in the mouth of the Palace is understood to mean something else to the Moslems, that is, the meaning is to be taken in a reversed sense. Personally I have no such experience; I cannot therefore say whether there is anything in it or not. I humbly venture, however, to state that all is now quiet here except the general despair and hopelessness of the Armenians as to their future (my despatch of the 4th instant). The eight Armenians imprisoned here for the last three weeks are still kept in prison. Once only they have been questioned by the Examining Magistrate as to their reported intention of emigrating to America and exciting others to follow their example. The object of their emigration to America, according to the Examining Magistrate, must have been to collect money from the rich Armenians there, to buy arms with these funds, and push the Armenians to rise.

I am told, however, that none of the prisoners have expressed any desire to emigrate. There are many, it is true, who are in the process of getting passports and will leave the country at the first opportunity; but not these rather prosperous merchants whose pecuniary standing, it seems, is alluring the non-paid Presidents of Courts.

I heard from a Turkish official that false witnesses are being prepared to frighten the prisoners and bring them thus to consent to pay satisfactory sums of bakshish. It is, however, to be seen whether this statement has any foundation or not.

As reported last week, I consulted the American missionaries here whether they desired the Acting Vali to be informed of the prohibition of the distribution of relief by local authority in Khizan. They told me that, the sum being a very small one, it was not worth while; besides, they did not know in what conditions the distribution was prohibited.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. SAFRASTIAN.

Inclosure 3 in No. 81.

Mr. Safrastian to Consul Shipley.

Sir, *Bitlis, April 25, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the following changes in the Administration of the Vilayet of Bitlis have taken place in the course of the current week:—

The Mutessarif of Mush.—With reference to my despatch of the 4th instant, Savfet Pasha, the hated Mutessarif of Mush, has been finally dismissed and recalled. It is said that he is removed also from the service, and with all probability he should not be appointed to a new post at least for a good many years. The new Mutessarif, Kiamil Pasha, the late Governor of Elbasan, is expected to arrive shortly.

The Mektubji here told me that, soon after the arrival of the new Mutessarif at Mush, Khalil Effendi, the Mayor, some other oppressive officials and Notables of Mush, and Kassim Bey, of Khevnor, will possibly be arrested and exiled somewhere else. The latter has already been summoned to Mush by the Courts as well as some of his followers.

The Mektubji went on to say that, although he did not know it officially, yet many others with him were unanimous in thinking that Kassim Bey was stopped in his outrageous treatment of Armenians, thanks to the representations of the British Embassy, &c.

The Russian Consulate.—M. Chivkow, the Russian Consul here, left Bitlis on leave some days ago. M. Akimovitch, an official of the Russian Foreign Office, will act during his absence.

The Commandant of Gendarmerie.—With reference to my despatch of the 7th March last, Izzet Pasha, the Commandant of Gendarmerie here, has been dismissed and ordered to go to Diarbekir. The new Alai Bey of Bitlis, Salih Khairi Bey, will arrive soon from Diarbekir.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. SAFRASTIAN.

[17810] No. 82.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 265.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May 18, 1908.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 233 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Van, reporting as to the situation in that district.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 82.

Vice-Consul Dickson to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 14.)
Sir, *Van, April 20, 1908.*

IN confirmation of my telegram of the 17th instant, I have the honour to inform you that the state of affairs in Van remains practically the same as reported in my No. 9 of the 6th March.

The Vali is afraid of incurring the displeasure of a small section of Turks by punishing the assassins and instigators of the massacre of the 23rd March. In a conversation with me he excused himself with the argument that it would be unfair to punish the Moslems without first punishing the "fedai." As he frankly admitted that he did not expect to catch any of the real "fedai," the obvious inference is that the assassins will not be punished.

Two squadrons of cavalry from Arjish and one battalion of Nizam infantry from Erzeroum have arrived here, four battalions of Redifs from the vicinity of Erzeroum, with Jelal Pasha as Brigadier, are expected to arrive within the next three weeks. These are to be distributed along the frontier and in the villages round Van, to try and stop the passage of "fedai." The Vali also informs me that two squadrons of the 15th Regiment of Hamidieh, Kiamil Bey's Shivili asshiret, are to come to Van, the remainder of the regiment going to the frontier. I understand that these two squadrons will be embodied with the regular cavalry now at Van, making squadrons of mixed regulars and Kurds under regular officers. With this system I think the Kurds will be kept pretty well in hand, and I do not personally anticipate trouble from them; but the precedent of employing Hamadieh for this work I consider bad. The Vali is extremely vague as to what he intends doing, but the general impression seems to be, and from what he tells me I should think it likely, that nothing very drastic will be done against the "fedai," and nothing at all against the assassins.

The bazaar is still closed; some few Armenians went down and opened their shops about the 6th and 7th April, but the aggressive attitude of the Bashi-Bozouks frightened them. The Vali has tried to get their representatives to persuade them to open, and asked them what they wished done. They asked for three things:—

1. The punishment of the assassins.
2. The Bashi-Bozouks to be prohibited from carrying arms.
3. That a certain Husni Bey, an officer attached to the Hamidieh, should be made responsible for the surveillance of the town, and that troops under him should be posted along the road to the city through the Moslem quarter.

The Vali would not grant (1) and (2), but appointed Husni Bey to be put in charge of the surveillance of order, &c. However, Husni Bey would not accept the responsibility without certain conditions which the Vali would not agree to, so that all three Armenian requests have been negatived; and the Armenians having little confidence in the Vali's bare promises the bazaar is still closed.

It is now four weeks since the massacre, and if the Government had taken steps to punish even one or two of the principal culprits at once (which was quite easy to do), the Armenians would have realized the good intentions of the Government towards them, their confidence would have been restored, the bazaar would have opened immediately, and there would have been a better chance of punishing the "fedai." As

it is every one is in a state of suspicion and nervous suspense, and there is an entire cessation of all trade, commerce, and agriculture in the vilayet.

This non-punishment of the culprits has had a very bad effect in the country, as the news has been passed all round among the Kurds that the Turks in Van have been massacring the Christians, and that the Government has done nothing to them. This news, probably exaggerated as it gets further, has, I hear, had a disturbing effect on the Kurds, who have been making aggressive visits to many Christian villages, occupying some and pillaging others; reports of six of such cases have already reached me in the vicinity of Van, while further south, although I have no definite information yet, I have reason to believe that things are disturbed.

Kiamil Effendi, Mudir of Archag, the man mentioned by the Ferik as stirring up trouble in his district, reported in my No. 9 of the 6th April, has been aggravating the situation in his nahié. On account of the distressing reports which came in from that quarter, and at the suggestion of the Ferik, I paid a flying visit to that district on the 14th April.

Archag and Kurukunduz are two large Armenian villages on one of the roads used by the "fedai" when passing to and from Russia. There is no doubt that the "fedai" have used these villages as halting places, though whether with or without the consent of the villagers is always a difficult question to decide. From what I gathered from Kurds and Turks in the neighbourhood, these villages do not seem to be any more guilty than any other villages in the vilayet.

Kiamil Effendi used to have a good reputation, but lately he seems to have changed, and appears to be trying to curry favour by a vigorous crusade against imaginary "fedai." With this idea he has been persecuting the local Armenians, and sending to Van grossly exaggerated reports of his successes against the unarmed villagers, reporting them as armed "fedai," and asking for troops to support him. Some few villagers are now in the prison at Archag, several have been pretty roughly handled, and none of the villagers were permitted to leave their villages, even to work in the fields. The Armenians naturally are very frightened and exaggerate everything, but some of the Christian villages in that district are owned by rich Turks who live in the villages, from these I heard that Kiamil Bey was doing a lot of harm, and that the local Kurds were really a menace at present. Nowhere where I passed were the villagers working in the fields, the reason always given being that they were afraid to leave the village on account of the menaces of their Kurd neighbours. The rayah Kurds are not working, as they say, the bazaar at Van being shut, they cannot get their implements, &c., mended. The bazaar is the pulse of the vilayet, as long as it is closed there will be unrest in the vilayet and no work done.

I am informed that of the total of corn produced in the vilayet about five-eighths is wheat and three-eighths barley. Of this three-quarters of the wheat was sown last autumn, but no barley. There remains, therefore, to be sown all the barley and one-quarter of the wheat. No work has been done up to date, and there only remains at most a fortnight before it will be too late, and the general impression is that there will be a famine this autumn.

The present Vali is a man who, by a sequence of lucky circumstances, has risen suddenly from being a telegraph clerk to Vali. He has no influential friends or relations, and no interest at the Palace; he is a fairly sensible man, is reasonable though weak, and means well. However he is frightened of loosing his post, and for that reason does not wish to make enemies of the Turkish employés, who are already jealous of his lucky promotion. He takes for a model the policy of inactivity which Tahir Pasha found successful, though, if anything, he exaggerates it. This policy is by no means a bad one in this country, given the circumstances; but when passions have been aroused it naturally takes time under this policy to restore things to their normal tranquillity. For a situation like the massacre of the 23rd March a more energetic course would have been better.

I fancy that the bazaar will open of itself gradually, and that things will calm down in the course of events, probably taking a few weeks. By that time the reinforcements of troops will have arrived, and with these distributed about, I doubt that the Hamidieh Kurds and those about Van will do anything out of the ordinary; but south of the vilayet, where the Government is nearly non-existent, it may be different. There the Christian population is Assyrian, they have a hard life among the Kurds at the best of times, and I am afraid that the garbled version of recent events in Van which will reach those parts is not likely to help them.

The Rev. Mr. Wigram, of the English Mission at Van, recently went to Kochannes, taking back with him to Tiari the boys of his school. He has telegraphed

me from Julamerk that the Kurds are very restless, and that affairs are in a bad way for the Nestorians in the south of the vilayet.

I also have news from Bitlis that the recent events have had a bad effect on the Kurds in that vilayet.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BERTRAM DICKSON,
Captain R.F.A.

[17812] No. 83.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May 25.*)

(No. 207.)
Sir, *Pera, May 19, 1908.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 214 of the 28th ultimo respecting the attack by Arabs on the "Blosse Lynch," I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah in which he suggests that by way of exacting reparation, the Sheikh of the people who first fired on the vessel should be asked to surrender two men to be shot at Amara, or heavy money compensation be required from him instead.

The Grand Vizier assures me that the six Arabs killed by the punitive expedition on which I reported in my despatch No. 200 of the 20th ultimo, belonged to the parties implicated in the attack. Moreover, any attempt on the part of the Turkish Government to exact pecuniary compensation would most probably lead to a renewal of the disorders and consequent interruption of the river service.

In these circumstances, I shall refrain from demanding further reparation unless you instruct me to the contrary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 83.

Consul Crow to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 30.)
Sir, *Bussorah, April 15, 1908.*

AS reported in my telegram No. 35 of the 13th April, the disturbances on the Tigris have ceased and the river boats are running again. The immediate cause of trouble was the farming out of certain Government lands at Mejer Saghir near Amara, of which the lease had expired. These lands had, I am told, formerly been leased to a brother of Gadban, Sheikh of the Beni Lam, named Faileh. The Turkish policy, which seems to me sound, is to gradually weaken the big tribal Sheikhs by dividing up the Government lands leased to them into small holdings and apportioning them to individual tribesmen, who would thus be brought into direct relation with the Ottoman authorities instead of farming them out *en bloc* to the Chief of a tribe, as hitherto. The Turks hope, by this method, to break up the old feudal system of land tenure and to gradually acquire greater hold over the nomad population of the Amara Sanjak by weakening the individual power of the Sheikhs.

Nazim Pasha appears to have gone about the business hurriedly and without duly considering the temperament of the Arab population with whom he had to deal. He gave the lease of Mejer Saghir to a certain Abul Nefise, a Nejdi, and an outsider, in the face of local opposition, and endeavoured to install him in his holding by armed force. The project was ill-advised, and could not be effected. The Turkish authorities explain the sudden attack on the "Blosse Lynch" by stating that the Arabs thought Nefise was on board her. This may be a plausible excuse from an Arab point of view for the first attack, as Nefise was on the river at the time, and was actually proceeding to Mejer Saghir in a sailing vessel, accompanied by Turkish soldiers, in order to take over his new leasehold, but it does not explain or excuse the second attack on the British vessel, when the firing lasted half an hour after she had left the Turkish camp and the scene of the dispute.

Tahir Pasha, the Commandant, who had been at Amara with Nazim Pasha and returned by the "Burhanieh" on the 11th April, informed me on the 13th April that the cause of trouble had been removed by cancelling the objectionable lease, and stated

that the river was, from his own personal observation, absolutely quiet, and nothing more was to be feared. I informed Messrs. Lynch's agent of this, and said that, under the circumstances, I now saw no objection to the "Blosse Lynch" leaving. I arranged, however, that the British vessel should accompany the "Barhanich," which was leaving about the same time, and would convey Nazim Pasha from Amara to Bagdad, and that she should take twenty soldiers on board at Kurna, the same number being supplied to the "Barhanich," and that the soldiers should be transferred to the "Mejidieh" at Kut, for the protection of that vessel on her downward journey. The "Blosse Lynch" accordingly left on the evening of the 13th April, having been detained here nine days.

Although the matter has thus been patched up by the Turkish authorities, it is evident that, as they had to give in to the Arabs in order to effect a settlement, the latter will be emboldened to resort to similar methods in the future to gain their ends. The British vessel is somewhat of a "stalking horse" for the Arabs, and suffers severely from that position. While making all allowances for the difficulties with which the Turks have to contend in exacting retribution for these unprovoked attacks on our ships, I think our position on the river will soon become untenable if measures are not taken to impose exemplary punishment.

In the present case two passengers' lives were lost, the Bahrein and the Persian woman both having succumbed to their wounds, while Messrs. Lynch's stoker and another passenger were both very severely wounded and the vessel was much damaged. I think Messrs. Lynch Brothers may with justice contend that some reparation ought to be obtained and an example made. As regards the loss of life, would it not be possible for the Turks, at our instance, to inforce the *lex talionis*, a divine precept, which is well understood by the Arabs and practised among themselves, and to which they could raise no possible objection on religious grounds. The Sheikh of the people who fired first on the "Blosse Lynch" near Amara, when the casualties occurred, I understand they were Gadban's "Hoshieh" or bodyguard—might be asked to surrender two persons as a penalty for the lives thus wantonly sacrificed, and the prisoners could be shot at Amara or heavy pecuniary compensation exacted instead. Personally I think their blood would be better for obvious reasons, but as the Sultan holds to his reputation for clemency, it may be difficult to insist on this and an execution may be inconvenient to carry out. But unless some drastic steps are taken, there is no doubt that the Arabs will, on a future occasion, treat our ships with no more consideration than they have done in the past, and in view of the number of passengers carried annually by Messrs. Lynch's steamers, this at least ought, in my humble opinion, to be a matter of grave concern to His Majesty's Government.

It may assist you to form an opinion of the situation here if I mention that the present distribution of troops in the Sanjaks of Bussorah and Amara is as follows:—

In Bussorah town 250 men, at Kurna and Medina 105 men, at Zobeir 50 men, and in the suburb of Bussorah on the river 156 men, 6 field pieces of artillery placed opposite the custom-house.

At Amara and neighbourhood there are four and a-half battalions, that is, 1,200 men, including one battalion of Samara redifs. There are also two antiquated cannon, one of which is, I am told, useless, and three small pieces of modern artillery.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. CROW.

[17814] No. 84.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 269.)

Sir, *Pera, May 19, 1908.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 109 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to transmit a paraphrase of a further telegram which I received this morning from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Van, reporting on the situation in that town.

It will be observed that Captain Dickson is informed that nearly all the real revolutionaries have left the town, and that he and his Russian and French colleagues have tried to persuade the Vali, as the best means of relieving the situation, to proclaim the promise of a general amnesty, but that his Excellency is afraid to take the responsibility of such a step.

On receipt of this telegram I visited the Russian and French Ambassadors and found that the latter had heard from Van in the same sense, and that both were

prepared to recommend the Porte to adopt the suggestion of the three Vice-Consuls. I told them that I was just going to the Porte, and proposed to make representations in the desired sense to the Grand Vizier. M. de Zinoview said that he himself could not go to the Porte to-day to speak to the Grand Vizier, and his Acting Chief Dragoman had already left the Embassy for his duties at the different Departments; he therefore begged me to tell the Grand Vizier that he was entirely at one with M. Constanet and me as to the desirability of the step recommended by the three Vice-Consuls.

I saw the Grand Vizier later in the afternoon and urged upon him the advisability, now that the principal "fedai" were believed to have left Van, of publishing at least the promise of an amnesty. I added that I had been requested by M. de Zinoview to tell His Highness that he was unable to come to the Porte, but that he was entirely in agreement with me in this matter. His Highness replied that he had just heard from the Vali that there were still some of the leading "fedai" in Van, and that a quantity of arms and ammunition was still hidden in the town; he could not therefore give instructions for the publication of a general amnesty, but he promised to telegraph to the Vali to proclaim the promise of pardon to all who had not taken an active part in revolutionary crime, provided that the arms and ammunition concealed were surrendered.

As I left the Grand Vizier's room I met M. Constans, who was about to make similar representations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

P.S. *May 20.*—I have just been informed by the Grand Vizier that a number of "fedai" have been surrendered or seized by the local authorities, who had also discovered a quantity of arms, ammunition, &c., in a spot in the Armenian quarter of the town indicated to them by an informer. His Highness said that this had all been effected without any untoward incident or bloodshed.

G. B.

Inclosure in No. 84.

Vice-Consul Dickson to Mr. G. Barclay.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Van, May 18, 1908.*

THE greater part of the real revolutionaries have, I am told, left Van, and there remain only native sympathisers and suspects, who stay in concealment. I am also informed that if an amnesty were proclaimed the greater number of them would give themselves up to the authorities. They do not believe, as is quite natural, in half promises which are not definitely given, and the amnesty would therefore have to be by Proclamation. Such a Proclamation would, in the opinion of the French and Russian Vice-Consuls at Van, contribute towards a solution of the present situation for the Armenians and the Ottoman Government, and this is also my own opinion, the reasons for which were stated in my despatch No. 12 of the 13th ultimo. We also consider that it will be bad for the Government, as if a search is made neither ammunition nor arms will be found.

I called on the Vali yesterday, and was accompanied by my colleagues. We tried to get him to offer an amnesty by Proclamation. The Vali, however, refused to promise anything, as he is afraid to take the responsibility upon himself.

The Sultan is to be petitioned to grant an amnesty by the Armenians, who are telegraphing through their Representative.

I feel certain that if the course should meet with your approval and you would join with M. Constance and M. de Zinoview in backing up the Armenians' Petition to the Porte, abuses, suffering, and even massacre may be stopped, and the revolutionary movement will be crippled.

[17815] No. 85.

Mr. C. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 270.)

Sir, *Pera, May 19, 1908.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 189 of the 15th ultimo, and to previous correspondence respecting the claims of the Heraclea Syndicate, I have the honour to report that the French Ambassador has received a message from the Sultan to the effect that His Majesty has, in accordance with the recommendation of the Council of Ministers, issued an Iradé for the acceptance of the French demands as embodied in a note which the Embassy had addressed to the Sublime Porte a fortnight ago. These demands were as follows:—

1. That the port of Zoungouldak should be officially recognized. This harbour, which is the port of export for coal from the Heraclea field, was constructed some years ago under the Concession obtained by the French Syndicate, but it has never been officially recognized, with the result that the Syndicate has not been able to levy port dues.

2. That the rights of the Syndicate to the collieries hitherto worked by them in the names of third parties should be fully recognized.

3. That their right should also be recognized to certain seams of coal which were discovered during the tunnelling work in connection with the construction of the railway connecting the collieries with the port.

4. That the obligation of the Porte to indemnify the Syndicate for the loss of port dues for several years and to pay certain debts due to the Syndicate should be admitted in principle. The French Ambassador tells me that the amount required for this indemnity will be between 5,000,000 fr. and 6,000,000 fr., together with interest, though a much bigger figure is mentioned by others as likely to be claimed by the Syndicate.

It has been generally known for the past day or two in Constantinople that the French Government had intimated to Munir Pasha that the question of the Heraclea coalfield must be settled without delay; indeed, I understand, though not from M. Constans, that a time limit had been fixed, and that Munir Pasha was informed that if the matter was not arranged by the 21st instant M. Constans would leave.

I saw M. Constans this afternoon, and he seemed much pleased at the settlement of this troublesome question. He inveighed against Izzet Pasha, to whose mischievous influence he attributed the obstinacy with which his demands had been resisted at the Palace. As so often in the past, the Sultan had had occasion to regret having followed Izzet Pasha's evil counsel, which has once again placed him in the humiliating predicament of having to yield to threats. Izzet Pasha's influence has suffered for the moment, but it would, I fear, be too much to hope that this result will be more than temporary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[17956] No. 86.

The Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received May 25.)

3, Sutter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London,
Sir, *May 18, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2nd instant, and, under instructions from my Board, I now beg to inclose statement of claim on the Turkish Government for damage sustained through the recent attack on our paddle steamer "Blosse Lynch."

We trust adequate compensation will be obtained for the British subject wounded on that occasion, and, with reference to your letter of the 11th September, 1907, we hope the claim for 500*l.* compensation to Mrs. Glanville on account of the murder of her son at Mamghil in February 1906 will be pressed forward at the same time.

Our advices from our agents abroad and from others connected with that region all confirm our view that a due regard for British interests in Mesopotamia can be

re-established only by making the Turkish Government suffer for the laxity of its local administration. On the last occasion, although Turkish officials had ample warning that disturbances were imminent, they neglected to take ordinary precautions.

With reference to the punitive measures undertaken against the offending tribesmen, referred to in the last paragraph of your letter under reply, I am directed to quote, for your information, from a letter from our Bussorah agents, dated the 18th April, as follows:—

"The 'Burhanieh' arrived at sunset on the 11th instant and did not have any trouble with the Arabs on the downward voyage. She took 300 soldiers on board at Coot for transport to Amarah. After passing Sheikh Saad some Arabs on the bank, who were without arms, made insulting gestures to those on the steamer, and the Commandant ordered the soldiers to fire, and, according to an eye-witness, about six of the Arabs were hit. Another group of Arabs were fired at from the steamer near Amarah, but no shots were fired from the shore."

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. W. MACLEAN, *Secretary.*

Inclosure in No. 86.

STATEMENT of Claim by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company (Limited) on the Imperial Ottoman Government for damage sustained through the attack on the Company's paddle steamer "Blosse Lynch" near Amarah on the 2nd April, 1908:—

	£ s. d.	£ s. d.
Loss of cargo and passage money through interruption of the steamer service for one week (average of preceding month):—		
One voyage, Bagdad to Bussorah, of paddle steamer "Blosse Lynch"—		
Loss of cargo	403 5 0	
Loss of passage money	135 0 0	538 5 0
One voyage, Bussorah to Bagdad, of paddle steamer "Mejidieh"—		
Loss of cargo	431 5 9	
Loss of passage money	157 0 0	588 5 9
(N.B.—As the steamers are constantly loaded to their full capacity in the upward direction, the loss of one voyage entails the booking of a proportionately less amount of cargo than we should otherwise have been able to accept.)		
Estimated cost of repairs to paddle steamer "Blosse Lynch," including cost of replacing hull plates perforated by bullets and other injuries sustained from rifle fire		200 0 0
(An exact account of the expenses incurred, including temporary repairs already effected, will be rendered when the repairs have been effected.)		
Incidental expenses, including telegrams, incurred in consequence of interruption of service, demurrid of cargo, &c.		10 0 0
Expense incurred by Company in extra pay to officers and crew of paddle steamer "Blosse Lynch" in consequence of the attack		56 0 0
Pay and expenses of fireman incapacitated by severe bullet wound in the skull		20 0 0
Compensation for increased cost of working the Company's service in consequence of this attack. The Company raised the scale of pay of its junior officers by 12 per cent. subsequent to previous attacks, and has still great difficulty in obtaining suitable men for its service. The amount here claimed is the equivalent of this extra expense on one year's pay only		72 0 0
		1,504 13 9

The damage done to the Company in respect of loss of business, the attacks having been made upon the Company's steamers and not upon the competing service, has not been estimated in the above claim.

[18026] No. 86*.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 116.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, May 25, 1908.*

I HAVE received the following telegram, dated the 19th instant, from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Van respecting the "fedais" at Van (see my despatch No. 269 of the 19th instant):—

"Nothing, beyond a verbal promise from the Vali, has been done with regard to the amnesty mentioned in your telegram of to-day.

"Up till now the authorities have taken 18 revolutionaries who were in concealment, as well as 60 lbs. of dynamite, 30 rifles, and 20,000 rounds of ammunition. They have also seized 46 Armenians who had not concealed themselves. The conduct of the search is still fairly good.

"An absolute panic was caused yesterday by six real revolutionaries, who, on being found in a house, fired and killed one soldier; the others fled and rushed about, out of all control, firing indiscriminately. When, after half an hour, during which three unarmed Armenians had been killed and several had been wounded, order was re-established, it was found that the 'fedais' had made their escape through the garden of the Episcopal Mission. An unsuccessful search was maintained last night and continues to-day. Panic-stricken Armenians assembled round Consulates. Two suspected persons were discovered in the American Mission, and the English Mission has also been searched.

"The conduct of the General Officer Commanding the troops and of the Vali fills me with hope, but the presence of these six revolutionaries is a source of real danger. I believe there are now no others here."

I have made representations to the Grand Vizier, urging him to take action regarding the Moslem agitators as soon as the remaining Armenian revolutionaries have been captured.

[17217] No. 87.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 25, 1908.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 1st ultimo, relative to the Arrangement respecting the use of the French flag by Muscat dhows, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that he forwarded to the French Ambassador copies of the correspondence exchanged between His Majesty's and the French Consuls at that port on the subject, as well as copy of the Proclamation which it is proposed to issue to give publicity to the terms of this Arrangement.

Sir E. Grey at the same time informed his Excellency that His Majesty's Government were fully satisfied with the solution arrived at, and solicited an expression of the approval of the French Government.

I am to transmit to you herewith copy of a note from M. Cambon in reply to Sir E. Grey's communication,* conveying the French Government's approval and the text of the Proclamation, and I am to observe that, so far as Sir E. Grey is aware, there is now no further obstacle to its immediate publication.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. LANGLEY.

[17364] No. 88.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 25, 1908.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20th instant, relative to the supply of red oxide to Messrs. Wönckhaus from the Island of Abu Musa.

* No. 78.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey concurs in the view expressed by Secretary Viscount Morley that it would suffice, pending the submission of the reply to the German case, that His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire should be instructed to ask the local representative of the firm to give due notice when they intend to resume operations with a view the conclusion of the necessary arrangements, and that it is therefore unnecessary to follow the course suggested by the Government of India.

Sir E. Grey would propose, if Lord Morley agrees, to add to the communication which His Majesty's Government are about to make to the German Government in reply to their Memorandum a statement of the arrangements adopted, and of the instructions given to Major Cox to enable Messrs. Wönckhaus to fulfil their contracts pending a final decision of the whole question.

Sir E. Grey presumes that the instructions referred to will now be dispatched without delay.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[18089] No. 89.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 26.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 30th ultimo, relative to Sheikh Mubarek's correspondence with the Vali of Bussorah in connection with his Fao property (with reference to India Office letter of the 15th instant).

India Office, May 25, 1908.

Inclosure 1 in No. 89.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Bushire, April 10, 1908.*

Sir,

IN continuation of the correspondence ending with my telegram dated the 13th instant, I have the honour to forward, for the information and orders of Government, a letter since received from Sheikh Mubarek, dated the 9th April, on the subject of his difficulties at Fao.

I have, &c.
(Signed) P. Z. COX.

Inclosure 2 in No. 89.

Sheikh Mubarek to Major Cox.

(After compliments.) *7 Rabi I, 1326 (April 9, 1908).*

I BEG to bring to your kind notice that I and those who have thrown in their lot with me are totally under the protection of the British Government, so that they may defend our rights—whether trivial or significant—as it is their well-known custom to use zeal and good offices in protecting those who appeal to them.

I have already represented to you regarding the encroachments done by the Turkish guards of fortress in an unjust manner upon my property at Fao, and (stated that) they have destroyed a portion of the dams in my property, and that a great damage was done to my property by the flood owing to the destruction of the dams. Being compelled (by circumstances), I communicated with the Vali of Bussorah and explained to him the high-handedness of the fortress guards, and requested him on the 23rd Safar (20th March) to give orders on the Kaimakam of Fao for the prevention of the guards of fortress. He gave me on the 28th Safar (31st March) a strange reply, which has no connection with my communication. A purport of his letter is that he has advised the Guard Department about the "insh" (a piece

of land) projecting from the river. As I had absolutely no dispute about the "tash," I sent him an answer on the 5th Rabi I (7th April) (to that effect).

I beg now to submit a copy of the correspondence, and to request that you will pay consideration (to this matter) and afford your protection in safeguarding my rights, because, as it is known to you, I and the whole Subah family depend for our livelihood on God and on our property at Fao.

The matter depends on your assistance.

Inclosure 3 in No. 89.

Sheikh Mubarek to Abdul Rahman.

(After compliments.) 23 *Safar*, 1326 (*March* 26, 1908).

ON the 26th Zilhijjeh, 1325, I brought to your notice the encroachment on the part of the guards and their attack on my property at Fao during night, and their destroying the dams which had been erected since many years ago to protect the date trees against the flood. I begged of your good graces to issue orders preventing the guards of fortress from making any interference and encroachments in a manner which may be against justice and rules.

As a damage has been caused to my property in consequence of the destruction of the dams, and as the damage has now been doubled by the increase of the flood and I have received no answer from your Excellency to insure the protection of my rights, I venture, in view of the daily increase of the damage, to again represent the facts and to solicit the favour of your issuing orders to the Kaimakam of Fao to prevent the guards of the fortress from meddling with the dams which protect my property from the attack of flood.

At any rate, the decision rests with you.

Inclosure 4 in No. 89.

Abdul Rahman to Sheikh Mubarek.

(After compliments.) 28 *Safar*, 1326 (*March* 31, 1908).

I HAVE received your esteemed letter dated the 23rd Safar, 1326, and understood what you have stated regarding the question of the "tash" (plot of ground) which has projected from the river. I have written the needful to the Department of the Guards, and in order to explain this fact I write you this answer.

Inclosure 5 in No. 89.

Sheikh Mubarek to Abdul Rahman.

(After compliments.) 5 *Rabi I*, 1326 (*April* 7, 1908).

IN the best time I had the honour to receive your order dated the 28th Safar, 1326, stating that you had written the needful to the Department of the Guards on the question of the "tash" (plot of ground) which has projected from the river. I have no dispute concerning that ground or the river, but my communication was confined to the encroachment of the guards of the fortress upon my absolute property, which has no connection with that ground or the river, but is a plot of land safeguarded by me against the flood. The guards of the fortress encroached thereupon by attacking it at night-time, and destroying a portion of the dams in a manner which is against justice and rules. I have already asked your Excellency to safeguard my rights, and I now beg to repeat my appeal for the prevention of the encroachment on the part of the guards of fortress.

At any rate, the decision rests with you.

[18083] No. 90.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received May* 26.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, and with reference to the letter from the Foreign Office of the 18th instant, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 22nd instant, regarding the protection of Bahreinis, &c., in Persia.

India Office, May 25, 1908.

Inclosure in No. 90.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, May* 22, 1908.

TELEGRAM dated the 2nd instant from His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, and telegram No. 369 from Resident in the Persian Gulf. Protection of Bahrein subjects. Mr. Marling was instructed in reply, by a telegram dated the 16th instant, to press Persian Government for an amended note, and was informed that, unless note disputes our right, and unless further cases arise, we are reluctant to raise the general question for the present.

As regards Shargah subjects, he was further informed that the particular case appears to be sufficiently met by the assurances given by the Governor of Bushire, if carried out.

[17089] No. 91.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 26, 1908.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th instant respecting the desirability, from the point of view of local British interests, of representing to the Ottoman Government the complaints of the Sheikh of Koweit in connection with the dispute regarding his property at Fao with the object of protecting his rights. It appears from the correspondence inclosed in your letter that in March last the Sheikh, in discussing this matter with Major Cox, stated that the trouble appeared to be over for the time, and did not request him to take any action.

In April, however, Major Cox telegraphed that the Sheikh was much aggrieved and begged that His Majesty's Government would put pressure on the Ottoman Government to agree to the appointment of a Committee to examine the matter on the spot.

It would therefore appear that some incident must have occurred between these two dates which has caused the Sheikh to change his attitude.

Before expressing an opinion as to the course to be adopted, Sir E. Grey would accordingly be glad if Secretary Viscount Morley would be so good as to furnish him with any further information which he may possess as to the circumstances which have produced this change in the attitude of Sheikh Mubarek.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[18264] No. 92.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 27.)

(No. 119.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople May* 27, 1908.

ON the 25th May Mr. Vice-Consul Mare reported by telegraph that a collision had occurred in Samos between the native inhabitants and the Turkish troops, and

that there had been some killed and wounded on both sides. M. Constans has received a telegram to-day, from which it appears that the conflict was of a serious character.

A collective inquiry was consequently made at the Sublime Porte to-day by the French, Russian, and British Embassies. The following is the statement of the Sublime Porte as to what occurred :—

Owing to the disturbed condition of Samos, Prince Copassis requested that additional troops should be sent before he summoned the Assembly. Two companies were sent from Smyrna, and on their arrival the gendarmerie of the island, who were aided by the Philhellene party, attacked the troops, wounding eighteen and killing ten. Prince Copassis was confined in his house, and the telegraph office was seized. The Ottoman Government has sent two gun-boats and three battalions to Vathy in order to assist in re-establishing order in the island, and Special Commissioners will be sent there, the Governor-General of Salonica and his Assistant having been selected for this purpose.

The Greek Government has been requested by the Ottoman Government to recall their Consul from Samos.

[18402] No. 93.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 28.)

(No. 120.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, May* 28, 1908.

SAMOS disturbances.

Telegraphic communication with Samos is cut, but I have received a telegram from Mr. Marc, dated the 27th May, from Scio, in which he asks that a ship of war may be sent. He reports further that the Prince's life is in danger, and that he is blockaded in his house with 200 Turkish troops without food. The Imperial troops are being besieged in their barracks, and fighting continues. The killed and wounded amount to 150, and a large number of women and children have fled for safety to the British Vice-Consulate.

The Grand Vizier stated this morning, in reply to a collective inquiry from the three Embassies, that the Porte was informed by the Commander of the ship sent from Smyrna to report on the state of affairs that the only people in the island engaged in fighting are the 150 gendarmes, and that the troops were only replying when fired at. The Special Commissioners with the Turkish war-ship and troops already dispatched have instructions to meet at Scio so as to arrive at Samos simultaneously and in overwhelming force, and thus render resistance hopeless. The Commissioner has the strictest instructions that bloodshed is to be avoided if possible.

The reinforcements are due to arrive at Samos this evening, and a Proclamation summoning the gendarmes to surrender their arms will at once be issued by the Commissioner, who will then hold an inquiry.

In view of the apparent wisdom of these measures, and of the fact that, with the exception of the "stationnaires" of the Embassies, war-ships could not possibly arrive under two or three days' time, the Representatives of the three interested Powers consider it advisable to await the result of the Commissioner's efforts to bring about a settlement before coming to a decision on this point.

[16706] No. 94.

Sir Edward Grey to the Marquis di San Giuliano.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, May* 28, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Count de Bosdari's note of the 16th March, informing me of the appointment of Captain Francesco Crispi to be Italian Consular Agent at Muscat, and requesting the co-operation of the British authorities on that officer's behalf, both in the discharge of his ordinary duties and in his special mission of watching the arms traffic.

I venture, in reply, to request your Excellency to be so good as to submit to the Italian Government the consideration that a trusted and secret native agent is far more likely than a European officer to be able to accomplish satisfactorily the object of watching this traffic.

[18570] No. 97 A.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 126.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, May 29, 1908.*

I HAVE received following telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire:—

"According to telegram I have received from Lieutenant Wilson, oil has been struck at 1,200 feet. The oil rises 75 feet above ground level intermittently."

[18574] No. 97 B.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 127.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, May 29, 1908.*

PERSIAN Customs launches.

Following incidents have occurred recently in the Gulf;

His Majesty's ship "Laurence" discovered on the 15th April a Persian Customs launch from Bunder Abbas issuing from an inlet on the Muscat Coast near Musandim. The excuse given was that a dhow had left Bunder Abbas without a clearance, and that she had followed it.

Since then the Customs launch from Lingah visited British Bassidu by night. In spite of protest, the Customs Mudir, the skipper, and part of the crew landed and created a disturbance. The British coal agent was insulted and threatened, and the inhabitants maltreated.

At the beginning of May an inoffensive dhow was seized on the Muscat Coast near Ras Lima, and towed to Bunder Abbas by the Charbar launch.

His Majesty's Consul succeeded in obtaining some satisfaction locally in two latter cases, but the local Belgian Customs Director admits that his control over Persian skippers is not effective.

I had already spoken to the Administrator of Customs in Tehran in consequence of the first case, and he gave instructions in the sense desired; but it seems that his authority is ineffective, as the two other cases have occurred since then.

In order to put an end to these objectionable practices, by which maritime peace is endangered, and to relieve us of responsibility in the event of retaliation being resorted to by the Arabs in cases such as the first and third, which has been threatened, His Majesty's Consul-General urges that a formal protest should be made to the Persian Government.

Might I be authorized to present a protest in writing with regard to the Bassidu incident on the ground of that place being British, and to address a further note in regard to the first and third incidents, requesting that launches should confine their activity to Persian waters, and strongly warning the Persian Government against action being taken in Muscat waters by these vessels?

Please inform me what the legal status of Customs preventive vessels is outside the territorial waters of the country to which they belong.

Even should the Italian Government not share this view, I have the honour to suggest that they might find it more convenient in any case to put off dispatching Captain Crispi to his post until the International Conference, now sitting at Brussels to consider the best means of suppressing the traffic, has finished its labours, since the result of the measures applied in consequence of its recommendations may be that Muscat may altogether cease to be an emporium for arms.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[18403] No. 95.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Athens, May 28, 1908.*

THE troubles at Samos.

I have just been told by the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, who came to see me for the purpose, that 120 refugees arrived from Samos at Syra to-day, and that they say much blood has been shed and many people are flying for their lives with their families. M. Skouzès has heard nothing from the Greek Consul. After making every allowance for exaggeration, he suggests that it would be well for the three Protecting Powers, Great Britain, France, and Russia, to send ships of war to Samos to watch events and reassure the population. According to his information Turkish troops are being sent to Samos from Smyrna, Ephesus, Salonica, Dedeagatch, and Uskub, and the Vali of Salonica has also been ordered to proceed to the island.

[18561] No. 96.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 122.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, May 29, 1908.*

SITUATION at Van. According to reports from Captain Dickson, the troops have so far behaved on the whole in a satisfactory manner in searching for revolutionaries. The telegram from the Droshak mentioned in your telegram No. 84 of the 28th instant is most probably founded on a belated account of the state of affairs in Van just after the assassination of the Armenian informer David. I have no cause to believe that preparations are on foot for a massacre of Armenians at Van, as stated by the Droshak.

[18573] No. 97.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 123.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, May 29, 1908.*

SAMOS. There are about twenty British subjects at Samos, and at my request the French Ambassador has ordered a Messagerie Maritimes steamer, which he is sending from Smyrna to-morrow with provisions for the French Consular Agency, which is besieged, and to embark French citizens if necessary, to give similar assistance to our Vice-Consulate and to British subjects if required.

With reference to Sir F. Elliot's telegram No. 8 of the 28th instant, the Greek Minister called on me this morning and urged the necessity of sending a ship of war to the island. Such a course might serve as an encouragement to the insurgents, and I am loth to recommend it for the moment.

[18685] No. 98.

Memorandum communicated by M. Métaxas, May 29, 1908.

LE Ministre de Grèce vient de recevoir par le télégraphe copie de la dépêche télégraphique suivante adressée par le Gouvernement Hellénique au Ministre de Grèce à Constantinople:—

"Le Capitaine de Port à Syra télégraphie au Ministre de la Marine que le paquebot de poste "Courrier" venant de Tigani, Samos, y a débarqué 120 femmes et enfants. Le capitaine et les passagers lui rapportèrent que la fusillade continue à Vathy et que des femmes et des enfants sont massacrés par les troupes Turques. Les corps des victimes, à cause de la panique qui y règne, sont privés de sépulture. Outre deux bataillons envoyés de Salonique avec Vali, deux autres bataillons sont prêts pour partir de Smyrne et un autre de Dédéagatz. Le Gouvernement Hellénique continue à ne pas avoir de nouvelles directes de Samos, et ignore, par conséquent, ce qui s'y est passé."

Le Ministre de Grèce à Constantinople a reçu pour instructions de communiquer ce qui précède aux Ambassadeurs de France, de la Grande-Bretagne, et de Russie, et d'insister auprès d'eux afin qu'ils envoient au plus tôt leurs stationnaires à Samos pour y protéger les habitants et faire le nécessaire pour mettre fin aux troubles. Il a été aussi chargé d'insister pour que les Ambassadeurs réclament de la Sublime Porte le retrait des troupes débarquées et de ne pas débarquer celles qui sont déjà en route.

M. Métaxas est chargé d'agir d'urgence auprès du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique dans le sens des instructions données au Ministre de Grèce à Constantinople.

Légation Royale Hellénique, Londres,
le 29 Mai, 1908.

[18264] No. 99.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 89.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, May 29, 1908.*

YOUR telegrams respecting Samos have caused me to feel some concern. A full report of the origin of the trouble should be furnished. It is not clear that the Prince had the right to send for Imperial troops without the consent of the Protecting Powers, as according to the Constitution of 1832 none are allowed, and according to the Vizieral letter of 1879 only one company.

You should continue to co-operate with your two colleagues.

His Majesty's Government have always taken an interest in the affairs of Samos, and they sincerely trust that the greatest circumspection will be used in the restoration of order. It may otherwise be necessary to dispatch a man-of-war.

[18614] No. 100.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 278.)
Sir, *Pera, May 25, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I learn from the Acting British Consul-General at Smyrna that, according to a telegram which he had received from the British Vice-Consul at Samos, a number of Imperial troops arrived at Samos this morning owing to political troubles. The local force, aided by the people, is reported to have opened a heavy fire on the troops, but the number of killed is unknown. Mr. Mare adds that the Prince-Governor of the island was beaten and imprisoned by the inhabitants, and that at the moment of telegraphing the firing was still continuing.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[18715] No. 101.

M. Métaxas to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 30.)

(Personnelle.) *Légation Royale Hellénique, Londres,*
M. le Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat, *le 30 Mai*, 1908.

FAISANT suite à mes démarches précédentes au sujet des troubles à Samos, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que les nouvelles que mon Gouvernement reçoit par voie indirecte sur les affaires de Samos inspirent de grandes inquiétudes. Les femmes et enfants se sont retirés dans l'intérieur de l'île. Les Samiens armés occupent les hauteurs dominant la capitale, d'où le danger d'une nouvelle collision avec les troupes. Je suis de nouveau chargé de représenter au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique la nécessité absolue de l'envoi immédiat à Samos de navires de guerre pour prévenir de nouveaux troubles et l'effusion de sang.

L'envoi des troupes Turques à Samos étant la cause de tout ce qui s'est passé, et pouvant amener des rixes encore plus graves, il est nécessaire que les Puissances Garantes de Samos interviennent pour engager la Sublime Porte à les retirer.

Je serais très obligé à votre Excellence de vouloir bien faire part du contenu de cette lettre, sous forme de communication verbale, à son Excellence Sir Edward Grey.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) D. G. MÉTAXAS.

[18725] No. 101[2].

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Athens, May 30, 1908.*

EVENTS in Samos.

A copy of a letter addressed by the members of the Samian Council to the British Vice-Consul on the 26th instant has been sent to me by the King of Greece, who says that it explains the state of affairs in the island.

According to this letter the movement is not an insurrectionary one; the Samian people are loyal to the Sultan and regret that without cause or necessity peace has been disturbed by the Prince. The Prince made a tour of the island, during which he excited the people against the Government, and he had frequently since his return held secret meetings with suspicious persons, and had threatened daily to upset things in general and forcibly render himself master of the island with the help of Turkish arms. Thus the people were justly alarmed on seeing the disembarkation of the soldiers, and taking with them the Councillors went to the Prince's Palace to ask the latter his reasons for summoning the troops. The Prince refused to give the order for the troops not to land, though he denied that he knew why they had come. An order given by the Prince to surround the telegraph office with troops increased the excitement of the populace, who were thus prevented from telegraphing to the Sultan. The excitement culminated at the advance of the troops after a boy had been killed by them, their disembarkation being contrary to the express stipulations of the Charter, and their aim being evidently to effect Copassi Effendi's resolution to overthrow Samian autonomy.

If arms have been taken up by the people it is in defence of the lives of women and children as well as of their liberties, and the Government enter a protest against the violent trampling on the privileges of Samos which the lying and intriguing reports sent to the Porte by the Prince have brought about. The Samians are willing to lay down their arms whenever a warship of one of the Protecting Powers shall arrive, as also in the case of the immediate departure of Copassi Effendi, who is the cause of all the trouble. They pray the Consular Representatives of those Powers and of Greece to urge their Governments quickly to send a ship for the protection of their families and for the purpose of making an inquiry, and they add that they await the decision of the Powers with confidence.

They further declare themselves ready and willing to cease firing so long as the troops do not fire from the Prince's Palace and their camp and kill women and unarmed citizens. But they will hold on to their positions until they are assured

to their satisfaction that no danger threatens the freedom and privileges of Samos. The first step must be the restoration of communication in the town, which is now interrupted by indiscriminate firing from Copassi's residence, the evacuation of which by the Turkish troops they also demanded.

[18726] No. 102.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Athens, May 30, 1908.*

MY telegram No. 9 of to-day.

The King of Greece, whom I have just seen, says he is convinced that the movement at Samos is one of internal politics only, and he thinks that what the Prince did was for his own interest, and that he was not acting in collusion with the Porte, as was suggested by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. His Majesty thinks the dispatch of Turkish troops regrettable, and believes the difficulty would have been settled by the Special Commissioner alone, provided that Copassi Effendi were recalled at once. In his opinion the presence of even one "stationnaire" would be of great assistance. The restoration of quiet at Samos is anxiously desired by His Majesty.

With the King's permission I communicated the letter to the French Minister and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, whom I also informed of the views of His Majesty.

According to reports received by them from Syra refugees state that the people made prisoners of forty Turkish soldiers, and afterwards killed them in retaliation for the massacre by the troops of a similar number of children.

[18727] No. 103.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 124.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, May 30, 1908.*

UP to the present the three Embassies which are acting together in urging on the Porte the greatest moderation in repressing the rising have only received scanty details of the disorders in Samos. This is very possibly due to the fact that the insurgents have broken off telegraphic communications, but I will furnish you with a full report as soon as possible, in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 89 of yesterday.

A rumour was current at Scalanova yesterday that eighty Samians, mostly women and children, and 150 of the Turkish troops had been killed and wounded, but this estimate should not be accepted without further confirmation.

The choice of Raouf Pasha, the Vali of Salonica, as Special Commissioner is an excellent one; he should have arrived at Samos with the reinforcements yesterday evening, or, at any rate, this morning. The ships, which included a cruiser, have received the most stringent orders not to use their guns, and the troops destined to occupy the town are not to use their rifles unless it is absolutely necessary. It is hoped at the Porte—reasonably, we think—that the chance of bloodshed will be reduced to a minimum by the employment of such an imposing force. In any case, it seems undesirable for the present that a European ship of war should be dispatched to the island.

[18728] No. 101.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 125.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, May 31, 1908.*

SIR F. ELLIOT'S telegrams Nos. 9 and 10 of yesterday. I have not received from the British Vice-Consul at Samos a copy of the letter which members of the Council have addressed to him, throwing all blame for the recent outbreak on the Prince, but, judging from my knowledge of his character, the allegations contained in the letter should not be credited without reliable information. In the opinion of the Grand Vizier, it is the Greek Consul who is responsible. The Embassies of the three guaranteeing Powers made representations to the Porte to-day, and received an

assurance of the most positive nature from the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Turkish troops would be withdrawn immediately after the restoration of order, and that there would be no change in the organic statute without consulting the three Powers.

We have received from the Porte the following account of recent events: On the arrival of the Turkish war-ships on the evening of the 29th they were fired on by the insurgents, and were compelled to take defensive steps and disperse the rebels. After the attacks on the Prince's Palace had ceased the troops were landed, and the Commander received the thanks of the foreign Consular Agents for the measures he had taken to restore order. The Commissioner sent to investigate the causes of the disturbance has telegraphed that he hopes order will be entirely re-established by to-day, and that he then proposes to consider, in conjunction with the Prince, what further measures are necessary.

The above account is somewhat vague, but the Italian Consul-General at Smyrna has telegraphed that order has been restored.

[18760] No. 105.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 283.)
Sir, *Pera, May 25, 1908.*

WITH reference to Sir N. O'Conor's despatch No. 653 of the 22nd October, 1907, respecting the proceedings in the Maghil trial, for the expedition of which I have repeatedly pressed the Grand Vizier, I have the honour to report that I have just received a telegram from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah announcing that the hearing of the case in the Court of First Instance has been concluded. The Consul states that two men have been condemned to death and one to fifteen years' imprisonment; these, I understand, being all that are at present in prison. Of the remainder who escaped three have been acquitted, four sentenced to death by default, and thirty-one to fifteen years' imprisonment. The details will no doubt be made clear when Mr. Crow's despatch arrives. In any case the condemned men have the right to appeal to Constantinople, and I shall not fail to press for a confirmation of the sentences now passed.

As regards the 500*l.* claim for the mother of Mr. Glanville, I have again urged the Grand Vizier to take steps to secure prompt payment. His Highness has put the matter before the Council of Ministers with a view to obtaining a favourable Ministerial decision, which he will submit to the Sultan for the necessary Irade.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[18763] No. 106.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 286.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May 26, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum, reporting that authorization has been granted to make an advance to the peasants to supply the deficiency in seed corn.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 106.

Consul Shipley to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 26.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, May 11, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to report to you that since my despatch No. 21 of the 25th ultimo authorization has at length been received by the local authorities from the Central Government at Constantinople to make advances to the peasants with a view of enabling them to supply the deficiency in seed corn referred to in my above-mentioned despatch. The advances in question are being made chiefly by the various

branches of the Agricultural Bank established in this vilayet, and will, I am informed by the Governor-General, Abdul Wahab Pasha, absorb a sum of from £T. 20,000 to £T. 25,000. The above measure is to be applied to the following districts, viz.:—Erzeroum, Baibourt, Pasen, Khinis, and Narman, with two kazas in the Erzindjan Sanjak, and the possibility of abuse is guarded against by the fact that the applicants have to produce a certificate from their respective village authorities to the effect that they are in need of such assistance, and have further to furnish three sureties each for the advance made to them, repayment of which is to be spread over a period of two years, with interest at 6 per cent. per annum. A considerable number of peasants, both Mussulman and Christian, of this district have already availed themselves of the above facilities, and I learn from a well-informed source that, as far as this kaza is concerned, the danger of a deficiency in this year's crops may now be regarded as having to a great extent been averted. It is sincerely to be hoped that the instructions which the Governor-General has assured me he has sent with regard to the above matter to the authorities of the outlying districts will be faithfully carried out by the latter, and that due care will be taken to insure that the villagers shall not be deterred from taking full advantage of the Government offer. In Khinis no actual advances on the terms above referred to would yet appear to have been made, though the latest arrivals from the latter place report that news that such assistance was to be given had reached that district.

In any case the advances already made have been most welcome, and the question arises why they have been so long deferred, seeing that the time for sowing operations is rapidly passing. The answer which has been suggested to me is that, although the Agricultural Bank has been in possession of funds all along, it was not allowed to dispose of them until it had been ascertained that they would not be required for military purposes. I am not in a position to state what amount of truth, if any, there may be in this suggestion, but it acquires a certain probability from the fact that the authorization given to the bank to make these advances coincides with the present lull, in this district at least, in military activity, while it is a matter of common knowledge that during the somewhat unsettled state of the situation in the earlier part of the year an embargo was laid on the grain stores of the bank by the military authorities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. S. SHIPLEY.

[18964] No. 107.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 127.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, June 1, 1908.*

THE French, Russian, and British Embassies have received assurances from the Grand Vizier to the effect that order has been restored at Samos.

There was some firing from the ships, his Highness says. This firing, however, was solely directed against positions held in the hills by the insurgents and against one house, from which the rebels had wounded a General, and were still firing themselves.

The Grand Vizier has promised to communicate to the three Embassies this evening a full description of the disturbances at Samos.

[19092] No. 108.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Athens, June 2, 1908.*

SAMOS: Mr. G. Barclay's telegram No. 125 of the 31st ultimo.

The Prime Minister regards the movement with absolute disapprobation, and positively assures me that, if the Greek Consul has encouraged it, as soon as proof of the fact is produced he will be dismissed the service. Since the 3rd February the Government have received no communication whatever from the Consul until a telegram dispatched on the 29th ultimo.

M. Theotoky has his suspicions that the Porte is at the bottom of the movement, having engineered it, perhaps, as an example of what may happen in Crete when the

international troops have been withdrawn. Circumstances which he regards as suspicious are the collection of large numbers of troops in secret, the dispatch in the first instance of 200 men, and the fact that until the last moment no complaint was made against the Consul. If, however, there are reasons which might induce the Turkish Government to desire a rising, the effect of the same reasons upon the Greek Government is to make them deprecate one.

The Porte speaks of "rebels," but I take leave to make a distinction between a rising against the Prince and a rising against the Sultan. Moreover, it is open to question whether the Special Commissioner is well-advised in taking the Prince into consultation as to the further measures necessary.

Two members of the Council of Samos, who have arrived at Syra, are said to be coming to-morrow to Athens, and to intend to lay their case before the Turkish Minister and the Representatives of the three Protecting Powers. Unless otherwise instructed by you I shall receive them if they call.

[19091] No. 109.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 129.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, June 2, 1908.*

THE French Embassy have heard from the French Consular Agent in Samos that order has been restored, but that there is still considerable anxiety among the people of the island. He says that the ship's fire appears to have done but little damage. A number of persons have been arrested, but the most prominent members of the revolutionary party seem to have made good their escape.

The Consular Agent advises the dispatch of a French war-ship to Samos, on the ground that it would remove all anxiety, but the Russian and French Ambassadors and I are all of opinion that the dispatch of a vessel to Samos would be inopportune and dangerous, as its presence there would be considered as an encouragement to those responsible for the outbreak of disorders.

I have received no further news from Mr. Mare.

[19171] No. 110.

Memorandum communicated by the Greek Minister, June 2, 1908.

LE Ministre de Grèce a été informé par le télégraphe que, suivant des renseignements reçus à Athènes par voie indirecte, un navire de guerre Turc a bombardé le 16 (29) Mai, pendant quatre heures, la ville de Vathy, où à l'heure actuelle il y a cinq navires Turcs. De nouvelles troupes sont arrivées à Samos. La plupart des habitants ont quitté Vathy et un grand nombre parmi eux se sont réfugiés en Grèce. La Commission d'Enquête Turque n'a pas encore commencé ses travaux. Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Grèce informe M. Métaxas qu'il vient de télégraphier au Consul Hellénique à Samos de conseiller aux Samiens prudence et modération. Le Gouvernement Royal pense que si les Consuls des Puissances Garantes de Samos, dûment autorisés par leurs Gouvernements, donnent la garantie que la Turquie respectera la Charte, que les troupes Turques se retireront aussitôt rétabli l'ordre, et si en même temps une amnistie générale est accordée, les Samiens doivent déposer les armes et contribuer à la pacification de l'île.

M. Métaxas est chargé de faire au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique les suggestions qui précèdent.

Légation Royale-Hellénique, Londres,
le 2 Juin, 1908.

[19266] No. 111.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Egerton.

(No. 67.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 2, 1908.*

IN giving the Italian Ambassador a note about Consular representation at Muscat to-day, I told him that I hoped the Italian Government would not press their request.

We had special relations with the Trucial Chiefs in the neighbourhood, and the multiplication of European Consuls at Muscat would introduce complications, seeing how close to Muscat those Chiefs lived.

I explained to the Ambassador that I made this communication to him verbally, as I wished to avoid conveying any impression that I was basing our request upon any question as to the Treaty rights of the Italian Government in Muscat. I was simply putting forward this consideration from the point of view of our own convenience.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[19211] No. 112.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 131.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, June 3, 1908.*

I HAVE telegraphed as follows to Sir F. Elliot:—

From all that I can gather, Sofouli, the leader of the party opposed to the Prince, was the origin of the disturbed state of the island which led to the dispatch of reinforcements to the garrison previous to the outbreak, and he has since taken the chief rôle in the insurrection. He is probably one of the two Samians mentioned in the penultimate paragraph of your telegram No. 11 of yesterday. I have been informed that the Turkish Minister at Athens has received instructions to refuse to hold any communication with him whatsoever.

[19217] No. 113.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 132.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, June 3, 1908.*

THOSE persons implicated in the recent troubles at Samos will be tried by the ordinary Civil Courts, and not by court-martial. This course has been decided on by the Sultan.

The Prince of Samos and the Special Commissioner have been instructed to do what they can to restore the *statûs quo* by enrolling gendarmes and by other means. In a few days the Special Commissioner will, it is believed, be able to return to Salonica.

[19092] No. 114.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, June 3, 1908.*

PROVIDED the French and Russian Ministers receive the members of the Council of Samos, I have no objection to your doing so also, as proposed in your telegram No. 11. It is, however, desirable that in this matter all three Representatives should act together.

[19091] No. 115.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 92.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, June 3, 1908.*

SAMOS. I approve your view as to not sending man-of-war (see your telegram No. 129 of to-day).

[19229] No. 116.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 75.)
Sir, *Athens, May 29, 1908.*

YESTERDAY morning, at his reception, M. Skouzès spoke to me about the state of affairs in Samos. He said that on the 24th the Turkish Minister had come to him and asked him to recall the Greek Consul, who was lending his support to the disorderly element in the town. He answered that that was rather a vague charge, and requested the Minister to give him details, but that all he had been able to elicit from him was that the Consul had taken part in the demonstration in memory of some local hero. However, he promised to telegraph to the Consul for explanations, and did so.

The next morning the Turkish Minister sent a secretary to his house to ask if he had received any answer, and on his negative reply it was suggested that the Consul's silence was an admission of guilt. However, on M. Skouzès reaching his office, he found a notice from the Eastern Telegraph Company stating that his message was lying at their Smyrna office, communications with Samos being interrupted—a fact of which he had no doubt the Turkish Legation was aware.

Owing to this interruption he was without any news from the Consul, but according to the reports which had found their way into the newspapers, and which I had no doubt seen, troubles had broken out owing to the refusal of the new Prince, Copassi Effendi, to summon the Assembly on the appointed day, and that having excited disturbances by his arbitrary action, he had then sent for Turkish troops to enable him to suppress them. This, said his Excellency, was contrary to the note of 1832, which provided that there should be no troops in Samos, and to the Firman, or Charter, of 1850, which laid it down that the public forces should consist of 100 gendarmes. (Not finding this latter document among my archives, I sent afterwards to M. Skouzès to ask him to let me see it. It contains the stipulations cited by him, which however appears beside the point in the present instance, since if the public reports are correct, the gendarmes themselves took part in the resistance offered by the Samians to the landing of the Turkish troops.)

I remarked to his Excellency that I supposed the Sovereign Power always retained the right of suppressing disturbances by force, subject to the withdrawal of the troops when order was restored.

Late yesterday evening M. Skouzès called upon me and said he had received news of the arrival at Syra, in a small steamer, of 120 refugees from Samos, who said there were as many more on their way in sailing boats, without sufficient food or water, and as it had fallen calm, help ought to be sent to them. They said that many had already been killed and wounded, and that fighting was going on. His Excellency was prepared to make every allowance for the exaggerations of people in a panic, but the fact that the panic existed, and that people were leaving their homes and flying for their lives, showed that something serious was in progress, and he wished to represent to the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Russia, under whose auspices the Constitution of Samos had been granted, that it would be desirable that they should each send a man-of-war to Samos, merely to watch events, to exercise a restraining influence over the Turks, should they be tempted to commit excesses, and to reassure the population.

The causes of the outbreak were still very obscure, but he could not help thinking that the Turkish Government had deliberately brought it about, with the object of reoccupying the island. Why they should wish to have another troublesome question on their hands he could not understand, but the fact that they had so promptly ordered troops from Smyrna, Ephesus, Dedeagatch, Salonica, and even Uskub, five or six battalions to deal with one small island, and the Vali of Salonica to go to

Samos as provisional Administrator, proved to him that they were prepared for the event; and he gave me to understand that he thought Copassi Effendi was in collusion with them.

The Greek Consul, from whom since he saw me in the morning he had received a despatch, written before the actual outbreak, anticipated trouble, and asked for the despatch of a Greek man-of-war, a request which the Government were not going to comply with.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. ELLIOT.

[19268] No. 117.

M. Métaxas to Foreign Office.—(Received June 4.)

(Personnelle.) *Légation Royale Hellénique, Londres, le 3 Juin*, 1908.
M. le Sous-Secrétaire d'État,

SON Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Grèce me télégraphie d'Athènes, en date d'hier soir, que, d'après des informations qu'il venait de recevoir du Consul-Général de Sa Majesté Hellénique à Smyrne, le pavillon Ottoman avait été hissé sur le Conak à Vathy (Samos).

Ceci constituant un acte d'occupation de l'île, le Ministre de Grèce à Constantinople a été autorisé de porter ce fait à la connaissance des Représentants des Puissances Garantes, en les priant d'intervenir auprès de la Sublime Porte afin que le pavillon de Samos soit de nouveau hissé sur la demeure du Prince, qui est toujours en fonctions.

Étant également chargé par son Excellence M. Skouzès d'agir dans le même sens près du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, je vous serais très obligé de vouloir bien faire part du contenu de cette lettre (sous forme de communication verbale) à son Excellence Sir Edward Grey.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) D. G. MÉTAXAS.

[19318] No. 118.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 4.)

India Office, June 3, 1908.

Sir,

IN reply to your letter dated the 25th ultimo, as to the supply of red oxide to Messrs. Wönckhaus from the Island of Abu Musa, I am directed by Viscount Morley to inclose copy of a telegram sent to the Government of India regarding the instructions to be given to His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire, and to express Lord Morley's concurrence in the proposed addition to the reply to be made to the Memorandum of the German Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 118.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

India Office, June 2, 1908.

(Telegraphic) P.

ABU MUSA. Your telegram dated the 15th May.

For the present it will suffice for Major Cox formally to request Wönckhaus' local representative to give due notice when resumption of operations is intended by the firm, with a view to making necessary arrangements for temporary supply, by which, pending the final decision of the case, they may be enabled to fulfil contracts. Major Cox should be instructed to this effect. A statement respecting the instructions sent to Major Cox in regard to arrangements for temporary supply will be added to the reply to the German Case.

[19354] No. 119.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Athens, June 4*, 1908.

REFERRING to Mr. G. Barclay's telegram No. 132 of yesterday.

I am not aware what is the extent of the Sultan's right to take decisions respecting Samos without reference to the Protecting Powers. However little the Samians deserve sympathy, it would be disastrous to the influence of these Powers in the East if they were to abdicate their functions of protection in this case. We can hardly expect a thorough and impartial inquiry into the causes of the disturbances so long as the Turkish occupation of the island is continued, nor unless dragomans are sent from the Embassies to attend it.

I have a suspicion that the disturbances were brought about by the Porte for its own ends. It is reported here that Cretan Mussulmans accompanied the Turkish troops and that these men are now being enrolled in the gendarmerie. If this is true further proof may be dispensed with, and it is superfluous to prophesy the consequences of planting in a purely Greek island a Mussulman minority.

The demand for the recall of the Greek Consul has been renewed by the Turkish Minister, who hinted at his expulsion if the demand were not complied with. Up to the present his proofs of the Consul's complicity amount to little more than assertions of it. I have advised the Greek Government to comply with the demand as evidence of their good faith, but they are reluctant to create a precedent by recalling a Consul on the strength of allegations unsupported by proofs.

[19364] No. 120.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—Received June 5.)

(No. 299.)
Sir, *Therapia, May 31*, 1908.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 124 of yesterday's date, and my telegrams since the 27th instant, respecting the outbreak of disorders in the Island of Samos, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received to-day from the Acting British Consul-General at Smyrna on that subject.

I have instructed Mr. Heathcote-Smith to obtain from Mr. Mave as soon as possible a full report of the origin and progress of the troubles, which I will not fail to forward to you when received.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 120.

Acting Consul-General Heathcote-Smith to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 46.)
Sir, *Smyrna, May 28*, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to report more fully with reference to my telegram of to-day's date about the disturbances in Samos.

It appears that some few days ago the Prince-Governor, Kopassi Bey, quarrelled with the Council of the Four Senators, who have on their side all the Government officials and all the local gendarmes.

Kopassi Bey appealed to the Sublime Porte, as he feared he was in danger of being removed from his position at the next General Assembly.

A Turkish steamer arrived on the 25th, Monday, with 200 soldiers, presumably to strengthen the Prince's position. As the landing of the new troops would raise to 450 the number of the soldiers in the island, the Samians resisted their entrance, inasmuch as it was an infringement of the privileges enjoyed by the Principality.

The Turks had therefore to land while exposed to a heavy fire.

Meanwhile Kopassi Bey was seized, beaten, and imprisoned by some of the Senate's party, but he eventually regained his Palace, and Turkish soldiers, 200 strong, came and occupied the building to protect him, only, however, to find themselves, when once inside, exposed to a continual fire from commanding positions.

The Prince and his wife and the Turkish soldiers were entirely without provisions, and the Palace water supply was cut off.

However, the British Vice-Consul managed to send them in some 800 lbs. of provisions, and also to induce the Mayor to turn on again the water supply.

There was no post out yesterday, and the following additional details have now come to hand:—

One hundred Turkish soldiers are surrounded in the barracks, and are in want of provisions.

The cable has been cut, and the "Marmaris," which crossed from Scala Nuova with military supplies on the 27th, returned at once from Samos to Scala Nuova, where it acts as despatch-vessel, while the "Messout" is now also lying at Scala Nuova.

The Turkish soldiers killed and wounded are now estimated at 150, while some 80 Samians are said to have perished, being mainly women and children, many of whom were killed at the point of the bayonet.

Many inhabitants have fled, and many have taken refuge in the Consulates, which, it is stated, have not been respected by the Turkish soldiers.

One side of the town is commanded by the armed Samians, and the other by the Turkish troops.

The Scala Nuova Vice-Consul considers that the presence of a foreign war-ship is necessary.

Two battalions are said to be leaving Scala Nuova to-day for Samos.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. E. HEATHCOTE-SMITH.

[19427] No. 121.

Mr. Pears to Mr. Tyrrell.—(Received June 5.)

(Private.)
Dear Mr. Tyrrell, *Reform Club, June 2, 1908.*

THANKS for your letter of the 22nd ultimo. I mark this private merely to indicate that I have no intention of publishing its contents in any form.

This question of Samos is going to give much trouble unless action be taken by England as one of the three Guaranteeing Powers who can speak most effectively in the Ægean; "action," I mean, mainly in the sense of firm representations to the Porte. I have followed the question from the appointment, about a year ago, of Caratheodori as Prince of the island. He is an exceptionally able man and had the confidence of the Council, and everybody in the island with the exception of a small clique, which was working for the Sultan's idea. The man who replaced him, Georgiades, I also know. He was recognized as a failure. But the important part to know is that each of the two later "Princes," namely, Georgiades and Kopassis, have gone with instructions to set the Constitution aside as far as possible, this being the Sovereign's idea. The Sultan naturally hates the word, and those who would obtain or keep his favour are anxious to restore the island to his absolute rule. Georgiades, with the want of tact which characterizes him, told the Council or Senate plainly that his instructions differed from the provisions in the Constitution, and that he was going to obey his instructions. Kopassis has shown a similar disregard of the people's wish. They are passionately attached to the island's rights, and, believing that the three Powers who guaranteed them will prevent any violation, have, as the Foreign Office is aware, addressed many remonstrances to our Consul-General at Smyrna and to the Embassy at Constantinople. The *causa causans* of the disturbances on last Sunday week was the refusal of the Prince to accede to the demands of the members of the Assembly that they should be convened—a clear violation of the Constitution. Apparently he lost his head when a demonstration took place outside the konak, and thereupon called upon the troops to fire. I am assured in a letter from Constantinople by a friend who cordially dislikes the Greeks, that Kopassis telegraphed to the Porte that the island was in revolution, and that it was decided on the 26th ultimo to send two men-of-war and 5,000 soldiers. Reuter's telegram in yesterday's papers gives the official Turkish view. It is probably as untrustworthy as the one which follows it from Athens, and we must wait for independent news.

The points I wish to call attention to are the following:—

That the Macedonian question will be still worse complicated if any massacre has taken place or should take place in Samos. The Greek population in Asia Minor,

already irritated by the opposition to their Patriarch's insensate conduct in Macedonia, will be roused to dangerous and foolish acts of demonstration in western Asia Minor.

That, substantially, the Samians are right, inasmuch as during the last nine months there has been a hardly concealed attempt to curtail their privileges.

And that a notification, given in such manner that the Samians—and, indeed, all interested—should learn that Great Britain will not permit the violation of their rights, would do more than anything else at the present time, not merely to put an end to the Samian troubles, but to let the Greeks in Greece and in Turkey understand that they have not been abandoned by the Western Powers. Whether such notification should take the form of a despatch or of the appointment of an English, French, and Russian Commission to inquire into the condition of Samos is a matter for consideration.

I discussed the Samian question on various occasions a few months ago with the late Sir Nicholas O'Conor, and though he was under the impression that the appointment of Kopassis would have insured peace, he fully recognized that to have a new Greek question opened up would be a serious nuisance. I believe that, were he now living, he would recognize that some step should be taken to let the Greeks, and notably the Samians, know that they were not abandoned.

It is only because, from my knowledge of Turkey and of some of the ex-Princes, I fear serious trouble ahead and believe that it can be avoided that I am writing. If you think well to bring what I have said to the knowledge of Sir Edward Grey you are of course free to do so. *Liberavi animam.*

Very sincerely yours,
(Signed) EDWIN PEARS.

[19391] No. 122.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 5.)

Sir, *India Office, June 3, 1908.*

IN reply to your letter dated the 26th ultimo, as to the dispute between the Turkish authorities and the Sheikh of Koweit concerning his property at Fao, I am directed by Viscount Morley to say that he has no further information on the subject than that contained in the correspondence forwarded with the letter from this Office of the 25th ultimo, which has crossed your letter under reply.

The facts as reported may suffice for the purposes of a general request to the Ottoman Government to instruct their local authorities to arrive at an equitable settlement with the Sheikh by means of a Committee such as is suggested by the Government of India or otherwise. But if a more precise support of the Sheikh's claims is practicable at this stage of the controversy, Lord Morley agrees that a detailed statement of the case will be necessary.

The draft of a telegram to the Government of India, which will be sent if Sir E. Grey considers it desirable, is inclosed for consideration.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[19394] No. 123.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 5.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, and with reference to the letter from the Foreign Office of the 25th ultimo, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 2nd instant, regarding the Muscat Arbitration Award.

India Office, June 4, 1908.

---

* Printed elsewhere.

Inclosure in No. 123.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, June 2, 1908.*

MUSCAT Award. Your telegram dated the 15th March last.

Proclamation approved by French Government, who suggest its publication at an early date. Arrangements with French Consul should be made accordingly by Political Agent.

[19488] No. 124.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 133.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, June 5, 1908.*

DISORDERS in Samos.

Sir F. Elliot's telegram No. 13 of yesterday.

The Porte assures me that there is no question of enrolling Mussulmans to serve in the Samian gendarmerie, as is stated in Athens, though there has been some discussion of a proposal to draft Christians from other parts of the Empire into the force under a non-Samian Christian Commanding Officer. Though Article 8 of the "Réglement" of 1852 does not preclude such a course, I am deprecating it on general grounds, and my colleagues will also do so.

I think it would be inadvisable to consider the proposal that an inquiry should be held, at any rate until the Embassies have received full reports from their Consular Agents in the island.

Since the beginning of the disorders the Porte has not failed to recognize the special position of the three Embassies representing the Protecting Powers.

[19923] No. 125.

Note Verbale communicated by M. Métaxas, June 5, 1908.

LE Ministre de Grèce a été chargé par son Gouvernement d'entretenir son Excellence Sir Edward Grey dans le sens suivant :—

La Sublime Porte ayant donné aux Puissances Garantes de Samos l'assurance formelle qu'après le rétablissement de l'ordre dans l'île elle retirerait les troupes qu'elle y a envoyées, et la Circulaire que le Gouvernement Turc adressa dernièrement aux Puissances affirmant que, grâce aux mesures, l'ordre a été rétabli, M. Métaxas a été autorisé par son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères d'attirer la bienveillante attention de son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Sa Majesté Britannique sur les points suivants : Selon toute probabilité, la Sublime Porte cherchera à prolonger aussi longtemps que possible le séjour de ses troupes à Samos. Aussi les Puissances, pour donner une preuve nouvelle de leur sollicitude envers l'île, dont le régime politique se trouve sous leur garantie, pourraient bien s'entendre dès à présent pour fixer à la Turquie un terme au delà duquel le séjour de ses troupes ne saurait être prolongé. Il ne faut pas aussi perdre de vue que la Turquie, en violation de la Charte Constitutionnelle, entretenait à Samos une garnison de 250 hommes, que, malgré les protestations des Samiens, elle persiste à maintenir. Le moment donc serait propice pour que la garnison en même temps que les troupes envoyées dernièrement quittent l'île.

M. Métaxas se permet d'ajouter que le Ministre de Sa Majesté Hellénique à Constantinople a été prié de faire les mêmes suggestions aux Représentants de la Grande-Bretagne, de France, et de Russie à Constantinople.

Légation Royale Hellénique, Londres,
le 5 Juin, 1908.

[19501] No. 126.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 77.)

Sir, *Athens, May 30, 1908.*

HIS Majesty the King of the Hellenes did me the honour this afternoon to send me a copy of a letter addressed to the British Vice-Consul at Samos by M. Hatsidakis, a member of the Council, or Government, of the island, on behalf of himself and his three colleagues, on the 26th instant. In a private note His Majesty expressed the opinion that this letter showed very clearly the true state of affairs.

In case Mr. Marc had been unable to forward the letter to his Majesty's Minister at Constantinople, I thought it my duty to send a full summary of it to you and to Mr. Barclay in my telegram No. 9 of this day. I have now the honour to inclose a translation of it, in lieu of a paraphrase of my telegram.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. ELLIOT.

Inclosure in No. 126.

M. Hatsidakis to Vice-Consul Marc.

(Translation.)

WHAT has happened since yesterday morning does not constitute an insurrectionary movement against the Sovereign Power, for the people of Samos remain faithful to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, and regret much that Prince Copassi has disturbed the peace and quiet of the place without necessity or cause. For days during his tour he was exciting the people against the Local Government; since his return he has been constantly in secret relations with suspected persons, and has daily threatened to upset everything and make himself master of the island by force with the help of the Turkish army. The people therefore, on seeing the Ottoman soldiers landing yesterday, were justly alarmed, and went first to the house of M. Sophoulis, whom they roused from his bed, and they took us to the Prince's Palace in order that we should ask the Prince for what reason he had summoned the Imperial army here. The Prince replied that he himself did not know the reason of the coming of the troops and the objects of the Porte, but he refused to send a written order to the Commander of the detachment not to disembark the troops that had arrived. The Chief of Police had in the end to go by his verbal order to request the officer to give orders that the troops should not move until the officer should have consulted the Prince, but the officer refused, and gave orders that the troops should immediately march on the town. The excitement of the people had been the more augmented by the order given by the Prince in the early morning that the telegraph office should be surrounded by Turkish troops so as to prevent the Government and the people from telegraphing to the Sultan. As the Turkish soldiers, in moving from the mole where they had landed, threw into the sea and killed a boy, this gave occasion for the excitement to reach its height, all the inhabitants being exasperated by their landing contrary to the express provision of the Charter and by the object of their coming, which was obviously to carry out Copassi's resolution to destroy the autonomous institutions and the liberties of the Samian people.

If since yesterday the people hold arms in their hands, they do so in defence of the lives of their wives and children and of their liberties, and the Government reserves to itself to submit to His Majesty a protest against the forcible trampling on local privileges brought about by the intriguing and lying reports addressed to the Porte by Prince Copassi, whose remaining in Samos has now become absolutely impossible. The people are ready to lay down their arms immediately on the appearance of a ship of war of one of the Protecting Powers, the presence of which will guarantee the lives of the inhabitants and the maintenance of their privileges. The people are also ready to lay down their arms on the immediate departure of Copassi, who is the cause of the state of affairs and responsible for it. And they beg the Consuls of the Protecting Powers and the Consul of Greece to urge on their Governments the early dispatch of a vessel of war to protect their families and to inquire into the facts, and they declare that they await with confidence the verdict and decision of the Powers.

They affirm also that they are ready to cease firing so long as unarmed citizens,

women, and children are not fired at and killed from the Ottoman camp and the Prince's Palace, from which so many have received their death. But they will maintain their positions until they have been assured that the privileges and the liberty of the place are in no danger. But the first necessity of all is the evacuation of the Prince's Palace by the Turkish troops, in order that communications may be resumed in the town, which have been completely cut by the indiscriminate firing upon every one by those outside the Palace.

Receive the assurance of my distinguished consideration,

(For myself and on behalf of my colleagues, Them. I. Sophoulis, Ek. Soloumis, and K. Dilanas),

(Signed) EM. MATSIDAKIS.

In the Harbour of Vathy, Samos,
13 (26) *May*, 1908.

[19502] No. 127.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 78.)
Sir,

Athens, May 30, 1908.

AS soon as I had drafted my telegram based on the letter from the member of the Samian Council which had been sent to me by the King, I went to the Palace on the chance of His Majesty wishing to see me about it. He graciously received me, and said he thought it was quite clear that the trouble in Samos was due to internal causes only; the Samians were impossible people: with every succeeding Prince the same dissensions broke out between him and the Government, each side claiming the disposal of the State patronage; it had always happened, even with men much more fit for the post than Copassi Effendi. I asked His Majesty if he thought that the Prince was playing for his own hand, saying that M. Skouses suspected him of being in collusion with the Porte to bring about the reoccupation of the island. He replied that he was sure Copassi Effendi was only actuated by personal ambition, and that the Turkish Government were quite innocent of any desire to reoccupy Samos, by which they could have nothing to gain. He regretted that troops had been sent, since that was a breach of one of the privileges guaranteed by the Powers, and he thought that the dispatch of a special Commissioner was an excellent step, and that it alone, coupled with the recall of Copassi Effendi, would have been enough to restore order, as had been the case on other similar occasions. His Majesty was very anxious that quiet should be re-established in Samos for the sake of this country. He thought that the presence of the "stationnaire" of even one only of the Protecting Powers would contribute greatly to this result by encouraging confidence.

Finding that His Majesty had not communicated the letter of the Samian Councillor to my French and Russian colleagues I obtained his permission to do so, and I also repeated to them what His Majesty had said to me.

May 31.—I am informed by the French Minister that after our meeting yesterday he saw M. Theotoky, who returned the day before from Corfu, and who was much annoyed by the events at Samos. He had received a telegram alluding to a Pan-Hellenic movement, and protested with the greatest energy against an idea of that kind, which, as he said, would be the most stupid form of madness, and declared that if the Greek Consul at Samos, of whose intelligence he had not a high opinion, had allowed himself to be drawn into any foolish intrigue of that kind, he would be most severely punished.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. ELLIOT.

[18715] No. 128.

Memorandum communicated to M. Métaxas, June 6, 1908.

SIR E. GREY presents his compliments to the Greek Minister, and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of his communication of the 30th ultimo, respecting the situation in Samos.

His Majesty's Government are carefully following the course of events in Samos, but, according to the reports from His Majesty's Minister at Constantinople, they are not led to believe that the dispatch of a war-ship, at any rate at present, would be desirable.

Foreign Office, June 6, 1908.

[19692] No. 129.

Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 126.)
Sir,

Tehran, May 21, 1908.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 101 of the 24th April on the question of the recognition by the Persian Government of our right to afford protection to subjects of Bahrein in this country, I have the honour to report that I have constantly urged the Minister for Foreign Affairs to send me an amended note in place of that which he addressed to me on the 9th April. His Excellency, however, pleads for more time to examine the matter from the historical point of view, and in consequence of the recurrent Ministerial crises of the past month he has not been able to prepare his case. The general tone of his conversation, however, has not led me hitherto to expect that the new note, when it does reach me, will be satisfactory; it is more likely that it will be an attempt to justify Persian claims over the islands, based chiefly on the repudiated Treaty of 1822. When I saw him on the 18th instant, I again brought the question up, and said that I believed His Majesty's Government would be perfectly satisfied with a note simply stating that general instructions had been given to the local Persian authorities to accept the representations of the British Consular officers on behalf of Bahreinis, and I elicited the tacit admission from his Excellency that his researches in the archives of the Foreign Office had been practically fruitless, and that he had been able to find no trace of any ratification of the abortive Treaty of 1822. His Excellency at last admitted that his disinclination to comply with our demand arose really from fear of what might be said of him in the Assembly, whose patriotic susceptibilities would be outraged. I told his Excellency that I thought he would have a perfectly good reply to any such criticisms by quoting the case of the Persians who found themselves in difficulties in Bahrein in November 1901, when the Persian Government had been forced to apply to us for assistance. His Excellency pretended to acquiesce, but I am convinced that without some material pressure, or at least the threat of it, which I understand from your telegram No. 100 of the 11th May His Majesty's Government is not at present disposed to employ, the Minister will contrive to avoid giving a satisfactory answer. It is unfortunate that circumstances should make it necessary for His Majesty's Government to adopt this attitude, for I think that, were I authorized to inform Mushir-ed-Dowleh unofficially that His Majesty's Government had decided to enforce compliance by material measures, it is more than likely that his Excellency would find means to comply with our demands and to conceal the fact of his compliance from the Parliament.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES M. MARLING.

[19735] No. 130.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 302. Very Confidential.)
Sir,

Therapia, June 2, 1908.

I HAVE not yet received the promised statement from the Porte on the recent disturbances in Samos nor the full report for which I have asked from Mr. Vice-Consul Mare, but in the meanwhile I have the honour to transmit a translation of a telegram dispatched to the Porte by the Prince Governor and an extract from a despatch addressed by the French Consul-General at Smyrna to the French Ambassador which M. Constans has been kind enough to communicate to me very confidentially.

From long acquaintance with Prince Kopassis I feel quite safe in saying that the allegations contained in the letter mentioned in Sir F. Elliot's telegrams

Nos. 8 and 9 are unfounded, and I have little doubt that his appeal for reinforcements was due to the turbulent attitude of the Phil-Hellene party under the leadership of Sofoulis. The extract from the report of the French Consul-General, who is a pro-Greek in his sympathies, shows clearly the mischievous influence which this man exercises in the island. No doubt the Ottoman Government were technically wrong in sending the reinforcements asked for without previously consulting the Protecting Powers, but this *lâche*, while no doubt it would have warranted a protest to the Powers, afforded no justification for the course taken by the turbulent party opposed to the Prince Governor. The attack on the Imperial troops was wholly unjustifiable, so far as our present information shows, and it is to be hoped that the persons responsible for it will meet with proper punishment.

From the moment that we knew that the Ottoman Government was taking measures which promised the restoration of order with a minimum of bloodshed, there has been complete unanimity among the three Representatives of the Protecting Powers as to the inadvisability of sending war-ships to Vathy, which would only have served the ends of the party responsible for the insurrection.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

P.S.—*June* 3.—I inclose a copy of the promised statement of the Porte, which has just reached me.

G. B.

Inclosure 1 in No. 130.

Prince of Samos to the Ottoman Government.

(Translation.)
(Telegraphic.) *June* 1, 1908.

ALTHOUGH the siege of the Prince's Konak continued from the day of the outbreak of the excesses already reported up to the arrival of the Imperial fleet, the continual attacks of the insurgents were repulsed. The Imperial gun-boat "Marmaviee," which was the first to arrive, was a source of great hope, and its Commander, Bekir Rashid Bey, gave much assistance. The display of the authority of the Government on the arrival of the other Imperial ships was felt by everybody, and although the insurgents who had concealed themselves at various points in the neighbourhood of Vathy continued to fire night and day on the Prince's Konak, they were driven back and chastised every time by the energetic return fire of the Imperial troops in the Konak and the firing of guns from the fleet. By the grace of His Majesty, there were no killed or wounded among the troops in the Konak, one servant only being wounded.

Sadik Pasha, Aide-de-camp to His Majesty, who was dispatched in the Imperial ship "Ezzedin," displayed the greatest valour by traversing the country at a very dangerous time, and taking a number of efficatious measures. His Excellency Halil Pasha, the Commander of the fleet, also took every kind of efficacious measure calculated to establish the extreme Imperial authority, and left nothing undone towards chastising the insurgents and restoring tranquillity; whilst the two ships which arrived yesterday with Imperial troops on board were entering the harbour of Vathy, certain insurgents concealed themselves in a wood on the right side of the harbour, and at the places where the troops were to land, and formed the intention of firing on them, but they were driven off and chastised by gun-fire from the fleet, and the soldiers, having been landed safely and in good order, occupied Vathy and the surrounding hills, and from that moment the insurgents' fire was stopped.

Upon news being received that the rebel leader Sofoulis, with certain of his assistants, was travelling about the villages declaring that the local privileges were about to be abolished by the Government, and indulging in seditious incitements to the effect that all the inhabitants must unite against the Government, I ventured to draw up a proclamation, which was communicated by telephone to the inhabitants of all the villages. In this proclamation the law-abiding inhabitants of the island were warned that they must not depart from their loyalty and allegiance, and must discountenance the excesses that had taken place, and other advice of a tranquillizing character was given, and it was stated that His Imperial Majesty had ordered that every kind of measure should be taken in order to meet the needs of the situation created by the outrages committed on the Imperial troops and on myself, and by

other crimes destructive of tranquillity. Not only did the contents of this proclamation render the efforts of Sofoulis and his assistants to rouse the people wholly fruitless and futile, but telephone messages began to come in from every party of the island expressing obedience and loyalty, and disapproving of the excesses in question, and conveying to me expressions of respect for having rescued the local Administration from the hands of seditious persons, and for my efforts to give effect to the intentions of His Imperial Majesty as regards insuring the conduct of local affairs in accordance with his Imperial will, and establishing the security of the Administration and the public tranquillity, and securing the prosperity and happiness of the island and every class of its inhabitants. In fine, by the powerful grace of His Imperial Majesty, as a result of the imposing display of military strength made to the island on this occasion, its tranquillity and security have been completely established, a stop has been put to the excesses which had hitherto assumed an habitual character, and the law-abiding inhabitants who constitute the great majority of the island are filled with unbounded gratitude for this to his Imperial Majesty. I also hastened to offer my congratulations on the mastery displayed, and submit that I am engaged in prayer for the prolongation of his Imperial life and glory, and that, while I remained in the hands of the miscreants, I was resolved to sacrifice my life for my Sovereign in resistance of and defence against them. His Excellency Raouf Pasha, Vali of Salonica, whose arrival produced an excellent effect, and who greatly contributed to tranquillize feeling in the island, together with the Commandant and Sadik Pasha and the military officers, took the necessary measures to meet the needs of the situation. At present not a gunshot is to be heard from the insurgents, His Majesty's servants in the island are alive, the security of the inhabitants has been insured by the necessary measures, and tranquillity has been restored. Among the insurgents were the whole gendarmerie, including their officers, consisting of 158 persons, the police officers, and certain officials attached to Sofoulis' faction. They were all commanded by the said Sofoulis and his accomplice Hadjidaki, who have for two years interfered in the administration of the island, seeking to secure their personal interests and committing a variety of seditious acts.

Inclosure 2 in No. 130.

M. Blanc to M. Constans.

(Extrait.) *Smyrne, le 28 Mai*, 1908.

POUR tous ceux qui suivent de près les affaires de Samos, il était certain que la dictature exercée par le fameux Sénateur Samien, Soufoulis, qui n'est en somme qu'un aventurier et un véritable agitateur révolutionnaire, ne pouvait manquer de conduire les choses au pire dans cette Principauté, toujours maintenue par les chefs de partis en état constant d'effervescence.

Dans ces conditions Soufoulis méprisait absolument l'autorité des Princes de Samos, refusait d'obéir à leurs ordres et se faisait un malin plaisir de les tenir sous sa tutelle. Tous les fonctionnaires Samiens et les gendarmes n'étaient recrutés que parmi ses partisans, et il déniait au Prince le droit de destituer ceux qui commettaient une faute quelconque.

En somme c'était lui seul qui exerçait une dictature brutale dans l'île tout entière, et les Ambassades savent avec quel arbitraire et quelle injustice il malmenait les sujets étrangers installés dans l'île. Les plaintes que nous recevions contre ce personnage étaient continuelles, et les Ambassades avaient beau les communiquer aux autorités Samiennes. Soufoulis enjoignait à ces dernières l'ordre de ne pas les exécuter, et c'était bien entendu que c'était lui seul qu'on obéissait.

La situation des étrangers était devenue dans ces derniers temps véritablement intolérable à Samos, et dès que les Agents Consulaires se plaignaient, Soufoulis s'adressait directement aux Ambassades ou aux Ministères des Affaires Étrangères pour demander leur révocation. L'an dernier il s'en prenait à notre Agent et à celui d'Italie; cette année il réclamait la destitution de l'Agent Allemand et de celui d'Autriche-Hongrie.

Il faut avouer, d'autre part, que le Gouvernement Impérial a bien fait tout ce qu'il fallait pour augmenter l'audace de ce personnage dangereux.

Lorsque, l'an passé, les gendarmes de son parti attaquèrent la garnison de Vathy, tuèrent plusieurs soldats et provoquèrent des troubles, qui n'étaient que les avant-coureurs de ceux qui viennent d'éclater, la Porte envoya une Commission sur les lieux, et alors que l'on était en droit de s'attendre à voir prendre des mesures sévères contre

Soufoulis, qui avait été l'instigateur de cette agitation, on apprit un beau jour avec stupéfaction que le Sultan avait rappelé son Gouverneur et accordé à Soufoulis une décoration d'une classe élevée.

Dans de semblables conditions il était certain qu'à la moindre résistance du Prince à ses ordres, Soufoulis, sûr de l'impunité, ne manquerait pas de recommencer à prendre une attitude comminatoire et à provoquer de nouveaux désordres. Je ne sais encore ce qui s'est passé à Samos, mais je suis certain que de toute façon ce sera encore le fameux Soufoulis qui aura été la cause du conflit et qui aura fait tirer sur les troupes Ottomanes. Il s'était fait la main, l'année dernière, à ce genre d'exercice, et il savait comment s'y prendre. D'ailleurs, que risquait-il à ce jeu? D'obtenir une décoration d'une classe encore plus élevée que celle qui lui a été accordée dans de semblables circonstances. Toute hésitation était superflue.

J'avoue que si, pendant de nombreuses années, je n'ai fait que témoigner une sympathie qui ne s'est jamais démentie à la population Crétoise, que je voyais lutter pour conquérir son indépendance, je n'éprouve aucun intérêt pour les Samiens, qui, en dehors de l'esprit d'hostilité qu'ils témoignent envers tous les étrangers, passent leur temps à agiter leur pays, à s'entre-tuer et à ruiner ainsi les intérêts étrangers, et cela non dans un but patriotique ou pour acquérir des libertés, car ils les possèdent toutes, mais simplement pour assurer le triomphe de l'un ou de l'autre des deux partis politiques qui divisent l'île et s'assurer de la sorte à eux-mêmes la jouissance des places et des fonctions rémunérées.

Je ne sais ce que va faire la Porte, je ne sais ce que vont dire les Puissances Protectrices de Samos, mais ce que je puis déclarer c'est que l'état d'anarchie qui règne dans l'île ne saurait continuer plus longtemps sans danger, et qu'il faudrait mettre un peu d'ordre dans l'administration de cette Principauté turbulente. Si les Samiens étaient seuls à souffrir de l'agitation qu'ils entretiennent dans leur île, il n'y aurait que demi-mal, mais il y a là-bas d'autres des étrangers qui voudraient bien pouvoir vaquer tranquillement à leurs affaires et se livrer en paix à leurs opérations commerciales. Or, tant qu'ils resteront exposés aux vexations des autorités Samiennes, qui sont entièrement à la discrétion de Soufoulis, il y aura un véritable danger pour le commerce étranger, et malheureusement aussi, comme le prouvent les événements actuels, pour les personnes et les familles de nos nationaux.

Inclosure 3 in No. 130.

Statement respecting Disturbances at Samos, communicated by the Ottoman Government to Mr. G. Barclay.

DEPUIS quelque temps la situation à Samos donnait lieu à des plaintes continuelles de la part des habitants. Les empiètements de quelques membres du Conseil local dans les services publics paralysaient toute l'Administration, qui se trouvait ainsi subordonnée aux caprices et aux fantaisies de cette faction, dont l'ambition était d'accaparer tous les emplois au profit de ces créatures, pour s'en servir dans son intérêt personnel et au détriment de la population. La lutte des partis s'était accrue à tel point qu'aucune justice n'existait plus. On cite des cas où même des étrangers ont eu à subir des actes arbitraires des organes judiciaires. Le Gouvernement Impérial n'a ménagé ni ses Conseils ni ses recommandations. Tout le monde connaît la longanimité dont il a fait preuve devant les prétentions et les exigences qui se manifestaient.

Changements successifs du Prince, missions d'enquête, réceptions de députations, rien n'a été négligé pour rendre aux Samiens le repos auquel ils ont droit. Cet état de choses menaçait, en se prolongeant, de compromettre gravement la tranquillité du pays et de provoquer des conflits sanglants. Ainsi le Prince, amené par les circonstances à prendre position et à exercer le pouvoir que lui conféraient les statuts de l'île, a dû réclamer le renforcement de la garnison, qui ne comptait que 240 hommes, la gendarmerie n'inspirant nulle confiance avec des chefs qui étaient tous à la dévotion de meneurs tels que Soufoulis et Hadjichaki. Répondant à cette demande, le Gouvernement Impérial a ordonné l'envoi de deux compagnies destinées à relever le prestige de l'autorité; le nombre restreint de ce contingent indiquait déjà par lui-même qu'il était appelé plutôt à donner un appui moral au Prince. Mais à peine les troupes avaient-elles commencé à débarquer, qu'elles étaient surprises et assaillies par des coups de fusil, qui faisaient plusieurs victimes. Elles furent obligées de riposter. C'étaient les gendarmes eux-mêmes qui tiraient avec des gens de Soufoulis, et sous sa

propre direction. Une grande panique s'en suivit. Le Prince fut attaqué jusque dans sa résidence. La rébellion était ainsi ouvertement déclarée. Aussitôt informé de ces faits regrettables, le Gouvernement Impérial dirigeait sur les lieux trois bataillons et quelques bâtiments de guerre pour le rétablissement de l'ordre.

En même temps son Excellence Réouf Pacha, Gouverneur-Général du Vilayet de Salonique, et son Adjoint Constantinidi Pacha, se rendaient dans l'île avec mission d'assurer la pacification, en prenant toutes les mesures nécessaires pour le maintien de la sécurité et la protection des populations. Les instructions dont ils sont munis leur prescrivent de lancer à leur arrivée une proclamation dans laquelle, en faisant part aux habitants des sentiments bienveillants de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan à l'égard de tous ses sujets, ils leur proposeraient de livrer tous ceux qui ont provoqué les troubles et tiré sur les soldats.

Comme cependant les rebelles ont également fait feu sur les vaisseaux de guerre, blessant même le Général Ismaïl Pacha pendant qu'il s'entretenait avec son Excellence Réouf Pacha sur le pont du "Hamidié," ce croiseur a dû bombarder les points d'où partaient les coups. A ce moment les troupes ont débarqué, et les rebelles se sont dispersés.

Grâce aux mesures prises, l'ordre ayant été complètement rétabli, les boutiques ont été rouvertes et les habitants ont recommencé à vaquer à leurs affaires.

L'intervention du Gouvernement Impérial produit la meilleure impression dans toutes les parties de l'île, et des adresses de remercîments arrivent de tous côtés au Prince.

Son Excellence Réouf Pacha procède actuellement aux constatations nécessaires pour la découverte des perturbateurs et leur punition conformément aux prescriptions de la loi. Il s'occupe aussi de la réorganisation de la gendarmerie, qui, d'après les stipulations des Firmans, se trouve placée sous le commandement du Prince.

Le but poursuivi par le Gouvernement Impérial tend uniquement à garantir le bien-être des habitants de l'île sans distinction, et la stricte application des Firmans qui leur ont été octroyés.

Le 2 Juin, 1908.

[19397] No. 131.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 306.)

Constantinople, June 3, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Erzeroum, transmitting a despatch from the Dragoman in charge of His Majesty's Vice-Consulate at Bitlis, reporting the expulsion by the Kurds of Ghendj and Khuyt of the Mutessarif and Mudir of those districts respectively.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 131.

Consul Shipley to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 29.)

Erzeroum, May 19, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the copies of a despatch, as marked in the margin, which I have received from Mr. Safrastian, Dragoman in charge of His Majesty's Vice-Consulate at Bitlis, reporting the expulsion by the Kurds of Ghendj and Khuyt of the Mutessarif and Mudir of the last-named districts respectively, and giving the details respecting the murder, from motives apparently, of robbery, of an Armenian family residing near Gop in Bulanik.

I am requesting Mr. Safrastian to inform me what steps the authorities of his district are taking to bring the perpetrators of the above crime to justice.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. S. SHIPLEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 131.

Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul Shipley.

Bitlis, May 9, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that risings of the Mussulman population have broken out in different places of this vilayet in the course of the past week.

Husameddin Bey, the Mutessarif of the Sanjak of Ghendj, has been violently expelled from Ardushen (centre of Ghendj Sanjak) by Mussulman population, the reason officially being stated that he was not liked by the people owing to his harsh treatment and selfishness. The news are very scanty respecting the other details, in consequence, I suppose, of the distance of the place and lack of communication.

The Mektubji of this vilayet left immediately for Ghendj to hold inquiry into the matter, and not at the same time pending the appointment of a fresh Mutessarif.

More serious appears to be the rising of the population in Khuyt, a mountainous Kurdish nahié of Bitlis.

The Mudir and all other authorities were driven out by the Kurdish mob of the place, and the notorious gendarmerie Captain Teherkess Ali Bey, famous by his ill-treatment of Armenians in Akhlat, &c., was very roughly handled, and told not to enter again Khuyt, unless he desired death.

The expelled officials arrived here at night, and two days later the Mudir and other officials were sent back by the Government, escorted by some forty soldiers and thirty zaptiehs under the command of a gendarmerie officer.

The prevalent opinion here is to the effect that the dispatch of a military force will bring the Kurds of Khuyt to their senses, who as a justification of their step have told the expelled officials that their presence in Khuyt is of no use at all to them, and not worth while, as long as the Government cannot prevent the permanent raids of the Kurds of Modky on their villages; secondly, that they cannot pay the taxes, which are getting heavier every year. With all probability the expedition will be able to conciliate the Kurds and restore the authority of Government and the Mudir in his position, count the sheep, and collect one part of the sheep tax.

The circumstance, however, of these simultaneous risings in Ghendj and Khuyt leads some people to suppose that they are originating from the same source. According to the same opinion an active propaganda is being carried on among these Kurds, and that Modky is in the process of fermentation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

P.S.—The prices of grain are said to stand at famine rates in Mush and Bulanik, corn being worth 30 piastres per kod.* In spite of the fact that the roads are open now, the price here is 20–22 piastres the kod, this increase in price being the result, I suppose, of the decreased import of corn from Diarbekir, owing to the murder of a Kurdish muleteer by Atmanli Kurds in Garzan Caza. All necessary victuals have of late doubled in price, and the widespread misery and distress are daily increasing.

A fortnight ago the following crime was perpetrated in Youjalu, an hour from Gop, upon an Armenian family: A certain Armenian, Alexan Khilgatian, had sold all his property, and would shortly emigrate to America. Murderers entered his house at night and butchered the whole family of five persons, and carried the cash money, a sum supposed to be £T. 200. The servants of the Hamidie Colonel Khalid Bey are said to be the murderers, as the relatives of the butchered family state that for a long time past Khalid Bey was coveting the fortune of the Armenian, and that on previous occasions the former had received already his share.

A. S. S.

* 10–12 okes.

[19740]

No. 132

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 307.)

Constantinople, June 3, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Bussorah, reporting that the Vali of Bussorah has invited Bin Saoud to settle tribal differences at Hassa.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 132.

Consul Crow to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 32.)

Bussorah, May 6, 1908.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 12 of the 8th February last, regarding affairs at Hassa, I am informed that El Muhanna tribes fought with the El Odah tribes at Aiyun, a village in Hassa. The El 'Odah were defeated, with some loss. The Mutessarif applied to the vilayet for more troops to reduce the tribes to order. The Administrative Council here came to the conclusion a month ago that it was not feasible to send more troops to Hassa for the purpose, and passed a Resolution to the effect that Bin Saoud should be invited to settle the tribal differences in Hassa in the Arab way. The Vali communicated this Resolution to the Minister of the Interior, the Reform Commissioner, and the Mutessarif of Hassa, and wrote at the same time to Bin Saoud, asking him to go to Hassa for the purpose. I understand that Bin Saoud has not yet reached Hassa.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. CROW.

[19741]

No. 133.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 308.)

Constantinople, June 3, 1908.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 282 of the 25th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Jeddah reporting further Bedouin raids.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 133.

Consul Monahan to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 21.)

Jeddah, May 22, 1908.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 20 of the 14th instant, I have the honour once more to report that the whole of the mail proceeding from Jeddah to Mecca has been taken by Bedouins. This is the third time within about six weeks. This time the robbery took place at noon on the 16th instant, near Derada, three hours from Jeddah. There was only one donkey carrying the mail itself, but travelling with it were ten other donkeys and riders. All the ten donkeys were taken, and their ten riders despoiled of all their money and baggage and a great part of their clothing. There appears to have been only one man, a civilian, with the postal donkey, and he was similarly robbed and the donkey taken away. The eleven men have all come back to Jeddah.

Twelve hours later—that is, about midnight of the 16th-17th instant—136 sick and convalescent soldiers, who had been overcome by the Jeddah climate, were proceeding from Jeddah on camels towards the healthy mountain station of Taif, escorted by twenty armed soldiers. When near the same place (Derada) the Bedouins

killed eleven of the escort and took all the camels, baggage, and provisions. A Turkish officer and his wife were travelling with this caravan, and were also robbed of their camel and all they had with them. Some of the camels have been recovered without anything that was on them. It is not known whether there were any casualties among the Bedouins. The people of the caravan seem to have taken refuge at the Jerada guard-house, and they have been sent on their way to Mecca and Taif.

I hear there are seventy to eighty soldiers in the military hospital here, so that the rate of sickness among less than 500 soldiers at Jeddah has been very high.

Kiazim Pasha, of the Hedjaz Railway, has just arrived here from Mecca, and he is leaving by to-day's steamer for Al Wedj. Two or three hundred soldiers were sent out to get him safely to Jeddah. The report that the construction of the line from Jeddah is about to be commenced is not confirmed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. MONAHAN.

[19986] No. 134.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 311.)
Sir, *Therapia, June 5, 1908.*

PENDING the receipt of the full report, for which I have asked Mr. Vice-Consul Mure, on the origin and course of the recent insurrection in Samos, I have the honour, in continuation of my despatch No. 302 of the 2nd instant, to transmit the accompanying copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna, giving an account by an eye-witness of the disorders in Vathy. It will be noticed that this account shows Mr. Sofouli's conduct in a very unfavourable light. No mention is made of the killing of a boy by the Imperial troops, which is alleged in the letter addressed by the Samian Council to the King of Greece to have been the first act of bloodshed. Indeed, according to Mr. Barnham's informant, the attack on the troops would appear to have been premeditated and to have taken a most treacherous form.

The account of the firing from the ships is somewhat in conflict with the Turkish version, according to which the ships only replied to the fire of the insurgents, but it will be observed that only the insurgents are spoken of as having been bombarded.

The disturbances do not seem to have spread beyond the capital.

A copy of this despatch has been sent to Athens.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 134.

Consul-General Barnham to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 49.)
Sir, *Smyrna, June 2, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I received the visit last evening of a Mr. Missir of Samos, who had just arrived from that place, and, as an eye-witness, gave me the following account of the disturbances which occurred there last week:—

The port of Vathy is in the shape of a horseshoe surrounded by a quay, and at the apex of the horseshoe, opposite the entrance, stands the Government House. On the quay to the left on entering the port are the French and Austrian Vice-Consulates, occupied by Mr. Missir's two brothers. On Monday, the 25th May, the steam-ship "Dikili" entered the port, having on board about 200 Turkish soldiers, and anchored opposite the Vice-Consulates. When the troops began to disembark the Prince and others who were on guard at the Palace to meet them, with colours flying and band playing. A street leads off from the quay at the corner of the French Vice-Consulate, and when the Prince's guard reached that point a native gendarme ordered them to stop. As they paid no heed he ran to the church a few steps up the street and rang the tocsin. Almost immediately a fusillade was opened upon the troops by a mob of insurgents who were in ambush on high ground behind the Vice-Consulates. Fifteen soldiers were shot down at the corner of the street, and others close by. While this was going on other insurgents, headed by Mr. Sofoulis, a Senator, who is the ringleader in the movement, forced his way into the Government House, attacked the Prince, and

dragged him out of his Palace across to the Senate House. When the soldiers had fought their way up to the Palace, the Prince was rescued, and brought back, but for the next three days he and the troops with him remained under siege. Next day the Turkish Station naire entered the port and timidly made its way up the harbour, when it was received by a heavy fire from the insurgents, and quickly retired.

On Thursday, the 28th May, the Turkish Admiral with a cruiser and three torpedo-boats arrived and proceeded to bombard the insurgents. Mr. Missir says that the Turkish fire was very effective, and he saw several people killed in a café above the Vice-Consulates, while a house close to the café was burnt to the ground. Naturally there was considerable panic among the townspeople, who fled for refuge to the Vice-Consulates, and to the French Convent, while very many boarded the Messageries steamer last Saturday and proceeded to Rhodes.

The Turkish Admiral appears to have since restored order. Guards were stationed before each Vice-Consulate, and patrols sent out in pursuit of the insurgents. These belong exclusively to Vathy, the villages in the interior taking no part or interest in the matter.

Mr. Missir has shown me a telegram which he received this morning, stating that everything is quiet.

As regards the cause of the disturbance, Mr. Missir says that there have been many questions which have brought the Prince into trouble, but that the immediate cause was the grant of a concession to a German Syndicate for the manufacture of cigarettes, which this Mr. Sofoulis and others resented as likely to injure their own business.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY D. BARNHAM.

[19391] No. 135.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, June 10, 1908.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3rd instant, respecting the dispute between the Turkish authorities and the Sheikh of Koweit concerning his property at Fao.

I am to concur in the terms of the draft telegram to the Government of India which forms the inclosure in your letter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LOUIS MALLET.

[20172] No. 136.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 11.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, with reference to the letter from the India Office of the 4th instant, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 10th instant, regarding the Muscat Arbitration Award.

India Office, June 11, 1908.

Inclosure in No. 136.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *June 10, 1908.*

ACTION referred to in your telegram of the 2nd instant as to the Muscat Award is being postponed in view of death of French Consul pending his successor's arrival.

[17956] No. 137.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 228.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 12, 1908.

IN reply to your despatch No. 267 of the 19th ultimo, respecting the attack by Arabs on the P.S. "Blosse Lynch," I transmit herein copy of a letter from the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company (Limited), inclosing a statement of their claim against the Ottoman Government for damage sustained through the occurrence.

I request that you will, before taking any further action in this matter, consult Mr. Consul Crow as to the details of the claim, and as to what would, in his opinion, be a fair lump sum to demand as compensation.

Upon receipt of his reply you should present Messrs. Lynch's claim to the Ottoman Government, explaining at the same time that it is necessary, in order to avoid a repetition of the offence, to make the Arab tribes understand that British steamers cannot be fired on with impunity.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

P.S. I have since writing this despatch, received your telegram No. 138 of the 13th instant, in which you inform me that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad, the Company have gained more than they have lost by the recent attack upon their steamer, and that Messrs. Lynch's agent has telegraphed to his employers to withdraw the claim. No notice of such withdrawal has yet reached me, and I should be glad of a report from Mr. Crow before informing Messrs. Lynch that I cannot support the claim.

I presume that you have considered the possible effect of abandoning the demand for the punishment of Gadban as well as the claim for compensation.

E. G.

[20418] No. 138.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 13.)

(No. 138.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, June* 13, 1908.

ATTACK on the "Blosse Lynch."

The statement claiming damages which has been submitted to you has been shown to me by Lynch's agent.

His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad requests that Lynch should not learn that his agent at Bagdad has supplied the following confidential information, viz., that the recent disturbances have been a source rather of profit than of loss to the Company, and that the local agent of the Company, having been told by His Majesty's Consul-General that he would not support the claim, is telegraphing to London to have it withdrawn.

[20419] No. 139.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 13.)

(No. 139.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, June* 13, 1908.

THE British Vice-Consul in Samos reports that the casualties in the fighting amounted to 30 Turkish troops and 25 Samians killed, and that there were altogether upwards of 100 wounded.

The Porte declares that the new local gendarmerie has been nearly all enrolled, and the Minister of War has received instructions to begin the withdrawal of the troops; one battalion is to leave at once. The elections for the Assembly will be held to-morrow.

---

* No. 66.

[20420] No. 140.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 140.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, June* 14, 1908.

ATTACK on steam-ship "Blosse Lynch." My telegram No. 138 of yesterday.

I have received a telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad urging that pressure should be brought to bear on the Porte to undertake the punishment of Gadban. This course might, however, necessitate punitive measures on a large scale and cause traffic on the Tigris to be seriously interrupted, though Major Ramsay does not think this probable. I have mentioned the proposal to the Grand Vizier, who says that the number of troops in the disturbed area is not sufficient to embark on repressive measures against the Arab tribes, and further that the hot season is not a propitious moment to choose for military operations. Therefore, at any rate till the cool weather, he is in favour of temporizing. You might think it well to inquire from Messrs. Lynch whether they are prepared to take the chance of traffic being seriously interrupted, though, in view of this danger and the possibility of serious fighting, I am somewhat doubtful whether it would be wise to try to induce the Grand Vizier to reconsider the matter, and indeed I do not know whether I should be able to do so.

[20480] No. 141.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 80.)
Sir, *Athens, June* 4, 1908.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 78 of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to report that I saw M. Theotoky on the 2nd instant, and that he repeated to me the assurances he had given to the French Minister, that if it should be proved that the Greek Consul at Samos had encouraged the movement, or anything in the nature of an Irrédentist agitation, he would not only be recalled, but dismissed the service. The Greek Government had grounds of complaint against him, inasmuch as with the exception of a telegram received a couple of days ago he had left them without any information whatever since the 2nd February, and therefore without any knowledge of what was brewing. This morning at the Minister for Foreign Affairs' reception I found the Turkish Minister about to make another demand for the recall of the Greek Consul, on the strength of a telegram from his Government, which contained allegations against the Consul, but nothing which I should regard as a proof of his complicity in the rising, and which concluded with the intimation that if he were not at once withdrawn other measures would be taken against him. In reply to my question whether he had furnished the Greek Government with proofs of these allegations, Naby Bey said he had done so; but M. Skousès told me he had had no communication from him on the subject since the first one reported in my despatch No. 75 of the 29th May. I advised M. Skousès in the interest of the Samians as well as of his own country, to sacrifice the Consul and recall him; if it should turn out afterwards that he had been unjustly accused he could easily be compensated. M. Skousès said there two objections to doing this; the Government were already being accused by the Opposition leaders, MM. Rhallys and Dragoumis, of want of energy in dealing with the question, and of pusillanimity in not having sent ships of war to Samos. (I may mention that the "Sphacteria," which was sent to cruise on the look out for refugees in sailing-boats, had strict orders not to go outside the limit of Greek waters.) Again, if they were to withdraw a Consul upon a mere unsupported accusation from the Porte, they would create a precedent which they would ever hereafter be expected to follow.

Contrary to the opinion of His Majesty the King, M. Theotoky was inclined to suspect that the Samian outbreak was organized by the Porte, perhaps as an example of what may occur in Crete after the withdrawal of the international troops, perhaps as a reassertion of the Sultan's authority in the eyes of his subjects. He thought it suspicious that such large bodies of troops should have been held in readiness, that 200 troops should have been sent off in the first instance without any apparent reason, and that complaints of the intrigues of the Greek Consul should have been withheld until the last moment. In speaking to M. Skousès to-day on this point I asked

him if it was true that Cretan Mussulmans had accompanied the Turkish troops to Samos. He replied that he believed it was, and that these people were now being enrolled by the Prince in the gendarmerie. If this proves to be really the fact, I cannot think of any stronger evidence to show that the rising was not unexpected by the Turkish Government and that they were prepared to turn it to their own advantage. It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the disastrous consequences which must follow upon the successful planting of a Mussulman Colony, however small, in an island hitherto free from the Mahommedan element, with the exception of the Turkish garrison.

It is clear that there must be an inquiry into the causes of the outbreak, and that it should be thorough and impartial. What guarantee is there that this will be the case, if the Protecting Powers are not represented at it, when one of the subjects to be inquired into is the conduct of the Prince, whose part the Special Commissioner is openly taking? What confidence can be placed in the Prince's recommendations for the future, until it is proved that he is not responsible for the errors of the past? It has also been suggested to me by M. Skouzès that witnesses will be reluctant to come forward so long as the island is in the military occupation of the Turks. His Excellency told me he had heard on authority on which he believed he could rely that Copassi Effendi is now circulating for signature Petitions to the Sultan praying him to bring Samos under his direct administration. The value of the signatures to such a Petition may be imagined.

I have the honour, therefore, to plead for the presence of representatives of the Embassies at the inquiry. The Samians are unsatisfactory people, who ought to manage their own affairs and to be contented with their lot, and who have brought their troubles on themselves. But they are by Treaty under the protection of the three Powers, and any apparent disposition to abdicate their functions on the part of the latter cannot but have disastrous effects upon their influence in the near East.

I am in constant communication upon this subject with the French Minister and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, and I may say that M. de la Boulinière agrees generally with the opinions expressed above. He told me to-day that when M. Constans threatened to send his "stationnaire" to reopen communications with the Consular Agents the Grand Vizier at once promised to have the telegraphic connections restored—a measure naturally much less distasteful to the Turkish Government, since the Consular Agents are not in possession of cyphers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. ELLIOT.

[20484] No. 142.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 84. Confidential.)

Athens, June 6, 1908.

Sir,

YESTERDAY evening I received a Memorandum signed by Messrs. Sophoulis and Hatzidakis, the two members of the Council or Government of Samos, who have arrived at Athens, setting forth their view of the recent events for the Governments of the three Protecting Powers. As it consists of eight quarto pages of close print, I am unable to forward a translation of it to-day.

This morning M. Sophoulis called upon me, and when I had warned him that, as His Majesty's Minister in this country, I had no *locus standi* to do more than listen to what he had to say and report it to you, we had a long and interesting conversation. Having noticed in the Memorandum a statement that the first occasion of a difference of opinion between the Prince and the Government was an incident in which a German subject was concerned, I asked M. Sophoulis to give me an account of it. He replied that he had purposely abstained from entering into the details in his Memorandum (which he has given to the press), as it related to matters which were better kept in the background. The facts were these: Some time ago a native cigarette manufacturer in Samos imported a cigarette-rolling machine. As machine-rolled cigarettes are notoriously inferior to hand made, the trade took alarm lest the reputation of Samos cigarettes should suffer, and owing to their representations an Ordinance was duly passed signed by the Prince and promulgated, enacting that all cigarettes should be stamped "machine made" or "hand made" as the case might be. The owner of the machine then nominally made over his business to a German subject, a local resident and a mere man

of straw, and soon afterwards the Director of the Custom-house reported to M. Sophoulis that a consignment of cigarettes marked "hand made," but really machine made, had been declared for exportation. M. Sophoulis ordered them to be confiscated. The German then went to him and complained. He replied that the Ordinance in force must be complied with. He then went to Copassi Effendi, who sent for M. Sophoulis, and said the German's operations were not to be interfered with, an instruction which M. Sophoulis declined to obey. Afterwards there appears to have been an altercation in the street between the German and a Samian, who abused and beat the German. The latter complained to M. Sophoulis of the abuse, but said nothing about the beating, and was told that he must lay an information before the Procureur, which he never did. He, however, threatened all sorts of consequences from the interference with German trade. The matter was brought before the German Embassy at Constantinople, which took it up, and demanded compensation for the assault, an apology from the Samian Government, the revocation of the Ordinance, and compensation to the German for every day that passed until it should be revoked. M. Sophoulis had it on the authority of a person in the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs that Copassi Effendi had himself written to Baron von Marschall promising him the satisfaction demanded. And yet the Samian Government had done nothing but what was strictly within its rights and in the best interests of the island.

M. Sophoulis thought that the Grand Vizier saw in this incident an opportunity for asserting, with the support of the German Embassy, the Turkish authority over Samos, as it had long been his endeavour to do. His predecessors had done the same, but in a less degree than Ferid Pasha. That they had not succeeded was due in great part to the benevolent dispositions of the Sultan himself, who had always proved accessible to the petitions of the Samians. The reasons of their desire to interfere were partly the prosperity of the Samians under their autonomous rule—a constant object-lesson to the rayah populations; partly the existence of a seminary in which Greek priests, chiefly from the Turkish-speaking districts of Asia Minor, were educated; partly the fact that Samos, as a free port, was a great smuggling centre, principally for tobacco, but also for other things, including sporting arms and gunpowder, in which a large trade was done with the neighbouring coast. On my manifesting some sympathy with the Turkish view of this latter cause of the prosperity of Samos, M. Sophoulis maintained that the Government of Samos could not be expected to take measures for the protection of the Turkish revenue.

Consequently, for years past, but especially under the present Grand Vizier, there had been constant attempts to curtail the privileges of the island. The Constitution was defective, inasmuch as, although the Prince had no power of veto except in matters in which foreign relations were concerned, he was not a constitutional Sovereign, but a mere Turkish functionary, whose interests were not in the island, but in satisfying his employers. Consequently, when for once the Samians had a good Prince, like Carathéodory Effendi, who governed for the good of the country in the true constitutional spirit, he was removed, to the despair of the Samians.

Copassi Effendi, M. Sophoulis was convinced, acted as he did in order to strengthen his own position with the Turkish Government. After the German incident he declined to summon the Legislative Assembly at the legal date, because he was already expecting the dispatch of troops, and, if the Assembly had been sitting, nothing could have prevented their laying their case before the Sultan. What occurred at the arrival and landing of the troops was described by M. Sophoulis in much the same terms as those used in the letter of which a translation was inclosed in my despatch No. 77 of the 30th ultimo. He added, however, that, after the refusal of the Commander of the troops to come to the Palace for orders, Copassi Effendi had proposed that he and M. Sophoulis should go alone together to meet him. They were prevented by the beginning of hostilities, but M. Sophoulis is now convinced that Copassi Effendi's only object was to hand him over to the troops.

As regards the actual fighting, M. Sophoulis declared that the people had only taken up arms in defence of their women and children, that few casualties had taken place on the Turkish side, and that the people had laid down their arms at once, without compulsion, feeling their impotence, and putting their trust in the intervention of the Powers. I understood him to say that after the first day there was no fighting. I suggested that the facts as regards the fighting would be reported on by impartial observers on the spot, but M. Sophoulis expressed no great confidence in the capacity of the Consular Agents to convey an accurate account of the events.

As regards the state of affairs now, M. Sophoulis declared that a veritable reign of terror exists. Delation is rife; Copassi Effendi has only to point a finger at a man

for him to be hurried off to prison. He told me something which I did not fully understand about his own young children having been in danger of arrest. He said that every man of any standing had fled, and that no one would return until the Turkish troops have been withdrawn.

As for the future, he said that the first necessity is the departure of Copassi Effendi, and the second the withdrawal of all the Turkish troops without exception. On my demurring somewhat to such a demand at this moment, seeing that there have been troops in Samos for the last forty years, he replied that they have always been protested against, that their numbers have been gradually increased until they have been of late 250, that they are not required for purposes of public order, and that they do harm, since they encourage successive Princes to lean on the support of their bayonets. He concluded by saying that the Samians look with the utmost confidence for the result of the intervention in their behalf of the Protecting Powers, especially Great Britain.

In terminating this Report, written in the greatest haste to catch the steamer to Constantinople this afternoon, I have the honour to suggest on the spur of the moment that it may be worth considering whether the good administration of Samos would not be better secured by removing the Turkish troops which, under an international instrument, have no right to be there, and by so altering the Constitution as to confer upon the Prince the power, which he at present lacks, of dismissing Ministers and dissolving the Assembly, and thus giving him some hold over both.

I have omitted to state that M. Sophoulis, while making no concealment of his Grecian sympathies, said that he was under no illusion as to the practicability of a closer union with Greece, which geographical considerations rendered impossible until a dim and distant future. The people of Samos were perfectly contented with their present political status, and desired no change. They paid next to no taxes, they were exempt from military service, and all they desired was to retain, under the sovereignty of the Sultan, the liberties guaranteed to them by the Charter of 1832.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. ELLIOT.

[20461] No. 143.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 321.) *Therapia, June 9, 1908.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a Report from Mr. Vice-Consul Mare on the recent disturbances in Samos. The French Chargé d'Affaires tells me that he has not yet received a Report from his Consular Agent, and Russia has no Consular officer in the island. Mr. Mare's Report is not very full, and I have not received from Smyrna the two previous despatches to which he refers. I am therefore asking His Majesty's Consul-General at Smyrna for a more complete statement.

It is quite evident, however, from the inclosed despatch that Mr. Mare regards M. Sofoulis as responsible for the state of things which led to the despatch of the 200 troops to the island for the reinforcement of the garrison, and that the disturbances began by an attack on the Imperial troops. It is unfortunate that the Porte did not consult the three Protecting Powers before sending the reinforcements, but it seems clear from the description of the situation given by Mr. Mare that reinforcements were needed if the Representative of the Suzerain Power was to be left with any semblance of authority.

Mr. Mare reports that order has been restored, but that a great many houses and shops have been opened and plundered by the troops "watching" Vathy. The Grand Vizier denies emphatically that there was any looting. Possibly the language used by Mr. Mare, whose knowledge of English is imperfect, may convey an inaccurate impression. In the circumstances prevailing at the time a certain measure of force was doubtless necessary in conducting the search for insurgents and arms; but on this point I shall be better able to form an opinion when M. Boppe has received a report from the French Consular Agent.

The Grand Vizier repeated to me yesterday his assurances that the troops would be withdrawn as soon as possible, and that the Porte would not attempt to modify the *status quo* in any particular. He further assured me positively that there was no intention of recruiting gendarmes and appointing their officers from outside the Island of Samos.

Mr. Mare gives no estimate in his despatch of the casualties during the recent disorders, but from a previous telegram from him I learn that some fifty Samians were killed, and Mr. Consul-General Barnham tells me that local information shows that of these only five were women and children. The rumours at Scala Nuova, reported in my telegram No. 124 of the 30th ultimo, thus prove to have been grossly exaggerated. The losses of the Turkish troops appear to have amounted to twenty-six killed and at least fifty wounded. The Grand Vizier asserts that seventeen of the killed are found to have been mutilated. There has been no mention in the Turkish press of the number of Turkish killed, or of these cases of mutilation, which so far have not been confirmed by our Vice-Consul. His Highness explained to me that it had been decided by the Sultan not to publish these details for fear of exciting the Mahommedan population of the Empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 143.

Vice-Consul Mare to Consul-General Barnham.

Sir, *Samos, June 2, 1908.*

IN continuation to my despatches of the 26th and 30th May, and with reference to my telegram of this day, of which copy I transmit to you herewith, I have the honour to bring to your notice that the insurgents, having left Vathy, tranquillity was at once re-established. The only thing, however, I am sorry to report is that the Turks watching the town opened and plundered during the first two or three nights a great many houses and shops, and caused great damages to the inhabitants.

For this reason I have at once addressed a letter to the Prince Governor, calling the attention of the Turkish soldiers to the houses under British protection distinguished by the British flag.

The reason of all these disturbances was on account of certain disputes which took place for political questions between the Prince and M. Sofouli, Senator and chief of the Government party. The Prince, it appears, through valid complaints, expressed his opinion of dismissing certain officials. This proposal was considered by the Senators as supporting the minority of Deputies, and began to oppose to all acts of the Prince, so that it was utterly impossible for his Highness to govern the island, more especially as all the authorities here and local gendarmerie, being composed of persons belonging to Sofouli's party, they were rather listening to the orders of the Senators than to those of the Prince Governor.

Under these circumstances, Kopassi Bey, not being able to protect the slightest interest of the Opposition party, has asked some more Turkish soldiers to be sent here, in order, I suppose, to replace by force the local gendarmerie by persons of his own. The Turkish Government, it appears, has approved his demand, and has sent at once 200 soldiers, but on their arrival the local gendarmes and some persons of Sofouli's party took their rifles and first opened fire at them.

Several persons have been now imprisoned—among whom the Mayor of Vathy—as suspicious.

On the arrival of the troops, three of the chief officers paid me a visit, and have placed a guard down the Vice-Consulate.

I have visited yesterday, together with the French, German, and Austrian Vice-Consuls, his Excellency Reouf Pasha, Imperial Commissioner and Governor-General of Salonica.

Inclosed you will find copy of a telegram received from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, with my answer to his Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GREGORY D. L. MARC.

[20603] No. 144.

The Marquis di San Giuliano to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 15.)

(Translation.)

Italian Embassy, June 10, 1908.

Your Excellency,

ON the 2nd instant, your Excellency was good enough to hand me your note of the 28th May, respecting the appointment of Captain Crispi as Italian Consular Agent at Muscat, and you indicated verbally the reasons for which, without contesting the rights enjoyed by Italy under Treaty, you considered it desirable that the appointment should be suspended.

I hastened to inform my Government the same day of your Excellency's words to me, and I have now received Signor Tittoni's reply.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that when my communication reached the Government, Captain Crispi was already on his way to Aden, where he will shortly arrive, and whence, according to his previous instructions, he was to have started immediately for Muscat, it being now the season when the stores of arms are collected which are forwarded in September to the Somali Coast.

Nevertheless, in order to comply with your Excellency's wishes, Senator Tittoni has arranged that Captain Crispi shall be kept at Aden pending the receipt of further instructions.

My Government, who are keenly desirous of falling in with your Excellency's proposals, accept your suggestion that any definite decision in the matter should be postponed until the result of the Brussels Conference, in so far as Muscat is concerned, is made known.

The proposal of the British Government to extend the zone of prohibition to the whole of the Red Sea and Endrumaut, with limitation of the tonnage of vessels, and to concede to the Sultan of Muscat the power to prohibit the importation of arms, are warmly supported by the Italian Government, who trust that your Excellency will maintain them, and insist on their integral adoption.

I have, &c.

(Signed) SAN GIULIANO.

[20670] No. 145.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 142.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, June 15, 1908.*

I LEARN from the Grand Vizier that the Council of Ministers has decided to withdraw immediately two of the battalions sent to quell the disturbances in Samos. Three of the war-ships have already left. It has also been decided that the troops previously stationed in the island shall be withdrawn at once, as it is thought that they may harbour resentment against the islanders.

The statements made by Sofoulis reported in Sir F. Elliot's despatch No. 88 of the 11th instant contain a number of inaccuracies. The Grand Vizier assures me that no Deputies have been arbitrarily displaced, the elections held yesterday being to replace those who had resigned, fled the island, or forfeited their mandates by infringing the statutes of the island. His Highness further assures me that there is no question of altering the statutes, and that no Articles of the Civil or Penal Code have been annulled. I also learn that the Turkish flag has not been substituted for the Samian. The Assembly meets on Wednesday, the 17th.

(Confidential.)

I learn confidentially from the French Chargé d'Affaires that they have received confirmation of the atrocities perpetrated on the Turkish troops reported in my despatch No. 321 of the 9th instant, the report which they have received being that about fifteen men who had surrendered were massacred and then mutilated.

[20689] No. 146.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 324.)

Therapia, June 14, 1908.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 212 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to report that I have received a telegram from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Van reporting an improvement in the situation in that town.

Captain Dickson states that it appears almost certain that all the revolutionaries still at liberty have now left Van. Their hiding places have been disclosed by the Armenians, and the search, which is being conducted in an orderly manner, is nearly finished. The total amount of arms and ammunition taken is about 260 rifles, 100,000 cartridges, and 400 lbs. of dynamite, and about 100 men have been arrested. Tranquillity has been re-established and the bazaar reopened. A certain number of troops and gendarmes have left for the surrounding villages in order to induce the Armenians to surrender their rifles.

Captain Dickson requests permission to make a tour in the western part of the Vilayet of Van, and to go to Bitlis and Sassoon as soon as the search has been terminated, provided the situation remains satisfactory; but as I am endeavouring to secure the punishment of some of the chief Moslem agitators responsible for the indiscriminate killing on the 23rd March, I think that for the moment at least Captain Dickson should remain at his post, and I am instructing him accordingly.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[20420] No. 147.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 96.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, June 16, 1908.*

ATTACK on "Blosse Lynch."

With reference to your telegram of the 15th June, No. 140.

Inquiry should be made as to whether, in Major Ramsey's opinion, the reasons advanced by the Grand Vizier are valid. He should also be asked whether he considers that punishment could be inflicted on Gadbon during the present season and without any very great difficulty.

Further consequences of an undesirable nature might be entailed by the dispatch of a large Turkish force to the neighbourhood in question.

[20902] No. 148.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 15.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Athens, June 17, 1908.*

I HAVE just received a letter in which M. Sofoulis protests against the elections in Samos and the convocation of the Assembly for the following reasons: The Assembly itself is the only authority which can accept Members' resignations. Only after an order of the Court of Appeal can dismissals of Members take place. For elections to be valid it is necessary that a fortnight's notice of the candidates' names shall be given by the competent Court. The Assembly which is on the point of meeting will thus be illegally constituted, and until the *status quo* has been re-established it is imperative that the meeting should be prevented.

[21053] No. 149.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Athens, June 18, 1908.*

IN reply to your telegram No. 20 (of to-day's date), cautioning me against giving encouragement to Sofoulis, I beg to state that I have seen him once, I never acknowledge the receipt of his letters, and the French Minister is the only person to whom I speak about him.

[21150] No. 150.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 147.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, June 19, 1908.*

THE Assembly of Samos met yesterday.

I reported in my telegram No. 142 of the 15th instant that the Council of Ministers had decided to withdraw two battalions at once, but I learn that the Sultan has ordered the reduction of the force in the island to two companies as before the outbreak of disorders.

[20461] No. 151.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 243.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 19, 1908.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 321 of the 9th instant, respecting the situation in Samos, and the dispatch of Turkish troops to reinforce the garrison of the island during the disturbances there, I request that you will take an early opportunity of pointing out to the Grand Vizier that Turkish troops should not have been sent without the previous consent of the Protecting Powers, and of expressing to his Highness the hope of His Majesty's Government that no attempt will be made to repeat such a proceeding.

In this connection I should be glad to learn how many troops have been kept in the island since the Vizirial letter of March 1879 was issued.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[21272] No. 152.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 149.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, June 21, 1908.*

I REPORTED in my despatch No. 303 of the 2nd instant that an Imperial Iradé had been issued for the payment of the sum of £T. 500 as compensation for the murder of Mr. Glanville at Mughil in 1906, and I now have the honour to report that I have received this sum, which I propose to place to your credit in the Extraordinaries account.

[21858] No. 153.

Messrs. A. and T. J. Malcolm to Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co.—(Communicated by Mr. Wilson Fox, June 22.)

Dear Sirs, *Bushire, May 30, 1908.*

ON the 26th instant the writer was requested to meet the Resident, who again referred to the Abu Musa affairs at some length. Briefly the position is as follows:—

That the Government has decided to allow the Germans to ship all the oxide which has been put out by Sunaya, and that the Germans are delaying the shipment of the balance now at Abu Musa, under the pretext of their inability to do so on account

of the prevailing hot months, which render the working of coolies and lighters on the island a matter of physical impossibility, and therefore the lifting of the ore will have to be put back for about six months. There are, the Resident said, several lots of oxide on the island mined by Sunaya for the Germans, estimated at about 3,000 tons, and of this quantity certain lots have been rejected as inferior stuff by the Germans and the rest have been approved of, and these will be shipped. (Between us, as report goes, pressure must have been brought to bear by the German Government for the shipment of the balance now at Abu Musa, as the authorities originally intended to debar them from doing so.)

The lots of oxide have been photographed.

The Resident then asked the writer to inform you that the Government was willing to allow you to negotiate through the writer with the Sheikh for the working of the mines, and that the Resident was anxious that mining operations should commence immediately as weather permitted, so that you might be able to ship oxide in about six months' time. The writer told the Resident that you were not now keen on taking up the Abu Musa business, and that we were consequently unable to move in the matter without reference to you.

This was a matter of surprise for Major Cox, who understood from the Foreign Office that you were still eager to obtain the Concession of the mines at Abu Musa. Writer reiterated his previous statement, when Major Cox replied that there were other applicants in England anxious to take up the business, but that he would like to give you the preference, specially as we, as your agents, would be better able to treat with the Sheikh, and that he would afford us every facility in concluding a contract with the Sheikh. He further said that he would write to the Foreign Office to communicate with you.

It is now for you to decide whether you authorize us to treat with the Sheikh, in which case you should send us your full instructions or let the matter pass you altogether. Perhaps it would be false modesty not to say that others are likely to seek our assistance, whether in India or England.

We asked you some time ago to let us know the quality of the oxide shipped by "Louise." Kindly enlighten us on the matter.

There are certain important new features connected with Hormuz, about which we shall write you next week.

Yours faithfully,
(Signed) A. AND T. J. MALCOLM.

[21382] No. 154.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 86.)
Sir, *Athens, June 9, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith in original, and translation by Mr. Joannidis, the Memorandum submitted to the Representatives of the three Protecting Powers at Athens by the Samian Councillors, MM. Sophoulis and Hatsidakis.

(Confidential.)

I showed my French colleague the draft of my despatch No. 84 of the 6th instant reporting my interview with M. Sophoulis, and allowed him to take a copy of it. In return he has allowed me to take a copy of his report of his conversation with the same gentleman, and I have the honour to inclose it herewith. It contains, I think, nothing that M. Sophoulis did not also say to me, although there are some points in it which I omitted to record.

I beg to call attention to M. de la Boulinière's remarks in parenthesis upon the German attitude with regard to the incident of the cigarette factory, and upon the evidence of the foreknowledge of Count d'Arco, the German Minister here, of a "revolutionary" state of affairs at Samos—a fact with which I was not previously acquainted.

I take this opportunity of adding to my report of M. Sophoulis' statements to me the following points which he regarded as corroborative of his belief that the whole affair was prearranged between the Grand Vizier and Kopassi Effendi: (1) the time chosen was when the island was depleted of the greater part of its male population, who had gone over as usual to the mainland for the harvest; (2) shortly before, the usual

Turkish soldiers had been replaced by a detachment of truculent Albanians from Macedonia.

In reply to my question as to the report current here that Cretan Musulmans had accompanied the troops to Samos and were being enrolled in the gendarmerie, M. Sophoulis told me he had heard nothing of it, but that he believed Christians from outside were being enlisted, which was itself a breach of the privileges of the island.

M. de la Boulinière tells me he asked him about the truth of the accusation against the Greek Consul of being mixed up in the movement. His reply was, "Poor man, I don't believe he knows to this day what has happened, or what it was all about."

With reference to your telegram No. 18 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to state that I ascertained from the French Minister and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires that they would both see M. Sophoulis if he called, subject in the case of M. Tatistchew to instructions to the contrary, which he did not receive. M. Stcherbatchew, however, the Russian Minister, returned on the 6th instant, and came to see me the same day, after I had already received M. Sophoulis' visit. Fresh from the impression of the attitude of the Ambassadors at Constantinople produced upon him by a conversation with M. Zinoview, he told me that he did not propose to receive M. Sophoulis, thinking it quite sufficient to transmit to his Government the Memorandum he had communicated to us. I told him I thought the Ambassadors were far too much inclined to view the situation through Turkish glasses, and he said he personally shared my opinion, but he was evidently afraid to give expression to it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. ELLIOT.

Inclosure 1 in No. 154.

Memorandum of the Government of Samos to the Ministers of the Three Protecting Powers at Athens.

(Translation.)

Athens, May 23 (June 5), 1908.

Your Excellency,

THE Princely Government of Samos being unable to communicate from that place with the esteemed Governments of the Protecting Powers, have the honour to address from this place, through us, to your Excellency, the present note throwing light on the sad events of the 12th (25th) May, and explaining the causes of them and the object at which they aimed.

Above all, we consider it as our chief duty to protest, in the name of the Samian people, against the altogether unjust accusations of the official circles at Constantinople, who are endeavouring to give a character of a premeditated revolutionary movement to the spontaneous explosion of extreme desperation that is inspired in the soul of a people by the certain consciousness of the loss of their most precious possessions and by the unexpected and instantaneous abolition of those liberties that have been acquired by means of incalculable sacrifices and superhuman struggles of a whole race.

The sad events at Samos that are keeping in the deepest emotion both the Samian people and their undersigned lawful representatives, who are mourning for the loss of so many victims on both sides, do not constitute premeditated revolution or rebellion of the Samian people, but, on the contrary, these events constitute a *coup d'Etat*, aiming at the abolition of the autonomous status of the Principality, a *coup d'Etat* that has long been meditated by Andrew Kopassi or Androulidaki, the last Prince of Samos, and was carried out by him with an infernal ingenuity that deserves admiration.

It never crossed the mind of the Samian people to repudiate due obedience to the Sovereign State, but they know also how to combine loyalty towards the Sovereign State with affection and the utmost devotion to the autonomous status that was granted by the Constitutional Charter of 1832, by which status a fully independent Administration is granted to the island; and the Samian people at the same time are pursuing, without trespassing, on the lawful limits of the *status quo*, the free and undisturbed development of their moral and mental faculties, as well as the material prosperity of the country, according to their own capabilities and their historical traditions.

All that took place in Samos on the 12th (25th) May, spontaneously and in a moment of extreme amazement, cannot be characterized otherwise than as a defence for the sake of the *status quo*, so unexpectedly and violently abolished. It was not a sentiment of insubordination, but a sentiment of conservative patriotism that had inspired, at the highest point of the danger, the idea of the protest of the people while in armed defence against the abolition of a *status quo* that is invested with the force and validity of public right internationally guaranteed. The Samian people, with the hope and the confidence that they are not going to be delivered to the slaughter as atoning victims, or that they will be abandoned to defend their rights by their own means, have voluntarily laid down their arms after their protest, looking to the Protecting Powers' humanity and justice for the protection of their infringed rights.

The *coup d'Etat* of the 12th (25th) May was but the last part of the Sublime Porte's policy that had been long ago started, and it was also the execution of a plan that for a long time was under consideration by many persons. Let us be allowed now to give a brief statement of the evolution of the said policy, that ended in the recent tragic events.

As it is known, your Excellency, the duration of the Prince's authority is not defined in the Constitutional Charter of the island, nor is this institution defined by any other express regulation, and the Prince is appointed as well as dismissed at the Sublime Porte's absolute pleasure.

Owing to this full dependence of the Prince upon the Porte, each successive Prince has no consciousness of any independence, nor the will to subordinate his character of employé of the Sublime Porte to the character and duties of a Chief of an autonomous State. The Princes always obey and submit to the Sublime Porte's orders, and do not only facilitate the interference of the Imperial Government in the independence of the internal administration, but also bring about such interference in order to show zeal and devotion. Up to a few years ago the gradual abolition of the autonomous status of the country was pursued by the peaceful and sure method of restricting the rights of the Council of the Principality that were granted by the fundamental provisions of the Constitutional Charter of 1832, and also by the strengthening of the Prince's authority and the concentration in the Prince's hands of as much greater powers as possible, against the spirit and the letter of the autonomous status of the island.

Thus the privileges of the country were tending to become figurative ones only and the autonomous Principality to be converted stealthily into a direct province of the Ottoman Empire, having only by name her own laws and her own Constitution, while being really governed by Princes, who are mere Commissioners of the Porte, and received orders from their superiors, that is, the Imperial Government, and are only responsible to this Government. The frequent changes of Princes that are requested by the Samian people are not attributable to any other reason than to the doubtful and uncertain position of the Prince as an institution. From the time, however, Ferid Pasha was appointed to the dignity of Grand Vizier, Samos was placed under his vigilant and constant observation, and he followed up all activity and all manifestations of the autonomous life of Samos, not only with an interest disproportionate to the smallness of the country, but also with unconcealed hate and enmity. Unfortunately great importance, more than necessary, was attributed by the Grand Vizier to the moral influence that the autonomous Principality could exercise, and every decision and every act of this Principality constantly occupies his Highness in the midst of the great and serious concerns of the Ottoman Empire. The Grand Vizier by indomitable persistance and underhand interferences, succeeded in frustrating the execution of works whose object was the material prosperity of the country, and it is well known that for months he was trying to frustrate the establishment of the Bank of the Principality of Samos, after giving express orders to the Prince who was then governing Samos under no condition to ratify the contract relating to it that had already been by the Legislative Body.

Not for a single day during the two last years has the Principality of Samos been left quiet and undisturbed, and these years passed away keeping us in a constant struggle, that was drawing all our attention and activity for the repelling of the hostile intervention of the Grand Vizier and for the peaceful defence of the rights of the country. The above struggle was increased to the utmost during the four months the late Prince Georgiades Effendi governed the island, and this question is summed up and recapitulated in two despatches of the Government of the Principality, the one

addressed to the preceding Prince and the other to the Imperial Commissioners of the Sublime Porte who were then sent to the island.

The firm loyalty and obedience of the Samian people towards the sovereign rights of His Imperial Majesty were manifested in the said despatches, as well as the firm resolution of the Samian people and their lawful representatives not to accept the least deviation from the strict letter of the Constitutional Charter of 1832, in opposition to the despotic inclinations of the Prince who was at that time governing Samos, and who had for sole rule of his policy the private instructions and orders given by the Grand Vizier—a fact that the said Prince honestly confessed.

We applied also to His Majesty the Sovereign. We must now admit that the just complaints of the Samian people always met with a willing Royal protection whenever these complaints managed to reach the Throne. For this reason the people of Samos maintain always in an undiminished way the sentiment of gratitude to the Throne and to the person of the Sovereign, notwithstanding the untimely display of ill-conceived zeal on the part of the Grand Vizier.

By the removal of the late Prince the Porte tacitly admitted the validity of the privileges enjoyed by the country as defined in the aforementioned despatches, and the struggle between the Grand Vizier and the small but autonomous Principality appeared to have ended.

The appointment of Kopassi Effendi as Prince of Samos followed, causing then new anxieties to the Samian people concerning their future, because for years past the name of Kopassi was rumoured as of a renowned intriguer. This rumour, however, appeared not to be true, because Kopassi's policy was at first perfectly constitutional and loyal, and he never ceased to assure the people by official Proclamations, and when answering any speech addressed to him, as well as in private conversations with every one whom he met, that his desire was to respect as sacred and holy the privileges and liberties of the country.

It was not possible for us to know what was the private correspondence interchanged from the beginning between Kopassi Effendi and the Grand Vizier, but it is certain that complete order and quiet prevailed, and the excitement of the people was soothed, as the Principality for three months was in no way harassed, nor were the regular functions of the Constitution impeded by the interference of the Grand Vizier. In the meanwhile occurred an insignificant incident of a German subject sojourning in Samos that was the occasion of a difference of opinion between the Prince and his Government, owing to the strong tone we considered indispensable to make use of, in order to uphold the interests and dignity of the country against the unjust and prejudicial demands of the German subject. Since that time Prince Kopassi, either because he rendered the said event more important than he ought, having considered it as a declaration of hostile disposition against him on the part of the Government and the majority of the Legislative Body, or because from this first and accidental cause the man's revengeful and vain instincts, having been forcibly restrained up to that moment, were then aroused, seized the idea of carrying into effect as soon as possible a speedy realization of the *coup d'Etat*, that was achieved on the 12th (25th) May.

With truly admirable dexterity he wove the web of his intrigue and machination in two directions; that is, to the people of Samos and to the Grand Vizier, acting in an opposite sense as regards each of these parties.

Kopassi endeavoured to create through the people a local revolt, that it might be used by the Grand Vizier as a well-grounded reason for a forcible intervention. He proceeded on a tour among the communes and sought by all means to entice and allure the people, promising officially and publicly, that he will succeed in obtaining double prices for the products of the island for a term of thirty years, and in exchange he invoked the assistance and support of the people in order for him to strengthen his power against the lawful authorities of the country.

We were indeed surprised at this novel conduct of the Prince, but we did not attach any importance to the strange challenges of Kopassi, both we ourselves and the whole of the Samian people considering them to be mere indications of overweening vanity and want of judgment.

Kopassi, on the other hand, was fomenting the known hostile inclination of the Grand Vizier, by means of infernal plots against the country, and the chief of these plots is the accusation he made (against us) of having under consideration a movement concerning the union of the island (with Greece), an accusation that has no need of a serious refutation, as it is only a common theatrical contrivance.

The details of the plot that was woven between the Grand Vizier and Kopassi

Effendi against the autonomous Constitution of Samos cannot be known to us, but this much is quite certain that Kopassi having grossly deceived himself, deceived also the Grand Vizier, representing the attempt to abolish the status of the country not only as easy and safe, but also in accordance with the sense of the Samian people, who were said to be devoted to the person of Kopassi and to adore him.

The said *coup d'Etat* was therefore decided on, as the time was considered to be suitable and on account of many other reasons unconnected with the strict interests of the Principality, and it was decided for Kopassi to be intrusted with it, as he was considered to be a capable tool for this, and also the person indicated for carrying out plans of a similar kind.

It is not necessary for us to explain in detail the motives of these acts. The restriction or the complete abolition of the autonomous status of Samos is an old and strong wish of the Grand Vizier, and this wish is not based on any unfavourable sentiments towards persons, but it is derived from his general policy. In the mind of the Grand Vizier, the Island of Samos, owing to its geographical position, was a dangerous place of contamination and of bad example to the surrounding coreligionist people on account of the liberties and moral progress of the island.

And since the cure of the evil by means of the intervention exercised for such a long period in a peaceful way had proved to be impossible, it was decided to employ radical and violent measures. Kopassi further gave his assistance to this work for reasons of another nature. In this way a good opportunity presented itself for him to display zeal and devotion in the expectation always of the consequent reward, and chiefly because, perceiving that his position was shaken in relation to the Legislative Body, he hoped to confirm his power in the island by means only of the military occupation of the island and the bloodless or violent abolition of the lawful authorities.

In consequence of above decision, the Legislative Body was not lawfully called to meet, because the presence of this Body would have been the greatest danger for the frustration of the intended *coup d'Etat*.

The annual convocation of the Legislative Body is an indefeasible right of the country, and this convocation cannot be made dependent on the goodwill of the Prince or of any other authority. The fact alone of the Legislative Body not being convoked, means a removal of the basis of the autonomous status of the country, and is equal to a complete abolition of the privileges of the island.

As regards this violation of the constitutional status, both the Government of the Prince and the Members of the General Assembly submitted a strong protest to the Prince and also to the Grand Vizier. The peace of the country, however, was not disturbed, for since the right of the annual convocation of the Assembly at the usual time was considered, according to the express letter of the Constitutional Charter, as an indefeasible right, it was decided for the Body to meet on the 18th May and proceed to business of itself.

The people of Samos and the Princely Government had no knowledge whatever, up to the last moment, of the contrivances agreed upon between the Grand Vizier and Kopassi Effendi, and exemplary order and unparalleled quiet reigned in the country. Only two or three days prior to the landing of the troops some suspicious signs of the infernal intentions of Kopassi Effendi were observed.

That is to say, it was reported to us from many rural communes, that certain persons in Kopassi's confidence were recruiting peasants and inviting them to proceed to Vathi at a fixed day, but for an unknown purpose, and promising them rewards and appointments. At the same time a confused and indefinite rumour reached us through persons belonging to the private service of Kopassi's family, that Kopassi was expecting to be reinforced by troops and intended to seize the gendarmerie barracks and the Chamber, and to abolish all lawful authorities. The day prior to the *coup d'Etat*, it became known that the Prince had had some private understandings with suspicious persons, and that he had had a long sitting on secret business with his Private Secretary and the Manager of the Telegraph Office.

Having a long experience of the past, and relying principally on the benevolent sentiments of His Imperial Majesty, who never previously allowed, even during the most anomalous times, the use of violent measures against Samos, we considered the rumour that during the last days was circulating in a timid way, as a ridiculous contrivance of Kopassi's, in order to intimidate the Legislative Body.

We did not, however, consider it superfluous to telegraph, on the 9th (22nd) May, to the Grand Vizier and notify him of this rumour, expressing at the same time our astonishment, and respectfully pointing out that, if really there was such an

intention on the part of the Sublime Porte, it would constitute a clear violation and overthrow of the constitutional status of the island.

In reply to our telegram, early on the 12th (25th) May, there arrived at Vathi Harbour the steamer conveying Ottoman Imperial troops, without any cause whatever, necessity, or even the least pretext of a reason, and at a time when throughout the island complete order, quiet, and peace pervailed. The arrival of the Ottoman Imperial troops came as a thunderbolt in a clear sky.

It is known, your Excellency, that according to an express provision of the Charter of 1842, the stay of Ottoman troops in the Principality is prohibited. It is true that for some decades now a small garrison has remained in the island, but the Legislative Body has many times protested direct to the Sublime Porte as regards this express violation of the Charter. But the country did not persist in asking for the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops, because the troops had never previously interfered in the least with the internal self-government of the island, even at the most troubled times of the island, and the people of Samos were accustomed to consider the presence of the small Ottoman garrison only as a mere and distant indication of the Imperial suzerainty.

The consequence, therefore, of the sight of the sudden and unexpected landing of new troops at the time when there was the greatest quiet in the country was to throw into commotion the people that were up to that moment altogether unsuspecting. They came to us in emotion and alarm and demanded that we should proceed to the Prince's palace and ask the Prince to explain to us what was going on.

We found the Prince a prey to unconquerable fear and nervous disturbance, shut up in his office and drawing up, with the assistance of his private clerk, Declarations and Decrees, such as usually follow a similar *coup d'Etat*.

We begged him to send written orders to suspend provisionally the landing of the troops, and requested that the telegraph communication might be left free for us to submit telegrams to the Sovereign and the Representatives of the Protecting Powers at Constantinople.

Both these requests he persistently refused. We then pointed out to him the terrible consequences and also the responsibilities he undertook towards the Imperial Government and towards the history of the country, and asked him at least to encourage the terrified people by addressing them a few reassuring words. Kopassi, however, instead of calming the people that were justly excited, threw oil on the fire by telling both us and the people that he knew nothing of the landing of the troops, and that he was in complete ignorance of the reasons and purpose of their landing.

What chiefly agitated the people, leaving no doubt in the mind of any one that we were in presence of a premeditated *coup d'Etat*, was the occupation of the telegraph office prior to the arrival of the steamer conveying the troops, and the blockade of the same office by a detachment of the Ottoman garrison with the intention of preventing any communication whatever of the Samian people with His Imperial Majesty and the Ambassadors of the Protecting Powers at Constantinople.

While we were discussing with the Prince, the sounding of trumpets of the troops that were landing was heard, and these troops being joined by the garrison that was quartered at Vathi, entered in full warlike equipment from the mole of the port towards the town.

It is confirmed that these troops when moved fired in the air in order to frighten the crowd of people that were gathered unarmed and amongst whom there were a great number of children and students. But this unfortunately was the signal for the bloody fight that followed between the troops, that fired indiscriminately, and the citizens.

On their way the Ottoman soldiers, after bayoneting innocent children and old men, shut themselves up in the palace of the Prince and the old barracks and fired in every direction. The greatest destruction and most of the murders of women, children, and old people were carried out from the palace and before the eyes of Kopassi Effendi.

Even we ourselves cannot define precisely the details of the destruction. What, however, is quite certain and indisputable, in spite of all official contradictions, is that the town was bombarded and many houses and shops were pillaged, and unarmed people were robbed by Ottoman soldiers, and all these things were carried on at a time when no reason whatever of trouble was given on the part of the Samian people. But the question of material destruction and personal losses bears but a small importance. The greatest importance lies with the political aspect of the question. The official circles of the Ottoman Empire, and above all Kopassi Effendi, are well

aware that no premeditated revolutionary movement was intended by the Samian people. If there existed the least suspicion it is removed by the events themselves.

Neither prior to the fight with the troops nor afterwards did the Samians denounce the Ottoman suzerainty over the island, nor did they cease either prior to the events or afterwards to manifest their submission to the throne of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan. No revolution has been suppressed, as falsely officially notified, simply because no revolution took place, neither were the Samian soldiers repulsed, but they themselves raised the siege of the Prince's palace and of the barracks, and retired in full order and in the middle of the day, thinking that after their emphatic protest the Samian people ought, before making use of their own weak powers, to intrust the protection of their violated rights to the Powers through whose guarantee and intervention these privileges and liberties were granted to this country.

The action of the Samian people, which was spontaneous and altogether unprepared, and inspired in a moment of a desperate affliction, in no way exceeded the limits of defence. It is not the people of Samos who revolutionized. The people of Samos are in this question the conservative element that upholds the maintenance of the *status quo*, while a revolutionist is the person that endeavours to abolish by force the international acts that have been valid for centuries. That the sad events of the 12th (25th) May constitute a true *coup d'Etat* by the Porte against the *status quo* of the island on the basis of a premeditated plan admits of no doubt.

The mere landing of the Ottoman troops without the knowledge of the lawful representatives of the Samian people and without the sanction of the Protecting Powers, at a time when complete peace prevailed in the country, constitutes an important question of a forcible intervention of the Porte, and affords the right to the Samian people to defend the *status quo*.

But when, prior to the landing of the troops, the telegraph office is in military occupation and is blockaded; when it is confirmed that on the very day that the troops were landed at Samos, and prior to the fight, two battalions from the interior of Asia Minor were moved to New Ephesus, two hours distant from Vathi Harbour; when from every direction within two days a large number of the Imperial fleet makes its appearance at the port of Vathi, can there any longer be the least doubt that the abolition of the autonomous Constitution of the island had been premeditated and decided long before?

Your Excellency, as the lawful representatives of the Samian people, and in their name protesting against the evident injustice of the Sublime Porte—an injustice that is applied not only directly against the Samian people, but also towards the Protecting Powers that have guaranteed the status of Samos—we have the honour to request the protection and quick action of the esteemed Governments of the Protecting Powers on behalf of the oppressed Samos.

The state of affairs that has been created after the landing of many thousands of soldiers exceeds the utmost limit of tyranny and oppression. Under the heel of the sinister Kopassi Effendi, who betrays the true interests of the Ottoman Empire and the liberties of the co-religionist people intrusted to him, the unfortunate and much-suffering island now struggles convulsively. A complete reign of terror now prevails, and the power of the laws and of the Constitution of the country have been replaced by the denunciations and the persecutions of Kopassi Effendi. The life and the personal liberty of the citizen depends on one nod or a mere hint from this man.

The sole desire of the Samian people is for the *status quo* that has been entirely abolished to be restored and lawful order to be re-established in accordance to the constitutional laws of the island. Above all, it is necessary that Kopassi Effendi should be immediately recalled, not only because he was the most important instrument for the carrying out of the *coup d'Etat*, but also because all future understanding between him and the Samian people has become impossible.

The people of Samos will never be able to forget the man who was the cause of so many moral and material destructions, and Kopassi himself having been insulted, spat upon, and stopped in the square of the town by the people, will, after the tragic events, always look upon the Samians with hate and with a feeling of revenge. In order also to re-establish the *status quo* and the peace of the country, the immediate evacuation of the island by the Ottoman troops is called for. The presence of numerous troops in the country is altogether unnecessary, because the order that has been disturbed, and that is disturbed only by the presence of the Imperial troops, will be restored by the withdrawal of the troops.

After the recent events, the further stay of the Ottoman garrison in the island is rendered impossible, because there will always exist the danger of new disturbances

and new interventions. Owing the above, and in order that peace and the status of the country may be completely established, we have the honour to request the full application of the relative provisions of the Constitutional Charter of 1832.

With the reserve of submitting to the esteemed Governments of the Protecting Powers, through the General Assembly, all measures that we may consider sufficient guarantees for the establishment of the autonomous laws of the country, and the avoiding of new dangers in the future, we beg your Excellency to accept the expression of our deepest respect.

The Council of the Principality of Samos,
(Signed) TH. P. SOPHOULIS.
EMM. C. HATZIDAKIS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 154.

M. de la Boulinière to M. Pichon.

AINSI que le faisait prévoir mon télégramme d'avant-hier No. 28, M. Sophoulis, qui avait été reçu hier par le Ministre d'Angleterre, est venu me voir aujourd'hui.

Je l'ai prévenu que je me bornerais à l'écouter et que ses déclarations seraient transmises à votre Excellence, qui jugerait de leur valeur et de leur portée.

Voici, aussi fidèlement que possible, l'historique qu'il m'a fait de la situation de Samos avant les derniers événements, son récit des événements, et ses conclusions:—

"La politique traditionnelle de la Porte a toujours été de chercher à restreindre les privilèges des Samiens. Le Grand Vizir actuel poursuit depuis plusieurs années avec une ardeur toute particulière cette politique que ses prédécesseurs suivaient avec plus de modération et moins de persistance. Le Sultan, au contraire, a plusieurs fois contribué à pallier le mauvais effet des tentatives de la Porte en prenant en considération les doléances que les membres du Gouvernement Samien faisaient parvenir jusqu'à lui.

"Les Princes de Samos, nommés directement par le Sultan, ne sont en réalité que des fonctionnaires Turcs; leur préoccupation principale n'est pas de gouverner dans l'intérêt de l'île, mais de plaire à la Porte et de lui obéir; ils sont ainsi conduits à favoriser les empiétements à la Constitution dont ils ont la garde. Il en résulte que, contrairement à la Constitution, qui ne leur donne le droit de veto que pour les affaires d'ordre extérieur, ils refusent de sanctionner des décisions d'intérêt local prises par l'Assemblée Samienne si la Porte leur en donne l'ordre. C'est ainsi, par exemple, que la Porte est parvenue à installer et à imposer les postes et télégraphes Turcs même pour le service intérieur de l'île.

"Il y a trois ans, les membres du Gouvernement Samien ont remis aux Ambassadeurs des trois Puissances Protectrices à Constantinople un mémoire au sujet de ces abus. Leur réclamation n'a pas été suivie d'effet mais la nomination de Caratheodori comme Prince de Samos leur a donné entière satisfaction ainsi qu'à tous les Samiens. Jamais aucune difficulté ne s'est élevée entre les Samiens et Caratheodori, qui a toujours respecté les privilèges de Samos. D'accord avec le Gouverneur, les membres du Gouvernement ont négocié la constitution d'une banque utile au commerce Samien, et il ne manquait plus pour la conclusion définitive de l'arrangement que le vote de la Chambre et la sanction du Gouverneur, tous les deux assurés, quand la Porte a rappelé brusquement Caratheodori, montrant par là son hostilité contre tout ce qui facilitait le développement et la prospérité de Samos. Les Samiens ont vivement regretté le départ de Caratheodori.

"Georgiadès a été nommé Prince de Samos; le peuple de Samos a refusé de le recevoir, pour protester contre le rappel de Caratheodori; et le Sultan, informé de cette protestation, a fait partir pour Samos une Commission d'Enquête avec un mandat de conciliation. L'entente s'est faite entre les Samiens et cette Commission, et Georgiadès a dû s'engager par une Proclamation à respecter le Statut Organique et tous les privilèges de Samos. Il n'a pas tardé à violer sa promesse et lui-même a répondu aux Samiens, qui le lui reprochaient: 'Vous avez raison; mais j'ai des ordres auxquels je suis forcé d'obéir.'

"Une nouvelle Pétition au Sultan et une nouvelle Commission d'Enquête ont eu pour résultat le rappel de Georgiadès. Kopassis Effendi a été nommé Prince de Samos.

"Pendant trois mois tout a été bien, mais le Grand Vizir avait une revanche à

prendre. Il la préparait silencieusement avec Kopassis, et jusqu'à la dernière minute personne, à Samos, ne s'est douté de ce qui se préparait. L'attitude de Kopassis, ses propos vaniteux, certains conseils déplacés qu'on savait qu'il avait donnés à des gens de l'intérieur de l'île faisaient sourire plutôt qu'ils n'inquiétaient.

"Le premier symptôme un peu sérieux, mais qui ne faisait pas encore prévoir l'avenir menaçant qui se préparait, a été le conflit survenu entre le Gouverneur et les membres du Gouvernement à la suite de l'incident de la fabrique de cigarettes Allemande." (Je ne reviendrai pas en détail sur cet incident, que j'ai déjà signalé dans mon rapport d'hier No. . Je dois insister, cependant, sur ce point que, d'après M. Sophoulis, l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, immédiatement saisi de la question par Kopassis lui-même, a fait transmettre à l'Agent Consulaire d'Allemagne par le Consulat-Général de Smyrne les instructions les plus péremptoires; l'affaire aurait été ainsi transformée, des Allemands de Samos auraient télégraphié à Berlin que leur vie était en danger, et M. Sophoulis serait devenu en Allemagne non seulement un rebelle, mais un brigand; je n'ai pas pu m'empêcher de me rappeler alors que dès le premier jour, quand tout le monde, à Athènes, était encore dans l'ignorance de ce qui se passait à Samos, le Comte Areo parlait déjà "d'état révolutionnaire"; quoiqu'il en soit et quels que soient les torts des Samiens, quand on voit et quand on entend M. Sophoulis on est tenté de croire que les reproches qui lui sont faits à l'occasion des cigarettes Allemandes sont entachés d'une exagération voulue et préméditée, et que, dans l'intérêt de tout, l'histoire de cet incident mérite d'être vérifiée.)

"Un second conflit est né du refus que Kopassis a fait de convoquer l'Assemblée, et ce conflit a été souligné—

"Par Kopassis Effendi, qui a donné l'ordre aux soldats Turcs de la garnison d'occuper les postes et télégraphes, enlevant ainsi aux Samiens tout moyen de réclamer et de communiquer avec Constantinople;

"Par les Samiens, qui ont résolu de se réunir quand même en Assemblée en vertu du droit qu'ils tiennent de la Constitution, et que le Gouverneur violait par un refus arbitraire de convocation.

"Malgré cela, le calme était complet à Samos. Cependant, il commençait à courir quelques bruits fâcheux; un serviteur de Kopassis racontait que ses maîtres avaient parlé entre eux de la prochaine arrivée des Turcs; on disait aussi qu'un sous-officier de gendarmerie avait brisé son épée plutôt que d'exécuter un acte de félonie, à l'égard de ses camarades, que lui commandait Kopassis.

"Un certain malaise régnait donc, mais il n'y avait eu aucun désordre, quand un matin, à l'aube, la veille du jour où l'Assemblée devait se réunir, est arrivé un bateau Turc chargé de troupes.

"Alors le peuple a fait lever M. Sophoulis et l'a conduit chez le Gouverneur. Il réclamait la réouverture des postes et télégraphes et un ordre de Kopassis empêchant le débarquement des troupes. Kopassis refusa de prendre les deux mesures, mais il se mit à la fenêtre et déclara au peuple qu'il ignorait la cause de cette arrivée de troupes, qu'il n'y était pour rien. L'agitation, qui était grande, fut à son comble quand les soldats débarquèrent, et quand, dans la bagarre, un enfant fut jeté à la mer; elle devint sanglante et fut plus meurtrière pour les Turcs que pour les Samiens. La foule exaspérée mena le Gouverneur sur la place devant le palais, le piétina et le frappa et l'aurait mis en pièces si M. Sophoulis ne l'avait protégé et couvert de son corps. La lutte fut d'ailleurs courte, car les Samiens eurent vite fait de comprendre qu'ils n'étaient pas en état de la continuer; M. Sophoulis en jugea ainsi tout le premier et il s'est hâté de s'embarquer.

"A partir de ce moment, dit-il, un régime de terreur a été organisé dans l'île."

La conclusion de M. Sophoulis est la suivante:—

Les Samiens mettent leur confiance dans les Puissances Protectrices pour le rétablissement et le maintien des privilèges qu'elles ont garantis.

Pour le rétablissement du calme il indique comme une nécessité—

1. Le départ de Kopassis, détesté par les Samiens, et qui ne peut éprouver que de la haine pour eux.

2. Le départ des troupes Turques, dont l'arrivée a été la cause déterminante des troubles parce qu'elle est apparue à tous comme contraire aux droits garantis à l'île.

Enfin, il exprime des vœux pour une modification dans la durée des pouvoirs du Prince de Samos et dans la forme de sa nomination.

En ce qui concerne la loyauté des Samiens à l'égard du Sultan, M. Sophoulis la déclare absolue. "Je dois, peut-être, le dire en rougissant," dit-il, "mais nous ne désirons pas et n'avons jamais souhaité devenir sujets Grecs; nous voulons uniquement conserver la situation privilégié que nous avons comme sujets Ottomans."

Cette dernière affirmation doit être véridique, les avantages des Samiens à rester Ottomans sont évidents, et, de plus, la situation géographique de l'Ile de Samos rend, en tout état de cause, l'annexion à la Grèce impossible.

Je transmets à votre Excellence ce long exposé à titre d'information; c'est la déposition d'un Samien; il m'a paru cependant que c'était un élément intéressant d'appréciation pour l'enquête qui établira la vérité et les responsabilités dans les derniers événements de Samos, et qu'il n'était pas inutile d'avoir un aperçu de l'état d'esprit des Samiens et de la manière dont ils envisageaient la situation de Samos.

Sir F. Elliot, dans son Rapport à son Gouvernement, dont je vous remets ci-joint, confidentiellement, copie, exprime l'idée qu'il pourrait y avoir lieu après le retrait total des troupes Turques, dont le Statut Organique de 1832 ne permet pas le maintien à Samos, de donner au Gouverneur une plus grande autorité en lui conférant le pouvoir de démettre les Ministres et de dissoudre l'Assemblée.

Il y aurait peut-être dans cette augmentation de pouvoir du Prince de Samos une compensation à l'exclusion totale des troupes, Turques conformément aux engagements garantis par les Puissances, mais ce qui n'apparaît clairement à la lueur imparfaite des renseignements que je possède, c'est que l'accroc toléré depuis quarante ans à un arrangement garanti par les Puissances a été la cause principale de tout le malentendu; les Turcs ont trouvé dans cette tolérance le droit d'envoyer des troupes à leur gré; les Ambassadeurs n'ont pas été éloignés de partager leur idée; mais les Samiens avaient continué à croire, malgré la présence d'une petite garnison Turque à Vathy, que les Turcs n'avaient pas le droit d'envoyer des soldats dans l'île et que ce privilège leur était garanti par les Puissances.

Le retour à un état de choses clairement défini où le devoir de chacun ne pourra plus être discuté ou incompris empêchera, sans doute, le retour d'incidents aussi fâcheux.

[21384] No. 155.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 88.)

Athens, June 11, 1908.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 86 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a further communication from M. Sofoulis, protesting against the proscriptions which he alleges are now in full swing at Samos, the arbitrary displacement of Deputies, Mayors, and Judges, the annulling by Decree of the Prince of Articles of the Civil and Penal Codes, and, above all, the convocation of the Assembly during the Turkish occupation and the state of siege, and before the proclamation of an amnesty.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. ELLIOT.

Inclosure in No. 155.

M. Sofoulis to Sir F. Elliot.

[*Non datée.*]

Excellence,

J'AI l'honneur de joindre au Mémoire que j'ai pris la liberté de vous soumettre des renseignements complémentaires sur la situation à Samos. Je demande la permission d'ajouter la relation des événements sanglants qui ont été la suite des désordres du 25 Mai, et de ne pas insister sur les pertes matérielles, les catastrophes, le pillage, les dévastations de l'île, car, peut-être, ces méfaits sont considérés comme des moyens de rétablir l'ordre. Je crois pourtant que le monde civilisé n'assistera pas impassible au spectacle des persécutions inhumaines dont le peuple Samien est l'objet, des proscriptions de citoyens innocents et paisibles, des arrestations en masse de tous les dignitaires et hommes de marque, qui, mis en prison, subissent outre les mauvais traitements physiques, le martyre de la faim.

Les événements politiques qui se déroulent à Samos depuis le 25 Mai ont une plus grande importance. Le fait même que le drapeau Turc a été hissé sur le Palais du Prince démontre qu'il y a eu modification dans les rapports internationaux de la Principauté.

Mais en dehors de celà les représentants légaux du peuple se voient dépouillés de leurs mandats par Décret Princier, tel, par exemple, le Député de Vathy. Toujours par Décrets Princiers les Maires sont emprisonnés, contraints de se démettre, ou sont destitués arbitrairement et remplacés; tel, par exemple, les Maires de la capitale et du Haut-Vathy. Également par Décret Princier sont abolis des Articles du Code Civil et du Code Pénal afin de pouvoir condamner sommairement tous ceux qui sont désignés comme coupables par Copassis Effendi. C'est dans le même but qu'on a remplacé tous les membres de la Cour d'Appel et qu'on a nommé comme Président de ce Tribunal le Secrétaire Particulier et Conseiller Privé du Prince.

Et après avoir proscrit les Députés les plus en vue, on annonce déjà à Constantinople que l'Assemblée Générale des Députés est convoquée à Carlovassi, afin que cette Assemblée sous le régime de l'état de siège et obéissant à la force des baïonnettes, ratifie les actes de Copassis Effendi, après qu'on aura fait sous-entendre aux Députés que leur consentement tacite est lié au rachat de leur vie et de leur liberté individuelle.

C'est, peut-être, le sentiment de respect à l'égard des droits de suzeraineté du Sultan qui a suggéré aux Puissances Protectrices la décision de laisser à la Sublime Porte toute liberté d'action pour la répression du soi-disant soulèvement de Samos. Mais les événements qui se déroulent dans l'île n'ont aucun rapport avec le rétablissement de l'ordre; ils constituent la création d'un nouvel état de choses et tendent à l'abolition complète du régime d'autonomie de Samos.

Cette manière d'agir de la Porte, violant les Traités Internationaux, abolissant les garanties, et modifiant les rapports internationaux de l'Etat, ne constitue pas seulement une iniquité envers le peuple Samien, mais aussi une offense envers les Puissances Protectrices. Et cette manière d'agir ne peut qu'avoir des conséquences plus graves et plus générales, dépassant les limites étroites des intérêts de l'île.

Si d'un côté on a laissé toute liberté d'action à la Porte, quant aux ennuis de la soldatesque, j'ose espérer qu'en présence d'un coup d'Etat politique les Puissances Protectrices ne se refuseront pas d'intervenir rapidement et efficacement afin de ramener et de raffermir l'état de choses antérieur, dans le but de parer à tout danger futur.

En faisant connaître tout ce qui précède à votre Excellence, j'ai l'espoir et la conviction qu'elle voudra avant tout agir de façon à ce que l'Assemblée des Représentants ne soit pas convoquée dans de pareilles circonstances, c'est-à-dire, sous la terreur de la loi martiale, avant l'éloignement des troupes et avant qu'amnistie soit accordée aux proscrits.

Je me permets également de faire remarquer encore une fois à votre Excellence que le rappel immédiat de Copassis Effendi est considéré comme indispensable au rétablissement de l'ordre. Ce rappel s'impose, non seulement par des raisons politiques, mais aussi par des raisons humanitaires.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) TH. P. SOFOULIS.

[21385] No. 156.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 90.)

Athens, June 11, 1908.

Sir,

AT his reception this morning M. Skouzès spoke to me again about Samos. He said he had at last received from the Consul a reply, dated the 4th but only dispatched from Smyrna on the 9th instant, to his first telegram requesting explanations of his having attended the requiem for the local hero (see my despatch No. 75 of the 29th instant), and of the charge brought against him of having been privy to the intrigues which led to the outbreak. He said he had attended the service by invitation, on the ground of the man commemorated having been an officer of the Greek army (he was of the period of the war of independence, it appears). As for his having taken part in the outbreak, his time was too much taken up with looking after persons who had sought shelter in the Consulate, and his actions were too much under observation for that to be possible. I remarked that he had evaded answering the question put to him, which was as to his proceedings before, not during, the outbreak. His telegram then went on to describe the reign of terror prevailing at Samos. In a telegram

dated yesterday and received this morning (the Turks having allowed the resumption of telegraphic communication in cypher) he said there was no change in the situation to report.

His Excellency said that the Government were so anxious to clear up the matter as regarded the action of their Consul that they were dispatching to Samos, the day after to-morrow, an official (M. Delyannis) of superior rank to him to inquire and report upon it.

M. Skousès entered once more into the arguments to show that the outbreak at Samos was prearranged between Copassi Effendi and the Porte, laying especial stress on the extraordinary rapidity with which Turkish ships and troops appeared on the scene, considering the time usually taken over any Turkish naval movement. He also represented very strongly that it is impossible to expect trustworthy evidence or an impartial report from a Commission of Inquiry conducted under a state of siege and uncontrolled by the presence of European officials. The Consular Agents were of no use at all, being all local people, with their own interests to guard. The Greek Government asked for nothing better than an inquiry, provided it was conducted by Representatives of the Powers.

It did not require M. Skousès' statements of these arguments to convince me of the force of them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. ELLIOT.

[21387] No. 157.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 93.)
Sir,

Athens, June 17, 1908.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 88 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a letter which I have this morning received from M. Sofoulis on the subject of the recent elections in Samos and the convocation of the Assembly. His statements, which it will be seen directly traverse those of the Grand Vizier reported in Mr. Barclay's telegram No. 142 of the 15th instant, are to the effect that resignations of members can only be accepted by the Assembly itself; that dismissals of members can only be effected after an order of the Court of Appeal; that elections, in order to be valid, require the proclamation of candidates a fortnight beforehand by the competent Court; that the Assembly now about to meet is therefore illegally constituted, and that it is imperative, in order to avoid future dangers, to prevent the meeting until the *status quo* has been restored.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. ELLIOT.

Inclosure in No. 157.

M. Sofoulis to Sir F. Elliot.

Excellence, [*Non datée.*]

LES élections auxquelles on procède actuellement à Samos pour le remplacement des représentants du peuple destitués ou forcés à démissionner constituent un vrai coup d'État contre l'autonomie de Samos.

Comme dans tout État constitutionnel, à Samos le Corps Législatif a seul qualité pour juger si la démission de l'un de ses membres est recevable ou non. Donc, les démissions des Députés acceptées par ordre du Prince sont absolument nulles et non avenues. D'autre part, la destitution d'un représentant du peuple doit être, pour avoir de la validité, précédée par une ordonnance définitive de la Cour d'Appel, après qu'on a observé toutes les formalités judiciaires et tenu compte des délais prescrits par les lois.

Voici encore une autre raison d'invalidation des élections qui ont lieu à Samos, suivant la loi électorale, ayant chez nous la valeur d'une stipulation constitutionnelle, la proclamation des candidats doit être faite par le Tribunal compétent deux semaines avant le jour des élections. Or, les élections qui ont lieu aujourd'hui n'ont été ordonnées que depuis avant-hier. Il est donc clair comme le jour qu'il ne s'agit plus là d'élections légales, mais de la nomination des représentants par Reouf Pacha et

Copassi Effendi. Ainsi, non seulement on abolit la Constitution du pays, mais encore on la tourne en dérision.

En conséquence, l'Assemblée qui sera prochainement convoquée ne peut avoir aucune base légale; ses actes et ses décisions ne peuvent avoir aucune validité. En tout cas, la convocation de l'Assemblée dans de pareilles conditions et sous l'empire de l'occupation militaire constitue un mépris absolu de la Constitution et des libertés du pays. Sous le règne de la terreur, personne n'aura le courage d'essayer de désobéir aux volontés de Reouf Pacha et de Copassi Effendi, volontés auxquelles les représentants du peuple seront obligés de se soumettre pour racheter leur vie et leur liberté.

Cette convocation de l'Assemblée est la manifestation la plus audacieuse, pour ne pas dire la plus impudente, du coup d'État effectué; les dangers qu'elle fera naître sont de beaucoup les plus graves. L'importance de ces dangers fait que l'on doit prendre toutes les mesures pour ajourner la convocation de l'Assemblée jusqu'au rétablissement complet du *status quo ante*. C'est pour cette raison que je prends la liberté de vous adresser la présente non seulement pour protester contre l'importunité [? inopportunité] de la convocation de l'Assemblée, mais aussi contre l'illégalité de sa constitution, insistant en même temps sur la nullité de ses décisions, quelles qu'elles soient. En vous soumettant cette protestation et en vous priant d'agir immédiatement en faveur du rétablissement de la loi fondamentale de notre pays, j'ai la conviction que votre Excellence voudra bien, alors qu'il en est temps encore, intervenir pour que la convocation de l'Assemblée soit ajournée.

De cette manière vous défendrez les intérêts les plus hauts et les droits les plus sacrés du peuple Samien contre la force et l'injustice.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) TH. P. SOFOULIS.

[21354] No. 158.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 328.)
Sir,

Therapia, June 12, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of two despatches from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Diarbekir reporting as to the oppression of the Christians in that vilayet by the Kurds, and stating that the representations which he had made to the Acting Vali seemed likely to be of little use. Mr. Heard states, however, that, in speaking to the Acting Vali, he took his stand on unofficial ground, and the Acting Vali then discussed business in an outwardly friendly manner. I have thought fit to approve Mr. Heard's definition of his unofficial position, and have caused the Minister of the Interior to counsel the Vali privately and unofficially to accept representations from the British Vice-Consul in a friendly spirit.

On receipt of Mr. Heard's first despatch on this subject, I brought Sadik and Muharrem Bey's doings to the notice of the Grand Vizier, and his Highness telegraphed to the Acting Vali to remove Sadik from the Administrative Council at Farkin. On receipt of a telegram from the Acting Vali that this had been done, I urged the Grand Vizier to have Sadik, if possible, retired. His Highness wrote urging this course on the Minister of Justice, and the latter has now instructed the judicial authorities at Diarbekir accordingly.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 158.

Vice-Consul Heard to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 12.)
Sir,

Diarbekir, April 4, 1908.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 5 of the 5th March, I regret to say that such cases of Kurdish oppression as I have brought to the notice of the Acting Vali do not at present seem likely to receive serious attention at the hands of the Local Government.

The cases to which His Majesty's Consuls from time to time call the attention of the local authorities form, of course, only a small fraction of the many wrongs and injustices suffered by the Christian population in these regions. Regarded in their

relation to the aggregate, their individual importance may appear small. There is no doubt, however, that the rare cases in which the oppressor is made to suffer for his misdoing through Consular intervention does influence the attitude of Moslem towards Christian to a considerable extent, whereas failure on the part of a foreign Consul to obtain retribution, a fact which seldom fails to gain notoriety, encourages the oppressors of the Christians to a corresponding degree. Hence, it is my humble opinion that the exertion of Consular influence in regard of any particular case of oppression or injustice is often fraught with considerations of principle, which outweigh the importance attaching to the actual matter for which redress is sought.

The following is a summary of the cases recently brought to the notice of the Acting Vali:—

1. Kurdish outrages at Palu (see my despatch No. 5 of the 5th March). As a consequence of the report made by the inspecting official, the Chief of Police has been dismissed and the offending Kurds repressed. This matter at least appears to have been settled satisfactorily.

2. Triple murder in Silivan (see above despatch). The documents of the case have been sent here, and a "Men'i-itihamié" (stay of further proceedings) has been issued. The case cannot accordingly be reopened without fresh evidence. Previous to the issue of this order, a representative of Sadik Bey arrived here, as he stated, "for his health." Some persons say he was intrusted with the task of bribing the necessary officials. There is fairly strong presumptive evidence to show that the Kaïmakam of Silivan was bribed when called upon to report on the affair. I learn on good authority that Sadik Bey and Muharrem Bey, having had their minds made easy on the score of further criminal proceedings, have resumed their favourite amusement of molesting Armenian women. Their exercise of the right of *Jus primæ noctis* in Armenian weddings is a matter of common notoriety. They no doubt consider that they are now free to indulge in every kind of excess. Nothing short of an order from the Sublime Porte for their summary removal pending an inquiry can put an end to their misdoings. I am informed that a police official of Farkin, who is cognizant of the whole affair, and who even asserts that he knows all the persons who were bribed to suppress the truth, states his readiness to tell all he knows if called upon.

The Acting Vali, who has had the whole affair explained to him by one of the principal Notables of Diarbekir, who is conversant with all the details of the crime, and can have little doubt in his mind as to the true facts of the case, declines to reopen a *chose jugée*, an attitude which is, of course, legally unassailable. It is hardly necessary to state that the law, so conveniently elastic when it is sought to enmesh the Christian, assumes, where his interests are concerned, the most austere and uncompromising rigidity.

3. Persecution of the Hodnof villagers (see my despatches Nos. 7 and 10 of the 17th April and 6th July, 1907). After the departure of the late Vali, the sons of Temür Beg returned to Hodnof and started molesting the villagers as before. I mentioned this to the Acting Vali, and he sent an order to the Acting Kaïmakam of Silivan instructing him "quietly to put an end to this state of affairs, and to prevent further complaints." The villagers who had come here to complain then returned to Farkin (chief town of Silivan), but after waiting some days were told to "refer the matter to the Court." I should observe here that a certain Khatib Bey, a Notable of Farkin, who wants to get hold of all the fields of Hodnof, is at the bottom of the trouble, he having incited Temür Beg to bully the villagers. That he should have "squared" the Kaïmakam would only be in the natural order of things.

I observed to the Acting Vali that he had ordered the Kaïmakam to keep these Kurds quiet, and that he had not done this, but had referred the villagers to the Law Courts. I told him that from what I had heard of the Court at Silivan they might as well appeal to the moon. I added that these men had fired last year on Zaptiehs sent to arrest them, and that his predecessor (who, it must be admitted, could act with vigour on occasion), had summarily ejected them from the village. His Excellency said he would inquire into this, but showed no disposition to have the offenders removed, which would be the simplest solution of the question.

4. Abduction of Armenian woman from Hilkanf (see my despatch No. 5 of the 5th March). As I have already informed the Acting Vali, this woman is known to be in a Rashkota village in Bisheri. This case has been dragging for some months and nothing has been done. After some discussion the Acting Vali stated that until certain punitive measures at present contemplated against the Rashkota tribe were undertaken, it would be impossible to reclaim the woman. I asked if he meant that Government was too weak to effect this. He was obliged to admit it.

5. Another similar case, of which it is perhaps unnecessary to give the details, concerning two Armenian women who had escaped from their Kurdish abductors, and whom, according to their account, the local Government of Bisheri was endeavouring to restore to their abductors, I also referred to the Acting Vali. My representations on behalf of the above provoked a slight outburst of impatience on the part of his Excellency.

"Why had these people not petitioned him?" (as a matter of fact they had, but the petition seems to have gone astray). "Why had they brought their complaints to me? These Armenians were always inventing lies and pouring them into the ears of Consuls. He understood that I was here to protect the interests of British subjects, not subjects of the Ottoman Empire. My acting as an intermediary for Armenian petitioners imparted a political complexion to such procedure. The French Consul never troubled him with any such affairs, &c." In short, he questioned my right to intervene on behalf of Armenians, as being outside my province.

I replied that, as I understood it, my duty, and the purpose for which I had been sent here by my Government, was to bring, in a friendly way, to his notice such cases of wrong or oppression as I became aware of, purely in the interests of justice and with the object of helping the Provincial Government to see that justice was done. I told him of a case and it was for him "to take it or leave it." There was no question of demanding anything as a right. (I did not say, as I might have, that if he persisted in disregarding my suggestions I should endeavour to make trouble for him from the Porte through His Majesty's Embassy.) I repudiated any political element in the question so far as I was concerned. If he inquired, I said, he would probably learn that the matters brought to the notice of Valis by Consuls were not often found to be incorrect. I knew as well as he did what liars most of the Armenians were, and I was in the habit of examining their statements before I referred their complaints to him. The local officials could not be depended on to do justice (as he admitted), and so, when I heard of cases of injustice in the province I brought them to his notice in the hope that he might see justice done. If he contested my right to do so, I suggested that he should write to Constantinople for instructions.

Recognizing that, whilst I took my stand on unofficial ground, my position, if weak, was unassailable, he moderated his tone and resumed the discussion of business in an outwardly friendly manner.

I trust that I may be excused for obtruding this somewhat personal discussion on your attention, but as the whole principle of my relations with the local authorities, in regard of what I take to be the chief object of my presence here is involved, I have ventured to explain at some length the manner in which I have defined my official—or rather unofficial—position here, in case the question should be raised again in a more acute form.

There is no doubt that Mahmud Aarifi Pasha resents my intervention on behalf of Christians, towards whom he is reputed to be distinctly ill-disposed. It is to be apprehended that he may even visit his ill-humour on the innocent subjects of my representations; my French colleague never interferes at all on behalf of Christians for this very reason. Should he prove obdurate I trust I may be able to show him that I do not rely on my own unaided efforts to see justice done.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. B. HEARD.

P.S. *April 8.*—Since my interview with the Acting Vali, I am glad to be able to report that his Excellency, having obtained confirmation of my statements with regard to Case 5, about the accuracy of which he appeared somewhat sceptical, is now taking the necessary action.

It appears that the first petition of one of the abducted women, Rahan, instead of being handed to the Acting Vali, was sent back to the Kaïmakam of Bisheri, by the Mutevin. A second petition sent in a few days ago would have shared the same fate, were it not that the Vice-Consular dragoman prevailed on that official to let it go through to the Vali. It contained, amongst other things, a complaint against a certain gendarmerie Lieutenant, Nuri Effendi (on the subject of whose existence the Acting Vali had previously rather rudely contradicted me). This man had been sent by the Kaïmakam of Bisheri to lay hold of Rahan, with a view to restoring her to her abductor, a brigand called Kassimo. Nuri Effendi failed to catch the woman, but is stated to have taken £T.8 from the village whence she fled. After interviewing Rahan, the Acting Vali sent orders to arrest Kassimo, and to have Nuri Effendi brought to Diarbekir for examination.

It appears that the Mudvin also referred a petition of the Hodnoflis (Case 3) addressed to the Acting Vali, back to the Kaïmakam of Silivan, but the villagers have now succeeded in getting a second one through to the Vali, who has referred it to the Administrative Council of the vilayet, so that there is now hope of something being done.

The peculiar arrangement, whereby all Petitions to the Vali must first pass through the hands of the Mudvin, requires a word of comment. I have never heard of such a thing any where else. It is obvious that if Petitions can be referred back to the very authorities responsible for the injustices complained of, the chances of the petitioners obtaining redress are greatly reduced. Were it not that Minas Effendi Hamdopoulo, a Greek exile of bad reputation, were known to be particularly hostile to the Christians of Diarbekir (by whom he is cordially hated) he could never have been intrusted with such a responsible duty, or have obtained the influence which he fortunately possesses.

The modest and retiring type of Mudvin sometimes known as the "Evvet Effendi," who, if he counts for nothing, does nobody any harm, would be far preferable to this malevolent Greek, who carries favour with the Government by oppressing, so far as he is able, those whom, theoretically, he is supposed to befriend.

W. B. H.

Inclosure 2 in No. 158.

Vice-Consul Heard to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 16.)

Sir, *Diarbekir, April 23, 1908.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 12 of the 4th April, I have the honour to state that the attitude of the Acting Vali is such as to confirm the impression that any further representations I may make on behalf of the Christians in this vilayet are likely to be of little use.

A few days ago, I instructed the Vice-Consular dragoman to call on him and express my gratification at the arrest of the brigand Kassim, and the summoning of gendarmerie Lieutenant Nuri Effendi to Diarbekir (see above despatch). At the same time I inquired whether, on consideration, he was now willing to have the sons of Temür Beg removed from Hodnof. The Acting Vali received my message with marked frigidity, and replied that the Hodnof villagers had better apply to the Court in Farkin. The dragoman again pointed out to him that his predecessor Fehmi Bey had removed these men from Hodnof and that they were guilty of having fired on Zaptiehs sent to arrest them. He replied that Fehmi Bey had acted improperly and that he had found no record of the armed resistance which I alleged.

A short review of the situation in Silivan may, perhaps, serve to make the case of the Hodnof villagers stand out more clearly in its relation to the general question of Moslem *v.* Christian.

Previous to the massacre of 1905, the Christians in this district were in the main independent farmers, enjoying a relative degree of prosperity. During the massacre they suffered heavily and the survivors found themselves reduced to ruin by the wholesale pillaging of the Kurds. Their lands then fell into the hands of various powerful Beys and Agas, and the majority have since existed in a state of *métayage*, their condition being more or less miserable according to the propensities of their Moslem masters. Should the intolerable nature of their sufferings drive them to seek redress, they would in the first place have recourse to the Kaïmakam of Silivan, who in nine cases out of ten is likely to be a mere creature of the local Notables. Finding no help here they would then appeal to the Vali, requesting at the same time the aid of His Majesty's Vice-Consul. This has been the course followed by the Hodnof villagers, and after over two months spent in fruitless petitioning at Farkin and Diarbekir, they now find themselves referred back to the Court at Farkin, and exposed to the vengeance of their persecutors who had warned them not to appeal to the Consuls.

The real ground for their persecution as previously stated, lies in the fact that they still own most of their fields and Khalil Bey wishes to get hold of them.

The Acting Vali would, no doubt, maintain that his action is perfectly regular, and that in referring the petitioners to the Local Court of First Instance, he is merely acting in accordance with the law, and that the summary expulsion of the accused without a previous judicial examination of the accusations brought against them would be irregular. When a Turkish official takes up this attitude, it is difficult to counter him. It is useless to tell him that the local Court is corrupt, that its decisions are governed

not by justice but by local influences, and in short that there is no justice to be had for the Christian as against the Moslem. These things cannot be proved. They are simply assertions based on common knowledge, and are true probably of every Court in Kurdistan. It is only in the chief centres, where foreign Consuls can keep an eye on the proceedings and protest when justice is too flagrantly denied that a Moslem can sometimes be made to pay an inadequate penalty for injuring a Christian.

Where a Vali, ignoring the suggestions of a foreign Consul, refers Christian petitioners to the tender mercies of the law as administered in this country, without exerting his personal influence to secure justice, as on occasion he is able to do, the last hope of the oppressed is taken away.

As my representations on behalf of the Hadnof villagers and with regard to the triple murder in Silivan have proved ineffectual, it is to be feared that the Armenians of this district will find their situation rendered more intolerable than ever. Security for life, honour, and property they have never enjoyed, and can never hope to enjoy. But a certain measure of protection against more than usually brutal and wanton ill-treatment might, I think, be secured for them if an example could now and then be made of such as are guilty of particularly flagrant outrage, and the oppressed would thereby be emboldened to make known their wrongs, which they now do at considerable personal risk. The attitude of the Vali, as I have already stated, is not encouraging. That he should dislike the Christians is perhaps only natural. But that an official in his position should speak openly of the Christians as "giaours" and "pigs," as he does in the presence of Notables of this town, is neither becoming nor conducive to public order. Moreover, he has personally ratified the appointment of Khati Bey (the chief oppressor of Hadnof), of Sadik Bey, and his Christian emissary (sent here it is alleged to distribute bribes—see my despatch No. 12 of the 4th April) as members of the Administrative Council of Silivan. This proceeding shows how little importance he attaches to my observations regarding these persons.

I trust that I may be excused for having written at such length on matters which might perhaps have been dismissed more briefly. I am anxious, however, to indicate the extent to which the welfare of the Christians is dependent on the attitude of the Vali towards Consular representations, and to explain clearly the grounds upon which I ask for the intervention of His Majesty's Embassy in the two questions which form the basis of this despatch.

Stated briefly, my respectful request is that representations should be made to the Sublime Porte to obtain—

1. The permanent removal of the sons of Temür Bey from Hodnof on the grounds already stated in previous despatches. This amounts simply to a confirmation of the order of the late Fehmi Bey.

2. The temporary removal of Muharrem Bey and Sadik Bey from Farkin pending a fresh trial. I would add that it is desirable that the Acting Vali should be instructed, if possible, to remove the two Beys summarily and without warning, and that he should not be asked to furnish a report on the subject before taking action. His report would only be a repetition of that already furnished by the Kaïmakam of Silivan, of whom he professes to entertain a high opinion. Opportunity would thus be given to the Beys to take measures for terrorizing the witnesses during their absence through the agency of their numerous following of armed and lawless Kurds.

I would suggest at the same time that it is also desirable that the Acting Vali should be instructed to see that all Petitions addressed to him should be placed in his hands, without passing through those of a subordinate official empowered to dispose of them as he thinks fit. Such procedure, as well as being detrimental to the interests of justice is, I presume, irregular.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. B. HEARD.

[21357] No. 159.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 331.)

Sir, *Therapia, June 12, 1908.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 324 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's

Vice-Consul at Van, reporting on the measures being taken by the local Government to stamp out the Armenian revolutionaries at Van.

I have expressed to Captain Dickson my approval of his action as reported therein.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 150.

Vice-Consul Dickson to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 15.)

Van, May 24, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to present an account of the measures now being taken by the local Government to stamp out the Armenian revolutionaries in Van.

Since the massacre of the Armenians on the 23rd March the situation has been gradually changing. About the 4th May, when the last of the reinforcements of five battalions had arrived, about half the shops in the bazaar used to open for a few hours each day. With the advent of such a large force the natural timidity of the Armenian seems to have prevailed over his revolutionary ideas, with the result that they all professed to be faithful and loyal subjects of the Sultan, and begged the "fedai" to go away from Van and not bring trouble on them.

As I had already informed you, Aram and Ishkan, with some twenty soldiers of the "fedai," had left Van some nine weeks ago. It would appear that they had been gathering funds and changing the hiding places of arms in various villages. Aram, with some few soldiers, recently returned to Van; thus, on the 16th May, Aram, the doctor, Sarkis, and some twelve soldiers were supposed to be in Van.

As I mentioned in my No. 6 of the 2nd March, 1908, the thirty odd "fedai" soldiers are nearly all foreigners, while the native Armenians are divided into active and passive members. As I understand, some of these active members have bought and paid for rifles from the Committee, while after the massacre of the 23rd March the rifles in the Committee's depôts were distributed amongst the active members with a view to resisting an attack on the Armenian quarters by the Bashi-Bozouks.

Within the last fortnight, when the arrival of the troops and other indications seemed to show that the Government meant taking action against the "fedai" only and did not intend a general massacre, the "fedai" would seem to have been persuaded not to make any resistance. In the interview I had with their Chiefs in February last (reported in my No. 9 of the 6th April) Aram had promised me that when the searching recommenced they would not attempt any organized resistance, but would conceal themselves, and only defend their own lives if discovered (which he seemed to think quite impossible), and that they would not defend their depôts of arms. This naturally referred to the four Chiefs and the "fedai" soldiers, but as all the young Armenians are suspects, and as their guilty consciences would make each one think that he would be arrested, there was always a chance that some of these might lose their heads and make resistance which might lead to serious results. It has been an open secret that without informers the Government would find nothing. In the many conversations I have had with the Vali and Ferik, I have tried to impress on them that the only way to succeed was by getting information and then acting on it quietly but firmly. Also that to get information they must show themselves both generous and magnanimous, friends of the people, ready to help them, pardon the erring, and protect them from the "fedai" influence and vengeance. In this way they would get all the respectable Armenians on their side and most of the half-hearted ones, and given the Armenian character, and the offer of money and protection, traitors would soon appear; whereas, if they adopted the traditional Turkish method of calling all the Armenians "fedai," and enforcing rigorous repressive measures against them, and letting the Kurds and Bashi-Bozouks help in the process, they would get no assistance from the Armenians, and the latter would be forced to turn to the "fedai" as their protectors, as in the case of the big massacres of 1882. The Vali and Ferik have acted more or less up to this idea, and so far the searching has been made in an orderly and praiseworthy manner.

On the 15th May the troops took post, completely surrounding the Armenian quarters, roughly about 2 square miles, lining the roofs of the houses on the edges of the quarters, with strong posts at various points and intervals. The guns of two batteries were posted on positions outside and commanding the quarters, while

cavalry and "hamidieh" patrolled the plains outside. Detachments of troops were placed in the more fanatic Moslem quarters, and Proclamations were posted cautioning the Bashi-Bozouks against making demonstrations or attempting to take part in the searching. Detachments were also posted in the neighbouring villages and in the passes and plains. The fact that the troops employed in the town were the battalions recently arrived from Erzeroum gave one confidece, as these men are mostly Lazes, and, as far as I have seen, are more orderly and better behaved than the troops recruited locally, who are mostly Kurds, brigands, and are quite untrustworthy. For this reason the local troops were sent out to the outlying posts. When these dispositions had been made, a Proclamation (translation inclosed)* was issued calling on the Armenians to deliver up the revolutionaries and their arms, &c. In the afternoon the Vali and Ferik called together thirty of the leading Armenians, and repeating this to them, explained that the troops were there to protect loyal Armenians from the evil influence of the "fedai" which up to now had overawed them, and that now the Armenians must help the Government to capture these "fedai" and to obtain their arms, &c. With regard to those natives who have had relations with the "fedai," they were to surrender their arms and he would try and obtain an amnesty for them from the Sultan. It would appear that the Ferik said that he would vouch for this amnesty being granted, but the Vali seems to have been rather half hearted about it, and the Armenians got the impression that the Vali wanted by this means to get hold of as many revolutionaries and arms as possible and then to have a massacre.

These Armenian Notables told the people what the Vali had said, and the people asked why the Proclamation made no mention of amnesty or grace. The Notables, all rich merchants, have little influence over the people, and are especially detested by the class from which the "fedai" are principally recruited, and these, naturally suspicious of the Turkish Government, looked on the Vali's verbal promise as a trap. In addition, no young Armenian with a hidden rifle was likely to inform the Notables of the fact. The consequence was that the Mission of the Notables failed, and they had to tell the Vali so.

On the 17th May my French and Russian colleagues and I called on the Vali and Ferik and tried all our persuasions to try and induce them to issue another Proclamation offering a promise of amnesty to those natives not accused of other than political crimes who should give themselves up. It would seem that such a promise of amnesty can only be given by the Sultan, and the Vali did not care to take the responsibility of giving it himself, and did not like mentioning such a Western idea to Constantinople. In this case his verbal promise given to the Notables was not worth much, especially so when the unscrupulousness and dishonesty of the minor Turkish officials is taken into account. One can hardly blame the young Armenian with a hidden rifle and a guilty conscience, and a wholesome dread of Turkish justice and prisons, if he preferred to run the risk of being captured during the search, to giving himself up on the extremely vague offchance of a pardon as held out by the Vali.

The Vali and Ferik though impressed by our arguments, said that there was not now time to obtain the necessary permission from Constantinople.

On the 18th May, the Armenian Notables made a final appeal to the Vali for an amnesty, which was refused, though the Vali permitted them to send a telegram through their Mourakhas to the Sultan, asking for clemency and an amnesty. One of their representatives came and begged me to ask my Embassy to interest itself in this, and so after talking to my colleagues here, I sent you my telegram of the 18th May.

After two false starts on the 17th and 18th May, the searching was commenced on the 19th May. A battalion of infantry, some hundred police, gendarmes, and various officials advanced with military precautions, and took up position round the quarter chosen to be searched. The surrounding gardens were scouted, and soldiers posted on the roof of every house and at all points of vantage. At the commencement only certain suspected houses in various quarters were searched, and this in an orderly and praiseworthy manner. Thanks to information supplied by various informers, they had a tremendous haul the first three days.

Van is supplied with water by a system of deep tunnels dug out of the earth. Two large mains come from the mountains some 8 miles away, as these enter the Van gardens they split up into several smaller drains, which follow the various roads through the town. These tunnels are a relic of the ancient Urartian civilization, and

* Not printed.

some 50 feet below the surface, every 20 yards is a manhole by which the earth is brought up to the surface. These manholes are usually closed with a stone and some earth at the top, but in the town many of them are open, and are used similarly to wells for the water supply, while others gradually come to the surface, where the water issues like a spring.

The "fedai" had made use of this system of drains to create hiding places for themselves.

On the 19th May, from information given, a well in a garden was opened, and a zaptieh (a dirty, insignificant looking little fellow) with a knife and a pistol was let down by a rope, at the foot of the well he found a passage connecting with the main water tunnel, wading along this he discovered a group of Armenians in a dug-out chamber or catacomb leading off the main drain. Twelve surrendered without firing a shot, though most were armed, some others escaped, going on down the drain, these were captured the next day.

Among the captured twelve were Arani, the Commander-in-chief of all the "fedai"; Theos, the chief native "fedai," and quite the most dangerous and influential among them—he might be called the Chief of the Intelligence and Staff; Terlimazian, the assassin of the traitor David, whose death caused the massacre of the 23rd March; Krikor, who with Theos murdered Armenak Effendi last year; Meloyan, the head Professor at the Armenian school in Van; two other "fedai" soldiers, the remainder being natives of Van of lesser importance. Since then the soldiers and police have been playing at hide and seek in the drains, guarding all the exits, while others have been searching various houses. The next day six more men were captured in the drains—two soldiers and the others native suspects. On the 22nd and 23rd May some forty-six individuals were arrested in their houses and in the streets as suspected persons. Up to the 24th May, the total captured was 18 men from drains, 46 suspects arrested, 30 rifles, 20,000 rounds of ammunition, 7 pistols, 50 lbs. of dynamite, printing press, official seal of the "fedai" Committee, various implements for the fabrication of bombs, various letters and papers, and a pile of miscellaneous odds and ends. Most of these things were found in three houses, most skilfully concealed in holes in walls plastered up, or in false supporting pillars, in each case in such a way that without information it would have been impossible to discover without pulling down the house.

At 3 P.M. on the 23rd May, while the troops, police, &c., were taking up position to search a fresh quarter, and while some gendarmes were scouting the gardens in the outskirts of this quarter, some six officials entered a small two-storied house in a narrow by-lane at the foot of the garden belonging to the English Mission in Van. The proprietor of this house is a widow, and her daughter was supposed to have had relations with some of the "fedai." The officials were not searching the house, but merely wanted to see the daughter and ask some questions. The girl was not downstairs, and a police commissaire, climbing the ladder to the upper rooms and opening the door, found himself facing Sarkis (the doctor), Armenak, and three other "fedai" in full war paint and armed to the teeth. Pointing their pistols at him they whispered, "Don't move." He threw himself back, pulling the door to; in doing so he fell down the ladder, which probably saved his life, as the "fedai" fired a volley which passed through the door. The "fedai" then appear to have rushed to the windows, and from them fired at the gendarmes, soldiers, &c., who were round about the house. A cavalry corporal who was in the garden was shot dead, the rest fled. Two gendarmes hid in a w.c. shed below a window. The officials in the house were unarmed with the exception of two, who had small revolvers. One of these foolishly let off his revolver in his nervousness. This informed the "fedai" above that there were people below, and they commenced a searching fire with their Mauser pistols through the floor to the rooms below (the floors are only single boarding about ½ inch thick). By some miracle no one was touched. The "fedai" then jumped from the window on to the w.c. shed and into the garden of the English Mission and disappeared.

One of the "fedai" put his foot through the roof of the w.c. on to the crouching gendarme's head. He fired his Martini, but, luckily for him, it misfired.

When the firing started there was a complete panic, soldiers and gendarmes rushing about everywhere and firing indiscriminately at every one.

It appears to be a natural characteristic of the Armenians, which no amount of practical experience of massacres can eradicate, that as soon as anything untoward occurs, they immediately rush out of their houses, generally with some bedding, and make their way to some other house, generally about half-a-mile away, usually going there via the gardens. This, then, is what occurred, and the gardens being full of

fruit trees, these soldiers happening to be in position on the various house-tops, seeing people rushing about in and out of the gardens trying to conceal themselves behind the trees, not unnaturally fired at them, and soon a hot fusilade was being kept up all over the Armenian quarters, wherever the posts of soldiers happened to be. Fortunately for the Armenians, the soldiers' aim must have been bad, as the result of some half-hour's fusilade, so far as I have heard, is only three killed and several wounded.

When the firing started the troops seem to have lost their heads completely, and instead of immediately attacking the house or surrounding it, they all retired to one side, allowing the "fedai" to escape, and then rushed about in all directions without any seeming order or discipline. During this panic many houses were entered, and money, watches, and other small portable objects stolen, and some women complain of having been raped. The gendarmes and police appear to have been the principal offenders.

Eventually order was established, and the quarter inclosing the house and gardens surrounded. This quarter is some 200 by 150 yards, with houses on three sides. The troops were naïvely confident that the "fedai" were still in this quarter, and searched every house and corner. I was in the English Mission at the time; it was searched, though nothing was found. The American Mission premises are in the next quarter across the road, where the fracas commenced. I went round and told Dr. Raynolds, the head of the Mission, to close his premises, and not allow any strangers in, but it was quite impossible for him to prevent a certain number of people from taking refuge, climbing over the walls, &c.

After a close search everywhere and a certain amount of loose firing, mostly at imaginary "fedai," I think, as no one was hit or captured, the searchers finally decided that the "fedai" must be in the American premises. These consist of an irregular walled inclosure about 250 yards square, with a hospital, houses, gardens, courtyards, orphanage, buildings, workshops, and all sorts of straggling buildings, and some 200 or 300 people live on the premises, including five Americans and their wives and families. Ahmed Bey, acting chief of gendarmerie, who was in charge of the search, told me he thought the "fedai" were in the American premises, and asked my permission to enter and search them. I told him that the proper procedure was for the Vali (the only representative of the Government that I officially recognized) to inform me in writing, but as this would necessarily waste a lot of time, and as both the Americans and myself wished to do all we could to help the Government against the "fedai," I said that I would waive this formality in the present instance so as to enable them to search at once for the armed "fedai," but that, if he wished to make search for other things, I must first have the Vali's official demand. Some hour and a-half was spent in searching the premises, and no signs of "fedai" were found, but among the native employés were two men whom the police said they would like to take, as they were wanted for other reasons. I said I could not let them take them unless I got a written demand from the Vali, so they left them. It was then 8 P.M., and quite dark, so the search was abandoned for the night. I told Dr. Raynolds to put the two men under lock and key, as they would probably be sent for the next day.

To-day I saw the Vali, who thanked me for having waived the question of the official demand to search the English and American Missions, and said the arrest of the two men was of little importance, and that when they wanted them he would let me know.

I would be glad to know for future guidance if I acted rightly under the circumstances.

The Vali also told me that, with the exception of this band of six, he had information that there were no other "fedai" in Van, and that all their efforts were now being directed to getting hold of these, and that, that accomplished, he hoped to be able to get an amnesty for the rest of the people, with the exception of certain individuals who would probably be arrested later on. He further told me that the instructions given him by the Porte only said that he was to let it be known that if the "fedai" were delivered up the Government would try to obtain an amnesty for the remainder. There was no mention of a Proclamation, and he thought it was now unnecessary, as the people had been informed through their Notables and priests that the Government would be lenient, and three men had already given up their rifles and had not been arrested (he did not mention that they had done this through the French Consul). Though not entirely agreeing with him, but believing that he really means well by the people, and is doing his best according to his lights to solve the question

peaceably, I thought it best under the circumstances not to press the subject either with the Vali or with you. I therefore informed you in my telegram of the 24th May that nothing further re the amnesty had been done.

I believe that with this Vali and Fejik one can obtain better results by unofficial conversations and councils here than by official representations at Constantinople, though exactly the opposite was the case with his predecessor.

The troops employed in the searching have been bivouacking in the Armenian quarters for the last week, and there have been several complaints of them having raped women at night. An officer told me that when expostulating with his men they told him that, being reserves, they were nearly all married men, and that it is nearly three months since they left their wives, and that they were only human, but that now they would be quiet. The principal complaint of the Armenian women seems to be that the soldiers did not pay them, so I do not personally think that any grave harm has been done, and perhaps a little Laz blood may improve the local Armenian.

The search continues to-day, but there have been no results. At the present moment there are some thousands of Armenians who have left their houses empty and, bringing their bedding, have taken refuge in the houses and gardens adjoining my Consulate. As it is impossible to discriminate who are guilty and who are innocent, I have refused to allow any one into the Consulate, and have told them (as it is impossible to make them go back to their houses) to remain in the adjoining houses and gardens, and that I will do my best to see that no harm comes to them.

Later, May 25.—This morning the "fedai" were reported to be occupying a house in the next quarter to mine. The quarter was surrounded, and a great deal of firing took place, which has just ceased. I have no accurate news of what took place, but have just been informed that the house was found empty, but that, by error, the soldiers had shot at each other, and that there have been some casualties. This fighting and chasing about from house to house is extremely dangerous work for every one, and may lead to serious consequences, and it was to try and prevent these that my colleagues and myself tried to get the promise of amnesty proclaimed before the searching began.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BERTRAM DICKSON,
Captain, R.F.A.

[21359] No. 160.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 22.)

(No. 333.)

Sir, *Therapia, June* 12, 1908.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 188 of the 13th April, reporting the dispatch to Derna of the Italian Judge on board the Italian cruiser "Varese" to investigate the circumstances of the murder of the Superior of the Catholic Mission at Derna, Padre Giustino, I have the honour to report that His Majesty's Consul at Benghazi has sent me a copy of his despatch to you of the 30th ultimo with regard to the result of the inquiry into the matter.

Mr. Fontana calls attention to the opposition met with by Italians on the part of the authorities in the purchase of land in the Benghazi district. This opposition is no doubt partly due to suspicions on the part of the Ottoman authorities of Italian designs in Africa; but obstruction in this matter is not confined to Italians or to Africa. Everywhere the acquisition of land by foreigners is meeting with all possible obstruction—so much so that it was recently thought well to present a collective protest to the Sublime Porte, signed by the Heads of Missions. I have the honour to transmit copy of this collective note, which was handed in by the German Ambassador, as doyen, on the 14th March.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 160.

Joint Note Verbale.

LES Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne, de Russie, d'Angleterre, de France, d'Italie, des États-Unis d'Amérique, et d'Autriche-Hongrie, les Ministres d'Espagne, de Belgique, de Grèce, et de Suède, et le Chargé d'Affaires des Pays-Bas, en se référant à la note verbale identique de l'année dernière, se voient de nouveau dans la nécessité d'attirer la sérieuse attention de la Sublime Porte sur les nombreuses difficultés et les restrictions apportées par l'Administration Ottomane, contrairement aux dispositions des lois et Traités, à la libre acquisition par les étrangers de propriétés foncières en Turquie.

Il est parvenu, en effet, à la connaissance des Ambassades et Légations précitées qu'une décision du Conseil d'État, rendue à la demande de la Direction du Defter-Hakani et sanctionnée par Iradé Impérial, a interdit le transfert au nom d'étrangers de tout titre de propriété (erasi miri), de quelque superficie que soit l'immeuble, sans autorisation préalable de l'Administration compétente à Constantinople.

L'obligation d'obtenir l'assentiment préalable du Gouvernement implique naturellement pour celui-ci la faculté de refuser son autorisation.

Cette formalité, qui n'est pas prescrite lorsque les acheteurs sont des sujets Ottomans, aurait pour but d'empêcher l'immigration des étrangers.

Les Représentants des Puissances soussignés ne peuvent que protester énergiquement contre l'adoption de ces mesures restrictives qui vont doublement à l'encontre des dispositions de l'Article 1er de la Loi du 7 Sépher, 1284, concédant aux étrangers le droit de propriété. Il est, en effet, stipulé que ces derniers sont admis au même titre que les sujets Ottomans, et sans autre condition, à jouir du droit de propriété des immeubles urbains ou ruraux dans toute l'étendue de l'Empire, à l'exception de la Province du Hedjaz, en se soumettant aux lois et règlements régissant les sujets Ottomans eux-mêmes.

Les Gouvernements respectifs ayant signé, avec la Sublime Porte, le Protocole établissant les conditions auxquelles les étrangers sont admis à la jouissance du droit de propriété, la Loi du 7 Sépher, 1284, revêt le caractère d'une Convention diplomatique à laquelle aucune modification ne peut être introduite sans le consentement des Parties Contractantes.

Les raisons d'ordre politique invoquées par le Conseil d'État, si tant est qu'elles puissent avoir un fondement, ne sauraient prévaloir, ni déroger, par conséquent, à une loi à laquelle les Puissances représentées ont adhéré par un acte diplomatique, sans qu'une entente ne s'établisse préalablement entre la Sublime Porte et les Puissances Signataires du Protocole de 1868.

L'évidence des considérations qui précèdent n'échappera certainement pas à la perspicacité du Gouvernement Impérial et les Représentants des Puissances soussignés prient la Sublime Porte de vouloir bien prendre telles mesures qu'elle jugera utiles en vue de faire rapporter les mesures restrictives précitées qui portent une si grave atteinte aux stipulations internationales.

Péra, le 14 *Mars*, 1908.

[21783] No. 161.

India Office to Foreign Office:—(*Received June* 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 14th May, relative to a proposal to abolish the Government coal depôt at Bushire and to create one at Koweit.

Copies have been sent to the Admiralty.

India Office, June 23, 1908.

Inclosure 1 in No. 161.

Major Cox to Government of India.

Bushire, May 5, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to make a reference on the subject of the arrangements now existing for the coaling of the ships of His Majesty's navy and the Royal Indian Marine in these waters west of Karachi, and especially at Bushire.

2. The Government of India are no doubt aware that coal is obtainable at—

(*a.*) Muscat—Government depôt.
(*b.*) Bushire—Government depôt.
(*c.*) Bussorah—depôt of private British firm.

As regards Muscat, I have no special observations to make. It is necessary and important for us to have a coaling station there, and the facilities obtainable, subject to the limited resources of the port in regard to coolies and lighters, are considerable.

3. Near the entrance to the Persian Gulf we have no coal, Basidu having fallen into desuetude as a coaling depôt for some twenty years past. It would no doubt prove very convenient to His Majesty's ships, which are, I believe, under standing orders to call there on their way up and down the Gulf, if we had a store at Henjam, but until the nature of our occupation is finally decided it would be impolitic to take any action in regard to that island which might possibly introduce a fresh element of difficulty in our negotiations with the Persian Government.

4. I now come to the case of Bushire. This depôt is, like that at Muscat, maintained by the Marine Department of the Government of India.

The coal hangars are rented and the handing of the coal is done under a contract arrangement with a local trader. The actual coal work is carried on under circumstances of great difficulty. The harbour is very treacherous for many months of the year for native boats, and, except in the latter part of the hot weather, perhaps from July to November, wind is apt to get up very quickly and it is impossible to rely on the calmness of the sea for two days together.

Moreover, only the smaller ships can venture into the inner anchorage 3½ miles from the shore. The larger vessels, such as His Majesty's ships "Hyacinth," "Proserpine," "Fox," cannot enter, and when they are driven to take coal have to do so from the outer anchorage 7 or 8 miles away.

Another difficulty is that we have no direct control over coolies, boats, or lantamen, and, owing to the vagaries of one and all and the difficulty of coaling ships at such long distances from the shore, the process is a most trying one both to those concerned with the ships at sea and with the coal on shore. The natural consequence is that vessels as a rule avoid coaling at Bushire, and the depôt is chiefly used for the requirements of the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence" and of the subsidized ships occasionally.

5. Now the "Lawrence" and His Majesty's three subsidized ships, "Sphinx," "Lapwing," and "Redbreast," can all coal without inconvenience and with much greater practical facility at Bussorah, where a store of coal is kept for sale to any vessel that may require it by a local British merchant.

It would seem, therefore, that if we only had to consider smaller ships in this part of the Gulf their needs could be supplied entirely by the Bussorah contractor, but in the absence of coal at Henjam it is no doubt necessary that we should have some coal in the north of the Gulf available in case of urgency for ships of any ordinary draught.

I have the honour in this connection to ask that the Government of India will be pleased to consider, in consultation with the naval authorities, whether the coaling station at Bushire could not conveniently and usefully be dispensed with and replaced by one at Koweit, where the harbour is much more sheltered and convenient for large vessels and where the more frequent appearance of our ships which would result would have a useful effect in other ways.

I would mention that, even if the Government depôt at Bushire were done away with, there would almost invariably, as now, be a store of coal in the godowns of one of the British shipping agents as at Bussorah, and as far as the "Lawrence" is concerned it would be no more trouble for her to go to Koweit or Bussorah for coal than to go for water to the Shatt-el-Arab, which she has to do regularly in any case.

Should it be considered necessary to maintain any fixed arrangement at Bushire, it might be held sufficient to enter into a contract with some local merchant in which he would undertake to have not less than 500 tons always available and to sell it to us at a fixed rate.

6. I recognize that this is a question which primarily concerns the naval authorities, but as a depôt at Koweit seems politically and practically to have a good many advantages over one at Bushire I have ventured to solicit consideration of it at this stage, as it may be held to affect the question, now before the Government, of the acquisition of part of Bunder Shweikh.

Inclosure 2 in No. 161.

Government of India to Commodore Sir G. Warrender.

(Confidential.) *Simla, July* 15, 1907.

I AM directed to say that the Government of India have under consideration the desirability of the abolition of the coal depôt at Bushire and the establishment of one at Koweit.

The coal depôt at Bushire is maintained by this Department, but it has been represented that the actual coaling work, which is done under a contract arrangement with a local trader, is carried on under circumstances of great difficulty and that the harbour itself has many disadvantages. At Koweit the harbour is much more sheltered and convenient for large vessels and the local Political Officer represents that the more frequent appearance of our ships there would have a useful effect in other ways.

2. I am to request that your Excellency will be so good as to favour the Government of India by wire with your opinion on the proposal.

Inclosure 3 in No. 161.

Commodore Sir G. Warrender to Government of India.

Digatalawa, July 24, 1907.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Confidential letter dated the 15th July, 1907, re stores and coal, a reply to which will be sent by wire as soon as possible.

Inclosure 4 in No. 161.

Commodore Sir G. Warrender to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *Colombo, August* 3, 1907.

I HAVE no objection to the proposed transfer of coaling station referred to in your letter of the 15th ultimo.

Inclosure 5 in No. 161.

Government of India to Director of Royal Indian Marine.

(Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *August* 26, 1907.

PLEASE wire, in consultation with Examiner, if necessary, cost necessitated if transfer of coal depôt, referred to in your unofficial communication of the 22nd July, is carried out.

Inclosure 6 in No. 161.

Director of Royal Indian Marine to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *Bombay, September* 5, 1907.

YOUR telegram dated the 26th August.

After consulting Examiner, Marine Accounts, can give no idea of cost of building at Koweit; suggest referring to Political Resident.

Inclosure 7 in No. 161.

Government of India to Director of Royal Indian Marine.

(Telegraphic.) *September* 19, 1907.

REFERENCE correspondence ending with your telegram of the 5th instant.

Please wire, after consultation with Examiner, if necessary, cost of establishment and maintenance of Bushire coal depôt.

Inclosure 8 in No. 161.

Director of Royal Indian Marine to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *Bombay, September* 21, 1907.

YOUR telegram of the 19th September.

Annual cost Bushire depôt establishment 670 rupees, other fluctuating charges annual average landing coal, 3,370 rupees, godown rent 1,000 rupees, and miscellaneous 90 rupees; total, 5,130 rupees.

Inclosure 9 in No. 161.

Government of India to Major Cox.

(Telegraphic.) *Simla, September* 26, 1907.

COALING arrangements. Your letter dated the 5th May.

Please state initial and recurring expenditure on Bushire coaling station, and also, if station were transferred to Koweit, would Bunder Shweikh foreshore be suitable for station?

Inclosure 10 in No. 161.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *Shiraz, September* 28, 1907.

PLEASE see your telegram dated the 26th September.

The foreshore in question seems to me to be eminently suited for the location of a coaling station, but I would recommend that you should invite the Commodore's opinion. I will answer the financial query later on.

Inclosure 11 in No. 161.

Government of India to Commodore Sir G. Warrender.

(Confidential.) *Simla, October* 15, 1907.

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with your telegram dated the 3rd August, 1907, regarding the abolition of the coal depôt at Bushire and the establishment of one at Koweit, I am directed to forward the accompanying copies of

telegrams,* and to request that your Excellency will be so good as to favour the Government of India with your views on the suitability of the Bunder Shweikh foreshore for the location of the coaling station.

2. I am also to inclose copies of correspondence in connection with the acquisition of the foreshore.†

Inclosure 12 in No. 161.

Commodore Sir G. Warrender to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Colombo, October* 23, 1907.

IN reply to your Confidential letter of the 15th instant, be pleased to acquaint his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council that I consider the Bunder Shweikh foreshore at Koweit is suitable for the proposed coal depôt at that port.

2. The inclosures to your letter under reply are returned herewith as requested.

Inclosure 13 in No. 161.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Bushire, March* 22, 1908.

WITH reference to Foreign Department telegram, dated the 26th September, 1907, regarding the proposed establishment of a coal depôt at Koweit, I have the honour to forward a copy of correspondence which has passed between this office and the Political Agent, Koweit, on the subject.

2. Major Knox estimates the cost of building three godowns to hold 3,600 tons of coal besides allowing air space and room to work in, at 35,000 rupees, but he thinks that by a careful manipulation of the exchange between dollar and rupee, and by importing for that purpose dollars from Bombay, much economy might be effected. I have no comments to offer on the estimates, which have been framed with the local knowledge of the rates of labour and prices of materials, and I think that they may be accepted unless the Government of India decide to have them prepared by the Assistant Engineer, Persian Gulf sub-division.

3. Next comes the question of coaling charges. These Major Knox puts down as follows in a subsequent communication:—

(*a.*) For ships coaling off Bunder Shweikh at 15 annas per ton.
(*b.*) For ships coaling in usual anchorage at 1 r. 14 a. per ton.

These rates include weighing and bagging (cost of bags inclusive), putting into boats, boat-hire, and stacking into bunkers on board the ship; they do not, however, seem to take into account the wear and tear of the bags and the cost of mending and replacing those that have become unserviceable. I think, therefore, that 1 r. 8 a. and 2 rupees per ton would be about the correct rates for coaling in Bunder Shweikh and in the present anchorage, respectively. In Bushire we pay 2 rupees per ton when coaling in the inner harbour and 2 r. 4 a. per ton in the outer anchorage.

4. Then comes the question of establishment charges. Major Knox proposes two watchmen as permanent establishment, and thinks that the duties of tindal and weighman can best be intrusted to the Indian crew of the Political Agent's launch. I do not, however, consider that it would be feasible to utilize their services in coaling matters. I doubt whether the crew would be always available for coaling work, as they will have their own work in the launch to attend to, and it may not unfrequently happen that the launch is away when a ship has to be coaled.

I think, therefore, that the coal depôt should have its own separate permanent establishment, consisting of a tindal and two weighmen. These men should be

* Telegram from Government of India to Major Cox, dated September 26, 1907; telegram from Major Cox to Government of India, dated September 28, 1907.

† Letter from Major Cox to Government of India, dated February 10, 1907, and inclosures; telegram from Secretary of State for India, dated June 26, 1907; telegram from Government of India to Major Cox, dated July 8, 1907; telegram to Secretary of State for India, dated July 7, 1907; telegram from Secretary of State for India, dated July 23, 1907; telegram from Government of India to Major Cox, dated July 30, 1907; telegram from Major Cox to Government of India, dated July 9, 1907.

located at the depôt and act as watchmen as well. The rate of pay which may have to be allowed to secure good men may be roughly estimated as follows:—

One tindal at 35 rupees per mensem.
Two watchmen at 25 rupees each per mensem.

The total cost of establishing a coal depôt at Koweit would thus be—

	Rupees.	
Initial charges	35,000.	
Recurring charges—		
Wages	1,020	per annum.
Petty repairs, &c. (say)	80	"
Total	1,100	"

The cost of the present Bushire depôt is as follows:—

	Rupees.	
Rent of godowns—		
Two at 80 rupees per mensem	960	per annum.
Five, at 220 krans per mensem	812	"
Wages—		
One tindal at 20 rupees per mensem .. } = 44 rs.	528	"
Two weighmen, at 12 rupees each per mensem }		
Total	2,300	"

By the transfer of the depôt to Koweit a saving of 1,200 rupees per annum would be effected in recurring expenditure, and we should be left with the initial cost estimated for managing the depôt, namely, 35,000 rupees.

5. With regard to the construction of a jetty and a light tramway which have been suggested by Major Knox, I fully concur with him that if these projects were carried out the coaling arrangements in Koweit would be placed on a very satisfactory footing, which would no doubt be welcomed by the Navy.

The expediency or otherwise of incurring this expenditure now seems to depend upon the question of the degree of importance with which Koweit is likely to be invested in the near future. This question will no doubt receive due consideration at the hands of Government.

Inclosure 14 in No. 161.

Captain Trevor (for Major Cox) to Major Knox.

Bushire, January 7, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Government of India have under consideration the question of abolishing the Government coal depôt at Bushire (where, as you are aware, the conditions for coaling ships are extremely inconvenient) and of creating one at Koweit instead.

I am desired to report the initial and recurring expenditure in connection with the depôt at Bushire, and to give similar estimates of probable initial and recurring cost in case of Koweit.

I attach a Memorandum giving details regarding the Bushire depôt, and request that you will put me in possession as far as possible of similar information and estimates for Koweit.

Inclosure 15 in No. 161.

Memorandum respecting Bushire Coal Depôt.

1. ON an average 3,000 tons are required per annum, but the quantity demanded annually is regulated on the basis of the average consumption of the three previous years, and the result arrived at is multiplied by 2½ so as to complete the supply for 2½ years, which we are supposed to keep in stock.

2. We have the following buildings for storing coal in Bushire, viz. (*a*) a

caravanserai containing three godowns of the dimensions given in the margin;* (*b*) one godown large and three godowns small, dimensions as per margin.† No ventilators are required if properly covered coal-sheds are built after the fashion of the godowns at present in our occupation here. I am trying to have a sketch of them taken for the information of Major Knox.

3. Our coal establishment here, which was only sanctioned in July 1906, consists as follows:—

One tindal on 20 rupees = 75 krans.
Two weighmen on 12 rupees = 45 krans each, and I think the same strength will have to be engaged at Koweit.

I would, however, observe that if a trustworthy man as a contractor for shipping and landing coal could be found in Koweit, who could also be intrusted with the custody of the coal under the supervision of the Political Agent's Office, there would be no need for a coal establishment. Of course the contractor will require liberal treatment in the matter of rates for shipping and landing coal. Here we pay 2 rupees per ton for shipping coal in the inner anchorage and 2·4 rupees per ton in the outer anchorage. The charges for shipping include labour for weighing and bagging the coal, putting it into lighters, conveying to the ship to be coaled, and putting and storing it on board. The charges also include the cost of gunny bags. The charges for landing include lighterage from the ship to shore and stacking the coal in the godowns. The Contractor here is supposed to have about 200 tons bagged and ready for immediate shipment. A regular contract will have to be drawn more or less on the lines indicated here.

Inclosure 16 in No. 161.

Major Knox to Major Cox.

(Confidential.) *Koweit, January 22, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Confidential letter dated the 7th January, 1908, and, in reply, to forward a Memorandum, in which I have done my best to estimate the probable initial and recurring cost of establishing the Government coal depôt at Koweit.

Inclosure 17 in No. 161.

Note on probable Initial and Recurring Cost of Establishing the Government Coal Depôt at Koweit.

Cost of Masonry Godowns.

	Cubic feet.
Inter measurement 38 × 80 × 15 feet.	
Two foundation walls, 52 × 3 × 7 × 2 feet	2,184
Two walls, 52 × 2 × 15 × 2 feet	3,120
Two foundation walls, 80 × 3 × 7 × 2 feet	3,360
Two walls, 80 × 3 × 15 × 2 feet	4,800
Plinth flooring, 80 × 48 × 1 feet	3,840
Twelve pillars, 3 × 3 × 15 feet	1,620
Twelve foundation pillars, 4 × 4 × 7 feet	1,344
Total stone work	20,268

N.B.—Foundations only 6 feet below soil. Extra foot required for plinth.

	Rupees.
Say, 20,000 cubic feet of stone = 100 hoom-loads, at 15 dollars per hoom-load plus portorage = 1,500 dollars, equivalent, at 180 per cent., to ..	2,540
Joss, labour, and water at twice the above figure (say)	5,000

It is a question whether one of cement to three of sand would not be more economical with seawater than one of lime to two of sand for foundations. The resulting damp should not injure the coal.

* Two godowns of uniform dimensions: length, 58 feet; breadth, 50 feet; height, 16 feet. One godown: length, 22 feet; breadth, 11 feet; height, 16 feet. Monthly rent, 80 rupees.

† One godown: length, 60 feet; breadth, 40 feet; height, 15 feet. Monthly rent, 100 krans. Three godowns of uniform dimensions: length, 26 feet; breadth, 27 feet; height, 15 feet. Monthly rent, 120 krans.

	Rupees
Fifteen beams, each 16 feet long, 240-foot run, at 2 dollars per foot = 480 dollars, equivalent, at 180 per cent., to	864
Qy. Whether steel beams or old rails doubled could not be used: more economical and stronger.	
Eighteen score chaudals or heritees, 14 feet long, at 35 dollars per score, plus portorage	1,134
Warehouse doors and windows	300
Roofing, mud, labour, baskils, and bawaris	500
Excavation for foundations	500
Ten per cent. for contingencies	1,233
Total cost	11,701

Three godowns of the above type would cost 35,000 rupees approximately. They would represent 172,800 cubic feet, which should accommodate, at 48 cubic feet per ton, 3,600 tons. Allowing for air space and rooms to work in, this does not seem excessive.

The estimates are pitched rather high on purpose. Much economy might be effected by the careful management of the dollar. A chest of 10,000 dollars might be brought from Bombay. It will be noticed that twenty-one years' rental at Bushire rates would pay for the initial cost, and repairs of a substantial structure like the above should be trifling.

The duties of tindal and weighmen could best be intrusted to the Indian crew of the Political Agent's launch, and their labour paid for by the job at 4 annas per ton.

A couple of local watchmen would be required, and it would be necessary to pay them at high rates of pay living at that distance from the town; 25 rupees per mensem would suffice per man, but they would have to be supplied with water, which would cost: initial storage tanks, 60 rupees = recurring monthly, 15 rupees. The recurring expenditure would have to be doubled probably for the Indian crew of steam-launch.

As regards loading the coal, the most simple, though certainly costly, arrangement would be a jetty—extreme length 200 yards—which would bring one into 20 feet of water at lowest tides, and alongside which most ships likely to want coal here for some time could lie. The cost of this is a matter for experts.

Expert knowledge would also be able to say whether a light tramway—say 250 yards long straight from the coal-sheds to the sea, along which truck-loads could be shoved right up to the ship's side—would not reduce the time and labour of loading and unloading to a minimum. The jetty would, of course, be useful for many other purposes.

Coolies are procurable, but would require a high wage, probably 2 dollars per day per head. Steamer wants 200 tons estimated cost of coolie labour. Required: gang of sixty men, working one whole working day at 2 dollars per head, 120 dollars = 204 rupees.

With the trucks and tramway forty men would suffice and do the job quicker.

We must add cost of bagging coal. But the whole thing should be done within 1 r. 8 a. per ton, exclusive of cost of building jetty, tramway, godowns, provision of trucks, and repairs to above plus cost of permanent establishment.

(Signed) S. G. KNOX, *Major*,
Political Agent, Koweit.

[21943] No. 162.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 25.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 14th May, relative to the silver currency in Muscat.

India Office, June 24, 1908.

Inclosure 1 in No. 162.

The Government of India to Major Cox.

Sir, *Simla, May 8, 1908.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 29th March last, on the subject of silver currency in Muscat.

2. I am to express regret that the proposal that the Government of India should purchase Maria Theresa dollars at the rate of some 150 rupees per 100 cannot be entertained. The proposal really amounts to this, that the Government of India should purchase a certain amount of bullion at a price largely in excess of its market value. The dollars when purchased would be only bullion. In January 1905, when the rate of 132 rupees to 100 dollars was offered, the price of silver was 27 13/16 pence per ounce, at present it is only 25 1/16.

3. In the circumstances I am to say that the Government of India, as at present advised, are unable to entertain the suggestion put forward by the Political Agent, Muscat.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. B. WOOD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 162.

Major Cox to Government of India.

Sir, *Bushire, March 29, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to the correspondence ending with Residency letter dated the 21st May, 1905, on the subject of silver currency at Muscat, and to submit for favour of consideration the letter dated the 23rd March from the Political Agent at Muscat.

2. Before coming to any definite understanding with His Highness the Sultan, Major Grey inquires whether, having regard to the fact that the average rupee value of the dollar in Muscat has considerably increased during the last two years, the Government of India can see their way to a revision of the rate which they would be prepared to pay for dollars received at the Bombay mint.

I trust the Government of India will be pleased to give this recommendation their early consideration.

Inclosure 3 in No. 162.

Major Grey to Major Cox.

Sir, *Muscat, March 23, 1908.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to my letter dated the 8th May, 1905, and previous correspondence in connection with the currency question in Oman.

2. As reported in my diary for the past week, Mr. T. J. Stephen, Manager of the National Bank of India at Karachi, has recently paid me a visit. On the 10th instant I took him to call upon His Highness the Sultan, who asked in the course of conversation to what profession Mr. Stephen belonged. On hearing that he was connected with banking, His Highness, to my complete surprise, at once introduced the question of currency reform, and begged me to discuss it with my guest and let him know the conclusions to which we arrived.

3. At a subsequent interview, Mr. Stephen and I pointed out to His Highness the advantage to be gained by the abolition of the Maria Theresa dollar in his territories, and I have since explained to him the proposals made by the Government of India in their letter to your address, dated the 17th January, 1905. He is quite inclined to accept them in principle, but you will see from the attached list of the rates of exchange which have obtained during the several months of the past three years that the rate of 132 rupees per 100 dollars offered by the Government of India in their letter referred to above would scarcely be sufficiently high in the present circumstances. It occurs to me that perhaps the Government of India might be prepared to raise their offer to 150 rupees or so per 100 dollars, in which case I have hope that this reform might be carried out.

TABLE of Exchange Rates at Muscat for 1905-6, 1906-7, and 1907-8.

Month.	Rate in Rupees per 100 Dollars.		
	1905-6.	1906-7.	1907-8.
April	133	151⅜	163½
May	137½	161¼	165
June	136¼	157	167
July	138¼	157	168
August	139⅞	176¾	171
September	140¼	167½	170
October	142½	176⅜	163
November	142	166⅜	154
December	145	171¼	145
January	147	166	146
February	150	161¼	142
March	152½	160¼	142 (to date)

Average monthly rate for the three years are 142, 164½, and 158.

Muscat, March 23, 1908.

[22073] No. 163.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 27.)

India Office, June 24, 1908.

Sir,

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th ultimo, inclosing the draft of the reply to be made to the representations of the German Government regarding the claims of Messrs. Wönckhaus in respect of the cancellation by the Sheikh of Shargah of the Concession for mining oxide on the Island of Abu Musa.

In reply, I am to return a copy of the draft,* on the margin of which are shown a small number of suggestions and alterations of a verbal character, which Viscount Morley would submit for the consideration of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The draft in its present form appears to Lord Morley to cover adequately the questions rising immediately from the cancellation of the lease. But it contains no indication of the views of His Majesty's Government as to the arrangements to be made for the working of the mines in the future. On this aspect of the question I am to invite reference to paragraphs 4 and 5 of my letter of the 31st March.

Lord Morley, as at present advised, is disposed to think that for reasons of policy it would be expedient to facilitate an early and friendly settlement by informing the German Government at this stage that His Majesty's Government are in favour of arrangements being made by the Sheikh whereby Messrs. Wönckhaus and other commercial firms will be enabled to procure oxide on terms safeguarding the Sheikh's interests.

Lord Morley would therefore propose, for Sir E. Grey's consideration, the addition to the draft of a paragraph to the following effect:—

"The object of His Majesty's Government in supporting the action of the Sheikh in cancelling the lease has been not to interfere with any legitimate commercial enterprise, but to maintain the sovereign rights and material interests of the Sheikh. As regards working of the oxide on the island in the future, His Majesty's Government, fully appreciating the conciliatory manner in which the German Government have dealt with the case, are anxious that an equitable arrangement in the interests of all parties should be arrived at. They are therefore prepared to use their influence with

* See "Asiatic Turkey and Arabia," Section 1, July 10, 1908.

the Sheikh of Shargah with a view to the adoption by him of a plan whereby Messrs. Wönckhaus, as well as other firms interested in the trade, will be able to procure red oxide from Abu Musa on terms which will safeguard the interests of the Sheikh."

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

[22219] No. 164.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 29.)

(No. 346.)

Therapia, June 22, 1908.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 234 of the 16th instant, requesting a report on the present state of the "Johara" piracy case, I have the honour to state that Mr. Vice-Consul Richardson reported in November 1907 that great delay had occurred owing to the inattention of Ahmed Fezi Pasha to the case and his determination not to give satisfaction by taking steps to punish the culprits concerned. His Excellency also opposed the formation of the Mixed Commission proposed by Mr. Richardson to deal with the question. When the Vali was instructed by the Grand Vizier to refer the case to the Commission, he insisted on the Italian Consul-General at Hodeida being a member of it, a proposal which was opposed by Mr. Richardson on the ground that the presence of a foreign Consular officer on an inquiry into a piratical attack on a British vessel was inadmissible.

A Commission composed of the Mutessarif of Hodeida, the President of the Criminal Court of First Instance of Hodeida, and Mr. Richardson was finally formed, and, after some obstruction on the part of the Vali, awarded sums on the different counts amounting in all to 1,025*l.* as damages, which sum Mr. Richardson considered satisfactory.

The Vali of the Yemen then communicated with the Porte, but stated that the flag of the "Johara" was not British but a red one without any distinctive mark, that Mr. Richardson admitted that her owner as well as some of the owners of the cargo were natives of Hadramut and consequently not entitled to British protection.

After some delay His Majesty's Embassy induced the "Conseillers Légistes" at the Porte, to whom the whole question was referred, to report that instructions might be sent to pay direct to the owners of the "Johara" and her cargo the amounts awarded by the Hodeida Commission, a method of settlement which avoids raising the somewhat delicate point of our right to protect natives of Hadramut. The Grand Vizier instructed the Vali of the Yemen accordingly, and I informed Mr. Richardson, requesting him to press the Vali to pay the 1,025*l.* awarded, and, if undue delay should occur, to refer the matter again to me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[22220] No. 165.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 29.)

(No. 347.)

Therapia, June 22, 1908.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 324 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to report that I have received a telegram from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Van, stating that the search for revolutionaries organized by the authorities has been practically concluded.

The situation has resumed its normal character, and the bazaar remains open, but the authorities still continue to search any houses where they have reason to suspect that arms are concealed. The total number of rifles that have been taken amounts to about 800, a large quantity having been surrendered by the inhabitants of the surrounding villages.

Captain Dickson states that on the 18th instant he called on the Vali, together with the French and Russian Consuls at Van, and inquired of him what steps he was taking to secure the punishment of the murderers and instigators of the massacre. They were informed by his Excellency, in reply, that a Commission of Inquiry had been instituted in order to investigate the matter, and to find out who were implicated.

The labours of this Commission had been interrupted by the necessity of organizing a search for the revolutionaries, but as soon as this search had been terminated the Commission would resume its labours, and those found guilty would be brought to trial.

Captain Dickson and his colleagues told the Vali that they did not consider that the Commission would be efficacious, or the Tribunal either, to secure the punishment of the culprits, on account of local influences. The Embassies had been promised by the Sublime Porte that those guilty should be punished, and they told the Vali that it would be highly desirable that this should be done by the Government without further pressure being brought to bear.

The Vali stated that he was in communication with the Porte on this matter, and said that the Consuls would be astonished at the satisfactory result.

Captain Dickson further states that the situation in Bitlis and the west of the Vilayet of Van is reported to be in a troubled condition, and several villages are said to have been evacuated. He says that he does not expect further disturbances near Van, and considers that it is not necessary for him to remain there. He asks me for permission to make a tour in the Bitlis Vilayet and the west of the Vilayet of Van, but I am still of the opinion that it would be better that he should remain at his post pending the result of my efforts to secure the punishment of the Moslem agitators responsible for the massacre on the 23rd March, and I have instructed him accordingly.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

[22223] No. 166.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 29.)

(No. 351.)

Therapia, June 23, 1908.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 202 of the 21st April, I have the honour to transmit herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Diarbekir, forwarding a despatch from the Acting British Vice-Consul at Bitlis, and another despatch from Bitlis, which I have received through Mr. Heard, describing the present situation in that vilayet. Mr. Safrastian fears that the notorious Major Riza Bey, who has been under surveillance at Gop for the last four months, is about to be liberated in order to organize his Kurds, and I am accordingly making representations with a view to preventing his release.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 166.

Vice-Consul Heard to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 20.)

Diarbekir, May 31, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith inclosed, a report from Mr. Safrastian, dated the 16th May, from Bitlis, describing the present situation in that vilayet.

From the cases of lawlessness which he mentions it would appear that the disorderly conditions which have prevailed for so long in this region are still far from being removed. The insecurity of the road from Diarbekir viâ Gharzan, upon which Bitlis mainly depends for its supplies of grain, is regrettable in view of the famine conditions prevailing in that district, whilst the merchants, who had already begun to desert that town in some numbers before my departure, must find the future more hopeless than ever, and it is probable that many more will leave to escape ruin, whilst there is yet time.

As regards the situation of the Armenians, I am not in a position to form an opinion as to their general condition throughout the vilayet, but, judging from the desperate straits to which they were reduced last year, and from the absence, so far as I am aware, of any steps on the part of the Government to ameliorate their condition, they would appear to be faced by the two alternatives of starvation or emigration.

The misfortune which has befallen the villagers of Papshen, whose miserable

condition I observed last year, is typical of the kind of disaster which may overtake any one of the many villages which are still making a feeble struggle for existence.

The state of Mush Plain requires little comment. The exact degree of starvation to which its inhabitants have been reduced is immaterial. As I had the honour to point out last year, the time for getting anything done to save these people would appear to have passed away.

Large numbers of refugees from the Bitlis Vilayet are now scattered all over this district. There are over 2,000 in the town of Diarbekir itself. During the winter they suffered greatly from want, sickness, and the insanitary conditions in which they were obliged to live. During the summer most of them are enabled to find work, but next winter, when work is not to be obtained, their numbers will probably be greatly swelled by a further influx from the north. It is difficult to see how they are to be maintained on local charity alone, and any extraneous financial assistance, such as I understand has often been forthcoming in previous years during similar times of stress, which could be obtained from charitable persons would greatly tend to alleviate the sufferings of these destitute refugees, most of whom consist of women and children, scantily clad, and suffering in many cases from various forms of disease.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. B. HEARD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 166.

Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul Shipley.

Bitlis, May 16, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report as follows upon the present state of things in this vilayet:—

Situation in Khuyt.—With reference to my despatch of last week, I have the honour to state that the expedition sent to Khuyt to restore the authority of the Government is encountering difficulty in overcoming the obstinacy of the Kurdish mob at that place. The Mudir and the Commanding Officer have appealed to the Sheikhs and Mollahs in the neighbourhood imploring their good offices for the settlement of the matter. The latter are said to be amongst the Kurds for the last four days persuading the Chiefs of the rising to accept the Mudir as their Governor, and permit the Government officials to count their sheep and collect the sheep tax. It remains to be seen whether the Kurds of Khuyt will consent to the above propositions advanced by Sheikhs.

Robbery in Garzan.—The Armenians of Papahan, a village half-an-hour from here, had sent some of their young men to Garzan with their own donkeys to fetch corn for sowing and food purposes. On their return journey on Monday last, they were attacked near Ziaret by the neighbouring Kurds. Three of them were slightly wounded; their twenty-five donkeys, sacks, and all corn were carried off by the robbers. Soon after this, some of the robbed villagers arrived here, others having gone to Seirt to ask the Government's assistance for the ruining misfortune which had befallen them. All that the Government did here was to send orders to Seirt to dispatch zaptiehs on the spot and discover the robbers. The Chief Clerk of the Administrative Council here had told the villagers that "they were rather to go and complain to God."

These unfortunate villagers of Papahan, amongst whom I lately distributed some pounds of relief, told me that they had borrowed also some money from Kurds in the town at an interest of 120 per cent., and, uniting the two sums, had sent for corn in Garzan, where the price is much cheaper than here. But now they lost not only the corn, but also their twenty-five donkeys and sacks, which formed their principal means of income, by every sort of transport.

One of the villagers stated that he had fled from his home in order not to hear the cries and shoutings of his hungry family of twenty persons.

A big caravan of 150 animals coming from Diarbekir is struck again in Garzan, the Kurdish muleteers fearing an attack between Garzan and Bitlis. They had telegraphed two days ago to the merchants here to the effect that, owing to the insecurity prevailing in the district, they could not be held responsible for any robbery of their goods, and had asked for a strong escort to join them. Both Moslem and Armenian merchants applied to the Government here, requesting that soldiers may be allowed to escort the caravan. In reply, the Government sent orders again to Seirt to take the necessary steps for security of the caravan against any aggression.

Situation in the Plain of Mush.—A young and intelligent gendarmerie Lieutenant, who was sent to count sheep among the various Kurds of Mush and collect sheep tax, returned here a few days ago. On my inquiring of him the state of the Mush Plain, he said that he had passed through some Armenian villages, which were "lately depopulated half-by-half." He had seen by his own eyes men and women wandering for special herbs and roots in the fields for their own nourishment. He added also that "the hungry Armenian is compelled to pay a tax of 4½ piastres for each sheep, while according to an approximate reckoning the Kurd, especially the powerful one, was paying 10 paras for each of them, hiding, of course, twenty and showing to the counting officials only one sheep." He being an Albanian by birth and only lately transferred in these parts, he was "shocked at the inconceivable disorder and anarchy prevailing, especially in Mush."

Situation in Bulanik.—As regards the butchery of a whole Armenian family in Yenjalu, referred to in my despatch of last week, new details are at hand from a completely trustworthy source. The crime has been perpetrated openly by Fahim Aga, the nephew of a certain Bishar, who, after having shot down the Armenian bekji, had entered the house of Alexan in question and murdered Alexan, his wife, and four children (not three, as reported last week). In presence of this inhuman crime, in a village at a stone's throw from Gop, the Government is said to have taken no step at all to arrest the criminals. In my humble opinion, this conduct of the Bulanik Government is easily accounted for in view of the frank statements which the Kaimakam of Bulanik made to Mr. Heard last autumn on our journey to Erzeroum (Mr. Heard's despatch of the 25th November last, dated from Erzeroum).

The Hungry Fugitives.—In the course of the current week, three gangs of Armenian famine-stricken villagers from Bulanik and Mush, each from 80 to 100 persons, passing through Bitlis on their way down to Diarbekir and Disheri, while the case of single families emigrating to above places from Khizan, Akhlat, and the neighbourhood is of daily occurrence. The above-mentioned gendarmerie Lieutenant told me also that many hungry Armenians of Mush were waiting for the opening of mountains, to enable them to cross the snow-covered passes between Mush and Diarbekir. According to his opinion, as also foreseen by Mr. Heard and myself, it is then that still greater numbers will leave home from the Plain of Mush in quest of bread and livelihood in Diarbekir.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. S. SAFRASTIAN, *Dragoman.*

Inclosure 3 in No. 166.

Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul Shipley.

Sir, *Bitlis, May* 23, 1908.

I HAVE the honour to report that two Armenian butchers of Bitlis, who had gone to the Kaza of Garjikan (Van) to buy sheep, were killed last week by the Kurds of Figans, a quarter of an hour from Kindrantz, the centre of Garjikan. Tahir Pasha, on his return to the Persian frontier, had happened to be in the neighbourhood when the crime was perpetrated, and had expressed a desire to hold an inquiry as to the identity of the murderers. It seems, however, that he, fearing to rouse the suspicions of the Vali of Van, had left the place after seeing the bodies. The murdered Armenians leave here big families and numerous minor children.

Liberation of Hamidié Officers.—From various quarters it is understood that Colonel Mehmed Emin Bey (who massacred and burned the Kurdish village of Aghveran in August last), Majors Suleiman Bey and Kulli Bey, the three Hasananli Hamidié officers in Bulanik, who were deported to Erzeroum in autumn last for their various misdeeds and crimes, have lately been authorized to return to their villages and join their regiments. As regards the arrest of the famous Major Riza Bey, he was kept "under surveillance" for the last four months in Gop. But it is reported now that he is to be soon set free to organize his Kurds.

This comedy of the Government in arresting temporarily the above-mentioned Hamidié officers, notorious for crying outrages perpetrated on the Armenians, and on Rayah Kurds in some cases, will no doubt have its discouraging effects on the oppressed population, and will encourage still more the Hamidié to commit exploits unchecked, and to complete the work of destruction of the Armenian element in Bulanik.

The butchery of a whole Armenian family in Yonjalu, referred to in my despatches

of the 9th and 16th instant, may probably be taken as an illustration of the state of mind created in Hamidié circles in immediate consequence of the liberation by Government of their criminal fellow-officers.

Armenian Emigrants sent back Home.—There are reports from many places in the vilayet to the effect that the authorities are sending back to their homes all destitute and famine-stricken Armenians who are now begging outside of their district. Thus many Armenians of the Plain of Mush have been sent back from Khinis and Bulanik, and all Armenians of Sasun who had gone down to the plain are being sent to their mountains, thus depriving hundreds of means of some sort of livelihood which they had managed to find out in their new temporary homes.

Return of Tahir Pasha.—Tahir Pasha, of Bitlis, who for the last month was staying in Akhlat, went back again to the Persian frontier. From a source which I consider to be trustworthy, I heard that, after the exchange of written statements with the Persian Delegates on the frontier, on the strength of which the region inhabited by Sunni Kurds was to be under the Turkish rule and that inhabited by Shiite Kurds under Persian rule, Tahir Pasha had expressed a desire to return to Bitlis, as having finished the mission intrusted to him.

The Grand Vizier, however, perhaps with a view to intriguing against him, had found defects in the proceedings, and had telegraphed to Tahir Pasha that he was to wait somewhere near Bitlis to receive the written instructions just issued from Constantinople. Now on the receipt of the said instructions he is going back again to the Persian frontier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. S. SAFRASTIAN, *Dragoman.*

[22224] No. 167.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 29.)

(No. 352.)
Sir, *Constantinople, June* 23, 1908.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 308 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to forward herewith two despatches from His Majesty's Consul at Jeddah with regard to the insecurity of the Jeddah–Mecca road owing to the hostility of the Bedouins to the Hedjaz Railway.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 167.

Consul Monahan to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 23.)
Sir, *Jeddah, May* 29, 1908.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 21 of the 22nd instant, I have the honour to report that Mushir Kiazim Pasha, of the Hedjaz Railway, left here for Akaba by Khedivial steamer on the 26th instant, taking with him the force which he had brought here (see my despatch No. 16 of the 23rd ultimo), namely, about 400 infantry with two guns. It is supposed that he will take this force from Akaba to Maan, and thence by rail to the railhead, which is now, I hear, within three days' march of Medina.

Recent troubles near Medina are the probable cause of his movements. On the 9th instant large bands of Bedouins, consisting in part of the tribe of Beni Ali of Awali, approached the town of Medina. Osman Pasha Muhafiz (Governor and Commandant), of Medina, came out with, it seems, the whole of the Turkish garrison of 200 men to a place called Bir Erwa, where the Bedouins were, within half-an-hour of the town.

The Bedouins are then described as having attacked the town from two other sides, contemptuous of the small number of the Turks. After some skirmishing Osman Pasha withdrew his force to a fort on the top of a hill called Jebel Ahmar (?), near the town, and from the fort kept up a lively fusillade on the Bedouins below from

12 noon to 5 P.M., when the Bedouins retired, having lost during the day about 200 men in killed and wounded. The Turkish casualties during the day are said to have been fifty or sixty. No Bedouins appear to have got into the town. During the whole night of the 9th–10th Osman Pasha, with the garrison, stood to arms within the town, and strong guards were posted at every gate. On the following night reinforcements from the troops constructing the railway arrived at Medina. The roads near Medina are all now said to be infested by Bedouins, and vegetables and fuel cannot reach the town.

The report of a great caravan robbery by Bedouins near Medina about the beginning of May (see my despatch No. 17 of the 8th instant) is confirmed, but full and precise details are still wanting.

I have it on good authority that the Vali has telegraphed to Constantinople that twenty battalions of reinforcements are needed in the Hedjaz if the construction of the railway is to go on.

On the 23rd May at noon seven men were coming from Mecca on donkeys towards Jeddah when, on their arrival at a place called Merwa, about four hours from Mecca, and six hours from Jeddah, some Bedouins came out and killed one and wounded one, and took the donkeys and other property of the travellers.

Yesterday all the imprisoned Bedouin Sheikhs in Mecca, who were arrested three months ago for their hostility to the railway (see my despatch No. 5, of the 29th February, 1908), were released.

One Major, and one Chief Engineer and two assistants, and ten sailors have been left behind here by Kiazim Pasha, so that perhaps the idea of soon beginning the railway from Jeddah towards Mecca has not been given up.

When Kiazim Pasha came this time from Mecca he had with him thirty-four mule cavalry, fifty Shereefian guards, and fifty other guards, and it was still found necessary to send from here 200 men to protect him on his way from Jerada (four hours from Jeddah) to Jeddah, which shows the state to which the country has been brought by Bedouin hostility to the railway.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. MONAHAN.

P.S. *June* 1.—The day before yesterday a caravan of forty camels laden with merchandize was attacked in the daytime by Bedouins half-way between Jeddah and Mecca, and all the merchandize was taken. My above account of the engagement with troops at Medina is given in a letter from Medina, the substantial accuracy of which I have no reason to doubt. Other accounts, which seem misleading, have appeared in Egyptian newspapers.

J. H. M.

Inclosure 2 in No. 167.

Consul Monahan to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 25.)
Jeddah, June 6, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report another great caravan robbery by Bedouins on the Jeddah–Mecca road.

On the 2nd instant, in the daytime, about the same place where other recent robberies have occurred, namely, at three or four hours' distance from Jeddah, a caravan of eighty-one camels, carrying merchandize and some specie, was entirely looted by Bedouins of the Masruh sub-tribe (Kabile) of the Harb tribe (Kaum), which sub-tribe ranging between Medina, Rabigh, and Jeddah, is hostile to the railway, and seems to have supplied the aggressors in all the recent cases of robbery and outrage between Jeddah and Mecca.

The Bedouins this time took away all the camels, as they belonged to an unfriendly tribe. Two men of the latter tribe who were with the caravan were wounded.

Reports which seem exaggerated have arrived of a recent encounter of a trading "sambook" (small local sailing craft) with pirates near Leeth, between Jeddah and and Konfidah.

The pirates, who are of a noble Bedouin tribe, Ashraf Beni Hasan, now settled near Leeth, kinsmen of the Grand Shereef, are represented as having been driven off with a loss of sixteen men killed.

Merchants in Jeddah, including some British Indians interested in the caravan mentioned in this despatch, are getting very uneasy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. MONAHAN

[21384] No. 168.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. G. Barclay.

(No. 258.)
Foreign Office, June 30, 1908.

Sir,

I HAVE received Sir F. Elliot's despatches No. 88 of the 11th and No. 93 of the 17th instant, relative to the situation in the Island of Samos, copies of which were sent to you direct.

You will have observed that many of the statements made by M. Sofoulis in the letters which he has addressed to Sir F. Elliot are in direct contradiction with the account of the situation furnished to you by the Ottoman Government, as reported in your telegrams and despatches.

I have accordingly to request you to endeavour to ascertain what is the actual state of affairs in the island at the present time, and whether there is any foundation for the allegations made by M. Sofoulis.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.